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THE NINTH CIRCLE OF HELL*: AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS OF IMPOSING PROLONGED SUPERMAX





The increasing number of inmates with a mental disorder in Ameri-
ca's prison population and the inadequacy of their treatment and housing
conditions have been issues of growing significance in recent years. The
U.S. Department of Justice estimates that "over one and a quarter million
people suffering from mental health problems are in prisons or jails, a
figure that constitutes nearly sixty percent of the total incarcerated popu-
lation in the United States." Furthermore, a person suffering from a men-
tal illness in the United States is three times more likely to be incarcer-
ated than hospitalized, with as many as 40% of those who suffer from a
mental illness coming into contact with the criminal justice system every
year and police officers almost twice as likely to arrest someone who
appears to have a mental illness. As a result, the United States penal sys-
tem has become the nation's largest provider of mental health services, a
"tragic consequence of inadequate community mental health services
combined with punitive criminal justice policies."
This growth in the number of inmates with a mental disorder, com-
bined with the recent rise in the use of prolonged supermax solitary con-
finement and the increasingly punitive nature of the American penologi-
cal system, has resulted in a disproportionately large number of inmates
with a mental disorder being housed in supermax confinement. The harsh
restrictions of this confinement often significantly exacerbate these in-
mates' mental disorders or otherwise cause significant additional harm to
their mental health, and preclude the delivery of proper mental health
treatment. Given the exacerbating conditions associated with supermax
confinement, this setting not only is ill suited to the penological problems
* See DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO 537-90 (Robert Hollander & Jean Hollander trans.,
Doubleday 2000) (containing cantos XXXII-XXXIV) (describing the Ninth Circle as the deepest
depths of hell, where its denizens are immobilized in ice ranging from up to their face to being
completely encapsulated). .
f J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor, School of Law, and Associate Professor of Medical
Education, School of Medicine, University of Virginia. The authors would like to thank Abigail
Turner and Ryan D. Tansey for their assistance, as well as the editorial staff of the Denver Universi-
ty Law Review.
I J.D. (anticipated 2013), University of Virginia School of Law.
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posed by the growing number of these inmates but also intensifies these
problems by creating a revolving door for many such inmates who are
unable to conform their behavior within the general prison environment.
Housing inmates with a mental disorder in prolonged supermax
solitary confinement deprives them of a minimal life necessity because
this setting poses a significant risk to their basic level of mental health, a
need "as essential to human existence as other basic physical demands,"
and thereby meets the objective element required for an Eighth Amend-
ment cruel and unusual punishment claim. In addition, placing such in-
mates in supermax confinement constitutes deliberate indifference to
their needs because this setting subjects this class of readily identifiable
and vulnerable inmates to a present and known risk by knowingly plac-
ing them in an environment that is uniquely toxic to their condition,
thereby satisfying the subjective element needed for an Eighth Amend-
ment claim. Whether it is called torture, a violation of evolving standards
of human decency, or cruel and unusual punishment, truly "a risk this
grave-this shocking and indecent-simply has no place in civilized
society."
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I. PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE SOCIETY'S RESPONSE TO INCARCERATED
OFFENDERS WITH A MENTAL DISORDER
For almost as long as there has been a criminal justice system, crim-
inal justice officials have struggled with how to respond to incarcerated
offenders with a mental disorder. Virtually everyone who interacts with
this population believes that society's current response is woefully inad-
equate, a problem that has been exacerbated in recent years. This Article
will focus on one aspect of the incarceration of this population-
prolonged supermax solitary confinement-that is widely believed to
contribute to and enhance mental disorders among inmates placed in this
setting. Furthermore, it will propose an alternative approach that can
provide a better response for all affected parties, including both the of-
fenders and the correctional officials charged with overseeing them. At
the same time, there is a general lack of overarching principles to guide
such an analysis. Based on a review of the current literature and a grow-
ing consensus regarding various points drawn from this literature, this
Article begins with an effort to articulate applicable principles.' These
principles include:
1. "Many individuals within society have a mental disorder."2
I. The first nine of these principles are derived from pre-incarceration principles previously
articulated by the first author in Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath,
Forging Links and Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice to
Better Respond to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 148-55
(2012).
2. Id. at 148; see also Julie Steenhuysen, Nearly I in 5 Americans Had Mental Illness in
2009, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/l 1/18/us-usa-
mentalhealth-idUSTRE6AH4GW20101118 ("More than 45 million Americans, or 20 percent of
U.S. adults, had some form of mental illness last year, and 11 million had a serious illness ....
Young adults aged 18 to 25 had the highest level of mental illness at 30 percent . .. ."); Steven
Reinberg, CDC: Half of Americans Will Suffer from Mental Health Woes, USA TODAY (Sept. 5,
2011, 11:28 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/medical/health/medical/mentalhealth/story/2011-09-
05/CDC-Half-of-Americans-will-suffer-from-mental-health-woes/50250702/1 ("About half of
Americans will experience some form of mental health problem at some point in their life . . . ."
(citing CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY
2012] 3
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2. "Mental disorders are not monolithic, but encompass a diverse
set of conditions. These disorders manifest in many forms and
affect individuals in many different ways. Their impact on ca-
pacities, abilities, cognitions, emotions, and behavior vary enor-
mously." 3
3. "A mental disorder is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. It tends
to fluctuate significantly over time and to interfere with some
functions but not others."
4. "A mental disorder can be debilitating, disorienting, frightening,
or overpowering to the person experiencing it."'
5. "Mental disorders tend to be misunderstood and can be upsetting
or frightening to observers, but the likelihood of resulting dan-
gerous behavior is widely overestimated." 6 At the same time, an
REPORT SUPPLEMENT, MENTAL ILLNESS SURVEILLANCE AMONG ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(2011))).
3. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 149; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (1999) [hereinafter SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT] ("Many ingredients of mental health may be identifiable, but mental health is
not easy to define.").
4. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 149; see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra
note 3, at 17 ("[R]elatively few mental illnesses have an unremitting course marked by the most
acute manifestations of illness; rather, for reasons that are not yet understood, the symptoms associ-
ated with mental illness tend to wax and wane.").
5. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 149. The Council of State Governments has noted:
"People with mental illness are falling through the cracks of this country's social safety net .... [A]
large number of people with mental illness ... have been incarcerated because they displayed in
public the symptoms of untreated mental illness. Experiencing delusions, immobilized by depres-
sion, or suffering other consequences . .. many of these individuals have struggled, at times heroi-
cally, to fend off symptoms of mental illness." COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT, at xii (2002).
6. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 149. As explained by the U.S. Surgeon General:
Are people with mental disorders truly more violent? Research supports some public
concerns, but the overall likelihood of violence is low. The greatest risk of violence is
from those who have dual diagnoses, i.e., individuals who have a mental disorder as well
as a substance abuse disorder. . . . In fact, there is very little risk of violence or harm to a
stranger from casual contact with an individual who has a mental disorder. Because the
average person is ill-equipped to judge whether someone who is behaving erratically has
any of these disorders, alone or in combination, the natural tendency is to be wary. Yet to
put this all in perspective, the overall contribution of mental disorders to the total level of
violence in society is exceptionally small.
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see also
Understanding Mental Illness: Factsheet, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/mentalhealth/understandingMentallness Factsheet.aspx (last
visited Nov. 16, 2012) ("A consensus statement signed by more than three dozen lawyers, advocates,
consumers/survivors, and mental health professionals reads in part: 'The results of several recent
large-scale research projects conclude that only a weak association between mental disorders and
violence exists in the community. Serious violence by people with major mental disorders appears
concentrated in a small fraction of the total number, and especially in those who use alcohol and
other drugs."' (quoting John Monahan & Jean Arnold, Violence by People with Mental Illness: A
Consensus Statement by Advocates and Researchers, 4 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 67, 70
(1996))).
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individual with a mental disorder is often vulnerable to self-
abuse or abuse by others.'
6. "Individuals with a mental disorder are more likely to come into
contact with the criminal justice system."8 Indeed, "[a] signifi-
cant proportion of individuals whose actions are brought to the
attention of the criminal justice system[, including sentenced of-
fenders,] have a mental disorder."9 In addition, inmates may de-
velop a mental illness, including a serious mental illness, while
incarcerated. o
7. "Persons with a mental disorder [, including those who are pris-
on inmates,] should be afforded the respect and dignity to which
all human beings are entitled."" "Human interactions generally
remain important to them and how they are treated by others and
society often has a significant impact on them."l 2
7. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 150. See Karen Hughes et al., Prevalence and Risk of
Violence Against Adults with Disabilities: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Observational
Studies, 379 THE LANCET 1621, 1621 (2012) ("Adults with disabilities are at a higher risk of vio-
lence than are non-disabled adults, and those with mental illnesses could be particularly vulnera-
ble."); Mary Elizabeth Dallas, Disabled Adults More Apt to Be Victims of Violence: Study,
HEALTHDAY (Feb. 27, 2012), http://consumer.healthday.com/Article.asp?AID-662154 ("Disabled
adults are at higher risk of being victims of violence than adults who aren't disabled, new research
finds. Those with mental illness are particularly vulnerable, with about 24 percent reporting having
experienced physical, sexual or 'intimate partner' violence during the past year . . . .").
8. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 150; Mental Health Early Intervention, Treatment, and
Prevention Act of 2000, S. 2639, 106th Cong. § 2(2) (2000) ("Twenty-five to [forty] percent of the
individuals who suffer from a mental illness . . . will come into contact with the criminal justice
system each year.").
9. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 150; see also Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer,
Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Re-
form, 7 D.C. L. REV. 143, 145 (2003) ("During street encounters, police officers are almost twice as
likely to arrest someone who appears to have a mental illness."); SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE
FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 17 & n.2 (2003) ("In 2000, the American Psychiatric Association reported research esti-
mates that perhaps as many as one in five prisoners were seriously mentally ill, with up to 5 percent
actively psychotic at any given moment." (citation omitted)); DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON
AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006) [hereinafter BJS REPORT] ("[Miore than half of all prison and jail
inmates ha[ve] a mental health problem.").
10. Prolonged solitary confinement, in particular, places even inmates with no previous histo-
ry of a serious mental disorder at risk of suffering psychological deterioration. See generally
ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 9, at 149-50; Stuart Grassian & Nancy Friedman, Effects of
Sensory Deprivation in Psychiatric Seclusion and Solitary Confinement, 8 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
49, 54 (1986); Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1450, 1450 52 (1983); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-term Solitary and
"Supermax" Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130-32 (2003).
I. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 151; see, e.g., Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 3, U.N. Doe. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006); Press Release,
U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., With 20 Ratifications, Landmark Disability Treaty Set to Enter into Force
on 3 May, U.N. Press Release HR/4941 (Apr. 3, 2008).
12. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 151; see also Howard Meltzer et al., Feelings ofLone-
liness Among Adults with Mental Disorder, 48 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 5,
12 (2013) ("This study has highlighted the strong association between loneliness and mental disor-
der. . . ."); Victoria Maxwell, This Won't Hurt a Bit, Really: Dating After Mental Illness, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Apr. 17, 2009, 9:26 PM), http://www.psychologytoday.com/print/4384 ("[W]e don't leave
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8. Like all human beings, inmates with a mental disorder may be
involved in interactions with other human beings where friction,
disputes, and altercations occur. Nevertheless, like most human
beings, the occurrence of human interactions can be of consider-
able importance to them. 3
9. Inmates with a mental disorder can "(a) learn from the conse-
quences of their behavior, (b) benefit from being held accounta-
ble for criminal behavior, (c) be deterred from further criminal
behavior, and (d) change their behavior, although they may have
an impaired capacity to do so that may require special assis-
tance."l4
10. "Responding appropriately to a criminal offender with a mental
disorder tends to be a complex undertaking" because mental ill-
ness tends to be multifaceted, with the appropriate course of
treatment as much an art as a science-and the challenge of forg-
ing a successful treatment program is compounded when ser-
vices are being provided in a correctional facility.'" Nonetheless,
placement of individuals with an untreated serious mental illness
within a correctional facility may place them at risk of harming
themselves or others.16
our hearts and desires behind when we get a diagnosis. We take them with us, along with our bodies,
minds (yes our minds) and spirits as we walk or, in my case, stumble our way to recovery. And
that's the point isn't it? Not how graceful we are, but that we're heading in the right direction and
surrounded, hopefully, with people who are heading our way too.").
13. For example, Hafemeister and Vallas have noted:
Of all human desires, the longing for intimacy with another human being is one of
the most intense. Yet despite the fundamental nature of this desire, for many it remains
elusive. Intimate relationships can be difficult to establish, daunting to maintain, and dev-
astating to lose. They can be a minefield for individuals who are relatively free of behav-
ioral, cognitive, or emotional impairments. The quest for intimacy, however, is particular-
ly complex and challenging for those with a mental disorder as such a disorder can limit
and impede social interactions, while associated stereotypes and stigma routinely disrupt
potential and existing relationships.
Thomas L. Hafemeister & Rebecca Vallas, Intimate Partner Violence and Victims with a Mental
Disorder (forthcoming) (on file with author).
14. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 152; see also SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON
MENTAL HEALTH RECOVERY 2 (2006) ("Consumers have a personal responsibility for their own
self-care and journeys of recovery. Taking steps towards their goals may require great courage.
[They] must strive to understand and give meaning to their experiences and identify coping strate-
gies and healing processes to promote their own wellness.").
15. Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 154. See generally Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quan-
dary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 391 (2006); Clarence J.
Sundram, Monitoring the Quality and Utilization of Mental Health Services in Correctional Facili-
ties, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 163, 167-68 (2003) (describing the common problems of diagnosis and
treatment of mental illness in correctional settings). The phrases "mental disorder" and "mental
illness" are sometimes used interchangeably, but for purposes of this Article the latter will be used to
focus on conditions that are more likely to vary over time and are considered to be relatively treata-
ble.
16. See infra Parts IV-V; see also Joyce Kosak, Mental Health Treatment and Mistreatment
in Prisons, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 389, 397-98 (2005) (providing adequate mental health treat-
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11. Courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have been virtually
unanimous in recent years in holding that inmates within a cor-
rectional facility are entitled to mental health treatment for a se-
rious mental illness.17 Inmates with a mental illness that is not
serious may also need this treatment to prevent their illness from
becoming a serious mental illness.' t
12. Individuals placed within a correctional facility should be
screened for the existence of a serious mental illness 9 upon their
initial placement and periodically thereafter, including following
a change in placement or an event that may indicate the presence
of a serious mental illness.2 When an inmate is identified as
ment in prisons improves prison safety by reducing the number of violent disciplinary infractions,
which is disproportionately high among inmates with a mental illness given inadequate treatment).
17. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1918 (2011) (finding that adequate mental health care
constitutes "basic sustenance," the deprivation of which constitutes a violation of the Eight Amend-
ment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' [that violates the
Eighth Amendment]." (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); Ramos v. Lamm, 639
F.2d 559, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1980) (stating that the medical care that states are to provide inmates
includes mental health care); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (establishing that
a prison inmate is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or health care
provider, exercising ordinary care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable certainty
that (1) the inmate's symptoms demonstrate a serious disease or injury; (2) the disease or injury is
curable or may be substantially alleviated as a result of necessary treatment; and (3) the potential for
harm to the inmate through unnecessary delay or ultimate denial of care would be substantial to the
inmate's health); McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ruling that denial of
psychiatric or mental health care, if sufficiently serious, may constitute an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion); Merriweather v. Sherwood, 235 F. Supp. 2d 339, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ruling that although
inmates are not entitled to the best possible mental health care, they are entitled to reasonable care
that meets the state's minimum standards of mental health treatment); Starbeck v. Linn Cnty. Jail,
871 F. Supp. 1129, 1141 (N.D. Iowa 1994) ("A medical need is serious if it is one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.").
18. See Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (ruling that a medical condition
constitutes a serious medical condition and implicates the right to treatment if untreated it will de-
generate and cause needless harm); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993) (hold-
ing that inmates need not wait until harm occurs for a court to find that serious needs are unmet).
19. Three specifiers may be listed after most diagnoses to indicate their severity: mild, moder-
ate, or severe. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
HEALTH DISORDERS 2 (4th ed. 2000). "Severe" is defined as "[m]any symptoms in excess of those
required to make the diagnosis, or several symptoms that are particularly severe, are present, or the
symptoms result in marked impairment in social or occupational functioning." Id. at 3. Another
phrase often used is "serious mental illness." See Jones'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107-08
(W.D. Wis. 2001), where an "operational" definition of the phrase was used based on any one of five
indicators. See infra note 235. However, in conjunction with prison inmates, the use of this phrase is
primarily driven by Estelle's prohibition of "deliberate indifference to [inmates'] serious medical
needs." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
20. See THE COMM'N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AM.'S PRISONS, CONFRONTING
CONFINEMENT 60 (John J. Gibbons & Nicholas B. Katzenbach eds., 2006) [hereinafter
COMMISSION] (identifying the need for and outlining appropriate supermax screening mechanisms);
Terry Kupers et al., Beyond Supermax Administrative Segregation: Mississippi's Experience Re-
thinking Prison Classification and Creating Alternative Mental Health Programs, 36 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 1037 (2009) (reviewing Mississippi's newly adopted screening mechanism and noting
positive outcomes); Hans Toch, The Future ofSupermax Confinement, 81 PRISON J. 376, 384-85
(2001); see also Jerry R. Demaio, Comment, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Threat of Over-
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having a serious mental illness, it is imperative that treatment be
offered promptly. 21
13. Although some inmates with a serious mental illness can be suc-
cessfully treated within their current placement, others cannot.
Close attention should be given to whether the current placement
has contributed to the occurrence of mental illness or has exacer-
bated a previously existing mental illness. To the extent it is de-
termined that such is the case, immediate efforts should be made
to move the inmate to a more suitable placement.22
14. The treatment provided to inmates with a mental illness should
be in accord with the generally accepted standards of practice of
mental health providers for the treatment of individuals with a
mental illness. Although accommodation to the security and ad-
ministrative needs of a correctional facility should be taken into
account, these needs do not excuse the delivery of substandard
mental health care in this setting, particularly as the appropriate
delivery of treatment will enhance the safety and security of in-
23mates and correctional staff in general.
15. The necessary components of a mental health program for in-
mates placed within a correctional facility include (a) periodic
systematic assessment of the need for mental health treatment or
special housing, including suicidal tendencies; (b) means by
which inmates may promptly bring their concerns about their
needs for mental health treatment to appropriate staff; (c) a suffi-
cient number of qualified mental health providers to ensure time-
ly access to needed mental health services; (d) timely delivery of
needed, individualized mental health treatment by qualified men-
tal health staff, including, but not limited to, the administration
classification in Wisconsin Supermax Prisons, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 207, 208-09 (advocating narrowly
tailored supermax screening mechanisms to prevent overclassification).
21. See I FRED COHEN, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED INMATE AND THE LAW 7-22 (2d ed.
2008) (contending that inordinate delays in access to mental health care "lead to exacerbation of the
existing symptoms and needless suffering, both of which are at the very heart of the Eighth Amend-
ment"); see also Ramos, 639 F.2d at 577-78 (finding that the lack ofa psychiatrist caused impermis-
sible delay in the delivery of mental health services); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1309
(E.D. Cal. 1995) ("Because the evidence demonstrates that there are delays everywhere within the
system and that those delays result in exacerbation of illness and patient suffering, a violation of the
objective facet of the test for violation of the Eighth Amendment has been demonstrated."); Dawson
v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1307 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (citing a failure to provide timely access
to mental health services).
22. See Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological Effects of Solitary
Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: Reviewing What We Know and Recommending What
Should Change, 52 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 622, 635 (2008) (recom-
mending monitoring procedures and concluding that "prisoners who decompensate in solitary con-
finement should be removed from the [Security Housing Unit] immediately and should be offered
appropriate psychiatric treatment").
23. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1928-29 (2011) ("Courts may not allow constitutional violations
to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of prison administra-
tion.").
8 [Vol. 90:1
THE NINTH CIRCLE OF HELL
of psychotropic medications in a manner that complies with pre-
vailing professional standards and a program for the identifica-
tion, treatment, and supervision of inmates with suicidal tenden-
cies; (e) the use of appropriate individualized treatment plans; (f)
timely communication among correctional and mental health
staff about inmate treatment needs and treatment responses; (g)
documentation of requests for treatment, identified mental health
needs, and responses provided; (h) maintenance of confidentiali-
ty, complete and accurate mental health records, and timely
transfer of mental health records between facilities and pro-
grams; and (i) preparation and implementation of an appropriate
discharge plan for released or transferred inmates.24
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROLONGED SUPERMAX SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT
I believe that very few men are capable of estimating the immense
amount of torture and agony which this dreadful punishment, pro-
longed for years, inflicts upon the sufferers; . .. I am only the more
convinced that there is a depth of terrible endurance in it which none
but the sufferers themselves can fathom, and which no man has the
right to inflict upon his fellow-creature. I hold this slow and daily
tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse
than any torture of the body ....
-Charles Dickens (after visiting Cherry Hill prison), 184225
The use of prolonged solitary confinement can be traced back at
least to the Middle Ages,26 but the modem supermax and its use of ex-
tended and total isolation is a relatively recent phenomenon. The super-
max has its roots in the early part of the nineteenth century, when the use
of prolonged solitary confinement became popular as what was per-
ceived to be a new, progressive rehabilitation technique. Eastern State
Penitentiary-opened in 1826 in Philadelphia and widely known as
Cherry Hill-was the proud prototype of the so-called Pennsylvania sys-
tem, which was considered innovative in that it subjected prisoners to
24. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 55-56 (3d ed.
2011) [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS]; I COHEN, supra note 21, at 2-8; Fred
Cohen, Correctional Mental Health Law & Policy: A Primer, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 117, 125-26
(2003); see also James R. P. Ogloff, Ronald Roesch & Stephen D. Hart, Mental Health Services in
Jails and Prisons: Legal, Clinical, and Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 109, 123 (1994);
Joanna E. Saul, This Game Is Rigged: The Unequal Protection of Our Mentally-Ill Incarcerated
Women, 5 MOD. AM. 42, 43-44 (2009); Sundram, supra note 15, at 165-66.
25. CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES 146 (Fromm Int'l ed. 1985) (1842).
26. Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief
History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 441 n.1 (2006) (commenting that
prolonged solitary confinement dates back "[p]erhaps to the monastic practice of imprisonment
during the Middle Ages: so called murus strictus or 'close confinement,' e.g., seems to indicate
imprisonment akin to solitary confinement").
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complete isolation, much like supermax confinement of today. 27 Howev-
er, as one critic put it, "[I]n Philadelphia . . . 'the celebrated system of
penitentiary discipline has been abandoned,' and in its place solitary con-
finement is to be substituted, 'the most inhuman and unnatural that the
cruelty of a tyrant ever invented."' 2 8
Implementing a "silent system," Cherry Hill mandated complete si-
lence, and "inmates labored alone in their cells and wore hoods during
exercise periods." 2 9 The emphasis on social isolation was so strong that
prison architects even rearranged sewer pipes to prevent prisoners from
communicating between cells.30 The underlying rationale for this system
was that prolonged isolation and silence would force an inmate into a
state of contemplation and moral reflection, thereby making him "the
instrument of his own punishment." 3 1 As Alexis de Tocqueville reported
after a trip to America to view these model institutions, "The solitary cell
of the criminal is for some days full of terrible phantoms.... [But when]
he has fallen into a dejection of mind, and has sought in labor a reliefi,]
... from that moment he is tamed and forever submissive to the rules of
the prison."32
The Pennsylvania model quickly became an "international sensa-
tion," as many European visitors came to inspect prisons like Cherry Hill
thinking that they might bring the model back home with them for adop-
tion.3 Hundreds of similar prisons utilizing strict solitary confinement
were constructed all over Europe, with the Pennsylvania model duplicat-
ed in England, France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, Norway,
Sweden, and Denmark, ushering in the "silent era" of prisons.34
But this era was short lived. The new prisons were exceptionally
expensive to build and maintain, and a growing, widespread problem of
27. Id. at 456-57.
28. ROBERTS VAUX, LETTER ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA 6 (Jesper
Harding ed. 1827) (emphasis omitted) (quoting WILLIAM ROSCOE, A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE
CAUSES WHICH HAVE LED TO THE ABANDONMENT OF THE CELEBRATED SYSTEM OF PENITENTIARY
DISCIPLINE, IN SOME OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 24 (1827)).
29. LORNA A. RHODES, TOTAL CONFINEMENT: MADNESS AND REASON IN THE MAXIMUM
SECURITY PRISON 36 (2004).
30. See NORMAN JOHNSTON, FORMS OF CONSTRAINT: A HISTORY OF PRISON ARCHITECTURE
92 (2000).
31. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC 85 (1971).
32. G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 39-40 (1833). It has also been noted that the Pennsylvania
model was heavily influenced by Quaker philosophy. See, e.g., THOMAS MOTn OSBORNE, SOCIETY
AND PRISONS 109 (1916) (stating that Quakers "[t]hought that the way to reform men was to force
them to think right; and they proposed to do this by means of a Bible in a solitary cell." (emphasis
omitted)); see also Smith, supra note 26, at 456-57 ("The inmate was expected to turn his thoughts
inward to meet God, to repent his crimes and eventually to return to society as a morally cleansed
Christian citizen.").
33. JOHNSTON, supra note 30, at 74. For example, in 1839 over four thousand people, includ-
ing groups of school children, toured Cherry Hill. Id.
34. Id.; Smith, supra note 26, at 457-58.
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overcrowding in correctional systems made an emphasis on isolation
virtually impossible to sustain.35 More significantly, the Pennsylvania
model was the target of increasing criticism from a variety of sources,
including critiques based on multiple studies of the effects of prolonged
solitary confinement on inmates' mental health.36
Prison officials in the United States and Europe began to notice the
widespread development of serious mental health issues in the prisoners
housed in these settings. At Cherry Hill, for example, reports began to
materialize as early as the 1830s of inmates with serious mental disor-
ders, "including hallucinating prisoners, 'dementia,' and 'monoma-
nia."' 37 Officials at Cherry Hill attempted in vain to provide an alterna-
tive explanation for the extensive mental illness in its population. One
report from 1846 attributed the disproportionate number of cases of men-
tal illness at Cherry Hill, as compared to non-Pennsylvania model pris-
ons, to the placement in Cherry Hill of "a high proportion of individuals
from the 'mulatto race' who apparently could not handle the confinement
as well as 'men of pure Saxon blood."' 38 Another theory put forward by
a physician at Cherry Hill was that "the cases of mental disorder occur-
ring in this penitentiary are, with a few exceptions[,] ... caused by mas-
turbation and are mostly among the colored prisoners." 39
However, prison officials elsewhere were quicker to recognize a
connection between the extreme isolation of prisoners at these facilities
and the increasing prevalence of mental illness. Millbank Prison in Eng-
land, for example, introduced the Pennsylvania system of solitary con-
finement in the late 1830s, but officials at Millbank in an 1841 report
complained "that a very extraordinary increase has taken place in the
number of insane prisoners in the prison."40 The report also suggested a
telling course of treatment for them: prisoners "should be placed together
and 'have the privilege of conversation. " Indeed, new 1841 regulations
at Millbank reduced confinement periods and allowed prisoners to con-
verse with two or more fellow inmates during exercise hours.4 2 Similar
developments took place across the United States as every state that tried
35. RHODES, supra note 29, at 39.
36. See infra notes 37, 40, 197-98 and accompanying text.
37. Smith, supra note 26, at 457-58. In nineteenth-century psychiatry, "monomania" denoted
"a single pathological preoccupation in an otherwise sound mind." JAN E. GOLDSTEIN, CONSOLE
AND CLASSIFY: THE FRENCH PSYCHIATRIC PROFESSION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 155-56
(2001). In 1880, monomania was recognized as one of seven categories of mental illness. See DSM:
History of the Manual, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsml/dsm-
history-of-the-manual (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). However, monomania faded over time as a diag-
nostic category and is not found in the currently widely employed Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000).
38. Smith, supra note 26, at 458.
39. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Pennsylvania model between 1830 and 1880 subsequently abandoned
it within a few years, with the exception of Pennsylvania.4 3 By the 1880s,
other than Cherry Hill itself, which continued to employ the "silent mod-
el" until 1913, prisons based on the Pennsylvania model had completely
disappeared." Prolonged solitary confinement as a method of rehabilita-
tion, in other words, was determined to be a profound failure.45
The systematic use of prolonged solitary confinement in correction-
al systems in the United States remained largely dormant through most
of the twentieth century.46 Likewise, even the selective use of extended
solitary confinement as a means of imposing discipline within relatively
traditional prisons began to lose favor.47 Authors of a study on prison
psychiatry in 1939 declared, perhaps optimistically, that around-the-
clock, prolonged solitary confinement was no longer practiced by any
"civilized nation." The Manual of Correctional Standards produced in
1959 by the American Correctional Association, the largest and oldest
correctional association in the world, instructed that solitary confinement
should be used only briefly, and only as a last resort. 4 9 The manual ad-
vised that no "more than fifteen days, and normally a period of a few
days [in solitary confinement] is sufficient."50 It precluded the use of
indefinite isolation and suggested instead a modified segregation for the
most difficult prisoners that included therapy and work opportunities."
Excessive solitary confinement, it stated, will "defeat [its] own purpose
by embittering and demoralizing the inmate," and it stressed that even
inmates in solitary confinement must have daily group or individual ther-
apy to protect their "[m]ental and emotional health."52
43. JOHNSTON, supra note 30, at 138.
44. Id.; Smith, supra note 26, at 465. Prisons modeled on the Pennsylvania system at Cherry
Hill were tried in "Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey (twice), Virginia, and Rhode Is-
land," but all except Cherry Hill had abandoned the model by the 1880s. JOHNSTON, supra note 30,
at 138. Although the legislation officially ending the silent system at Cherry Hill and converting it
into a "congregation system" passed in 1913, the silent system had gradually and largely disappeared
in practice over the years prior. NEGLEY K. TEETERS & JOHN D. SHEARER, THE PRISON AT
PHILADELPHIA CHERRY HILL: THE SEPARATE SYSTEM OF PENAL DISCIPLINE 1829-1913, at 220-23
(1957).
45. See generally SHARON SHALEV, SUPERMAX: CONTROLLING RISK THROUGH SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT 15-16 (2009) ("During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it became clear that
the new [Pennsylvania model] penitentiaries did not reform criminals and were extremely expensive
to run, and there was little proof that they were any more effective than other forms of confinement.
As evidence of the devastating health effects of solitary confinement surfaced, there was also a
growing moral and ethical debate . . . .").
46. RHODES, supra note 29, at 39.
47. Smith, supra note 26, at 466.
48. Id
49. RICHARD A. MCGEE ET AL., AM. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL
STANDARDS 246-47 (1959).
50. Id. at 247.
51. Id. at 247-49.
52. Id. at 253-54.
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The mid-i 970s, however, marked the beginning of an unprecedent-
ed growth in America's prison population.5 3 Whereas the rate of incar-
ceration had remained largely unchanged from 1925 to 1975, it quintu-
pled over the next quarter century, driven in part by an increase in the
crime rate.54 The 1970s and 1980s also saw the virtual abandonment of a
rehabilitative philosophy in U.S. prisons, increasingly replaced by a per-
vasive view that retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence were the pri-
mary purposes of incarceration.55 It was in this increasingly punitive at-
mosphere that the supermax, prolonged solitary confinement model
emerged and flourished.
Most point to an October 1983 extended lockdown following the
killing of two prison guards at the U.S. Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois-
a maximum-security prison opened in 1963 to replace the infamous pris-
on at Alcatraz-as the origin of the modem American use of supermax
prolonged solitary confinement. 57 At Marion, a week of inmate rioting
had led to a "prolonged emergency lockdown" of inmates that was never
lifted, becoming a "'large-scale experiment in solitary confinement' that
continues to this day."5 The Marion lockdown "experiment" led correc-
53. Haney, supra note 10, at 127-28.
54. See Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 162-63 ("During the first seven decades of the
twentieth century, 'the incarceration rate in the United States consistently averaged 110 inmates for
every 100,000 people.' In the 1970s this rate began to increase, and in the 1980s and 1990s it grew
exponentially. Between 2000 and 2009, the number of incarcerated offenders continued to increase,
although this growth was slower than in previous decades. It is estimated that over two million
(2,292,133) individuals were incarcerated in U.S. prisons and jails in 2009, or approximately 743 of
every 100,000 members of the population. The result is the highest rate of incarceration in the world
and a crowded and over-extended correctional system. Despite devoting substantial resources to the
building of new facilities, many prison and jail systems are operating above their official housing
capacity." (quoting DENNIS SULLIVAN & LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING
FOUNDATIONS OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES 9 (2001))); see also Haney, supra note 10, at 127-28. But
see E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2011, at 1-2, 4 (2012) (reporting that the number of sentenced incarcerated individu-
als decreased in 2010 (a decline of 0.1%) and 2011 (a decline of 0.9%) to 1,598,780 at year-end
2011, although this still represented 492 sentenced prisoners per 100,000 U.S. residents). Most of
this decrease was the result of efforts to reduce the prison census in California, which, in turn, was
driven by a lower court ruling upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Plata v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 1910
(2011), that the State of California must "reduce its prison population to 137.5% of the prisons'
design capacity [approximately 110,000 prisoners] within two years" to alleviate overcrowding. Id.
at 1928; see also CARSON & SABOL, supra, at 2-4.
55. See Haney, supra note 10, at 128-29; see also SHALEV, supra note 45, at 6; Hafemeister
et al., supra note 1, at 162 ("Beginning in the 1970s, support for the rehabilitative model waned,
driven by high recidivism rates and the perception that the process of rehabilitation was practically
and morally complex and often unsuccessful.").
56. See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text; see also Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at
162 ("It is no coincidence that the more favored models of retribution, deterrence, and incapacita-
tion, with their emphasis on incarceration, have in recent years combined to result in the imprison-
ment of more people in the United States for the purpose of crime control than virtually any other
society in history.").
57. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 26, at 442-43; RHODES, supra note 29, at 28; Arrigo & Bull-
ock, supra note 22, at 624-25.
58. RHODES, supra note 29, at 28 (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-
MAXIMUM SECURITY CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA 24 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
lockdown was largely a response to the killing of two prison guards within a few hours of each other
in two separate incidents. Smith, supra note 26, at 442.
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tions departments across the United States to implement their own sys-
tematic lockdowns, and a new incarceration paradigm was born.59 For
example, in 1994, the first federal prison constructed to be expressly
modeled after this approach, called a "super-maximum," opened in Flor-
ence, Colorado. 60 Many states followed suit,61 systematically imposing
long-term, oftentimes indefinite, disciplinary segregation in which in-
mates are placed in virtually total isolation and severely restricted in their
movements.62
In 1991, the organization Human Rights Watch identified the rise of
supermax confinement as "[p]erhaps the most troubling" human rights
trend in the U.S. correctional system, estimating that at least thirty-six
state prison systems had completed or were developing such facilities at
that time.63 In 1997, the authors of a study on the use of these facilities
concluded: "[A]t no point in the modern history of imprisonment have so
many prisoners been so completely isolated for so long a period of time
in facilities designed so completely for the purpose of near total isola-
tion."64 By 2000, Human Rights Watch estimated that approximately
20,000 prisoners were confined in supermax facilities across the United
States.65 A 2004 Urban Institute survey of self-identified supermax war-
dens determined that forty-four states had at least one supermax facility,
collectively housing roughly 25,000 prisoners.66 Another study conduct-
ed in 2006 concluded that there were by then at least fifty-seven super-
max prisons or units within prisons in approximately forty states.67 A
front-page, feature news article published in 2012 asserted:
At least 25,000 prisoners-and probably tens of thousands more,
criminal justice experts say-are still in solitary confinement in the
United States. Some remain there for weeks or months; others for
59. Erica Goode, Prisons Rethink Isolation, Saving Money, Lives and Sanity, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2012, at Al (recounting that the use of long-term isolation "began three decades ago, when
corrections departments-responding to increasing problems with prison gangs, stiffer sentencing
policies that led to overcrowding, and the 'get tough on crime' demands of legislators-began re-
moving ever larger numbers of inmates from the general population").
60. Gertrude Strassburger, Judicial Inaction and Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Are Super-
Maximum Walls Too High for the Eight Amendment?, 11 TEMP. POL. & Ctv. RTS. L. REv. 199, 202
(2001).
61. Id.
62. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
63. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1991).
64. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis
ofSupermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 477,480 (1997).
65. JAIME FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OUT OF SIGHT: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY
CONFINEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2000).
66. Arrigo & Bullock, supra note 22 at 624.
67. Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
115, 115 (2008).
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years or even decades. More inmates are held in solitary confinement
here than in any other democratic nation.
Notwithstanding that prison systems across the United States are in-
creasingly financially strained and overcrowded, with the U.S. Supreme
Court recently taking the extraordinary step of ordering the California
correctional system to dramatically reduce its prison population,7 0 the
popularity and use of supermax prisons has continued to grow despite
their high operating costs. 7 1 The increasing popularity of this punitive
penological approach and its severe isolation of purportedly dangerous
and disruptive prisoners proved "politically contagious," as "politicians
and prison administrators across the USA and elsewhere competed to
build the most secure, high-tech, fortified isolation prison" possible,72
although as a result of its high costs and perhaps influenced by increasing
humanitarian concerns, the popularity of supermax prolonged solitary
confinement may be beginning to diminish.
Today, the correctional departments of the various states and the
federal government use a variety of phrases to describe their own super-
68. Goode, supra note 59; see also Atul Gawande, Hellhole, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 30,
2009, at 37, 42 ("The United States now has five per cent of the world's population, twenty-five per
cent of its prisoners, and probably the vast majority of prisoners who are in long-term solitary con-
finement."); Shanna McCord, UC Santa Cruz Professor Craig Haney Talks to Senate Subcommittee
About the Perils ofSolitary Confinement, SANTA CRUZ (Cal.) SENTINEL (June 20, 2012, 6:33 PM),
http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/news/ci_20901442/uc-santa-cruz-professor-craig-haney-talks-
senate?source=rss&utm source=dlvr.it&utm medium=twitter ("An estimated 80,000 of the 2.3
million inmates in U.S. prisons and jails are in long-term solitary confinement.").
69. See Hafemeister et al., supra note 1, at 162-64, 187.
70. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923-24 (2011); see also Robert Bames, Justices Uphold
Order That May Release Thousands of Calif Inmates, WASH. POST, May 23, 2011, at Al ("[The]
Supreme Court ... ordered California to reduce its chronically overcrowded prisons by more than
30,000 prisoners, saying judges must get involved when prison conditions are 'incompatible with the
concept of human dignity."'); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Tell California to Cut Prisoner Popula-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at Al.
71. See SHALEV, supra note 45, at 4. But see Goode, supra note 59 ("[A] growing number of
states .. . are rethinking the use of long-term isolation and re-evaluating how many inmates really
require it, how long they should be kept there and how best to move them out. Colorado, Illinois,
Maine, Ohio and Washington State have been taking steps to reduce the number of prisoners in long-
term isolation; others have plans to do so. On Friday, officials in California announced a plan for
policy changes that could result in fewer prisoners-being sent to the state's three super-maximum-
security units.").
72. SHALEV, supra note 45, at 4; see also Gawande, supra note 68, at 43 ("By 1999, the
practice had grown to the point that Arizona, Colorado, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, Rhode Island,
and Virginia kept between five and eight per cent of their prison population in isolation, and, by
2003, New York had joined them as well. Mississippi alone held eighteen hundred prisoners in
supermax-twelve per cent of its prisoners over all.").
73. See Goode, supra note 59 ("Humanitarian groups have long argued that solitary confine-
ment has devastating psychological effects, but a central driver in the recent shift is economics.
Segregation units can be two to three times as costly to build and, because of their extensive staffing
requirements, to operate as conventional prisons are. They are an expense that many recession-
plagued states can ill afford; Gov. Pat Quinn of Illinois announced plans late last month to close the
state's supermax prison for budgetary reasons. Some officials have also been persuaded by research
suggesting that isolation is vastly overused and that it does little to reduce overall prison violence.
Inmates kept in such conditions, most of whom will eventually be released, may be more dangerous
when they emerge, studies suggest.").
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max prisons and units within prisons that impose prolonged solitary con-
finement, including "security housing units" in California, "special man-
agement units" in Arizona, "high security units" in Texas, "intensive
management units" in Washington, and "special control units" in New
Mexico, among others. 74 No matter what the phrase, these facilities all
share a distinct approach: they "house prisoners in virtual isolation and
subject them to almost complete idleness for extremely long periods of
time."75 A supermax can be a "freestanding facility, or a distinct unit
within a facility" that houses specifically selected inmates in an extreme
form of long-term administrative segregation emphasizing "separation,
restricted movement, and limited direct access to staff and other in-
mates."7 6
Although supermax confinement exists in many states, housing both
state and federal inmates, its operation and procedures are remarkably
uniform. Employing sophisticated designs and technology, the ultimate
goal is to limit, as much as possible, environmental and human interac-
tion.7 7 Often referred to as "prisons within prisons," 78 inmates are typi-
cally confined for twenty-three or more hours per day in cells ranging
from sixty to eighty square feet in size. 9 Exercise is limited to one hour
per day, during which time an inmate is placed, unaccompanied by any-
one else, in a designated (often-bare) exercise room.80 Inmates eat all
meals alone in their cells, and no social activity of any kind is permit-
ted.81 They are kept under constant surveillance with "computerized
locking and tracking systems [used to] allow their movement to be regu-
lated with a minimum of human interaction." 82
74. See WILLIAM C. COLLINS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NAT'L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX
PRISONS AND THE CONSTITUTION: LIABILITY CONCERNS IN THE EXTENDED CONTROL UNIT 5
(2004).
75. Haney, supra note 10, at 126.
76. CHASE RIVELAND, NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUPERMAX
PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 3 (1999).
77. Haney, supra note 10, at 125-26.
78. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N OF N.Y., MENTAL HEALTH IN THE HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS: A
STUDY OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN NEW YORK STATE PRISONS 47 (2004) [hereinafter CANY]
("Regardless of the terminology, conditions inside these prisons within prisons are basically the
same: 23-hour lockdown, sensory deprivation, social isolation and enforced idleness . . . ."); see also
Goode, supra note 59 (noting one former inmate described the conditions as "hell").
79. See Haney, supra note 10, at 127; see also COLLINS, supra note 74, at 6; SHALEV, supra
note 45, at 3. Although the amount of time that prisoners spend in their cells may vary, actually more
than twenty-three hours per day is the standard: often it is twenty-three hours per day five days a
week, with twenty-four hours per day on weekends. RHODES, supra note 29, at 237.
80. See Haney, supra note 10, at 126. This exercise opportunity may be quite limited. See
Anderson v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 848 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 (D. Colo. 2012) (noting that maxi-
mum security facility inmates are "taken to a similarly small cell with a pull-up bar for exercise");
Ford v. Bender, No. 07-11457-JGD, 2012 WL 262532, at *6 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2012) ("'[E]xercise'
consisted of walking back and forth in outdoor cages that are approximately six feet wide by ten
yards long. There was no exercise equipment.").
81. Haney, supra note 10, at 126.
82. Id.
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Great pains are even taken to reduce an inmate's necessary interac-
tions with prison staff.83 Inmates are denied access to all work, rehabilita-
tion, recreational, and other activities and programs, and any services
provided are usually delivered through a small portal at their cell front,
including mental health services. 84 Their principal and often sole human
interactions are brief encounters with prison staff, which typically consist
of muffled speech through a double-paned window or the passing of an
object through a tray-sized "cuff port" on the cell door." For years, their
physical contact with other humans may be "limited to being touched
through a security door by a correctional officer while being placed in
restraints or having restraints removed." The norm is to impose, to the
fullest extent possible, complete sensory deprivation and social isolation.
III. PRISON CONDITIONS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
[W]hen a sheriff or a marshal takes a man from a courthouse in a
prison van and transports him to confinement for two or three or ten
years, this is our act. We have tolled the bell for him. And whether
we like it or not, we have made him our collective responsibility. We
are free to do something about him; he is not.
-Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 197087
Courts have long recognized the potential for serious harm to in-
mates subjected to prolonged solitary confinement. In 1890, the Supreme
Court reflected on the recently defunct Pennsylvania model experiments
with institution-wide, prolonged solitary confinement:
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short con-
finement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to
impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; oth-
ers, still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better
were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover suffi-
cient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the communi-
ty.8
8
83. Consider, for example, the following description of a routine meal delivery in a supermax
facility: "Two officers deliver lunch to each pod, carrying the trays to the inmates one at a time. One
officer opens the cuffport and stands carefully to one side while the other, who is dressed in a water-
proofjumpsuit, quickly pushes in the tray." RHODES, supra note 29, at 23.
84. See Haney, supra note 10, at 126 ("[Slome facilities [even] employ 'tele-medicine' and
'tele-psychiatry' procedures in which prisoners' medical and psychological needs are addressed by
staff members who 'examine' them and 'interact' with them over television screens from locations
many miles away.").
85. Id.
86. RIVELAND, supra note 76, at 11.
87. Warren E. Burger, "No Man Is an Island, " 56 A.B.A. J. 325, 326 (1970).
88. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). In Medley, the Court analyzed whether a legisla-
tive change resulting in solitary confinement for a prisoner condemned to death for an offense that
occurred before this change amounted to an ex post facto violation. Id. at 162-63. In concluding that
it did, the Court considered the nature of solitary confinement to determine whether it was in fact
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Nevertheless, despite the Supreme Court's apparent condemnation of this
practice (although it did not directly address its constitutionality in this or
subsequent rulings) and a growing number of studies confirming the
devastating psychological consequences of prolonged solitary confine-
ment,89 "virtually every court which has considered the issue" has thus
far held that prolonged solitary confinement, without more, does not vio-
late the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.90
A. The U.S. Supreme Court's Development of the Eighth Amendment
Standard for Assessing the Adequacy ofPrison Conditions
Prior to 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court had not examined the ap-
plicability of the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions. That began to
change with the Court's issuance of its ruling that year in Estelle v.
Gamble, where the Court addressed the failure of prison officials to pro-
vide medical attention to an inmate. 91 The Court ruled that the govern-
ment has an "obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is
punishing by incarceration," holding that "deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's serious illness or injury" violates the Eighth Amendment. 92
Significantly, Estelle established for the first time that the protections of
the Eighth Amendment are not limited to the terms and nature of the
sentences imposed on criminal offenders, but are applicable as well to
the care provided prison inmates during incarceration. 9 3 It also intro-
punishment. Id at 167-68. In doing so, the Court traced the history of prolonged solitary confine-
ment and resolved that it was indeed "an additional punishment of the most important and painful
character." Id. at 171.
89. See infra notes 193-216 and accompanying text.
90. 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 3:17 (4th ed. 2011). See, e.g., Ajaj v.
United States, 293 Fed. App'x 575, 582-84 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding conditions such as "lock-down
for 23 hours per day in extreme isolation," "indefinite confinement," and "limited ability to exercise
outdoors" did not, individually or in concert, amount to an Eighth Amendment violation); McMillan
v. Wiley, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1249-51 (D. Colo. 2011) (ruling that inmate's allegations that he ate
his meals alone, left his cell only up to five times per week for recreation in a "man cage," and had
no human contact unless he was shackled and escorted by guards failed to establish deprivation of
basic needs as required for Eighth Amendment claim); Sital v. Burgio, 592 F. Supp. 2d 355, 359
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (determining that conditions during a nine-month stay in the security housing unit
did not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, because no finding established that conditions were particularly severe or that they
jeopardized prisoner's health or safety); Moore v. Schuetzle, 486 F. Supp. 2d 969, 983 (D.N.D.
2007) (concluding that administrative segregation that allows only one hour per day of recreation is
not cruel and unusual punishment), aff'd, 289 Fed. App'x 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). But see
infra Part Ill.B-C.
91. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976) (holding that an inmate suffering from a
back injury whose complaint showed that he had been seen by doctors and medical assistants on
seventeen occasions within a three-month period, failed to state a cause of action against his physi-
cian, both in his capacity as treating physician and as medical director of the corrections depart-
ment). Although Estelle is important in that it removed the barrier between the Eighth Amendment
and prison conditions, it concerned only the relatively limited question of medical care in the context
of a single denial of such care to a particular prisoner. Id. at 102-05. It did not, therefore, address the
broader question of the Eighth Amendment's role as applied to prison conditions in general.
92. Id. at 103, 105.
93. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 90, § 3:3.
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duced the phrase "deliberate indifference" as the standard for determin-
ing whether prison officials have violated an inmate's Eighth Amend-
ment right to such care.94
In Rhodes v. Chapman,9 5 the Court expanded the reach of the
Eighth Amendment to encompass prison conditions in general.9 6 There,
the Court concluded that prison conditions violate the Constitution when
they deprive inmates of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessi-
ties."97 In Rhodes, the Court varied from Estelle in that it did not take the
state of mind of prison officials into account in its constitutional analysis;
rather, it simply conducted "an objective analysis of the prison condi-
tions."98 Thus, following Rhodes, the Court had established two diver-
gent approaches to an Eighth Amendment analysis of prison conditions:
a subjective examination of whether the defendant had a sufficiently
"culpable state of mind"-deliberate indifference-as established by
Estelle, and an objective analysis addressing whether the deprivation was
sufficiently serious, as established by Rhodes.99
94. Id. Although the Court used the phrase "deliberate indifference" for the first time in Es-
telle as the governing standard for analyzing violations of the right to medical care, it provided little
definition of the phrase. Prior to Estelle, the Supreme Court had apparently never used this language.
JOHN BOSTON, Wilson v. Seiter: A Preliminary Analysis, in 8 NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 43 (Steven Saltzman & Barbara M.
Wolvovitz eds., 1992) (utilizing results of a computer search of all Supreme Court cases since 1790).
It should be noted that this deliberate indifference test is not the standard governing an emergency
situation, such as a prison riot. For that scenario, there is an even higher requirement for finding a
constitutional violation: a showing that conduct was carried out "maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-22 (1986) (quoting Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
95. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
96. Id. at 448-52 (holding that the practice of housing two inmates in one cell ("double bunk-
ing") did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment). The Court further noted, "We consider here
for the first time the limitation that the Eighth Amendment ... imposes upon the conditions in which
a State may confine those convicted of crimes." Id. at 344-45. Whereas Estelle involved the "rela-
tively discrete question of medical care in the context of a single denial of care to a particular prison-
er," Rhodes established for the first time that general prison conditions, either alone or in combina-
tion, can violate the Eighth Amendment. I MUSHLIN, supra note 90, §§ 3:3-:4.
97. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
98. Arthur B. Berger, Wilson v. Seiter: An Unsatisfying Attempt at Resolving the Imbroglio of
Eighth Amendment Prisoners' Rights Standards, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 565, 584 ("The Court stressed
that its inquiry was confined to determining 'whether the actual conditions of confinement. . . were
cruel and unusual.' Thus, the Court made clear that suits challenging conditions of confinement were
to be judged by objective consideration of the totality of prison conditions." (quoting Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 351 n. 15)).
99. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., in his concurring opinion, added:
The District Court may well be correct in the abstract that prison overcrowding and
double ceiling such as existed at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility generally results
in serious harm to the inmates. But cases are not decided in the abstract. A court is under
the obligation to examine the actual effect of challenged conditions upon the well-being
of the prisoners. The District Court in this case was unable to identify any actual signs
that the double ceiling at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility has seriously harmed
the inmates there; indeed, the court's findings of fact suggest that crowding at the prison
has not reached the point of causing serious injury. Since I cannot conclude that the to-
tality of conditions at the facility offends constitutional norms, and am of the view that
double ceiling in itself is not per se impermissible, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 367-68 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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In 1991, with its ruling in Wilson v. Seiter,'00 the Court attempted
"to rationalize and harmonize its decisions regarding the applicability of
the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions and practices."'o In Wilson,
Justice Antonin Scalia concluded that, when challenging prison condi-
tions on Eighth Amendment grounds, plaintiffs must satisfy both an ob-
jective and a subjective test.102 For Scalia, a constitutional violation ne-
cessitates at least some culpable state of mind on the part of the actor,
which requires at least some subjective analysis.10 3 That is, plaintiffs not
only must satisfy the objective requirement of Rhodes by showing that
prison conditions caused a deprivation sufficiently serious to deprive
them of a minimal life necessity, but also must show that this deprivation
involved more than mere negligence on the part of a prison official.'0 In
other words, it must be shown that the inadequate prison conditions were
the result of "deliberate indifference" on the part of prison officials, the
standard established in Estelle.'os
Although the Court's imposition of a subjective test in Wilson in-
creased the likelihood that prison officials-protesting that they were
unaware of the adverse impact of inadequate conditions on prisoners-
would be protected from Eighth Amendment liability, the Court's next
two cases made clear that establishing deliberate indifference is far from
an insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs.
In Helling v. McKinney,'06 the Court ruled that a showing of actual,
present injury was not necessary for a claim seeking relief, as it held that
the Eighth Amendment protects inmates from "imminent dangers," as
well as from harms actually experienced.'o7 In Helling, the Court found
that an inmate who was involuntarily subjected to tobacco smoke while
housed with another inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes per day
stated a valid claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment, notwith-
standing that the inmate had not yet experienced actual physical harm.' 0o
In doing so, the Court offered the example of a prison inmate subjected
to unsafe drinking water, reasoning that such an inmate could bring a
valid claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment "without waiting for
an attack of dysentery."l 09 Furthermore, Helling also established that
100. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
101. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 90, § 3:6 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wilson, 501
U.S. at 296, 303, 306 (vacating lower court finding that various prison conditions-including over-
crowding, excessive noise, inadequate heating and ventilation, and unsanitary dining facilities-did
not violate the Eighth Amendment, and remanding for reconsideration under the "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard).
102. Id at 298.
103. Id
104. Id at 298, 305-06.
105. Id. at 303.
106. 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id. at 27-28, 34.
109. Id. at 33.
20 [Vol. 90:1
THE NINTH CIRCLE OF HELL
actual knowledge by prison officials of injury (or imminent injury) re-
sulting from prison conditions need not be present to satisfy the culpable
state of mind requirement, but rather that claimants need only show ex-
posure to such conditions is "demonstrably unsafe," and that the risk is
"so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose
anyone unwillingly to such a risk."'10
In Farmer v. Brennan,' the Court narrowed this component
somewhat. In Farmer, the Court held that the requisite state of mind to
establish "deliberate indifference" was indeed something more than mere
negligence, namely that there must be a showing that the prison official
was at least "reckless in a criminal sense." 1 2 However, the Court added
that the claimant is not required to show that "acts or omissions [were
committed] for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that
harm will result."1 3 It is enough that the inmate demonstrates that offi-
cials were "recklessly disregarding" a "substantial risk of serious harm to
a prisoner."ll4 In other words, deliberate indifference exists "when a per-
son disregards a risk of harm of which he [or she] is aware."" Further-
more, the Court explained that although a certain degree of knowledge
on the part of prison officials as to the presence of harmful conditions is
required, that knowledge can be inferred from objective circumstances
when the risk is obvious."l 6
With regard to prison conditions that are purported to impose psy-
chological harm on inmates, as Professor Michael B. Mushlin explains,
[I]f a condition is obviously harmful to the mental well being of an
inmate, . . . then it is permissible to infer that the defendant must have
known of the risk, and the failure to correct it can be evidence of the
[requisite] subjective state of mind of the defendant to be deliberately
indifferent. 117
Thus, Farmer makes clear that deliberate indifference can be established
even if prison officials have no direct knowledge that a specific harm
will befall a particular inmate because a present and known risk to a class
110. Id. at 33-34, 36 (emphasis added).
111. 511 U.S. 825, 830-31, 847 (1994) (asserting deliberate indifference to claimant's safety
because prison officials knew the prison had a violent environment and a history of inmate assaults,
leaving the inmate particularly vulnerable to a sexual attack).
112. Id at 831, 837.
113. Id. at 835.
114. Id. at 836.
115. Id. at 837.
116. Id. at 842 ("Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge . . . is a question of fact
subject to demonstration in the usual ways . .. and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official
knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.").
117. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 90, § 3:12.
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of inmates establishes deliberate indifference to each of the members of
the class."m8
118. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843-44 (using the example that if prison officials are aware that a
particular class of inmates is at particularly high risk of rape in their prison, "it would obviously be
irrelevant to liability that the officials could not guess beforehand precisely who would attack
whom."). At the same time, it should be noted that a claimant seeking to establish the occurrence of
a constitutional violation faces some significant procedural impediments. Inmates are indeed entitled
to bring a federal civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officials who have
violated their constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress. . . ."); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam) (holding that
prisoners could bring suit against state prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Furthermore, many
§ 1983 suits challenging prison conditions involve Eighth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Jordan v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). However, in an attempt to curb an influx of what were perceived
to be frivolous prisoner claims that were believed to be clogging the dockets of the federal courts,
Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 1996. The Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.,
28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); see also Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 109 (D.
Mass. 2001) (Congress enacted the PLRA to cut down on the filing of frivolous lawsuits by prison-
ers, in response to lawsuits seeking damages for such things as "insufficient storage locker space, a
defective haircut by a prison barber, the failure of prison officials to invite a prisoner to a pizza party
for a departing prison employee, and yes, being served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy
variety." (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Robert
Dole))).
There are two related impediments that are particularly germane to a cause of action
seeking to establish that prolonged supermax solitary confinement constitutes an Eighth Amendment
violation. First, under the PLRA, an inmate must show a physical injury as a predicate to a success-
ful pleading of mental or emotional injury under § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006) ("No Federal
civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.").
This physical injury must be more than de minimus, although not necessarily serious, in order for a
claimant to successfully plead mental or emotional injury. See, e.g., Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App'x
797, 798-99 (1lth Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding "mere bruising" from 17.5 hours in restraints
was de minimus, even where prisoner complained of "welts"); Jarriett v. Wilson, 162 F. App'x 394,
396-98 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that inmate confined for twelve hours in "strip cage" in which he
could not sit down did not suffer physical injury even though he testified he had a "bad leg" that
swelled "like a grapefruit" and caused severe pain and cramps); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191,
193-94 (5th Cir. 1997) (inmate's sore, bruised ear, lasting for three days, was de minimus). But see
Anderson v. Colo., Dep't of Corr., 848 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295, 1299 (D. Colo. 2012) (affidavit in
which inmate stated that lack of outdoor exercise while placed in administrative segregation in a
maximum security facility caused his muscles to grow weaker was sufficient to create a fact dispute
that he sustained physical injuries and thereby defeat a motion for summary judgment based on the
Prison Litigation Reform Act).
Second, the PLRA prevents any prisoner from bringing an action under § 1983 "until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). This require-
ment essentially mandates the dismissal of any § 1983 claim where the inmate fails to comply with
any aspect of the prison's grievance procedures, even if the relief sought by the inmate cannot be
obtained through the grievance process. See, e.g., Marshall v. Knight, No. 3:03-CV-460 RM, 2006
WL 3714713, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 14, 2006) (dismissing, for failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies, plaintiffs claim that prison officials retaliated against him in their classification and
disciplinary decisions, even though prison policy dictated that no grievance would be upheld that
challenged classification and disciplinary decisions). But see Bonner v. Beth, No. 05-C-1075, 2007
WL 725120, at *12 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 7, 2007) (finding inmate pursuing a § 1983 claim had shown
that there was deliberate indifference to his mental health while he was placed in segregation and
that he had sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies). For an inmate experiencing a mental
disorder, it may be particularly difficult to satisfy all the requirements for pursuing and exhausting
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B. The Modern Standard
As described above, an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison
conditions must satisfy both an objective and a subjective test.
The objective component addresses whether the harm suffered or
likely to be suffered was sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that this
objective component of the Eighth Amendment must evolve to reflect
"contemporary standards of decency."ll 9 Exactly what constitutes "con-
temporary standards of decency," however, is an elusive question.' 2 0 As
applied to prison conditions, the Supreme Court held in Rhodes that it is
no longer tolerable for prison conditions to deprive inmates of the "min-
imal civilized measure of life's necessities."1 21 The Supreme Court has
suggested-with lower courts explicitly ruling-that minimal life neces-
sities include adequate safety, food, warmth, exercise, and basic hy-
giene.122 As discussed, the Supreme Court in Estelle further established
"adequate medical care" as a minimal life necessity in this context.123 As
also noted, Helling further clarifies that an Eighth Amendment violation
any available grievance procedure. See Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdic-
tion-Stripping and Executive Power: Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 321 (2007); Developments in the Law: The Impact of the Prison Litigation
Reform Acton Correctional Mental Health Litigation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1150 (2008).
119. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (determining that the prohibition against cnmel and unusual
punishment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society").
120. A part of this question is what sources can be relied upon in determining existing contem-
porary standards of decency. In a somewhat related Eighth Amendment context where the question
was whether applying the death penalty to "mentally retarded" offenders constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment, the Supreme Court suggested that in ascertaining "the evolving standards of decen-
cy that mark the progress of a maturing society," Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted), international standards could be instructive. Id. at 325 & n.21
("Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed
by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."). The inclusion of this source of
information in the majority's analysis, however, drew a strong objection from Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion, who contended that "if it is evidence of a national consensus for
which we are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant." Id. at 325
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). To the extent that the views of the world community are relevant to a
determination of whether prolonged supermax solitary confinement constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in general or when applied to inmates with a mental illness, it is worth noting that the
Special Rapportuer on Torture for the United Nations, Juan Mendez, recently issued a report that
calls for significant limitations to be placed on the practice of solitary confinement. See generally
U.N. Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/66/268
(Aug. 5, 2011).
121. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
122. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); see, e.g., infra notes 217-20; see also
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 1002 (5th ed. 2009) ("Prisoners have successfully used the [Cruel and Unusual Punishment
C]lause to obtain court censure of ... generally abysmal conditions. But in reaching these results,
the courts have usually required demonstration of 'barbarous' conditions that 'shock the con-
science."' (citing Paul Friedman, Legal Regulation ofApplied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institu-
tions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 39, 61-62 (1975))).
123. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying
text.
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can occur absent any actual injury if a threat of injury constituting a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is present. 24
One open question, however, is whether and when purely psycho-
logical harm (or an imminent danger of psychological harm) represents
the denial of a minimal life necessity. As of yet, the Supreme Court has
not directly addressed this question.125 However, the Court's decision in
Helling, which does not require actual physical injury to state a claim,
seems to suggest that purely psychological harm can constitute a denial
of a minimal life necessity.126 This view also receives support from the
Court's recent ruling in Brown v. Plata, where it found adequate mental
health care constitutes "basic sustenance," with the deprivation of this
care a violation of the Eight Amendment.' 27 Indeed, most lower courts
have reached precisely this conclusion. 2 8
To establish a constitutional deprivation, however, the subjective
component must also be met, which necessitates an inquiry into the state
of mind of the person or persons responsible for the harm (or imminent
harm).12 9 As discussed, with regard to prison conditions, the applicable
standard is "deliberate indifference,"l 3 0 which requires at least the equiv-
alent of criminal recklessness.' 3' Nevertheless, this knowledge can be
inferred from objective circumstances and does not require direct evi-
dence of a culpable state of mind at the time in question.1 32 Furthermore,
these circumstances need not be linked to a particular risk to a specific
inmate, but may be inferred when a general risk poses a threat to a class
of inmates of which the claimant was a member.13 3
124. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
125. However, Justice Blackmun did suggest that the Eighth Amendment encompasses both
psychological and physical harm in his concurring opinion in Hudson v. McMillan. 503 U.S. 1, 16
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I do not read anything in the Court's opinion to limit injury
cognizable under the Eighth Amendment to physical injury. It is not hard to imagine inflictions of
psychological harm-without corresponding physical harm-that might prove to be cruel and unu-
sual punishment.").
126. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
127. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910,1928 (2011).
128. See, e.g., Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2001) (determining that claim
can be based on the presence of a "strong likelihood" of psychological damage due to the denial of
exercise privileges for ninety days); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 273 (7th Cir. 1996) (remarking
that "the Constitution does not countenance psychological torture merely because it fails to inflict
physical injury"); Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a significant
emotional injury can constitute Eighth Amendment pain); Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557, 559 (7th
Cir. 1994) ("Mental torture is not an oxymoron, and has been held or assumed in a number of pris-
oner cases . . . to be actionable as cruel and unusual punishment."); Williams v. Ozmint, 726 F.
Supp. 2d 589, 594 (D.S.C. 2010) (finding that inmates are not required to show physical injury to
state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment); I MUSHLIN, supra note 90; see also infra Part IlI.C.
129. See supra notes 103-05, 111-18 and accompanying text.
130. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
131. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994).
132. See id. at 842.
133. Id. at 843.
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C. Cases Considering Inmates with a Mental Illness or a Significant Vul-
nerability to Mental Illness Who Are Placed in Prolonged Supermax
Solitary Confinement
The Supreme Court has not yet taken under consideration whether
the prolonged supermax solitary confinement of inmates with a mental
illness violates the Eighth Amendment. However, this issue has been
addressed in recent years in a series of lower court cases.
Most significantly, in Madrid v. Gomez,134 a district court in Cali-
fornia considered a claim that conditions in the supermax unit at Pelican
Bay State Prison-known as the "Security Housing Unit" (SHU)-were
sufficiently injurious to the mental health of inmates to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.' 35 The court held
that confinement in SHU constituted "cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment for two categories of inmates: those
who are already mentally ill and those who ... are at an unreasonably
high risk of suffering serious mental illness."' 36
Turning to the requisite objective element, the court held that alt-
hough mere "generalized psychological pain" resulting from prolonged
segregation is not sufficient to implicate the Eighth Amendment, "if the
particular conditions of segregation . . . inflict a serious mental illness,
greatly exacerbate mental illness, or deprive inmates of their sanity, then
[prison officials] have deprived inmates of a basic necessity of human
existence-indeed, they have crossed into the realm of psychological
torture."137 That is, inflicting, causing, or exacerbating a serious mental
illness by this confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and
satisfies the objective component established in Rhodes because freedom
from conditions that inflict a serious mental illness constitutes a minimal
life necessity.138
Regarding the subjective element, the court refused to hold that
conditions in SITU were a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment
because the risk that psychological pain would rise to the level of a seri-
ous mental illness was not imminent enough as to all the inmates in SHU
134. 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
135. Located in Crescent City, California, Pelican Bay State Prison at the time of Madrid was a
maximum security prison where about half the facility was devoted to housing a general population
of inmates and the other half imposed supermax confinement in the unit known as the SHU. Madrid,
889 F. Supp. at 1155. The Court's description of the SHU suggests that it was virtually identical in
operation to other supermax settings across the country: "[flnmates remain confined to their cells for
22 and 2 hours of each day. Food trays are passed through a narrow food port in the cell door.
Inmates eat all meals in their cells. Opportunities for social interaction with other prisoners or voca-
tional staff are essentially precluded. Inmates are not allowed to participate in prison job opportuni-
ties or any other prison recreational or educational programs. Nor is group exercise allowed." Id. at
1229.
136. Id. at 1267.
137. Id. at 1264-65.
138. See id at l266.
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to establish deliberate indifference.139 However, the court reasoned that
the conditions did present a known "substantial or excessive risk of
harm" to a specific class of these inmates, namely "those who the record
demonstrates are at a particularly high risk for suffering very serious or
severe injury to their mental health," which included "the already men-
tally ill, as well as persons with borderline personality disorders, brain
damage or mental retardation, impulse-ridden personalities, or a history
of prior psychiatric problems or chronic depression."1 40 The court con-
cluded that exposing this class of inmates to prolonged supermax solitary
confinement put them at significant risk of serious mental illness, consti-
tuted a deprivation of a minimal life necessity, and demonstrated deliber-
ate indifference to, and was thus a violation of, the inmates' Eighth
Amendment rights. 14 1
Two cases decided in the decade following Madrid came to the
same conclusion utilizing similar reasoning. In 1999, a federal district
court in Texas took up a challenge to multiple supermax "high security
units" in Texas prisons. 14 2 In Ruiz v. Johnson, the court found that asso-
ciated conditions "clearly violate constitutional standards when imposed
on the subgroup of the plaintiffs' class made up of mentally-ill prison-
ers." 43 Without defining "mental illness," the court noted that "[i]n light
of the obvious severity of these inmates' needs, it is determined that de-
fendants have been deliberately indifferent to the serious risks" these
placements posed to these inmates. 144
In 2001, a federal district court in Wisconsin came to the same con-
clusion in Jones 'El v. Bergel4 5 regarding the conditions at the Supermax
Correctional Institution (Supermax) in Boscobel, Wisconsin, holding that
"housing any seriously mentally ill inmates at Supermax constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment."l46 Notably, although the facility did utilize
mental health screening tools and monitoring apparently designed to
identify and limit the risk to inmates with a mental illness, the court
found that the screening and monitoring were grossly inadequate and
139. See id. at 1266-67.
140. Id. at 1265, 1267.
141. See id at 1264-67.
142. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev'don other grounds, 243 F.3d
941 (5th Cir. 2001).
143. Id. at 915.
144. Id.
145. 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
146. Id at 1122. The same basic pattern of prolonged supermax solitary confinement described
above in Part I and in conjunction with Madrid was recited by the court here. The court noted that
inmates at Supermax
spend all but four hours a week confined to a cell.... The cells are illuminated 24 hours
a day. Inmates receive no outdoor exercise. Their personal possessions are severely re-
stricted. .... They are permitted no clocks, radios, watches, cassette players or televi-
sions .... A video camera rather than a human eye monitors the inmate's movements.
Visits other than with lawyers are conducted through video screens.
Id. at 1098.
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ineffective because it was obvious that inmates with severe mental illness
were still being housed there. 147 The court determined that deliberate
indifference existed because "the Screening Tool and monitoring serve
as little more than band-aids to the potentially detrimental conditions to
which defendants are subjecting mentally ill inmates."1 48
Whereas the plaintiffs in Jones'El had sought only injunctive relief,
another case addressing the placement of inmates with a mental illness in
supermax confinement arose when one of the inmates considered in
Jones'El brought a claim for monetary damages. In Scarver v.
Litscher,14 9 the court again concluded that prison staff at Supermax had
violated this inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to
"conditions so lacking in physical and social points of reference [that
they] would lead to a kind of psychological torture and future acts of
self-harm." 150 Similarly to the courts in Madrid and Ruiz, the Scarver
court reasoned that because, as Farmer established, "a fact finder may
conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very
fact that the risk was obvious," 51 deliberate indifference could be
properly inferred from the court's finding that the defendants knew of the
severe conditions, as well as from the serious mental illness and contin-
ued deterioration of the inmates housed there.15 2
Remarkably, however, on appeal Judge Richard A. Posner, writing
for the majority of a panel of the Seventh Circuit, found that deliberate
indifference had not been established.153 Although Judge Posner found
that "it is a fair inference that conditions at Supermax aggravated the
symptoms of Scarver's mental illness and by doing so inflicted severe
physical and especially mental suffering," Posner also determined that
defendants were "not indifferent to [Scarver's] welfare." 5 4 In a line of
reasoning strikingly divergent from the analysis established in Farmer
and applied by other lower courts, Posner reasoned that deliberate indif-
ference could not be established here because the plaintiff provided no
147. Id. at 1121. The court found that the screening and monitoring process was inadequate in
that it was "not a reasonable safeguard against housing seriously mentally ill inmates at Supermax
because it is not designed to keep seriously mentally ill inmates out of Supermax." Id. The screening
tool utilized, by the defendant's own admission, was inadequate on its face in that it allowed prison-
ers with a diagnosis of serious mental illness and listed under the "restricted movement" category, to
still be placed in Supermax on a case-by-case basis. See id. Furthermore, the screening mechanism
was ineffective in that the evidence demonstrated that it was often not used, or was ignored. See id
at 1122. That is, the screening tool was not designed to keep seriously mentally ill inmates out of
Supermax, and further it did not in practice keep seriously mentally ill inmates out of Supermax. Id.
148. Id.
149. 371 F. Supp. 2d 986 (W.D. Wis. 2005).
150. Id at 1003.
151. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994).
152. Scarver, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1002-03. Although prohibiting such behavior in the future,
the court determined that monetary relief was not appropriate as the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity because a constitutional prohibition of this behavior was not clearly established
at the time. See id at 1005.
153. Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 977 (7th Cir. 2006).
154. Id at 975.
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direct evidence that the defendants in fact knew specific conditions in
Supermax were contributing to the plaintiffs particular mental illness. 155
He reasoned that, although "[o]f course [the defendants] soon realized
that Scarver was in serious distress because of his mental illness," delib-
erate indifference was not established because there was "no evidence
... that they realized the harm that the conditions of his confinement
were inflicting on him."l 56
Notwithstanding this ruling, similar lawsuits have been filed in
many states, resulting in numerous court rulings or consent decrees es-
tablishing significant benchmarks affording protection to inmates with a
mental illness placed in prolonged solitary confinement. For example,
the Indiana Department of Correction in 2007 agreed to move all mental-
ly ill prisoners housed in the SHU of a Supermax facility out of segrega-
tion.157 Similar lawsuits targeting Supermax facilities in Wisconsin,
Ohio, Connecticut, and New Mexico all resulted in a settlement agree-
ment or a court order directing that all seriously mentally ill prisoners no
longer be held in these facilities.158
In 2007, in Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of
Mental Health, a statewide settlement was reached regarding the solitary
confinement of inmates with a mental illness in New York prisons.
The plaintiffs had argued that a large number of inmates with a mental
illness were being housed in "extended isolation units," leading to a sig-
nificant deterioration in their mental health.160 The settlement, later em-
bodied in legislation, mandated that all inmates with a serious mental
illness receive a minimum of two hours per day of out-of-cell treatment
or programming, and required the institution of a mental health screening
program at admission, as well as the creation and expansion of available
155. Id.
156. Id. ("[T]here [was] no indication that [prison officials] attributed [the inmates serious
distress because of mental illness] to the heat of the cell, the constant illumination of the cell, or the
denial of audiotapes or similar equipment."); see also Ford v. Bender, No. 07-11457-JGD, 2012 WL
262532, at *10 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2012) (denying claim for mental and emotional injuries resulting
from sensory deprivation while placed in the Department Disciplinary Unit in a maximum-security
state prison because the inmate, who "suffered from depression, anxiety, insomnia and anorexia" at
the time of his placement, was able to interact with others on a day-to-day basis, including
"healthcare providers, mental health staff, other inmates, correctional staff, visitors and counselors"
and "did not suffer from any major mental illness at any time throughout his incarceration"); Bonner
v. Beth, No. 05-C-1075, 2007 WL 725120, at *15 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 7, 2007) (rejecting deliberate
indifference to mental health claim of inmate placed in segregation for three and one half months
after determining that the inmate "received prompt medical attention in response to his mental health
issues").
157. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Solitary Confinement Called "Inappropriate"
for Mentally Ill Prisoners in Indiana (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/solitary-
confinement-called-inappropriate-mentally-ill-prisoners-indiana.
158. Id
159. Private Settlement Agreement at 2, Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office
of Mental Health, No. 02 Civ. 4002 (GEL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2007).
160. See id at 2.
28 [Vol. 90:1
THE NINTH CIRCLE OF HELL
mental health residential programs.16 ' The impetus for the settlement was
a belief that inmates with a mental illness should receive treatment, not
isolation. 162
More recently, in 2010, an agreement was reached in Presley v.
Epps, a lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi, "challenging inhumane conditions and a lack of medical
and mental health care" in Unit 32, which was being used for prolonged
supermax solitary confinement at the Mississippi State Penitentiary in
Parchman, Mississippi. 16 3 Under this agreement, which purportedly
"paves the way for resolving the . . . lawsuit," state officials "pledged to
transfer the entire population of Unit 32 to other facilities over the course
of the next several months, move all seriously mentally ill prisoners to
[the state's] mental health facility in Meridian, [Mississippi,] and remedy
the inadequate medical and mental health care in Unit 32 so long as any
prisoners remain there."'64 In a prior 2007 Supplemental Consent Decree,
the parties agreed that "prisoners with Severe Mental Illness, other than
those on Death Row," would not be held in Unit 32 for more than four-
teen days, that those "requiring inpatient level of care will be housed at
... another facility," and that a space at Unit 32 would be designated to
be used exclusively as a "Mental Health Step-Down Unit ... to house
mentally ill prisoners who require an intermediate level of psychiatric
care."' 65 Strikingly, in a 2012 follow-up to this settlement, it was report-
ed that prison officials found that as restrictions were loosened on this
population, violence went down and the inmates became better be-
haved. 16 6 MiSSissippi's commissioner of corrections, Christopher B.
Epps, who is also the president of the American Correctional Associa-
161. See id. at 6.
162. See id. at 2.
163. Agreement of the Parties to Seek Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1, Presley v.
Epps, No. 4:05-cv-00148 (N.D. Miss. June 4, 2010); Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union,
ACLU Strikes Deal to Shutter Notorious Unit 32 at Mississippi State Penitentiary (June 4, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/aclu-strikes-deal-shutter-notorious-unit-32-mississippi-state-
penitentiary [hereinafter ACLU]; see also Goode, supra note 59 (describing how the judge had ruled
that conditions at Mississippi's "super-maximum-security prison" were unacceptable and ordered
improvements).
A similar lawsuit has also been filed in Arizona. David Fathi, Solitary Confinement in
Arizona: Cruel and Unusual, NAT'L PRISON PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2012, 1:09 PM),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/solitary-confinement-arizona-cruel-and-unusual ("A class
action lawsuit filed today ... alleges that the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) houses
thousands of prisoners in solitary confinement conditions so harsh they violate the Eighth Amend-
ment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. While other states also use solitary confinement, Arizo-
na has added features that seem designed to gratuitously increase suffering. The cells in that state's
supermax Special Management Units (SMUs) were deliberately constructed with no windows to the
outside, so prisoners-many of whom have no means of telling the time become disoriented and
confused, not knowing ... whether it is day or night. The cells are often illuminated 24 hours a day,
making sleep difficult and further contributing to prisoners' disorientation and mental deteriora-
tion.").
164. ACLU, supra note 163.
165. Supplemental Consent Decree on Mental Health Care, Use of Force and Classification at
1-2, Presley v. Epps, No. 4:05-cv-00148-JAD (N.D. Miss. Nov. 13, 2007).
166. Goode, supra note 59.
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tion, noted his own views had changed as a result of this lawsuit and that
he now believes that "[i]f you treat people like animals, that's exactly the
way they'll behave."l 6 7
Similarly, on April 12, 2012, "[a] federal judge ... approved a set-
tlement meant to guarantee alternatives to segregation for mentally ill
inmates in Massachusetts prisons." 68 This settlement stemmed from a
2007 lawsuit filed after prisoners "engaged in self-destructive behavior
while in solitary confinement without [being provided] adequate mental
health services," and "1l prisoners, including some with serious mental
illness, committed suicide in segregation cells within a 28-month peri-
od."'69 Under the settlement, "[w]hen seriously mentally ill inmates must
be placed in segregation, they will receive extra psychological help, and
their cases will be reviewed regularly to determine whether other options
,,170are appropriate.
Another lawsuit is ongoing in Colorado, where it is being asserted
that an inmate with "serious mental health issues" held in administrative
segregation for more than eleven years in Colorado's maximum security
facility not only is being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment but
also has been deprived of a liberty interest without due process as a result
of a failure to provide him with necessary medications, and that he has
experienced discrimination on the basis of his mental impairment in vio-
lation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.17' These three
claims have all survived a motion for summary judgment.172 Filed by
members of the University of Denver Sturm College of Law's Civil
Rights Clinic, it has been reported that during testimony the presiding
federal judge "was strongly urging Colorado Department of Corrections
officials to fix the harshest conditions at the state's supermax prison-
before he has to do it for them."l73
167. Id. (observing that "prison officials started out isolating inmates they were scared of but
ended up adding many they were simply 'mad at"'); see also Gawande, supra note 68, at 45 (inter-
viewing a state-prison commissioner who had "been either a prison warden or a commissioner in
several states across the country for more than twenty years" and who stated that he "would remove
most prisoners from long-term isolation units if he could and provide programming for the mental
illnesses that many of them have," and who asserted that .'I believe that today you'll probably find
that two-thirds or three-fourths of the heads of correctional agencies will largely share the position
that I articulated with you').




171. Anderson v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., No. 10-cv-01005-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 991620, at *1
(D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2012).
172. Id.
173. Alan Prendergast, Troy Anderson Lawsuit: Supermax Conditions Draw Criticism from
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It has further been reported that New York and Texas "have begun
to scale back the use of solitary confinement under pressure from prison
watchdogs" and that "[l]awsuits have been brought by the American Civ-
il Liberties Union and others in a half-dozen states-including ... Cali-
fornia-because of worries about isolation's effect on the mentally
ill."l 74 Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Justice "recently launched a
probe into a 1,550-bed Pennsylvania prison where inmates complain of
long periods of isolation and a lack of mental-health treatment" and has
been requested by the Legal Aid Justice Center, which represents twelve
inmates in isolation in Virginia, to commence an investigation of the Red
Onion State Prison in Virginia, where more than 500 of its nearly 750
inmates are held in solitary confinement (on average for 2.7 years), in-
cluding 173 who suffer from mental illness.175
Finally, the federal government has in general become more active
in investigating the use of this practice as concerns grow about the ad-
verse impact of prolonged solitary confinement. This past summer a
Senate "hearing [was] held before the Subcommittee on the Constitution,
Civil Rights and Human Rights, [which] represents the first time law-
makers on Capitol Hill have taken up the issue of solitary confine-
ment." 7 6 The increased national and international scrutiny of this prac-
tice was noted, as well as the fact that it has "been the target of a growing
number of lawsuits." 7 7
174. Anita Kumar, Critics of Va. Supermar Prison Doubt Isolation Is The Solution, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 7, 2012, at A01.
175. Id. In addition, the Editorial Board of the Washington Post has declared that "prolonged
solitary confinement can lead to devastating consequences, including psychosis, reduced brain
function, debilitating depression and increased rates of suicide" and urged Virginia to follow the lead
of other states and reduce its reliance on solitary confinement. Editorial Board, Solitary Confinement
in Virginia, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2012, at A14 [hereinafter Editorial Board, Solitary Confinement].
A subsequent report noted that in response "Virginia is reconsidering how it administers solitary
confinement at the state's only super-maximum prison and plans to implement sweeping changes to
its often-criticized practices." Anita Kumar, Virginia Plans Changes in Prisoner Isolation Process,
WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2012, at AO1. The Editorial Board of the New York Times similarly called for
"an immediate, strictly enforced bar on holding . . . mentally ill inmates in severe conditions of
isolation." Editorial Board, The Abuse ofSolitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2012, at A26
[hereinafter Editorial Board, The Abuse].
176. Erica Goode, Senators Start a Review of Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2012, at Al3.
177. Id. (reporting testimony regarding "a class-action suit filed on [June 18, 2012,] on behalf
of mentally ill inmates held in solitary at ADX, the federal super-maximum-security prison in Flor-
ence, Colo." and that in May 2012 "lawyers representing prisoners held for more than 10 years in
isolation at Pelican Bay State Prison in California filed suit in federal court, arguing that solitary
confinement is unconstitutional"); see also Erica Goode, Fighting a Drawn-Out Battle Against
Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at Al (describing the subsequent mental health
problems of an inmate placed in solitary confinement for eight years and noting "California correc-
tions officials-prodded by two inmates at Pelican Bay last year and the advice of national prison
experts-this month proposed changes in the state's gang policy that could decrease the number of
inmates in isolation").
It should also be noted that in February of 2010, the American Bar Association House of
Delegates approved the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Treatment ofPrisoners, which declares
that "[n]o prisoner diagnosed with serious mental illness should be placed in long-term segregated
housing." ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 55; see also id ("No prisoner
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D. Deference to Legitimate Security Concerns
Although the line of cases just discussed suggests a strong trend to-
wards recognizing that inmates with a mental illness placed in prolonged
supermax solitary confinement are entitled to special attention and pro-
tection under the Constitution, a significant hurdle remains for inmates
asserting such claims: courts tend to defer in these cases to legitimate
penological interests.'78 Accordingly, the courts in these cases often rec-
ognize a need to defer to legitimate security concerns of prison officials.
The settlement in Disability Advocates, for example, mandated that
all inmates with a mental illness be placed in residential mental health
treatment units, unless "[e]xceptional circumstances . . . occur creating
an unacceptable risk to [the] safety and security of inmates or staff."179
Similarly, in Madrid, the court justified extending greater protection to
inmates with a mental illness than to other inmates by reasoning that, for
the latter, the security needs of the prison outweighed the mere "psycho-
logical pain" suffered by these inmates when placed in prolonged segre-
gation and, with regard to those inmates, accorded "substantial defer-
ence" to prison management concerns. 80 In Ruiz, the court was careful
not to "condemn Texas's system of administrative segregation" in its
entirety, recognizing that segregation "'may be a necessary tool of prison
should be placed in segregated housing for more than [one day] without a mental health screening,
conducted in person by a qualified mental health professional, and a prompt comprehensive mental
health assessment if clinically indicated. If the assessment indicates the presence of a serious mental
illness, or a history of serious mental illness and decompensation in segregated settings, the prisoner
should be placed in an environment where appropriate treatment can occur."); id. at 95 ("Correction-
al authorities should be permitted to physically separate prisoners in segregated housing from other
prisoners but should not deprive them of those items or services necessary for the maintenance of
psychological ... wellbeing. . . . Conditions of extreme isolation should not be allowed regardless of
the reasons for a prisoner's separation from the general population. Conditions of extreme isolation
generally include a combination of sensory deprivation, lack of contact with other persons, enforced
idleness, minimal out-of-cell time, and lack of outdoor recreation.").
178. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-25 (1990) (balancing an inmate's "signifi-
cant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs" against the
"interest [of prison administrators] in ensuring the safety of prison staffs and administrative person-
nel, [and their] duty to take reasonable measures for the prisoners' own safety"); Bonner v. Beth, No.
05-C-1075, 2007 WL 725120, at *15 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 7, 2007) ("[M]anaging prisons is not a job for
the federal courts."). But see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928-29 (2011) ("Courts may not
allow constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the
realm of prison administration.").
179. Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 159, at 4. Such exceptional circumstances are
defined as occurring when there is an "unacceptable risk to safety and security of inmates or staff."
Id However, the settlement does not provide specific examples of such circumstances.
180. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1262 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In Madrid, the court specif-
ically recognized the need for deference to prison officials, saying that "[gliven the 'limitations of
federalism and the narrowness of the Eighth Amendment,' it is not the Court's function to pass
judgment on the policy choices of prison officials." Id. (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1237,
1246 (9th Cir. 1982)). The court added that "prison administration is a matter 'peculiarly within the
province of the legislative and executive branches of government."' Id (quoting Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987)). However, the court also noted that "the mental impact of a challenged
condition should be considered in conjunction with penological considerations," and that conditions
that are "sufficiently harmful . . . will at some point yield to constitutional constraints, even if the
condition has some penological justification." Id.
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discipline' [that] is certainly within the defendants' discretion."' 8 1 Like-
wise, in Jones'El, the court noted that "defendants should be afforded
due deference." 82
Indeed, in other contexts the Supreme Court has "been particularly
active in developing standards of deference to constrain lower courts in
prison cases" and has often emphasized that deference must be afforded
to prison administrators when there is a valid security reason for a given
practice, even when that practice might otherwise constitute a constitu-
tional violation.'83 The Court has recognized that there must be a "mutual
accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provi-
sions of the Constitution that are of general application." 8 4 In a chal-
lenge to various security measures in a New York short-term correctional
facility, the Court remarked, "[Elven [where] a restriction [otherwise
violates] a constitutional guarantee . . . the practice must be evaluated in
light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding insti-
tutional security."8 8 Likewise, in Rhodes, the Court deferred to prison
officials who placed up to seven inmates in cells built for two people,
reasoning that these officials did the best they could given the over-
crowded conditions and remarking that one cannot, "assume that state
legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the
Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to
achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system." 8 6
Moreover, the cases discussed above that have directly examined
the constitutionality of housing inmates with a mental illness in pro-
longed supermax solitary confinement indicate that deference to a legit-
imate security interest can play a role in conjunction with both prongs of
the applicable Eighth Amendment test. With regard to the objective
component, in Madrid, the harm incurred by the class of inmates was
181. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (quoting Young v. Quinlan,
960 F.2d 351, 364 (1992)), rev'don other grounds, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).
182. Jones'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1124 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
183. Mikel-Meredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem of Super-
max Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1505, 1512-13 (2004); see, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1928 ("Courts
must be sensitive to the State's interest in punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, as well as the
need for deference to experienced and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and
dangerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.").
184. Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); see also id. at 555 (holding that Nebraska
prison disciplinary policy violated inmates' due process rights by depriving them of good-time
credits without an opportunity for a hearing, but limited the holding by adding that inmates' rights
"may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment").
185. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). In Wolfish, the Court concluded that "[p]rison
administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and
to maintain institutional security." Id.
186. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981). However, in his dissent in Rhodes, Justice
Marshall wrote that it "is unrealistic to expect legislators to care whether the prisons are overcrowd-
ed or harmful to inmate health. It is at that point-when conditions are deplorable and the political
process offers no redress-that the federal courts are required by the Constitution to play a role." Id.
at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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weighed against the need to maintain adequate levels of security and
order within the institution.' 87 With regard to the subjective component,
the presence of a legitimate security interest may influence a determina-
tion of whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the pro-
tected interests of the inmate, as appeared to be part of the reasoning
underlying the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Scarver.in
However, the case law also reveals that there are limits to the level
of deference courts will accord prison officials in this context, 18 9 limits
that will be further explored below.190 As recently noted by the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Plata, where a substantial reduction in the census of
the California prison system was ordered, in part because of the inade-
quacy of the mental health services being provided to the inmates within
this system, "Courts may not allow constitutional violations to continue
simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of pris-
on administration."I91
IV. THE PROLONGED SUPERMAX SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF INMATES
WITH A MENTAL ILLNESS OR INMATES HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO A
MENTAL ILLNESS CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
187. The court stated that "[o]n the one hand, a condition that is sufficiently harmful to inmates
... will at some point yield to constitutional constraints, even if the condition has some penological
justification. ... On the other hand, a condition or other prison measure that has little or no penolog-
ical value may offend constitutional values upon a lower showing of injury or harm." Madrid v.
Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
188. Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 976-77 (7th Cir. 2006). As discussed, the plaintiff in
Scarver was also one of the plaintiffs in Jones'El. Christopher Scarver, as it turns out, was an espe-
cially difficult inmate. Suffering from schizophrenia, delusions, and constant voices in his head,
Scarver had murdered fellow inmates on two occasions since being incarcerated, claiming direction
from God. Notably, one of those inmates was the infamous Jeffrey Dahmer, a notorious serial killer.
Id. at 973. The court reasoned that "[p]rison authorities must be given considerable latitude in the
design of measures for controlling homicidal maniacs without exacerbating their manias beyond
what is necessary for security." Id at 976. The difficulty faced by prison officials weighing the
dangers of confinement against Scarver's unique danger to other inmates apparently contributed to
the court's refusal to issue a finding that deliberate indifference to Scarver's mental health needs
occurred. Id. at 976-77. Another way in which deference to a legitimate security interest could
negatively affect such a challenge is that a court may in fact find a violation of an inmate's constitu-
tional rights and, nevertheless, deny the requested relief. Indeed, Scarver was the only inmate denied
injunctive relief in Jones'El, based on a finding that he posed a significant security concern. See
Jones'EI v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1125-26 (W.D. Wis. 2001). Likewise, Scarver also was
denied monetary relief in Scarver, following a ruling that defendants' were entitled to qualified
immunity. Scarver, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1005. Strikingly, all three opinions addressing Scarver's
complaint in the two cases recited the same facts, but each interpreted the application of the requisite
deference differently.
189. See supra Part Ill.C.
190. See infra Part IV.
191. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928-29 (2011).
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Objects talk to me . . . . Sometimes the radiator comes alive and
tries to attack me. At night I get lonely and the door and the radiator
and the shadows come alive and try to get me.
-Supermax inmatel92
A. The Objective Component: Housing Inmates with a Mental Illness or
Inmates Who Are Highly Vulnerable to Mental Illness in Prolonged
Supermax Solitary Confinement Deprives Them of a Minimal Life Ne-
cessity Because this Setting Poses a Signficant Risk to Their Basic
Level ofMental Health, a Need "as Essential to Human Existence as
Other Basic Physical Demands, " with the Harm Suffered or Likely to
Be Suffered Sufficiently Serious to Constitute Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment
The research documenting the harmful psychological effects of pro-
longed solitary confinement is remarkable for its consistency. As one
researcher put it, "There is not a single published study of solitary or
super-max like confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement lasting
longer than ten days ... failed to result in negative psychological ef-
fects."' 9 3 Indeed, as will be discussed, the personal accounts, descriptive
studies, and systematic research spanning multiple continents over more
than a century is virtually unanimous in its conclusion: prolonged super-.
max solitary confinement can and does lead to significant psychological
harm. 194
As indicated,19 5 studies of the psychological effects of prolonged
supermax solitary confinement extend back to supermax's ill-designed
predecessor, the Pennsylvania model. For example, Francis Gray's ex-
tensive 1847 study, Prison Discipline in America, concluded that the
incidence of insanity and death at Pennsylvania model institutions far
192. McGEE ET AL., supra note 49, at 55 (quoting an inmate after eighteen months in solitary
confinement).
193. Haney, supra note 10, at 132; see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 120, at 9
("[Fifteen] days is the limit between 'solitary confinement' and 'prolonged solitary confinement'
because at that point, according to the literature surveyed, some of the harmful psychological effects
of isolation can become irreversible.").
194. See Gawande, supra note 68, at 37 (asserting that "to exist as a normal human being
requires interaction with other people" and tracing scientific research supporting the conclusion that
prolonged social isolation results in cognitive deterioration and the development of a range of psy-
chiatric symptoms to attachment studies by Harry Harlow with baby rhesus monkeys in the 1950s,
confirmed by EEG studies going back to the 1960s showing a "diffuse slowing of brain waves in
prisoners after a week or more of solitary confinement," and demonstrated by accounts provided by
a host of prisoners of war and prisoners in general placed in extended solitary confinement). But see
MAUREEN L. O'KEEFE ET AL., ONE YEAR LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION viii-ix (2010) (finding negative effects from prolonged adminis-
trative segregation, but concluding that it was not as detrimental to mental health as hypothesized).
This report, however, has sparked much controversy and criticism. See, e.g., SHARON SHALEV &
MONICA LLOYD, THOUGH THIs BE METHOD, YET THERE IS MADNESS IN'T: COMMENTARY ON ONE
YEAR LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION
2-5(2011).
195. See supra Part 11.
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outpaced those at more traditional institutions.'9 6 Gray remarked, "[I]t
appears that the system of constant separation as established here, even
when administered with the utmost humanity, produces so many cases of
insanity and of death as to indicate most clearly, that its general tendency
is to enfeeble the body and mind."l 9 7
Likewise, modem case studies and descriptive accounts provided by
mental health staff employed at modem supennax settings have consist-
ently reported the same adverse symptoms: appetite and sleep disturb-
ances, anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, paranoia, hallucinations, and
self-mutilations, among others.198 In addition, direct studies of prison
isolation have similarly documented a broad range of adverse psycholog-
ical symptoms, including, but not limited to, insomnia, anxiety, panic,
withdrawal, hypersensitivity, ruminations, cognitive dysfunction, hallu-
cinations, loss of control, irritability, aggression and rage, paranoia, de-
pression, self-mutilation, and suicidal ideation and behavior.'99 It has also
been determined that some of the negative health effects are long-term,
with
continued sleep disturbances, depression, anxiety, phobias, emotional
dependence, confusion, impaired memory and concentration [extend-
ing] long after the release from isolation. Additionally, lasting per-
sonality changes often leave individuals formerly held in solitary
confinement socially impoverished and withdrawn, subtly angry and
fearful when forced into social interaction[, which] often prevents in-
dividuals from successfully readjusting to life within the broader
prison population and severely impairs their capacity to reintegrate
into society when released from imprisonment. 200
What is particularly striking about these studies is not the range or
nature of these symptoms, but their overwhelming prevalence. Indeed, it
appears that an inmate in supermax confinement is virtually guaranteed
196. FRANCIS C. GRAY, PRISON DISCIPLINE IN AMERICA 181 (1847).
197. Id.
198. See Haney, supra note 10, at 130. See generally Frank J. Porporino, Managing Violent
Individuals in Correctional Settings, I J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 213 (1986); Robert G. Slater,
Psychiatric Intervention in an Atmosphere of Terror, 7 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 5 (1986).
199. See Haney, supra note 10, at 131; U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 120, at 18 ("Re-
search ... shows that solitary confinement appears to cause 'psychotic disturbances,' a syndrome
that has been described as 'prison psychoses.' Symptoms can include anxiety, depression, anger,
cognitive disturbances, perceptual distortions, paranoia and psychosis and self-harm."); Goode,
supra note 59 ("[S]tudies suggest that the rigid control, absence of normal human interaction and
lack of stimulation imposed by prolonged isolation can cause a wide range of psychological symp-
toms including insomnia, withdrawal, rage and aggression, depression, hallucinations and thoughts
of suicide, even in prisoners who are mentally healthy to begin with."). See generally Grassian,
supra note 10, at 1450-54; Grassian & Friedman, supra note 10; Craig Haney, Infamous Punish-
ment: The Psychological Consequences of Isolation, 8 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 3 (2007); Richard
Kom, The Effects of Confinement in the High Security Unit at Lexington, 15 SOCIAL JUST. 20
(1988).
200. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 120, at 18; see also Gawande, supra note 68, at 41
("One of the paradoxes of solitary confinement is that, as starved as people become for companion-
ship, the experience typically leaves them unfit for social interaction.").
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to develop some form of negative psychological effect as a result. In
perhaps the most significant study of supermax confinement, psycholo-
gist Craig Haney assessed 100 randomly selected inmates in SHU at Pel-
ican Bay in connection with the Madrid case. Haney concluded that 91%
of the inmates suffered from anxiety, 84% experienced insomnia, and
70% faced an "impending nervous breakdown." 201 Furthermore, 88%
were reported to be experiencing rumination and irrational anger, 86%
exhibited an oversensitivity to stimuli, 83% showed social withdrawal,
77% suffered chronic depression, 67% demonstrated "overall deteriora-
tion," 61% had violent fantasies, 41% reported hallucinations, and 27%
were suicidal.202
In addition, Haney noted a number of troubling social pathologies
connected to supermax confinement among the inmates. Indeed, the dep-
rivation of social interaction and the absence of external feedback appear
to cause even mentally stable inmates to suffer. As Haney explained:
Because so much of our individual identity is socially constructed
and maintained, the virtually complete loss of genuine forms of so-
cial contact and the absence of any routine and recurring opportuni-
ties to ground one's thoughts and feelings in a recognizable human
context leads to an undermining of the sense of self and a disconnec-
tion of experience from meaning. Supermax prisoners are literally at
risk of losing their grasp on who they are, of how and whether they
are connected to a larger social world. Some prisoners act out literal-
ly as a way of getting a reaction from their environment, proving to
themselves that they are still alive and capable of eliciting a genuine
response-however hostile-from other human beings.203
This desperation for external feedback is likely the cause of the high
prevalence of feces, urine, and semen throwing that occurs universally in
supermax confinement.204 One explanation for this behavior is that in-
mates are so desperate to gain some sort of attention, no matter how neg-
ative, they will use the only tool they have-their own body and its
products.205
Haney and other mental health experts have described these identi-
fied symptoms as a syndrome, calling it "isolation sickness," "reduced
environmental stimulation syndrome," or "security housing unit[] syn-
201. Haney, supra note 10, at 133.
202. Id at 134.
203. Id at 139-40.
204. RHODES, supra note 29, at 43-49.
205. Id. at 44, 46. Rhodes describes feces throwing as a uniquely social act: "[T]he products of
the body are also heavily charged symbolic carriers of the fact that you are 'other' than me; one way
a social boundary can be sustained is through the projection of disgust onto those on the 'other' side
of it." Id; see also Gawande, supra note 68, at 42 (noting that "[t]he main argument for using long-
term isolation in prisons is that it provides discipline and prevents violence," but countering that "the
evidence doesn't bear this out" and for individuals placed in extended solitary confinement,
"[r]esistance [is] often [their] sole means of maintaining a sense of purpose, and so their sanity").
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drome."2 0 6 One of the most detailed and well-known descriptions of this
phenomenon has been provided by Dr. Stuart Grassian.2 07 Grassian has
identified an extremely high prevalence of a number of related, severe
symptoms in these inmates, including hypersensitivity to external stimu-
li, perceptual distortions, aggressive fantasies, and hallucinations.2 08 Like
Haney, Grassian concluded that these symptoms constituted "a clinically
,,209distinguishable psychiatric syndrome.
As demonstrated by these studies, the psychological harms pro-
duced by supermax conditions clearly constitute a failure to provide a
significant minimal life necessity, namely a reasonable opportunity for
mental health as required by the Eighth Amendment. 2'0 The psychologi-
cal harm typically resulting from prolonged supermax solitary confine-
ment has consistently offended standards of decency for more than a
century-as evidenced by the eventual rejection of the Pennsylvania
model around the world, 2 1 1 and the outpouring of negative responses to
today's use of prolonged supermax solitary confinement. 2 12
In addition, research has established that inmates with a mental dis-
order are particularly vulnerable to suffering adverse psychological ef-
fects from this environment.213 It has been noted that solitary confine-
ment is "particularly damaging to those with pre-existing mental illness.
For these prisoners, solitary [confinement] poses a grave risk of psychiat-
ric injury, self-harm, and even suicide. Deprived of the social interaction
206. Haney, supra note 10, at 137.
207. See Grassian, supra note 10, at 1451-54.
208. Id. at 1452-53.
209. Id. at 1453; see also Goode, supra note 59 ("When Dr. Terry Kupers, a psychiatrist and
expert on the effects of solitary confinement, toured Unit 32 for the plaintiffs in the A.C.L.U. lawsuit
[challenging conditions in the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi's "super-
maximum-security prison"], he found that about 100 of the more than 1,000 inmates there had seri-
ous mental illness, in many cases improperly diagnosed. Some were actively hallucinating. Others
threw feces or urine at guards or howled in the night."); Fathi, supra note 163 ("It's long been
known that solitary confinement is extraordinarily damaging to mental health, often inducing mental
illness in previously healthy prisoners.").
210. See supra Part Ill.B.
211. See supra Part il.
212. See, e.g., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 55; Lenna Kurki &
Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and Problems ofSupermax Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385,
391 (2001); Charles A. Pettigrew, Comment, Technology and the Eighth Amendment: The Problem
ofSupermax Prisons, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 191, 191 (2002); U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 120,
at 7 ("[T]he social isolation and sensory deprivation that is imposed by some [nations] does, in some
circumstances, amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and even torture. The Special
Rapporteur's predecessors have noted that prolonged solitary confinement may itself amount to
prohibited ill-treatment or torture."); id at 23 ("Indefinite solitary confinement should be abol-
ished.... Solitary confinement must never be imposed or allowed to continue except where there is
an affirmative determination that it will not result in severe pain or suffering."); Weidman, supra
note 183, at 1505; COMMISSION, supra note 20, at 14 (recommending, after a year-long investigation
by a bipartisan national task force, prisons "[e]nd conditions of isolation" and "[e]nsure that segre-
gated prisoners have regular and meaningful human contact and are free from extreme physical
conditions that cause lasting harm"); Gawande, supra note 68, at 37-46; Goode, supra note 59;
Fathi, supra note 163; Editorial Board, The Abuse, supra note 175; Editorial Board, Solitary Con-
finement, supra note 175.
213. See Fathi, supra note 163; see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 120, at 19.
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that is essential to keep them grounded in reality, many prisoners with
mental illness experience catastrophic and often irreversible psychiatric
deterioration." 2 14 A United Nations report determined:
Research has shown that with respect to mental disabilities, soli-
tary confinement often results in severe exacerbation of a previously
existing mental condition. Prisoners with mental health issues deteri-
orate dramatically in isolation. The adverse effects of solitary con-
finement are especially significant for persons with serious mental
health problems which are usually characterized by psychotic symp-
toms and/or significant functional impairments. Some engage in ex-
treme acts of self-mutilation and even suicide. 215
This report concluded that "[nations] should abolish the use of solitary
confinement for .. . persons with mental disabilities." 2 16
Indeed, just as the Supreme Court in Helling found that a tobacco-
smoke-free environment is a minimal life necessity by contemporary
standards, and just as courts today routinely find basic physical condi-
tions such as sanitation,2 17 toilets, 218 Warmth, 219 and exercise 220 to be min-
214. Fathi, supra note 163.
215. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 120, at 19. To the extent that a court requires a show-
ing of physical harm in addition to mental harm, acts of self-mutilation and suicide should readily
satisfy such a requirement. See supra notes 169, 175, 198-99, 202, 214 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the Supreme Court and other courts have apparently embraced the recognition that mental
deterioration can readily lead to physical harm and injury. See supra notes 107-10, 125-28, 139-41
and accompanying text.
216. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 120, at 23; see also id. at 10 ("The Subcommittee on
Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has pointed
out that prolonged solitary confinement may amount to an act of torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment and recommended that solitary confinement should not be used
in the case of .. . the mentally disabled."); id. at 22 ("Considering the severe mental pain or suffering
solitary confinement may cause when used. . . for ... persons with mental disabilities, it can amount
to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); COMMISSION, supra note 20, at
14 ("Prisoners with a mental illness that would make them particularly vulnerable to conditions in
segregation must be housed in secure therapeutic units.").
217. See, e.g., Bumette v. Bureau of Prisons, 277 Fed. App'x 329, 331-32 (5th Cir. 2007)
(decrying inmates forced to endure odor of bagged sewage when prison officials refused to remove it
from their cells); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996) (cell "permeated with [s]tale air
that was [slaturated with [flumes of [fleces . . ., the smell of urine and vomit, as well as other bodily
odors" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Blake v. Hall, 688 F.2d 52, 56, 59 (1st Cir. 1981) (con-
demning a failure to remove food, garbage, and excrement on floors and walls).
218. See, e.g., Hears v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2005) (no working toilets);
Mitchell v. Newryder, 245 F. Supp. 2d 200, 204 (D. Me. 2003) (no access to bathroom facilities for
five hours while plaintiff sat in his own feces); Masonoff v. DuBois, 853 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D. Mass.
1994) (no access to flushing toilets).
219. See, e.g., Davis v. Biller, 41 Fed. App'x 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2002) (exposure to extreme
cold while in segregation); Moore v. Garner, 199 F. Supp. 2d 17, 37-38 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (subjec-
tion to prolonged "bitter cold"); Mitchell v. Shomig, 969 F. Supp. 487, 490 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (extend-
ed exposure to temperatures of fifty degrees or less).
220. See, e.g., Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that prison
officials prohibited inmate from "recreat[ing] for periods up to seven weeks in succession, and at
most, was called once every two weeks for sessions of no longer than one hour at a time" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Divers v. Dep't of Corr., 921 F.2d 191, 194 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that
inmate was allotted forty-five minutes per week of exercise while in segregation); Platt v. Brocken-
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imal life necessities falling within the Eighth Amendment objective
component requirement, it is hard to imagine that conditions that almost
inevitably lead to a significant deterioration of mental health do not trig-
ger protection as well, particularly when inmates with a mental illness or
inmates who are highly vulnerable to mental illness 2 2 1 are involved. In-
deed, in the recent landmark decision of Brown v. Plata, the Court found
adequate mental health care to be a basic need, the deprivation of which
constitutes a violation of the Eight Amendment.2 22 There, the Court com-
pared adequate mental health care to "basic sustenance." 223 As the court
in Madrid put it, "[I]t is beyond any serious dispute that mental health is
a need as essential to a meaningful human existence as other basic physi-
cal demands our bodies may make for shelter, warmth or sanitation." 2 24
B. The Subjective Component: The Placement oflnmates with a Mental
Illness or Inmates Who Are Highly Vulnerable to Mental Illness in
Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement Subjects Them as a Class
to a Substantial Present and Known Risk of Serious Harm and Consti-
tutes Deliberate Indifference to Their Needs in Violation of Their
Eighth Amendment Rights
As discussed, the fact that supermax confinement is likely to pose a
serious risk of harm to an inmate's mental health is not, by itself, enough
to establish a constitutional violation; the claimant must also establish
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the risk that this
placement posed to the inmate.225 As noted, courts have thus far general-
ly refused to find that prolonged supermax solitary confinement, without
more, violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unu-
borough, 476 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471-72 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (noting that inmate was only allowed to
exercise for one hour twice per month).
221. The application of this requirement to "inmates who are highly vulnerable to mental
illness" is derived in part from Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995). There, as
discussed, the court held that confinement in SHU constituted "cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment for two categories of inmates: those who are already mentally ill
and those who ... are at an unreasonably high risk of suffering serious mental illness." Id. at 1267
(emphasis added); see also supra note 136 and accompanying text. The court added that the condi-
tions presented a "substantial or excessive risk of harm" to "those [inmates] who the record demon-
strates are at a particularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe injury to their mental
health," which included "the already mentally ill, as well as persons with borderline personality
disorders, brain damage or mental retardation, impulse-ridden personalities, or a history of prior
psychiatric problems or chronic depression." Id. at 1265, 1267; see also supra note 140 and accom-
panying text. In addition, courts, other entities, and various commentators have noted the importance
of pre-placement screening and post-placement monitoring to identify inmates for whom psycholog-
ical harm is likely, in part because of the serious, long-term, and sometimes permanent nature of this
harm when it occurs. See supra notes 20, 22, 147-148, 161, 170, 177 and accompanying text. Final-
ly, the Supreme Court has stated: "We have great difficulty agreeing that prison authorities may not
be deliberately indifferent to an inmate's current health problems but may ignore a condition of
confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week
or month or year." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).
222. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011).
223. Id. at 1928.
224. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1261 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
225. See supra Part Ill.B.
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sual punishment.2 26 Although the research indicates that inmates in su-
permax confinement are highly likely to suffer some form of emotional
and psychological trauma,227 and that a number of inmates do suffer seri-
ous, often debilitating harm to their mental health,228 particularly when
their stay in this setting exceeds a relatively brief period of time, 229 not
all inmates will suffer serious harm to their mental health.230 Further-
more, it has been asserted that "taking prisoners out of these places often
goes a long way in reducing or eliminating the negative effects." 231 Thus,
although at some point the courts may find existing research sufficiently
convincing to conclude that these placements pose an unacceptable risk
of harm for inmates in general, this uncertainty as to who will be harmed
poses a significant impediment for claimants who are required under the
Supreme Court's current standard to establish that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to the risks posed.232
However, there is a subgroup of inmates, namely inmates with a
mental illness or inmates highly vulnerable to mental illness, for whom
the likelihood of a risk of harm is sufficiently established that the courts
can, and should, rule that prison officials are sufficiently aware of these
risks so that placing these inmates in prolonged supermax solitary con-
finement constitutes a deliberate indifference to their basic needs. In his
study of supermax confinement, Haney concluded that "[a]lthough in my
experience, virtually everyone in these units suffers, prisoners with
preexisting mental illnesses are at greater risk of having this suffering
deepen into something more permanent and disabling." 2 33 As discussed,
prisoners with a preexisting or a high vulnerability to mental illness are
far less likely to be able to withstand the stress, social isolation, sensory
226. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part IV.A.
228. Id.
229. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. When prisoners are sent to isolation as a
disciplinary measure for specific misbehavior, the stay typically lasts from ten to up to thirty days,
but the segregation associated with supermax confinement can last indefinitely. Goode, supra note
59.
230. Goode, supra note 59 ("Some inmates appear to function adequately in solitary confine-
ment or even say they prefer it.").
231. Haney, supra note 10, at 141. But see U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 120, at 9 ("[Fif-
teen] days is the limit between 'solitary confinement' and 'prolonged solitary confinement' because
at that point, according to the literature surveyed, some of the harmful psychological effects of
isolation can become irreversible."); Gawande, supra note 68, at 40 (asserting that prolonged solitary
confinement alters the normal functioning of the brain and often has long-term adverse psychologi-
cal effects). But see supra note 200 and accompanying text (noting that some of the negative health
effects are long-term).
232. See supra Part Ill.B. However, an inmate placed in prolonged solitary confinement may
be able to successfully pursue a procedural challenge that there is not a rational basis for this place-
ment and that the inmate should be transferred to the general population, although even here the
claim may be more likely to prevail if the inmate can establish that this confinement is having a
serious adverse effect on the inmate's mental health. See, e.g., United States v. Bout, No. 08 CR
365(SAS), 2012 WL 653882, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012). But see Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d
1001, 1014-16 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that inmates did not have a liberty interest in avoiding
transfer without due process).
233. Haney, supra note 10, at 142.
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deprivation, and idleness of supermax confinement.23 4 In Jones 'El, for
example, expert witness Dr. Terry Kupers testified that supermax condi-
tions were "toxic" for inmates with a mental illness.2 35 Dr. Kupers, who
had studied multiple supermax facilities all over the country, explained
that "[t]he almost total isolation and inactivity deprives seriously mental-
ly ill inmates of reality checks; they receive no feedback to keep their
psychosis in check."2 36
Similarly, in an interview with the Correctional Association of New
York (CANY), Dr. Grassian explained the effects of supermax confine-
ment on inmates with mental illness:
As a result of this [disorder], such individuals are almost pathologi-
cally stimulation seeking and incapable of tolerating stimulus depri-
vation. When placed in stringent conditions of confinement, they be-
come agitated and paranoid and their emotional state and behavior
deteriorates. Many become floridly psychotic or so agitated that they
engage in awful, grotesque behaviors. They cover themselves and
their cells with feces, they mutilate themselves; try to kill them-
selves. 237
Likewise, a retired supermax unit chief told CANY that "[m]y feeling is
that people with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, or major depression
should not be housed in SHU, period. These are seriously persistently
mentally ill people. SHU is not the place for them." 23 8
Another aspect of supermax confinement that should make the vul-
nerability of these inmates to serious harm relatively obvious to prison
officials is that supermax confinement, by its very nature, significantly
impedes the delivery of adequate mental health services on a timely ba-
sis. Prisons are ill equipped to meet the mental health needs of prisoners
in general, 239 but the restrictive measures inherent in supermax confine-
234. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text; see also BRUCE ARRIGO ET AL., THE
ETHICS OF TOTAL CONFINEMENT 61 (2011) ("[T]he effects of placing inmates with pre-existing
mental health conditions in solitary confinement-particularly in extreme isolative conditions and
for protracted periods of time-are especially devastating."); Haney, supra note 10, at 142.
235. Jones'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103 (W.D. Wis. 2001). Dr. Kupers used an
operational definition of "serious mental illness" that consisted of any one of five possible indica-
tors:
confirmed serious mental illness by evaluation of a mental health professional with the
assessment recorded electronically; multiple acute care admissions (at least three) to an
acute care facility at the state penitentiary; case management notes with mention of hallu-
cinations, delusions and psychotropic medications in the chart; mental health residency of
30 or more days in one of the department's residential mental health units; or an electron-
ically recorded diagnosis of a psychotic disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, de-
mentia or borderline personality.
Id. at 1107-08; see also supra note 19; infra note 266.
236. Id. at 1104.
237. CANY, supra note 78, at 48.
238. Id.
239. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MENTAL ILLNESS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND U.S. PRISONS 1-2
(2009).
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ment typically have the effect of further limiting, if not curtailing, what
little mental health treatment might otherwise have been forthcoming.240
This forces the many inmates with a mental illness who are more vulner-
able to the effects of this confinement to often face the tribulations of
supermax confinement unaided by treatment or other forms of assistance
that might prevent or diminish the harm they experience.2 4'
For example, Christopher Scarver, the prisoner who was part of the
plaintiff class in Jones 'El and who was the exclusive focus of Scarver,
while housed at Supermax in Boscobel, Wisconsin, suffered from "hear-
ing" constant voices in his head.242 Prior to being transferred to Super-
max, Scarver was able to use headphones and a radio to help drown out
the voices; however, a ban on such personal devices at Supermax meant
that this "aid" was not available to him there.243 As a result, after having
had virtually no problems for a number of years in a less restrictive facil-
ity, once placed in Supermax, Scarver resorted to banging his head
against the wall, engaged in multiple suicide attempts to "get the voices
to stop," and cut his head with a broken piece of glass "because [he]
wanted to see what was inside [his] head." 244 Surely, prison officials
would or should have been aware of such behavior and its implications.
In addition, being confined to a cell twenty-three hours per day
means that any mental health treatment that does occur in a supermax
setting is typically limited to "cell front therapy," in which "[inmates]
can [only] discuss intimate, personal problems with mental health staff
who cannot easily see or hear them through the cell doors (unless they
speak so loudly that other prisoners in the housing unit also can listen
rn)."245 In some facilities, mental health treatment is done via "'tele-
psychiatry' sessions, in which disembodied images attempt to assess and
address [inmates'] problems from distant locations." 24 6 In addition, Dr.
Kupers concluded that mental health staff, even when they interacted
240. Id. at 4 ("The psychological harm of supermaximum security confinement is exacerbated
because mental health professionals are not permitted to provide the full range of mental health
treatment services to the prisoners."); see also Fellner, supra note 15, at 404 ("In many segregation
units, mental health services are so poor that even floridly psychotic prisoners receive scant atten-
tion."). Supermax solitary confinement, designed to severely limit human interaction, also signifi-
cantly impairs inmates' interactions with mental health and other prison staff who might provide
them with needed assistance. Id. at 404-05, 411.
241. In light of the continual and close observation (albeit from a remote location) of inmates
in supermax confinement and the series of reports and court rulings that have been issued document-
ing this problem, it defies logic to assert that prison officials are unaware of the deterioration of the
mental health of inmates that often occurs in this setting.
242. Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 974-75 (7th Cir. 2006).
243. Id.
244. Jones'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1113-14 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (alterations in origi-
nal) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Haney, supra note 10, at 143.
246. Id In an effort to minimize direct human interaction and because supermax facilities tend
to be located in relatively remote locations and are relatively unrewarding or undesirable locations in
which to work, such facilities often rely instead on various technological means to enable mental
health professionals to communicate with inmates without being directly present. See supra note 84.
2012]1 43
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
with these inmates, were "too wary of malingering," causing them to
"overlook those who are in serious need of psychiatric help."247 Fre-
quently, even inmates who had been repeatedly admitted to psychiatric
hospitals, who were previously prescribed strong antipsychotic and
mood-regulating medications, and who had been previously diagnosed
with serious mental illnesses and treated for years, were nonetheless rou-
tinely found by staff to be malingering or "merely manipulating." 248
As the Supreme Court made clear in Farmer and Helling, if a threat
of actual injury posed by an environmental hazard to a class of inmates is
imminent, the failure to remedy that hazard constitutes deliberate indif-
ference on the part of prison officials. 24 9 The transfer of an inmate with a
mental illness or an inmate who is highly vulnerable to mental illness
into supermax confinement constitutes deliberate indifference to a signif-
icant risk that the inmate will suffer severe psychological harm. Not only
are inmates with or highly susceptible to a mental illness particularly
psychologically vulnerable to the strain and trauma caused by supermax
confinement, they are made more vulnerable by the fact that the restric-
tive environment of supermax renders meaningful treatment and moni-
toring of their mental health difficult if not impossible.
Given the widely accepted research findings that inmates with a
mental illness are a class particularly at risk, as well as the recognition of
this risk by courts dating back to Madrid, prison officials can no longer
genuinely claim that they are unaware of the risk prolonged supermax
solitary confinement poses to inmates with or highly vulnerable to a
mental illness. As a result, claimants can readily establish the requisite
deliberate indifference by such officials to the impact of prolonged soli-
tary confinement on these inmates.
247. Jones'El, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.
248. Id. Dr. Grassian noted:
There was too great a pull towards seeing inmate behavior as manipulative and to uncriti-
cally, reflexively, view inmates as 'malingering' without any meaningful attempt at psy-
chiatric evaluation-even utterly disregarding the existence of prior records clearly doc-
umenting serious psychopathology, and even utterly disregarding the fact that at the very
same time that the inmate was being diagnosed as 'malingering,' he was simultaneously
on high doses of potentially toxic antipsychotic medication.
CANY, supra note 78, at 59.
249. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) ("[A] prison official may be held liable
under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement . .. if he knows that
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it."); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) ("We have great difficulty
agreeing that prison authorities may not be deliberately indifferent to an inmate's current health
problems but may ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious
illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year. . . . That the Eighth Amendment
protects against future harm to inmates is not a novel proposition."); see also supra Part I1l.A-B.
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V. DEFUSING THE DEFERENCE DEFENSE:
THE MYTH OF THE "WORST OF THE WORST"
There is a notion in the popular mind that the people who end up in
solitary confinement are the most ruthless kind of James Cagneys of
the prison system. In fact, what you often see there is exactly the an-
tithesis: they are very often the wretched of the earth, people who are
mentally ill, illiterate, and cognitively impaired, people with neuro-
logical difficulties, people who just really can't manage to contain
their behavior at times. The prison system tends to respond to this by
punishment.250
As discussed above, judicial deference to penological and adminis-
trative concerns plays a significant role in Eighth Amendment challenges
to prison conditions.251 However, these concerns readily falter when at-
tention is focused on the large number of inmates with a mental illness
placed in prolonged supermax solitary confinement.
An assertion often advanced in describing and defending supermax
facilities is that they house the "worst of the worst"; the violent, danger-
ous inmates who simply cannot be housed anywhere else.252 According
to the National Institute of Corrections (NIC), supermax prisons house a
system's "most dangerous, recalcitrant, aggressive, and antagonistic in-
mates."253 It has described supermax facilities as existing for the "control
of inmates who have been officially designated as exhibiting violent or
seriously disruptive behavior while incarcerated." 25 4 In fact, one of the
primary rationales advanced in defense of supernax confinement is that
it lowers the overall level of violence in prison systems by placing the
most difficult-to-manage inmates in a facility or unit specially designed
to meet the challenges posed by these inmates.2 55 However, several stud-
ies have concluded that supermax facilities are not populated only by the
"worst of the worst," and that "the effectiveness of supermax prisons as a
mechanism to enhance prison safety remains largely speculative." 256
250. Stuart Grassian, Remarks at Advisory Committee Meeting of Correctional Association of
New York (June 26, 2002).
251. See supra Part 1II.D.
252. Kurki & Morris, supra note 212 ("Prison administrators often describe supermax inmates
as 'the worst of the worst'...."); RHODES, supra note 29, at 24 ("These facilities are routinely
described by correctional officials and in the press as housing 'the worst of the worst' and thus
serving as 'prisons within prisons."').
253. COLLINS, supra note 74, at v, xi.
254. RIVELAND, supra note 76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
255. Smith, supra note 26, at 443; see also Kurki & Morris, supra note 212 (identifying the
two most common express goals of supermax confinement to be the reduction of violence by sepa-
rating the most dangerous inmates and to provide a general deterrent of violence within the general
population, concluding "however, [that there is] only anecdotal evidence to support either of these
propositions," and noting that they have been "judged false by many prison researchers").
256. Smith, supra note 26, at 443; see also Goode, supra note 59 ("[P]rison systems began to
send people to segregation units who bore little resemblance to the serial killers or terrorists the
public imagined filled such prisons.. . . [P]rison officials started out isolating inmates they were
scared of but ended up adding many they were simply 'mad at."'); id. ("Some officials have also
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Nevertheless, this conception of supermax prisons still predominates.
According to one federal judge, for example, "[c]ommon sense . . . tells
us that the prisoners ... are apt to be the worst of the worst and that
guards must therefore use more repressive methods in dealing with
them."257
A. Who Really Is in Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement?
"Common sense" notwithstanding, nearly every expert who has
studied supermax confinement has expressed serious doubt that the in-
mates housed in them truly represent the "worst of the worst." 25 8 Dr.
Grassian told the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Pris-
ons 25 9 that "[m]any of these people [placed in supermax confinement]
who are said to be the 'worst of the worst' are simply the wretched of the
earth. They're sick people." 260 According to Craig Haney, "there is no
evidence that these allegedly 'worst' prisoners are any worse than those
who had been adequately managed by less dramatic measures in the
past."261 Likewise, Fred Cohen, a renowned expert on prison mental
health systems, concluded that "[s]erious doubts now have arisen as to
whether such facilities actually have the 'worst of the worst."'
2 62
Due to differing classification schemes and a dearth of definitive
empirical studies, it is difficult to ascertain exactly who is in supermax
confinement. 2 63 However, the research that does exist unanimously indi-
cates that supermax facilities and units house a disproportionately large
number of inmates suffering from a serious mental illness. In 2004,
CANY studied mental health care in prisons throughout the state of New
York, and concluded that 11% of the inmates in twenty-three-hour lock-
down had been diagnosed with "a major mental disorder such as schizo-
phrenia."264 The same report found that, at some prisons, more than 60%
of the inmates in supermax confinement were receiving mental health
265
services. A comprehensive study of inmates in Washington's super-
been persuaded by research suggesting that isolation is vastly overused and that it does little to
reduce overall prison violence. Inmates kept in such conditions, most of whom will eventually be
released, may be more dangerous when they emerge, studies suggest.").
257. Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 1996).
258. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
259. COMMISSION, supra note 20. Established by the Vera Institute of Justice in 2005, the
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons seeks to identify and recommend solutions
to serious challenges facing America's jails and prisons. Id at ii, 7. The Commission was co-chaired
by former United States Attorney General Nicholas B. Katzenbach and the Honorable John Gibbons.
Id. at iii.
260. Id. at 60. Dr. Grassian was referencing prisoners with a mental illness, and describing a
'revolving door' phenomenon where mentally ill prisoners in the most isolating conditions become
so acutely ill that they end up being committed to a psychiatric hospital, where they recover just
enough to be sent back to the control unit. And the cycle begins again." Id.
261. Haney, supra note 10, at 129.
262. 1 COHEN, supra note 21, at 11-3.
263. Goode, supra note 59.
264. CANY, supra note 78, at 48.
265. Id
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max facilities-known as "Intensive Management Units" (IMUs)-
concluded that "approximately 30 percent of IMU residents show evi-
dence of serious mental illness. This is substantially higher than the 10-
15 percent estimates of [serious mental illness] prevalence in [the] total
inmate population[]."2 66 A comprehensive Canadian study produced al-
most identical results, concluding that "29% of those in 'special handling
units' and 31% of those in 'long-term segregation units' suffered from
'severe mental disorders."' 2 67 Some, however, have suggested that even
higher prevalence levels exist. Craig Haney estimated the percentage of
supermax prisoners with a mental illness to be twice as high as found
among prisoners in the general population, with a study of two supermax
prisons in Indiana leading to the conclusion that "over half of the inmates
at the SHU are mentally ill." 2 68
B. How Do They Get There? A Look at the Classification Process
Generally, correctional systems employ two categories of segrega-
tion: administrative and punitive.2 69 Punitive segregation-also called
disciplinary segregation-is traditional solitary confinement where an
inmate receives a time-based sanction for a disciplinary infraction after
being afforded due process, which involves some sort of hearing and a
finding of guilt.27 0 On the other hand, placement in administrative segre-
gation, which includes supermax confinement, is left "solely [to] the
discretion of correctional administrators and staff."2 7 1 These placement
decisions are made unilaterally by prison officials and may last indefi-
nitely.27 2 As Craig Haney put it, "[M]any prisoners are placed in super-
max not specifically for what they have done but rather on the basis of
who someone in authority has judged them to be."2 73
Because placement in supermax confinement generally results from
a classification decision, rather than being the consequence of a discipli-
nary violation and a punitive sanction to which due process protections
attach, placement is almost always for an extended, indefinite period of
266. David Lovell et al., Who Lives in Super-Maximum Custody? A Washington State Study, 64
FED. PROBATION 33, 36 (2000). Researchers used a combination of five "proxy indicators" to identi-
fy serious mental illness: (1) the inmate had been confirmed as having a serious mental illness by
prison staff; (2) the inmate had multiple acute care admissions for the treatment of mental illness; (3)
case management notes mentioned the presence of hallucinations, delusions, or a prescription of
psychotropic medications; (4) a previous mental health residency had occurred lasting thirty or more
days; or (5) a diagnosis of a psychotic disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, dementia, or
borderline personality. Id. at 35-36; see also supra notes 19, 235.
267. Sheilagh Hodgins & Gilles C6td, The Mental Health ofPenitentiary Inmates in Isolation,
33 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 175, 176, 180 (1991).
268. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 58, at 17.





273. Haney, supra note 10, at 127.
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time. 274 The NIC reports that the average length of stay an inmate can
expect once placed in supermax confinement is "at least 12-24 months,
if not longer." 2 75 The average length of time spent in the federal super-
max facility in Florence, Colorado, for example, is over three years; the
minimum stay in South Carolina's Kirkland supermax unit is a year and
a half, and transfer out of Virginia's Red Onion supermax prison requires
at least two years of confinement during which time no disciplinary in-
fractions have been committed by the inmate.2 76
Classification criteria for placement in supermax confinement are
often ambiguous. 277 In 1996, the NIC surveyed twenty-nine prison sys-
tems across the United States, of which eleven indicated that 1% or less
of all inmates were in the supermax category, seven said that 5%-8%
278were, and one responded that 20% of its inmates fell in this category.
This survey suggests that the methods prison officials use to identify a
"supermax inmate" vary widely from system to system. What these clas-
sification procedures suggest, moreover, is that they allow prison offi-
cials a significant degree of discretion in assigning inmates. 27 9 Although
inmates may typically be placed in supermax confinement because of
gang activity or violent behavior, it appears that most or all supermax
settings also have a "catchall" category that permits confinement for
merely difficult or disruptive behavior.2 80 In the state of Washington, for
example, inmates may end up in supermax confinement after being de-
termined to exhibit "unpredictability" or "extremely bizarre behavior," or
for being "difficult to manage in other prison settings." 28 1 In New York's
correctional facilities, one can be assigned to supermax confinement for
"committing an unhygienic act" or "disobeying a direct order."2 8 2
Not surprisingly, the broad nature of the classification schemes em-
ployed and their focus on disruptive or difficult behavior means that the
types of behaviors sometimes associated with mental illness can serve as
grounds for supermax confinement. As Craig Haney puts it:
274. Id.
275. COLLINS, supra note 74, at 6.
276. Kurki & Morris, supra note 212, at 388.
277. Indeed, many commentators have raised the problem of overclassification in this setting,
with prison officials feeling pressure to fill empty supermax beds both because the general popula-
tion is typically overcrowded and because supermax facilities are costly and prison officials fear
budget cuts, or perceptions of waste, if these beds are not kept full. See Demaio, supra note 20, at
216.
278. COLLINS, supra note 74, at 6.
279. See Goode, supra note 59 ('"Certainly there are a small number of people who for a
variety of reasons have to be maintained in a way that they don't have access to other inmates,' said
Chase Riveland, a former head of corrections in Colorado and Washington State who now serves as
an expert witness in prison cases. 'But those in most systems are pretty small numbers of people."').
280. Id. ("[P]rison officials started out isolating inmates they were scared of but ended up
adding many they were simply 'mad at."').
281. Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 37.
282. CANY, supra note 78, at 50.
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Unproblematic adjustment to prison requires conformity to rigidly
enforced rules and highly regimented procedures. Many mentally ill
prisoners lack the capacity to comply with these demands and they
may end up in trouble as a result. If they are not treated for their
problems, the pattern is likely to be repeated and eventually can lead
to confinement in a supermax unit.283
That is, prison officials often "treat disordered behavior as disorder-
ly behavior." 284 The result is that "[tjhe mentally ill are disproportionate-
ly represented among prisoners in segregation."285
C. Inability to Conform Their Behavior
Facilities also typically employ a system of "levels or steps" by
which inmates in supermax confinement can "earn" their way back to
less restrictive housing by going lengthy periods of time without any
disciplinary violations.2 86 The goal is to encourage inmates to take re-
sponsibility for their actions and show that they are capable and willing
to conform to the rigid structure of prison life if they want to return to
general population. According to one commentator, "the logic of the
infraction system is ... to engage the rationality of the inmate. It posits
that eventually-if staff hold their ground and refuse to deviate from
supplying consequences [for misbehavior]-the prisoner will make a
connection between what he does and what happens to him" and change
his behavior accordingly. 287 But what happens when the environment of
supermax confinement triggers those very behaviors that result in infrac-
tions, thereby precluding such a progression?
In Jones'El, Dr. Kupers randomly selected twenty-one inmates and
determined that eight suffered from a serious mental illness.288 Of those
eight, just one had ever made it to level three, and only briefly, with pro-
gression to a level five required to "graduate" from supermax confine-
ment 289 The court noted that these prisoners were "stuck on levels one
and two," and concluded that they were "not able to control their behav-
ior to reach higher levels."2 90 For example, when one of the eight in-
mates, Christopher Scarver, began banging his head against the wall out
of desperation to silence the constant voices in his head, he was denied
promotion to the next level.291 In conjunction with this denial, a mental
health staff worker wrote the following message to Scarver: "[Tihe inci-
283. Haney, supra note 10, at 142; see also HANS TOCH & KENNETH ADAMS, ACTING OUT:
MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN CONFINEMENT 13 (2002).
284. Developments in the Law, supra note 118, at 1145.
285. Fellner, supra note 15, at 402.
286. COLLINS, supra note 74, at 6.
287. RHODES, supra note 29, at 77.
288. Jones'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1108 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
289. Id. The inmates had been in this setting from one to three years. Id. at 1108-16.
290. Id. at 1120.
291. Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2006).
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dent of you banging your head on the wall and other bizarre behavior is
not appropriate. We highly recommend that you cooperate [with] clinical
services so that advancement can be considered in the future."292 This
example demonstrates that there is little penological purpose being
served by such a system when its infraction system is based on the ra-
tionality of the inmate but is applied to an irrational inmate. As Judge
Posner rightly commented, Scarver "was banging his head because he
was crazy, not because he was unwilling to cooperate." 293
This type of incident, of course, is not unique to Scarver. Indeed,
Dr. Kupers noted that several of the eight inmates with a serious mental
illness who he examined appeared to have no knowledge of "why they
were [in] Supermax or what they had to do to advance to a higher lev-
el."294 Research has indicated that inmates with a mental illness are gen-
erally more likely to accumulate disciplinary infractions than counter-
parts who do not have a mental illness. For example, one study of the
mental health records of 9,013 inmates in New York found that inmates
with a mental illness accumulated significantly more disciplinary viola-
tions than did other inmates. 295 Another study examined 3,426 federal
prison inmates and found a disciplinary infraction rate of 21.6 per 100
inmates for those inmates with a mental illness, and 14.0 per 100 inmates
for all other inmates.296 And perhaps most striking, when CANY con-
ducted interviews with nearly 200 inmates in supermax facilities in New
York, it discovered that the average stay was six-and-a-half times longer
for inmates who appeared on the mental health caseload than for all other
297
inmates.
D. What's the Point? Looking for a Penological Justification
The Supreme Court has made it clear that deference to penological
interests must play a part in appraising Eighth Amendment challenges to
prison conditions, and that the legitimate security needs of the prison
must be balanced against the gravity of the harm incurred by the in-
mates.298 However, the arguments advanced as to the security needs
served by supermax confinement tend to be largely unsubstantiated
claims that its imposition reduces violence and improves prison function-
ing by isolating the most dangerous prisoners-the "worst of the
worst." 29 9 The actual effectiveness and function of supermax settings in
292. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
293. Id.
294. Jones'El, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
295. Kurki & Morris, supra note 212, at 411-12.
296. Kenneth Adams, Former Mental Patients in a Prison and Parole System, 10 CRIM. JUST.
BEHAV. 358, 362, 368 (1983).
297. CANY, supra note 78, at 50.
298. See supra Part III.D.
299. See supra Part V.A-B.
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achieving these goals have been called into doubt.3 00 Furthermore, it is
not clear how certain aspects of supermax confinement, such as reduced
access to vocational opportunities, personal items, and outdoor time, are
rationally related to the penological interest in reducing violence. 30 1
With regard to inmates with a mental illness, the security interest
achieved is even more questionable. Given the disproportionately high
number of inmates with a mental illness in supermax confinement, given
the grave effect it has on their mental health, and given the fact that they
are so often unable to conform adequately to the rigid disciplinary struc-
ture necessary to progress out of this setting, 302 it appears that housing
inmates with a mental illness in supermax confinement more likely cre-
ates a penological burden, rather than diminishes it. Surely, no penologi-
cal purpose can be served by herding inmates into an expensive and per-
petual cycle of disciplinary infractions and further confinement of which
the primary effect appears to be the exacerbation of the mental illness
that was the root of their placement in the first place, but which may also
render them more violent, unresponsive, impulsive, or disruptive.
Supermax settings do not contain the "worst of the worst"; they
contain a mix of the "worst of the worst" and a relatively random group
of inmates who in one way or another have been difficult to deal with.
As Fred Cohen asserts, it is possible that supermax settings actually con-
tain more of the "wardens' 'problem children' than the "worst of the
worst."3 03 Unfortunately, a significant number of these "problem chil-
dren" are inmates with a mental illness for whom supermax confinement
serves only to magnify, rather than solve, a penological problem. As the
court in Ruiz put it, supermax settings have become "a repository for a
great number of mentally ill citizens. . . . Then, in a tragically ironic
twist, they may be confined in conditions that nurture, rather than abate,
their psychosis."304
300. See, e.g., Daniel P. Mears & Jamie Watson, Towards a Fair and Balanced Assessment of
Supermax Prisons, 23 JUST. Q. 232, 235 (2006) ("[S]cant attention has been given to how supermax
prisons achieve specific goals, thus undermining the plausibility of causal claims about the effec-
tiveness of these prisons."); C. S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on
Aggregate Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1367 (2003) (describing a study
of changes in inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assaults in four states, concluding that the
opening of supermax prisons had no effect on and may have increased system-wide violence);
SHALEV, supra note 45, at 209 ("[T]he introduction of supermax prisons has not, in fact, succeeded
in reducing violence throughout the prison estate, and may have even contributed to its increase.").
301. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that "aspects of
the conditions in the SHU . . . appear tenuously related to legitimate penological interests . ... For
example, it is not clear how the lack of an outside view, the extreme sterility of the environment, and
the refusal to provide any recreational equipment in the exercise pen . . . furthers any interest other
than punishment, and defendants have not advanced one.").
302. See supra Parts IV.A., V.A-C.
303. 1 COHEN, supra note 21, at 11-31.
304. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999), revd on other grounds, 243
F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).
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It may be that the number of inmates with a mental illness in su-
permax confinement and their ready placement there, and the fact that
broad infraction schemes keep them there, is due more to the political
reality of supermax settings than a legitimate security interest. The reali-
ty of today's supermax confinement is perhaps best understood by com-
paring it to its earlier counterpart-the Pennsylvania model.30 s Nine-
teenth-century experiments with prolonged solitary confinement, howev-
er misguided, were apparently rationalized by the belief that they could
effectively rehabilitate a prisoner by forcing him into a state of introspec-
tion and meditation. 30 6 Accordingly, they were rather abruptly abandoned
when it was discovered that they had little rehabilitative value.307
Today's supermax confinement utilizes a very similar technique but
with a very different, albeit equally misguided, justification. Arising in
an increasingly punitive political environment, 30s the core logic that un-
derlies its employment is "punitive individualism," which focuses on
wrongful acts and a belief that inmates should be held accountable for
their actions.3 09 Its guiding principle is that inmates who fail to conform
to society's rules have chosen to be difficult and therefore deserve to be
further punished for their infractions. As one commentator put it, "The
belief that the inmate moves in a charmed circle of his own reason and
autonomy-or that he can be made to do so through discipline-is what
ultimately justifies practices of order within the prison."310 In reality, the
modem supermax is not the unfortunate but necessary place to house the
"worst of the worst." Instead, it is a calculated disciplinary mechanism.
But when an inmate can neither conform to the rules generated by this
mechanism nor benefit from resulting discipline, and is only made worse
as a result of this placement, its penological purpose ceases to be valid.
In reality, today's supermax confinement has devolved to the point
where it primarily serves another function: namely, a convenient, albeit
inefficient and cruel, administrative solution to the pressing challenge
posed by difficult prisoners with a mental disorder who permeate the
correctional system. It is the real-life manifestation of the proverbial
"lock 'em up and throw away the key" approach, as it has become a "re-
pository" for difficult-to-manage inmates with a mental illness.. and
305. See supra Part H.
306. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
307. See supra Part 11.
308. See supra notes 53-56.
309. RHODES, supra note 29, at 84.
310. Id. at 81.
311. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 243
F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).
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,,3 12their placement "of last resort. Supermax confinement has become a
warehouse for the system's and society's mental health problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
The increasing number of inmates with a mental disorder in Ameri-
ca's prison population and the inadequacy of their treatment and housing
conditions have been issues of growing significance in recent years. The
U.S. Department of Justice estimates that "over one and a quarter million
people suffering from mental health problems are in prisons or jails, a
figure that constitutes nearly sixty percent of the total incarcerated popu-
lation in the United States." 313 Furthermore, a person suffering from a
mental illness in the United States is three times more likely to be incar-
cerated than hospitalized,3 14 with as many as 40% of those who suffer
from a mental illness coming into contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem every year3 15 and police officers almost twice as likely to arrest
someone who appears to have a mental illness. 3 16 As a result, the United
States penal system has become the nation's largest provider of mental
health services, 317 a "tragic consequence[] of inadequate community
mental health services combined with punitive criminal justice poli-
* ,,318cdes.
This growth in the number of inmates with a mental disorder, com-
bined with the recent rise of prolonged supermax solitary confinement
and the increasingly punitive nature of the American penological sys-
tem, 3 19 has resulted in a disproportionately large number of inmates with
a mental disorder being housed in supermax confinement.3 20 The harsh
restrictions of this confinement often significantly exacerbate these in-
mates' mental disorders or otherwise cause significant additional harm to
their mental health, as well as preclude proper mental health treatment.32 1
Given this impact, focusing on "punitive individualism" 322 in this setting
is not only an ill-suited response to the penological challenges these in-
312. The phrase "asylums of last resort," and versions of it, have been used on and off by
various commentators in a variety of different ways, but was most notably used in this context by
Loma Rhodes to refer to supermax units. RHODES, supra note 29, at 99.
313. Developments in the Law, supra note 118, at 1145.
314. Rita Rubin, Mentally Ill People Are Sent to Jail More Often Than Hospital, USA TODAY,
May 12, 2010, at 4D.
315. Mental Health Early Intervention, Treatment, and Prevention Act of 2000, S. 2639, 106th
Cong. § 2 (2000).
316. JENNIFER WOOD ET AL., CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL lHEALTH SERVICES & CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESEARCH, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, POLICE INTERVENTIONS WITH PERSONS AFFECTED BY
MENTAL ILLNESSES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL THINKING AND PRACTICE 11 (2011).
317. Shane Levesque, Closing the Door: Mental Illness, the Criminal Justice System, and the
Need for a Uniform Mental Health Policy, 34 NOVA L. REV. 711, 713 (2010).
318. Fellner, supra note 15, at 392.
319. See supra notes 55-56, 59-72, 313-18 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Part IV.
322. RHODES, supra note 29, at 84.
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mates pose but also inappropriate in light of the inability of many of
these inmates to conform their behavior within the prison environment.323
Housing inmates with a mental disorder in prolonged supermax
solitary confinement deprives them of a minimal life necessity because
this setting poses a significant risk to their basic level of mental health, a
need "as essential to . . . human existence as other basic physical de-
mands,"3 24 and thereby meets the objective element required for an
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim.3 25 In addition,
placing such inmates in supermax confinement constitutes deliberate
indifference to their needs as this setting exposes this class of readily
identifiable and vulnerable inmates to a present and known risk by know-
ingly placing them in an environment that is uniquely toxic to their con-
dition.326 Whether it is called torture, a violation of evolving standards of
human decency, or cruel and unusual punishment, truly "[a] risk this







See supra Part V.D.
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1261 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1266.
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REQUIRING THE STATE TO JUSTIFY SUPERMAX
CONFINEMENT FOR MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS:
A DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION APPROACH
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ABSTRACT
The Eighth Amendment has long served as the traditional legal ve-
hicle for challenging prison conditions, including long-term isolation or
"supermax" confinement. As described by Hafemeister and George in
their article, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment Analysis of
Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a
Mental Illness, some prisoners with mental illness have prevailed in
Eighth Amendment challenges to prolonged isolation. Yet an equal or
greater number of these claims have been unsuccessful. This Essay con-
siders why some of these cases fail, and suggests that one reason is that
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not contain a well-defined doctri-
nal framework for courts to use in considering a prison's proffered "le-
gitimate penological interest" in a given condition of confinement, in-
cluding prolonged supermax confinement. In this Essay, we explore the
idea that the federal disability discrimination statutes may offer a more
tailored methodology for challenging solitary confinement of mentally ill
prisoners. Unlike an Eighth Amendment claim, in which a prisoner typi-
cally challenges the aggregate of supermax conditions, a disability dis-
crimination approach requires courts to assess the individual conditions
that comprise supermax confinement, a process that requires an analysis
of whether discrimination is occurring vis-a-vis each component depriva-
tion. Finally, the Essay concludes by examining the disability discrimina-
tion approach in the context of claims asserted by the Civil Rights Clinic
of the University of Denver Sturm College of Law on behalf of a mental-
ly ill man who has been in isolation for over a decade.
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INTRODUCTION
A man is taken away from his experience of society, taken away
from the experience of a living planet of living things, when he is
sent to prison.
A man is taken away from other prisoners, from his experience of
other people, when he is locked away in solitary confinement in the
hole.
Every step of the way removes him from experience and narrows it
down to only the experience of himself.
There is a thing called death and we have all seen it. It brings to an
end a life, an individual living thing. When life ends, the living thing
ceases to experience.
The concept of death is simple: it is when a living thing no longer
entertains experience.
So when a man is taken farther and farther away from experience,
he is being taken to his death.
-Jack Henry Abbott
As described in The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on In-
mates with a Mental Illness, the practice of housing prisoners in pro-
longed isolation or "supermax" conditions has grown significantly over
the past few decades.2 Today, at least 25,000 prisoners across the country
are held in long-term solitary confinement. 3 Many of them have mental
1. JACK HENRY ABBOTr, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM PRISON 52-53
(1981).
2. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness,
90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2012).
3. Ryan Devereaux, Solitary Confinement on Trial: Senators Hear From Experts on Prison
Reform, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 19, 2012, 12:25 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/I 9/solitary-confinement-trial-us-senators. Some esti-
mates place the number of people in solitary confinement closer to 80,000. Id.; see also Reassessing
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illnesses that caused or contributed to their segregation, and even those
without a pre-diagnosed condition suffer mental health harms as a result
of prolonged isolation.
The idea that supermax confinement can cause or worsen mental
health issues is both intuitively obvious and supported by psychological
studies.4 This psychological trauma results not only from the characteris-
tic separation from other people but also from the confluence of extreme-
ly restrictive conditions that comprise solitary confinement. As noted by
Hafemeister and George, this collection of conditions is remarkably uni-
form. Typical segregation involves being locked up alone in a small cell
for twenty-three hours or more each day.5 Meals generally come through
a slot in the solid steel door of the cell, as do any communications with
prison staff.6 Most prisoners are permitted to exercise one hour a day in a
fenced area that resembles a "dog run," though even this time is spent
alone.7 Segregated prisoners usually are denied many services and pro-
grams provided to non-segregated prisoners, such as educational classes,
job training, drug treatment, work, or other kinds of rehabilitative pro-
gramming. Access to law libraries, family visits, and phone calls is very
limited. And prisoners in solitary confinement typically are not permitted
any human touch, save for when the correctional officers shackle them to
escort them from location to location.9
Students at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law's Civil
Rights Clinic (CRC or the Clinic) are all too familiar with the use of
Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, 112th
Cong. (June 19, 2012) [hereinaflter Hearings] (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (citing the Bureau of
Justice statistics).
4. Dr. Craig Haney, a psychologist who has studied the effects of solitary confinement for
nearly thirty years and has visited dozens of solitary-confinement units across the country detailed
the effects of these conditions generally in an expert report in the Clinic's case Silverstein v. Federal
Bureau ofPrisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2011 WL 4552540 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2011). In that report, he
summarized decades of research, concluding that
[tIhe psychological effects of solitary or isolated confinement are well understood.
Knowledge of these effects is based on literature developed over many years, by re-
searchers and clinicians from diverse backgrounds and perspectives. The literature is em-
pirically consistent-virtually every one of the studies conducted has documented the
psychologically precarious state of persons confined under conditions of penal isolation,
and many address in detail the pain and suffering that isolated prisoners endure. It is also
theoretically sound; there are numerous reasons why one would expect long-term isola-
tion, the absence of meaningful social interaction and activity, and the other severe depri-
vations that are common under conditions of solitary confinement to have harmful psy-
chological consequences.
Report of Craig William Haney at 3-4, Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471 (D.
Colo. Apr. 13, 2009), 2009 WL 8514046.
5. Dr. Haney testified at Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Reassessing Solitary Confine-
ment, where he detailed the conditions generally seen in isolation or supermax units. See Hearings,






long-term solitary confinement in both state and federal prisons in Colo-
rado. One of six clinics comprising the Student Law Office,' the Civil
Rights Clinic represents prisoners in cases challenging the constitutional-
ity of their prison conditions." The law school is 100 miles away from
Colorado's "prison valley," an area near Cafion City that holds thirteen
prisons, several of which are supermax facilities.12 This region contains
the nation's only federal supermax-the U.S. Penitentiary, Administra-
tive Maximum (ADX)-as well as three solitary-confinement facilities
run by the state system, the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC). Many of the Clinic's clients have been held in solitary con-
finement for years and, in the case of one client, for decades.' 3 Having
conducted interviews and corresponded with hundreds of prisoners in
these facilities, the Civil Rights Clinic has made the constitutionality of
conditions in solitary confinement the focus of its current caseload. Over
the past five years, our cases have challenged the living conditions at
various supermax facilities, the processes by which prisoners are placed
and retained in these facilities, and the treatment of prisoners with mental
illness in supermax prisons.14
In The Ninth Circle of Hell, Hafemeister and George assert that
long-term solitary confinement of mentally ill prisoners violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
They offer this assertion both normatively and descriptively, setting forth
the theoretical basis for why isolation of mentally ill prisoners should be
unconstitutional and citing case law for the proposition that many courts
have so held. As a normative matter, we agree that holding mentally ill
prisoners in long-term segregation should be illegal. But we do not be-
lieve that courts are reaching this conclusion with the consistency or ease
10. The Student Law Office (SLO) is the in-house clinical education program at the Universi-
ty of Denver Sturm College of Law. Founded in 1904, the SLO is one of the oldest clinical programs
in the country. In the SLO, students develop their legal knowledge, lawyering skills, and profession-
al values while working with underserved clients and communities to address urgent problems,
influence public policy, and improve the quality of legal problem solving.
11. A brief overview of all of the Civil Rights Clinic's cases can be found at University of
Denver Sturm College of Law's website. Civil Rights Clinic Cases, STURM COLL. OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, http://law.du.edu/index.php/law-school-clinical-program/civil-rights-
clinic/civil-rights-clinic-cases (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
12. See Welcome to Prison Valley, TIMECOM PHOTOS,
http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2009197_2173542,00.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2012).
13. One of the Clinic's clients has been in solitary confinement for over twenty-nine years.
See Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2011 WL 4552540, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
30, 2011).
14. The Civil Rights Clinic operates as most law-school clinics do, though our docket is
somewhat unusual in that our cases are litigated in federal court and generally take several years to
complete. See generally Paul D. Reingold, Why Hard Cases Make Good (Clinical) Law, 2 CLINICAL
L. REV. 545, 545 (1996). CRC students who have been admitted to practice by court order represent
clients under the supervision of clinic faculty. While enrolled in the CRC, the student attorneys
perform all of the required litigation tasks on their cases, including client counseling, propounding
and responding to discovery requests, taking and defending depositions, drafting motions and briefs,
and conducting trials.
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portrayed by Hafemeister and George. While acknowledging that a
state's "legitimate penological interest" in holding a prisoner in segrega-
tion is a factor considered by the courts in determining the constitutional-
ity of solitary confinement, Hafemeister and George assert that this fac-
tor will, or at least should, "readily falter" in cases involving prisoners
with mental illness.15 By contrast, our review of the cases and our expe-
rience litigating Eighth Amendment cases on behalf of individual plain-
tiffs is that an asserted "legitimate penological interest" plays a signifi-
cant, and potentially determinative, role in judicial decisions of the con-
stitutionality of solitary confinement.1 6 We believe that when prison offi-
cials claim that isolation is necessary for correctional purposes, such as
safety and security, courts often will hold that there is no violation of the
Eighth Amendment-even when the prisoner is mentally ill.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. In Part I, we describe the failure
of Eighth Amendment doctrine to explicitly consider a state's interest in
a challenged prison condition and discuss the ways in which the legiti-
macy of the state's interest nevertheless pervades-and sometimes dic-
tates-the outcome of Eighth Amendment claims challenging the impo-
sition of solitary confinement on mentally ill prisoners. In Part II, we
share our thinking about an alternative legal approach the CRC is explor-
ing to address the overuse of long-term solitary confinement for people
with mental illness. This approach, which is grounded in the federal dis-
ability rights statutes, may provide an additional vehicle for some people
with mental illness to challenge some of the component conditions that
comprise supermax confinement.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
THE UNDEFINED ROLE OF "LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL INTEREST"
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim that a prison condition is
cruel and unusual, a prisoner must satisfy a two-prong test with objective
and subjective components. The objective prong requires the prisoner to
demonstrate that the challenged condition is sufficiently serious to merit
review, either because it deprives a prisoner of a "basic human need"' 7 or
because the condition presents a "substantial risk of serious harm."' The
15. Hafemeister & George, supra note 2, at 45.
16. This dynamic exists not only in Eighth Amendment cases but also in cases in which a
prisoner challenges prolonged or indefinite placement in solitary confinement as a violation of his
rights under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1011 (10th Cir.
2012); Silverstein, 2011 WL 4552540, at *1.
17. The Eighth Amendment violation must include "the deprivation of a single, identifiable
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); see also
Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The Eighth Amendment requires jail officials
'to provide humane conditions of confinement by basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shel-
ter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates' safety."' (quoting
Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998))).
18. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-38 (1993) (finding sufficiently grave
harm where there was a "substantial risk of serious harm" resulting from second-hand smoke).
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subjective prong requires a showing that prison officials acted with "de-
liberate indifference" in imposing or maintaining the condition despite
knowing about the harm or risk of harm. 19 Notably, the test is silent with
respect to penological interest.
Despite the fact that the Eighth Amendment inquiry does not con-
template a role for the state's penological interest in determining the con-
stitutionality of a prison condition, we agree with Hafemeister and
George that judicial deference to any "legitimate penological interests"
asserted by prison officials is a "significant hurdle" to successful litiga-
tion under the Eighth Amendment.20 Having said that, however, we ques-
tion their conclusion that the penological and administrative concerns
underlying this deference will be overcome in cases in which mentally ill
prisoners are being held in isolation. 2 ' Although it is true that several
class action lawsuits have succeeded in challenging this practice, the
more common lawsuits brought by individual plaintiffs have not consist-
ently fared as well. 22 Many Eighth Amendment cases brought by mental-
19. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
20. Hafemeister & George, supra note 2, at 32.
21. Id. Although Hafemeister and George discuss several cases that hold that mentally ill
prisoners should not be in solitary confinement, these are class action lawsuits. Id. at 25-31. The one
case they cite in which a mentally ill plaintiff lost was an individual suit. Id. at 27-28.
22. We are unaware of any in-depth analysis of the reasons why individual cases have not
fared as well as class actions in challenges brought on behalf of mentally ill individuals. A reading of
the cases offers several possibilities. First, many individual prisoner-plaintiffs are not represented
and cannot afford counsel or expensive mental health experts. Although this distinction is important,
it is not independently sufficient because there are cases where prisoners are represented and these
claims are still dismissed. See, e.g., Home v. Coughlin, 155 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1998); Williams v.
Branker, No. 5:09-CT-3139-D, 2011 WL 649845 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 10, 2011). Second, class action
cases appear to bear a lower causal burden than cases brought by individual plaintiffs. Typically,
mentally ill plaintiffs must demonstrate that any deterioration in their condition is caused by solitary
confinement and not the course of their disease generally. See generally Helling, 509 U.S. at 35-36
(requiring condition to cause risk). In a single-plaintiff case, it may be difficult to demonstrate this
causal relationship and to exclude other potential causes, such as prison generally, age, or other
factors. See generally Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2011 WL 4552540, at
*18 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2011) (denying risk of harm from insomnia because plaintiff failed to
demonstrate "direct connection" between harm and isolation, and relied on general studies regarding
mental harms caused by solitary confinement, which were not found to be persuasive). If the indi-
vidual prisoner-plaintiff has not notably deteriorated in solitary confinement, this may actually count
against him, perhaps because it is believed that the risk of harm going forward is lessened. See
Farmer v. Kavanagh, 494 F. Supp. 2d 345, 367 (D. Md. 2007) ("It should be noted that Ms. Farmer's
conditions, at least as documented in the record before the court, have not led to the type of violence
and uncontrollable behavior exhibited by the plaintiffs discussed in Jones 'El, whose incarceration in
Supermax unhinged them from any connection to the world around them."). Class action plaintiffs,
however, can rely upon broader data and studies regarding the effects of solitary confinement on
mentally ill people more generally, making the causal proposition easier to prove. See generally
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (relying, in part, on interviews of sixty-five
individuals to demonstrate harm to entire class). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, legitimate
penological interest is harder to demonstrate in the context of a class. When a single plaintiff is
before the court, the prison officials can put on evidence of his crimes and risks in the prison system,
both of which inevitably appear frightening and are often persuasive. See, e.g., Scarver v. Litscher,
434 F.3d 972, 976 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he treatment of a mentally ill prisoner who happens also to
have murdered two other inmates is much more complicated than the treatment of a harmless luna-
tic."). In the context of a class action, however, prison officials have a more difficult time providing
compelling evidence, in part, because of the number of class members and the diversity of reasons
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ly ill individuals have lost, failing even under compelling circumstances
to obtain relief.23
At times, these cases explicitly cite legitimate penological interest
as a basis for denying the claim, stating that housing a mentally ill pris-
oner in isolation is not unconstitutional unless it is "without penological
justification."24 For example, in the one individual suit discussed by
Hafemeister and George, Scarver v. Litscher,25 the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that the prisoner had endured mental suffering from his
placement in supermax confinement, noting that he had repeatedly
banged his head against the solid wall of the cell.2 6 Despite acknowledg-
ing that these circumstances were disturbing, Judge Posner's opinion
made clear that the courts do not want to interfere with correctional man-
agement of dangerous prisoners.
The murderous ingenuity of murderous inmates, especially in
states such as Wisconsin that do not have capital punishment, so that
inmates who like Scarver are already serving life terms are undeter-
rable, cannot be overestimated. Prison authorities must be given con-
siderable latitude in the design of measures for controlling homicidal
maniacs without exacerbating their manias beyond what is necessary
for security. It is a delicate balance.27
Although not all federal judges express their opinions so bluntly, a simi-
lar underlying sentiment is regularly present in such cases, and may be
28influencing the decision even absent any explicit language.
As a doctrinal matter, how courts assess the role and legitimacy of a
penological interest in a prison condition (including solitary confine-
for their placement in segregation, and also because the pattern of conduct and the impact of solitary
confinement are more apparent.
23. See, e.g., Home, 155 F.3d at 31 (holding that placement of prisoner with mental illness
did not violate Eighth Amendment, in part, because it was not "without penological justification");
Haggins v. Minnesota Comm'r of Corr., No. 10-1002, 2012 WL 983590, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb. 14,
2012) (finding that placing mentally ill prisoner in disciplinary isolation did not violate the Eighth
Amendment, after extensive discussion of his disciplinary infractions); Farmer, 494 F. Supp. 2d at
370 (finding, as a matter of law, that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to mentally ill
prisoner placed in solitary confinement); Hill v. Pugh, 75 F. App'x 715, 721 (10th Cir. 2003) (deny-
ing Eighth Amendment claim regarding isolation of prisoner with mental illness by finding it did not
meet objective standard); Williams, 2011 WL 649845, at *3 (finding prisoner with mental illness did
not meet standard to show he was likely to be harmed by isolation). But see Washington-El v. Beard,
No. 2:08-CV-01688, 2011 WL 891250, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2011) (finding prisoner with
history of severe mental illness "nudged his claim for relief across the line of the conceivable,"
though noting it was a "very close call" to survive a motion to dismiss).
24. Home, 155 F.3d at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Washington-El, 2011
WL 891250, at *5.
25. 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006).
26. Id. at 975.
27. Id. at 976 (citations omitted).
28. See generally Mikel-Meredith Weidman, Comment, The Culture of Judicial Deference
and the Problem ofSupermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1505 passim (2004) (discussing significant
deference given to state penological interests and examining the three class actions cited by Hafe-
meister and George).
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ment) is a significant question, given that the test for whether a condition
violates the Eighth Amendment does not contemplate the role of the
prison's "legitimate penological interest." 2 9 Because of the limits the
federal courts have imposed on the other constitutional rights of prison-
ers, courts are in the habit of deferring to prison officials when they
claim that a particular condition or treatment is necessary.30 Judges are
explicit about the fact that they lack experience in managing prison sys-
tems, and that prison officials should be given wide berth to address is-
sues of safety and security.3 ' As a result, most constitutional protections
are limited for those who are in custody. Yet, the Eighth Amendment
stands in contrast to other sources of rights for prisoners precisely be-
cause prisoners are those whom the Amendment is meant to protect. As
such, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the limits imposed on the oth-
er constitutional rights of prisoners do not apply to claims of "cruel and
unusual punishment" because doing so would thwart its entire purpose:
protecting those who are incarcerated. 32 The Court has explained that
"[t]he full protections of the [E]ighth [A]mendment most certainly re-
main in force [in prison]. The whole point of the [A]mendment is to pro-
tect persons convicted of crimes."3 Accordingly, the Court has held that
affording "deference to the findings of state prison officials in the con-
29. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 819 (2006) (discussing empirical research
that demonstrates that courts defer to penal institutions more than any other government entity, even
when "strict scrutiny" analysis is applied). See generally Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?:
Weighing Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 50 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author).
30. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Although prisoners retain some degree of
their constitutional rights while in prison, many of these give way to legitimate penological interests
of the States. Id. (weighing violation against legitimate interest as part of test); Weidman, supra note
28, passim (discussing the "culture of deference that constrains federal courts from intervening in
prison affairs"). The majority of challenges to violations of prisoners' constitutional rights are exam-
ined under a form of "rational basis" review. Fred Cohen, Penal Isolation: Beyond the Seriously
Mentally Ill, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1017, 1021-24 (2008) (discussing the standard of review
applied by the Supreme Court in several cases involving prisoner's rights). Accordingly, if the prison
has any reasonable basis for acting in the manner that it does, the practice will be upheld. This rea-
sonableness standard is not without critique. Fred Cohen describes Supreme Court decisions regard-
ing the rights of prisoners as "almost nonchalant and consistently out of touch with reality, in consti-
tutionally accepting the most fundamental deprivations imposed on inmates as legitimate conse-
quences of conviction and imprisonment," citing Turner as "part of the contemporary, constitutional
foundation for determining inmate claims to fundamental rights, including First Amendment
claims." Id. at 1021. His observation of the effect of Turner on prisoners'-rights jurisprudence is
incisive: "Turner has evolved into a so-called rule of reasonableness that consistently limits inmate
claims ranging from visits to access to reading material. The flipside of severe judicial limits on
inmate condition claims is the expansion of deference to the opinions-and not necessarily opinions
supported by evidence-of prison officials." Id.
31. See generally Weidman, supra note 28, passim (discussing significant deference given to
state penological interests).
32. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005) ("[T]he integrity of the criminal justice
system depends on full compliance with the Eighth Amendment.").
33. Id. (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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text of the [E]ighth [A]mendment would reduce that provision to a nulli-
ty in precisely the context where it is most necessary." 34
Yet, how this "lack" of deference is to be implemented in the Eighth
Amendment context remains uncertain." Neither the objective nor the
subjective components of the Eighth Amendment test specify how an
asserted penological interest will be considered and whether it can pre-
clude a finding that a particular condition is cruel and unusual. The ab-
sence of an express doctrinal mechanism to consider penological interest
has not rendered it irrelevant to the analysis but rather has permitted
courts to implicitly fold it into both the objective and subjective prongs
of the test.36 This is not entirely surprising; common sense dictates that
we cannot evaluate whether punishment is cruel and unusual without
understanding the reason it is imposed. But without explicit direction as
to how penological interest should be considered-including the weight
it should be given and whose burden of proof it is to demonstrate the
validity of that interest-courts often do the exact opposite of what was
directed by the Supreme Court and defer to prison officials' interests in
determining whether a condition is constitutional.
This failure to scrutinize the legitimacy of an asserted penological
interest is particularly troubling in the context of supermax litigation, in
which the challenge is not to just one condition but rather to a collection
of conditions that, in the aggregate, produce extreme isolation and senso-
ry deprivation. Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoner-plaintiffs argue
that the psychological and physical harm resulting from this confluence
of conditions-twenty-three-hour-per-day lockdown, denial of employ-
ment and educational opportunities, extreme limits on the ability to have
fresh air and exercise, and lack of visits and phone calls-can satisfy the
objective standard38 even though each component condition likely would
be deemed insufficiently serious to warrant Eighth Amendment protec-
tion.39 While combining these conditions assists the prisoner in demon-
strating harm in the form of the deprivation of a human need or a risk of
serious harm, this "sum total" approach also may advantage prison offi-
cials, who are not required to provide a legitimate penological basis for
each of the denials that contribute to that harm. For example, courts do
not ask prison officials to explain why the number of phone calls in a
supermax unit is severely limited and instead only look for justification
for a prisoner's placement in that unit.
34. Id (quoting Spain, 600 F.2d at 193-94).
35. Glidden, supra note 29 (manuscript at 15-16).
36. Id. (manuscript at 7-8).
37. Id. (manuscript at 15-16).
38. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363 n.10 (1981) ("Prison conditions alone or in corn-
bination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003) (finding denial of all visita-
tion for a period of years is not cruel and unusual punishment).
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Against this legal backdrop, prison officials are encouraged to cite
blanket interests of "safety" and "security" as the basis for the multiple
deprivations that comprise solitary confinement. 40 Parsing that general
assertion is difficult, in part, because the decision to place a prisoner in a
supermax unit often follows the adage "when all you have is a hammer,
everything looks like a nail." Prison administrators use solitary confine-
ment for a diverse range of issues: to restrain a prisoner who is acting
violently, as punishment for prisoners who have committed disciplinary
infractions, to protect prisoners who are at risk in the general population,
and as a place to house those awaiting classification or designation.4 1
Additionally, supermax cells are also used for "status-based" reasons
(i.e., to confine those who have been convicted of certain types of crimes
or are believed to be gang members).42 In each of these situations, insula-
tion 4 3 from other prisoners may be appropriate for some period of time.
But the collection of other conditions that accompany segregation-loss
of employment, contact visits, phone calls, and limited reading materi-
al-may be at best unnecessary and at worst harmful.
The significance of these related conditions cannot be overstated.
Dr. Craig Haney, one of the nation's foremost mental health experts on
solitary confinement, has observed, "Although social deprivation is at the
core of solitary confinement, and what seemingly accounts for its most
intense psychological pain and the greatest risk of harm, prison isolation
units also deprive prisoners of more than social contact."" He notes the
"characteristically high levels of repressive control, enforced idleness,
reduced environmental stimulation, and physical deprivations," all of
which, he says, "lead to psychological distress and can create even more
lasting negative consequences."45 Haney further observes that "most of
the things that we know are beneficial to prisoners-such as increased
participation in institutional programming, visits with persons from out-
side the prison, and so on-are either functionally denied or greatly re-
stricted to prisoners housed in solitary confinement."4 6 And these depri-
vations, both in and of themselves and coupled with social isolation, can
cause a separate set of harms: "In addition to the social pathologies that
40. See Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological
Analysis ofSupermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 477, 550-51
(1997).
41. Id. at 492-95 (discussing history of solitary confinement and reasons given for its applica-
tion).
42. See id. at 492-93 (discussing rise of use of solitary confinement for gang-related issues);
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Ruiz v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. Ca. Sept. 10,
2012) (challenging status based isolation in California).
43. We borrow this term from Fred Cohen, who uses it to distinguish separation of a prisoner
from penal isolation, which includes deprivations of sensory and social stimulation, as well as exer-
cise, reading material, telephone access, and educational and vocational programming. Cohen, supra
note 30, at 1037.
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are created by the experience of solitary confinement, . . . these other
stressors also can produce their own negative psychological effects."47
Under the current Eighth Amendment framework, however, prison
officials are not required to justify the specific deprivations that comprise
supermax confinement. Because a generalized assertion of "security"
often suffices to demonstrate a legitimate penological interest, prison
administrators have no incentive to tailor the particular conditions of
confinement to the purpose for which the person is placed there. Unsur-
prisingly, generalized assertions that conditions are necessary-and judi-
cial deference to those assertions-pervade Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence, leaving the attendant conditions of supermax prisons largely un-
examined.
II. A DIFFERENT APPROACH: THE DISABILITY RIGHTS STATUTES
Given the concerns associated with an Eighth Amendment ap-
proach, the Civil Rights Clinic began exploring alternative ways to chal-
lenge the component parts of supermax confinement. The federal disabil-
ity rights statutes-the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 48 and
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA) 49-provided this opportunity for
prisoners in solitary confinement who have mental illnesses that rise to
the level of a disability.50 For those prisoners, the ADA and RA permit
challenges to each of the underlying conditions that comprise supermax
confinement (access to education, telephone calls, books, etc.) on the
theory that the denial of each service or privilege-if withheld because
of a prisoner's disability-may constitute an act of discrimination.
In the remainder of this Essay, we discuss how a disability discrim-
ination claim on behalf of a mentally ill prisoner in solitary confinement
might look. This discussion is grounded in the work and thinking of the
students and faculty in the Civil Rights Clinic, especially those who liti-
gated a similar claim over the past several years.51 We offer this frame-
work as a possible vehicle for some prisoners with mental illness to chal-
lenge supermax conditions. Yet, we also have the goal of demonstrating
a way to conceptualize the burden that the state might shoulder when
placing a prisoner in segregation and determining the particular condi-
tions of his confinement. The disability discrimination paradigm demon-
47. Id.
48. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2006 & Supp. V
2011), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
50. We are grateful to the attorneys at Fox & Robertson, P.C., our co-counsel in Anderson v.
Colorado Department of Corrections, for their work with us in developing these theories.
51. The case is Anderson v. Colorado Department of Corrections, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D.
Colo. 2012). Three generations of Civil Rights Clinic students have represented Troy Anderson in
his claims against the State, culminating in a bench trial held earlier this year. The student attorneys
were Patrick Curnalia, Ashley Wheeland, Lee Knox, Courtney Longtin, Matt Court, Katherine
Hartigan, Maha Kamal, and Brenden Desmond.
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strates that it is possible to place the burden of justification on the prison
officials, and for this requirement to be specific. Examining each of the
various conditions comprising supermax confinement also highlights the
punitive (sometimes-draconian) nature of supermax prisons, in that it
becomes clear that many of the conditions and restrictions do not serve
any legitimate purpose. As detailed below, although prison officials may
espouse safety as the reason for a deprivation, there often is no evidence
or apparent basis to support this claim. We believe that a similar ap-
proach should be incorporated into the Eighth Amendment framework,
particularly in light of the Supreme Court's directive to avoid generalized
deference to prison officials in conditions of confinement litigation.
A. The Federal Disability Discrimination Statutes: A Brief Overview
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public entities on
the basis of disability.52 The Rehabilitation Act, the precursor to the
ADA, prohibits such discrimination by recipients of federal funding." To
state a claim under these statutes, the plaintiff must allege that "(1) he is
a qualified individual with a disability, (2) who was excluded from par-
ticipation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, pro-
grams, or activities, and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or dis-
crimination was by reason of a disability."5 4
A person has a qualifying disability when he has a physical or men-
tal impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life ac-
tivities, has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as having such an
impairment. 5 The name or diagnosis of an impairment does not make a
person disabled; rather, it is whether the impairment affects the person's
ability to perform a "major life activity," which is statutorily defined to
include learning, concentrating, thinking, and communicating, as well as
the operation of neurological and brain functions (among others).5 6 Sig-
nificantly, several circuits have determined that an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a person's ability to interact with others qualifies as a
disability.57
The second element of an ADA or RA claim is that the plaintiff
must demonstrate that he is being denied "services, programs or activi-
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). Because most prisons, including state facilities, typically receive
federal financial assistance, virtually all of them are subject to liability pursuant to the RA.
54. Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 500 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007).
55. ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 705 (2006 & Supp. V 2011), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)); 29
U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2006).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Additionally, the determina-
tion of whether a person's "impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made with-
out regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as ... medication ... or learned
behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications." § 12102(4)(a)(4)(E)(i).
57. See infra Part l.C. 1.
66 [Vol. 90:1
2012] SUPERMAX: DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION APPROACH 67
ties"58 that he is qualified to receive. Services, programs, and activities
include essentially "anything a public entity does."59 Because prisoners
have virtually every aspect of their lives controlled by the correctional
department, almost any official activity in which inmates participate is
within the scope of the ADA and RA. 6 0 Examples of covered services
include phone calls, visits, job opportunities, educational courses, and
access to reading material. Per the statutes, a prisoner must be "quali-
fied" to receive these services. The prisoner is so "qualified" as long as
the services are provided by the correctional department (or potentially
within the prison where the individual is housed).
The third element of a prima facie claim under the disability rights
statutes is that the prisoner-plaintiff was discriminated against on the
basis of his disability. 62 Under the ADA and RA, the denial of equal ac-
cess to services for behavior resulting from a disability constitutes dis-
crimination regardless of the specific intent motivating the denial. 6 3 Un-
der the regulations implementing the ADA, discrimination is defined to
include "[d]eny[ing] a qualified individual with a disability the oppor-
tunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service" or af-
fording a disabled person "an opportunity to participate in or benefit
from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded oth-
ers."64 Additionally, the antidiscrimination mandate of the disability
rights statutes prohibits public entities from "utiliz[ing] criteria or meth-
ods of administration . .. that have the effect of subjecting qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability."65
Finally, the disability rights statutes require public entities to make
"reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disa-
bility."66 Accordingly, if a prison offers educational courses but does not
58. Department of Justice General Prohibitions Against Discrimination, 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(1)(i), (ii) (2012).
59. Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997) (discuss-
ing ADA regulations and concluding that they state that the statute's "broad language is intended to
'appl[y] to anything a public entity does."' (alterations in original) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.102)),
aff'd, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
60. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211.
61. Title II of the ADA states that a "[q]ualified individual with a disability" is a person with
a disability "who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... meets
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2006).
62. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 ("No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.").
63. See id.; James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims Against
State Entities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Seminole Tribe and Flores, 41 ARIZ.
L. REV. 651, 726-27 (1999) (noting that Congress intended the ADA to protect against not only
discrimination motivated by malicious intent but also that resulting from indifference).
64. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
65. § 35.130(b)(3)(i).
66. § 35.130(b)(7).
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provide a means for prisoners with vision or hearing impairments to ac-
cess those courses, the denial is discriminatory. Further, the accommoda-
tion mandate is intended to be flexible in order to address each individu-
al's situation; for example, it may require Braille materials or a reader for
a blind prisoner, or a sign-language interpreter or written materials for a
deaf prisoner.
In certain situations-typically involving prisoners with physical
disabilities who have been placed in solitary confinement-courts have
ruled that a prison's denial of equal services constitutes discrimination on
the basis of disability and issued remedial orders to the prison.6 1 If a
prisoner is placed in solitary confinement solely because of his disabil-
ity-for example, a wheelchair user who is housed in a segregation unit
because that is the only part of the prison that contains wheelchair-
accessible cells-courts have held that there is no basis for also denying
him access to the educational programs and other services that are typi-
cally associated with segregated confinement.6 1 Some of these courts
have parsed the various conditions that comprise segregation, and held
that the only permitted deprivations are those that prison officials can
demonstrate are necessary and "fundamental" 6 9 to the goals of the prison.
For example, the Ninth Circuit determined that although segregation of
disabled prisoners was shown to serve legitimate safety goals, there was
no basis to deny the prisoners access to educational and other program-
ming.7 0 If denial of a program or service is unnecessary, courts have
found such denials to constitute additional "punishment" that is not justi-
fied and have ordered prisons to modify the programs to make them ac-
cessible to and usable by prisoners with disabilities.7'
Once a prisoner has demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, prison officials can raise an affirmative defense. Because the disa-
bility rights statutes require only reasonable modifications to policies,
practices, and procedures, modifications will not be required where they
would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activi-
ty."7 2 In the prison context, the reasonable modification-fundamental
67. See Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1220-22 (9th Cir. 2008); Love v.
Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that denying quadriplegic prisoner
housed in infirmary access to programs violated the ADA).
68. Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1221.
69. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
70. Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1220-22; see also § 35.130(h) ("A public entity may impose legiti-
mate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of its services programs or activities.
However, the public entity must ensure that its safety requirements are based on actual risks, not on
mere speculation, stereotypes or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.").
71. Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1221-22.
72. § 35.130(b)(7). In the employment context, the classic example of a fundamental altera-
tion (there termed "undue hardship") is a blind person who seeks employment as a bus driver. Be-
cause the accommodation required for the person to perform the essential functions of the job (driv-
ing the bus) is so onerous-i.e., a sighted person having to do (or very closely guide) the actual
driving-provision of the accommodation would constitute an undue hardship and therefore is not
required.
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alteration doctrine has the effect of placing the burden on prison officials
to demonstrate why denial of a particular service, benefit, program, or
activity is necessary. Because the accommodations should be specific
and individualized, prison officials must demonstrate why in each case
the particular prisoner cannot receive the requested services. As a result,
it becomes more difficult for the prison to rely on generalized assertions
of "safety" to support the deprivations and instead forces an articulation
of the reason for the particular condition. In this way, the disability rights
statutes do not render irrelevant the penological concerns of prison offi-
cials, but compared with the Eighth Amendment, the prison's burden to
demonstrate the necessity of a particular denial is both heavier and more
clearly defined.
B. Anderson v. Colorado Department of Corrections
As discussed by Hafemeister and George, many prisoners held in
solitary confinement have mental health issues that qualify as impair-
ments.7 Yet there have been very few cases brought by prisoners with
mental illnesses that have challenged the individual deprivations com-
prising solitary confinement. One of the CRC's cases, Anderson v. Colo-
rado Department of Corrections,7 4 proved to be suitable for a novel chal-
lenge under the disability rights statutes. Mr. Anderson is a mentally ill
man who had been isolated in one of the state supermax prisons, Colora-
do State Penitentiary (CSP), for more than a decade. Mr. Anderson-
unlike many people held at CSP-did not seek to be removed from soli-
tary confinement. Despite his desire to leave isolation, Mr. Anderson
believed there was a legitimate reason to keep him there: the particular
combination of his mental illnesses had previously caused him to act out
impulsively and violently,75 and he was afraid that if he were put in a
general-population unit without adequate mental health treatment, history
would repeat itself.
73. Hafeneister & George, supra note 2, at 38-39.
74. No. 10-cv-01005-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 3643063 (D. Colo. Aug. 24, 2012). In this case,
Mr. Anderson asserted three theories under the ADA and the RA: first, that the prison's failure to
provide him necessary medication to treat his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) con-
stituted a denial of services on the basis of his disability; second, that the prison's refusal to provide
the treatment for his ADHD that would enable him to participate in a program through which he
could progress out of isolation constituted a discriminatory failure to make reasonable modifications
in policies and practices; and third, that to the extent that his mental illness disability requires Mr.
Anderson to be insulated from other prisoners, the automatic denial of other services and benefits
such as outdoor access, books, educational programs, canteen items, etc., discriminated against him
on the basis of his disability. It is the third theory that is discussed in this Essay.
75. In the lawsuit, it was undisputed that Mr. Anderson is diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, polysubstance abuse (in remission in a controlled environment), dysthymic
disorder, antisocial disorder, and personality disorder not otherwise specified with borderline and
narcissistic features. Mental health expert Dr. Raymond Patterson explained that these disorders lead
to inability to concentrate, impulsivity, violence, self-injury, and difficulty focusing. Dr. Patterson
explained that this constellation of symptoms both led to Mr. Anderson's placement in isolation, and
prevented him from participating in necessary therapies and progressing out of solitary confinement.
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Mr. Anderson desperately wanted mental health care, though in the
event that treatment was unsuccessful in resolving his behaviors, he was
willing to stay in the supermax in order to preserve everyone's safety. If
indefinite supermax confinement was to be his fate, however, Mr. An-
derson wanted the onerous and punitive conditions associated with CSP
confinement to be lessened. CSP has many of the deprivations typically
found in supermax confinement: prisoners are allowed to own only two
books, they receive a very limited number of phone calls, all of their
visits are non-contact, educational programming is extremely limited and
correspondence courses are not permitted, canteen access (which in-
cludes food and hygiene items) is severely limited, and the ability to hold
any job is limited to one porter position per unit. In addition, CSP sub-
jects prisoners to some conditions that are even more severe than those
found in many supermax units. For example, CSP prisoners accrue only
a fraction of the earned time credits available to prisoners in general-
population units, resulting in longer periods of incarceration. Additional-
ly, prisoners at CSP are denied all outdoor access; their only exercise
occurs alone in an empty, indoor cell.
A traditional approach to this case would have been to challenge
Mr. Anderson's placement in solitary confinement as violative of the
Eighth Amendment and to seek his removal from CSP. Yet, because of
Mr. Anderson's concerns, the complaint drafted by the student team did
not request removal; instead, it raised challenges to the supermax condi-
tions under the ADA and the RA. In one of these challenges, we sought
to parse "solitary confinement" into its elements and remove those that
were not justified by safety or another legitimate interest. Although Mr.
Anderson conceded the interest in insulating him from other prisoners
(absent successful mental health treatment), he disputed that this interest
required him to be denied services such as books, education, and outdoor
exercise. The prison officials could argue that "safety" justified his isola-
tion, but arguments that he was too unsafe for books and outdoor exer-
cise were unpersuasive because these "benefits" were provided to other
high-security prisoners without issue. Placing the burden on the prison
officials to justify the denials made it apparent that much of the treatment
in solitary confinement is unnecessarily punitive and discriminatory,
even if it may not always reach the level of being declared "cruel and
unusual."
C. The Case Against Segregation Under the American with Disabilities
Act and Rehabilitation Act
In this final subpart, we discuss the elements of the ADA and RA
claims in Mr. Anderson's case and explain how the disability rights stat-
76. These two claims require identical showings of proof, with the exception that cases
brought under the RA must be against entities that receive federal funding.
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utes might be used in similar lawsuits with the effect of more firmly
placing the burden on the state to justify the various conditions and re-
strictions comprising solitary confinement.
1. Disabled by Mental Illness
The first requirement of an ADA or RA claim is that the plaintiff
has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits his ability to
perform a major life activity. In some ways, Mr. Anderson is emblematic
of many prisoners who are put in solitary confinement. He has a history
of extensive and varied diagnoses that reach back to his childhood years,
which include bipolar disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, depres-
sion, anxiety, polysubstance dependence, and attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder (ADHD).n Expert witnesses and prison mental health
staff testified that these disorders impaired Mr. Anderson's ability to
think, learn, concentrate, and to interact with others. Although Mr. An-
derson was receiving some mental health treatment, his severe ADHD
impaired his ability to participate in therapy because he could not con-
centrate or learn the cognitive and behavioral therapies offered by his
psychologist.
Although each individual prisoner's disability will vary, many peo-
ple in administrative segregation may qualify as disabled within the
meaning of the disability rights statutes because their mental illnesses
significantly impair their ability to interact with others. 78 Indeed, the ina-
bility to interact with others, which often results from mental illness, is
the main reason that many people are placed in solitary confinement.
While the nature and extent of such an impairment would be a factual
question appropriate for determination on an individualized basis, it is
plausible that a significant number of prisoners in administrative segre-
gation are disabled because of a mental impairment that substantially
limits their ability to interact with other people. In Mr. Anderson's case,
77. Interestingly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations implementing
Title I of the ADA (which applies to private employers) state that the following mental illnesses will
usually be considered disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of
2008: "major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compul-
sive disorder, and schizophrenia." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2012).
78. Although somewhat controversial, many circuits have found that a severe limitation in the
ability to interact with others is a protected disability under the ADA or RA. See Jacques v. DiMar-
zio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 2004). A harder question is what distinguishes a mental im-
pairment that substantially limits a person's ability to interact with others from maliciousness (or
even simple grouchiness). The Second Circuit answered this question by explaining that an employ-
ee is disabled when his ability to "connect with others" is significantly impaired, as evidenced by his
inability "to initiate contact with other people and respond to them, or to go among other people-at
the most basic level of those activities." Id.
Additionally, a point to consider is whether some prisoners are actually disabled as a
result oftheir isolation. Evidence shows that prisoners who spend years in solitary confinement have
predictable problems when required to integrate back into society. Studies indicate that they suffer
anxiety at being around people, sometimes have auditory and visual hallucinations, and have higher
re-offense and recidivism rates upon release. See generally Haney & Lynch, supra note 40, at 496-
539 (discussing recognized effects of solitary confinement).
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the prison officials continued to hold him in solitary confinement be-
cause of negative interactions with staff members; his record contained
numerous inappropriate comments he had made to staff and these were
relied upon to keep him in isolation. Similarly, many prisoners may have
records indicating that the basis for their placement in isolation is an ina-
bility to interact with others, 7 9 as most prisoners are placed there either
because of unsafe behavior or for their own security, both hallmarks of
an inability to interact with others.
2. Services
The second element of an ADA or RA claim is that the plaintiff is
being denied access to services, programs, and activities for which he is
qualified. This element of a disability discrimination claim is the least
complicated to prove. All prisons have numerous programs and services;
nearly every activity during a prisoner's day qualifies as a "service" or
"benefit" under the statutes. Because the services are provided to prison-
ers as part of their incarceration, most prisoners are "qualified" to receive
them.80 Almost as a matter of course, placement in a supermax unit re-
sults in prisoners being denied many services that are available in open-
population units. In Mr. Anderson's case, we asserted that he was denied
numerous services as a result of his administrative segregation place-
ment. Most obviously, he was not permitted many of the services provid-
ed to general-population prisoners: outdoor exercise, reading material,
phone calls, contact visits, most canteen items, and mental health treat-
ment commensurate with the community standard of care.81
3. Cause of the Deprivation
The most difficult aspect of a disability discrimination claim is es-
tablishing that the deprivation is occurring "on the basis of," or because
79. Another way to demonstrate a disability under the ADA and RA is to show that a person
is "regarded as" having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(g)(1)(iii) (2012). Some prisoners who believe they are able to function in an open prison
population may be able to show that they are being discriminated against because the prison regards
them as being disabled due to an inability to interact.
80. Of course, certain benefits may be limited by location (particular prison or unit) or by
another qualification (e.g., some jobs may require specific prior training or experience).
81. In Colorado, as in most state correctional systems, its own policies stated that prisoners
would receive medical and mental health care treatment that is at the "community standard." Yet,
Mr. Anderson was being denied medications and therapies that are considered standard for his disor-
ders. For example, CDOC denied almost everyone stimulant medications (Adderall, Ritalin), which
are universally regarded as the most effective treatments in the community. The prison claimed that
to provide these medications caused a security risk (i.e., a legitimate penological interest), however,
because some individuals did receive them it remained questionable whether their provision would
constitute a "fundamental alteration" of services. Second, we alleged that these drugs would be a
reasonable accommodation to permit Mr. Anderson to participate in state programs such as mental
health therapy and the progression program that would allow him to progress out of solitary con-
finement.
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of, the prisoner's disability. 82 Under this requirement, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he was placed or retained in solitary confinement as a
result of behavior resulting from his disability. For example, if a prisoner
were required to complete an educational program to progress out of
solitary confinement, he would be held there "by reason of' his disability
if that disability (or the prison's failure to accommodate it) kept him
from completing the program.
In Mr. Anderson's situation, there was little question that he was
housed in administrative segregation based on his behavior; his cluster of
disorders caused him to act impulsively and inappropriately. 84 These
outbursts resulted in Mr. Anderson receiving numerous incident reports
for rule violations that prevented him from progressing out of solitary
confinement. In an Eighth Amendment context, these types of incidents
typically would be used by a prison to justify isolation. Here, however,
they served as evidence that Mr. Anderson's disability-caused behavior
was the reason he remained in solitary confinement. Mr. Anderson testi-
fied about how he wanted to improve his behavior-in particular, his
interaction with others-but could not control his outbursts and threaten-
ing interactions. His prison record was replete with proof of his sincerity
and his attempts to improve through mental health counseling and drug
therapy. His situation is likely analogous to many people in prison; the
reasons they are held in solitary confinement ultimately relate to their
mental illnesses.
4. "Fundamental Alteration"
Once a prima facie case of discrimination is made under the ADA
or RA, prison officials may claim that to make modifications to their
policies and practices in supermax units would constitute a "fundamental
85alteration" to their services, programs, and activities. In Mr. Anderson's
case, one of the fundamental alteration arguments made by the prison
officials was that the set of deprivations comprising confinement at CSP
was part of the behavioral modification program of the prison, meaning
that the deprivations existed to give Mr. Anderson and other prisoners an
incentive to progress out of CSP. Here, however, Mr. Anderson was not
choosing bad behavior; it was caused by his mental illness. For the indi-
vidual deprivations attendant to CSP confinement-loss of phone access,
82. ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 705 (2006 & Supp. V 2011), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)); 29
U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2006).
83. For example, it is discriminatory under the ADA and RA for the prison to require a pro-
gram but not to give a blind prisoner audio or Braille materials, or to fail to provide a learning-
disabled prisoner additional time for testing or other accommodation.
84. Although the State argued that his conduct was volitional, even prison mental health staff
acknowledged that many of his behaviors resulted from his mental illnesses.
85. A prison could also assert that requiring it to permit certain mentally ill prisoners to par-
ticipate in services, programs, or activities would "pose[] a direct threat to the health or safety of
others." 28 C.F.R. § 35.139 (2012). The State did not make this argument in Mr. Anderson's case.
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limited reading material, denial of canteen, and denial of contact visits-
prison officials struggled to give explanations as to why they had an in-
terest in denying these services to a prisoner who is in long-term isola-
tion and does not appear to be close to progressing out, especially when
the purpose of the denial-behavior modification-is rendered irrelevant
by virtue of Mr. Anderson's disability. And because the ADA and RA
require individualized accommodations, the prison officials had difficul-
ty claiming that one prisoner could not be treated differently from oth-
ers.86
Although multiple and varied fundamental alteration arguments ex-
ist in different contexts, the disability rights statutes place prison officials
in a defensive posture, requiring them to justify the various denials that
comprise segregated confinement. If a prisoner is denied a service or
benefit based on his disability, discrimination has occurred unless the
entity can provide sufficient justification for the denial. In contrast to the
amorphous role that penological interest plays in an Eighth Amendment
analysis, the disability rights statutes place the burden on the prison to
explain why a deprivation or practice is necessary. For example, while
prison officials may successfully assert that it would be a fundamental
alteration to allow a person in solitary confinement more access to other
prisoners, it often will be harder for them to demonstrate why reduced
phone calls or limited access to educational correspondence classes are
necessary. In this way, it may be possible to challenge aspects of the
isolation itself, such as the refusal to permit contact visits with family
members, or the denial of additional reading materials or correspondence
courses.87
Although the disability discrimination framework cannot be incor-
porated wholesale into the Eighth Amendment context, it does offer two
features that are lacking in current Eighth Amendment supermax juris-
prudence: the ability to examine the specific components of solitary con-
finement and the imposition of a requirement on the State to justify those
specific conditions. Disability discrimination litigation demonstrates that
it is possible and practicable to require more from the State, a lesson that
could be imported into the Eighth Amendment context to better align it
with the Amendment's purpose of serving as a check on government
power.
86. Indeed, CSP's own progression and regression programs contemplate different privileges
being granted and removed based on individual behavior. See COLO. DEPT. OF CORR. ADMIN. REG.
No. 650-03 § IV(G)(1), ADMIN. SEGREGATION (2012).
87. Ultimately, in Mr. Anderson's case, the court did not reach this issue, focusing instead on
the two other ADA and RA claims asserting discrimination based on the prison's failure to make the
necessary modifications to its policies for Mr. Anderson to receive appropriate medication.
74 [Vol. 90:1
2012] SUPERMAX: DISABILITY DISCRIMNATION APPROACH 75
CONCLUSION
To be sure, a disability discrimination approach to challenging soli-
tary confinement is not a perfect solution. It does not solve the epidemic
of penal isolation, nor does it even ensure that mentally ill prisoners will
be kept out of isolation. But in those cases where the legitimate interest
in isolation may undermine an Eighth Amendment claim, or where the
need for insulation from other prisoners is conceded, the disability rights
statutes provide a vehicle for making incremental improvements to su-
permax confinement. The ADA and RA provide a more nuanced ap-
proach to addressing the collection of conditions that a mentally ill per-
son in a supermax endures, requiring prison officials to justify the need
for each deprivation of a service or benefit in order to continue the deni-
al. This approach can be used to benefit individual prisoners and, we
hope, as a template for the direction that courts should move toward in
the Eighth Amendment arena.

THE PERSISTENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE:
How LEGAL DOCTRINE THRIVES ON SKEPTICISM
JESSIE ALLENt
ABSTRACT
This Article starts with a puzzle: Why is the doctrinal approach to
"proximate cause" so resilient despite longstanding criticism? Proximate
cause is a particularly extreme example of doctrine that limps along de-
spite near universal consensus that it cannot actually determine legal
outcomes. Why doesn't that widely recognized indeterminacy disable
proximate cause as a decision-making device? To address this puzzle, I
pick up a cue from the legal realists, a group of skeptical lawyers, law
professors, and judges, who, in the 1920s and 1930s, compared legal
doctrine to ritual magic. I take that comparison seriously, perhaps more
seriously, and definitely in a different direction, than the realists intend-
ed. Classic anthropological studies reveal several telling structural simi-
larities between traditional proximate cause analysis and ritual magic.
Moreover, it seems that in diverse cultural contexts, magic not only sur-
vives skeptical exposure, it feeds on it. Drawing on the anthropological
literature, I propose that exposing doctrinal indeterminacy functions as a
kind of ritual unmasking that ultimately increases rather than diminishes
the credibility of doctrinal analyses. The Article concludes by consider-
ing how unmasking doctrinal indeterminacy works to strengthen faith in
doctrine and by raising some questions about the implications for law's
legitimacy. Does unmasking doctrine only further mask judicial power?
Or can ritual theory help us see some potential legitimate value in main-
taining doctrine as the form of legal decision making, even as we
acknowledge doctrine's inability to determine legal outcomes?
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INTRODUCTION
[T]here is a relation between faith and skepticism ... that has es-
caped notice in some classic illustrations of magical healing . . . in
that the success of such ritual lies not in concealing but in revealing
trickery ....
-Michael Taussig
Legal concepts do not decide cases. Lawyers, law teachers, and
judges themselves acknowledge that judges do not mechanically apply
legal doctrines.2 Opinions vary on the extent of doctrine's indeterminacy
from the observation that "doctrine [is] insufficient to explain judicial
decisions"3 to the blunt accusation that doctrines are "lies." 4 But most
1. Michael Taussig, Viscerality, Faith and Skepticism: Another Theory of Magic, in IN NEAR
RUINS: CULTURAL THEORY AT THE END OF THE CENTURY 221, 221 (Nicholas B. Dirks ed., 1998).
2. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the
Legitimacy of the US. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 195, 196 (2011) ("[N]o serious
analyst would today contend that the decisions of the justices of the Supreme Court are independent
of the personal ideologies of the judges."); Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49,
50-51 (2010) ("[M]ost everyone accepts some version of the claim that law is indeterminate.");
Frank Sullivan et al., Three Views from the Bench, in WHAT'S LAW GOT To Do WITH IT? 328, 330
(Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) ("Judicial decision-making is not syllogism."); Steven J. Ware,
The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 Mo. L. REV. 751, 767 (2009) (pointing out that judges
exercise discretion and in many cases make law and that this view of judging is so widely shared that
"it is virtually impossible to find anybody who disputes it today"); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism
for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 469 (1990) (explaining that the view that judges make, rather
than find, legal outcomes "has dominated American legal education for over half a century").
3. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due
Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 793 (2009); see also EDWARD
H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949) ("In an important sense legal rules are
never clear.").
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participants in legal culture agree that doctrinal formulas do not inde-
pendently produce legal outcomes. Nor is this realistic view confined to
legal practitioners. Recent research indicates that the American public
understands judicial decision making as a process that involves political
choices.6 Apparently "we are all realists now."7 It is no longer controver-
sial, if it ever was, to say that concepts like due process, privity, and
proximate cause, and the formal doctrines that elaborate them are inde-
terminate. And yet, doctrine remains the central and distinctive mode of
legal process. Judges continue to go through doctrinal analyses as if they
did determine outcomes. Lawyers continue to make doctrinal arguments
and to couch policy concerns in doctrinal terms. Law professors continue
to teach doctrinal formulas, albeit with plenty of skeptical commentary.9
And whenever there is a new nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court, she is
required to publicly profess her strict adherence to doctrine as the sole
legitimate method for deciding legal questions.' 0
It seems that doctrine revealed is not doctrine debunked. My ques-
tion is, Why not? Why doesn't indeterminacy disable legal doctrine?
Why do we persist in using a method to decide legal cases that we
acknowledge cannot actually make decisions? In this Article, I look at
this problem in the context of tort doctrines of proximate cause, and I
suggest a possible explanation for-or at least a new perspective on-the
survival of formal doctrinal analysis in a skeptical age.
4. Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 156 (1994).
5. See sources cited in supra note 2. Even a rare avowed formalist who argues that doctrines
should be used to decide cases believes that judges today take an instrumental policy making ap-
proach to adjudication at least some of the time and that it would be "just plain silly" to claim that
doctrine could determine the outcome of every case. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in
Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 166, 170 (2006). Another defender of formal legal reasoning nevertheless
acknowledges that "the self-reporting of judges probably exaggerates the effect of formal law on
their decisions." FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 140-41 (2009).
6. In a recent survey asking how the U.S. Supreme Court decides cases, 57.3% of respond-
ents "agree that judges actually base their decisions on their own personal beliefs." Gibson & Caldei-
ra, supra note 2, at 207.
7. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 467 (1988) (emphasis
added) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). But see
SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 144 (asserting that the "all" is an "egregious exaggeration"); BRIAN
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 132 (2006) (noting that most legal academics do not
identify as either realists or formalists but do view law as a means to achieving policy ends, as the
realists advocated).
8. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 77, 79 (2009). Tamanaha has argued persuasively that judges' skeptical attitudes about doctri-
nal determinacy long predate the realist critiques of the twentieth century. Id
9. Law professors perennially sigh over students' naive demands for determinate doctrinal
formulas, but as Lawrence Solum points out, most final exams nevertheless wind up testing students'
mastery of the very doctrinal formulas we have mocked. Solum, supra note 5, at 168.
10. See, for example, Justice Sonya Sotomayor's statement during her confirmation hearings
saying that "[i]t's not the heart that compels conclusions in cases, it's the law." Ari Shapiro, So-
tomayor Differs With Obama On 'Empathy' Issue, NPR (July 14, 2009, 5:32 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=106569335.
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To really look at the contradictory combination of doctrine and
skepticism, one has to avoid both denial-the assumption that somehow
what appears to be contradictory must not be contradictory because it is
so common-and polarization-insisting that the contradiction between
doctrinal faith and doctrinal skepticism must be resolved. If unalloyed
belief in doctrinal determinism is unrealistic, so is the opposing position
that legal doctrine is nothing but an empty disguise. At the least, neither
pure faith nor pure skepticism captures the experience of most legal prac-
titioners. For most judges and lawyers, I daresay the habits of doctrinal
thought and language seem qualitatively different from other forms of
decision making, yet these same legal practitioners openly discuss doc-
trine's indeterminacy.
We need a new way, then, to understand the persistent combination
of doctrine and skepticism in modem legal practice. In the 1920s and
1930s, the legal realists, a group of skeptical lawyers, law professors, and
judges, compared legal doctrine to ritual magic." In this Article, I take
that comparison seriously, perhaps more seriously, and definitely in a
different direction, than the realists intended. When the realists called
doctrinal analysis "magic" words,12 they generally meant that judges and
lawyers were engaged in a fraud or fantasy.' 3 To realist critics, doctrinal
reasoning mirrored the naive or duplicitous magical practices of primi-
tive cultures that they assumed were devoid of modem doubts about
magic's efficacy. According to some anthropological accounts, however,
magic in other cultures is often characterized by an interplay of faith and
skepticism.14 I find the combination of illusion and revelation described
by ethnographers of magic strikingly similar to the puzzling mixture of
doctrine and realism in adjudication. In this Article, I use those accounts
to investigate how doctrinal practice and doctrinal skepticism manage to
exist side by side in legal practice.
Of course, it is farfetched to compare modem adjudication to ritual
magic. But the goal of this comparison is quite down to earth. I want to
come to terms with the contradictory combination of doctrinal and skep-
tical analysis that characterizes legal practice. I maintain that the combi-
nation of doctrine and skepticism in judicial opinions is not satisfactorily
11. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 11-12 (1930); Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935); Leon
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence, 28 COLUM L. REV. 1014, 1016-17 (1928).
12. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 11, at 820.
13. The exception was Thurman Arnold. In two books he published in the 1930s, The Symbols
of Government (1935) and The Folklore of Capitalism (1937), Arnold explored the "symbolic,"
"ritual, " "ceremonial," and "ideal" character of legal theory and practice in ways that did not deni-
grate those practices. See also Keith J. Bybee, The Rule ofLaw Is Dead! Long Live the Rule ofLaw!,
in WHAT'S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY Do IT, AND WHAT'S AT
STAKE 306, 312-16, 317-21 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); Jessie Allen, A Theory ofAdjudica-
tion: Law as Magic, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 773, 803-05 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Taussig, supra note 1. See generally E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT,
ORACLES, AND MAGIC AMONG THE AZANDEpassim (abridged ed. 1976).
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explained either by the realist view of doctrine as fraud, or by what I take
to be the current mainstream view that doctrinal reasoning is incomplete
but can be redeemed by combining it with policy analysis." Comparing
the doctrine-skepticism combination in modem legal practice to magic-
skepticism in other cultures does two things. First, it is a way to make
strange the ordinary-to help us recognize that the situation we take for
granted merits critical investigation.16 Second, the comparison with ritual
magic allows me to draw upon the observations and insights of anthro-
pologists who have explored the puzzling combination of practice and
skepticism in other social contexts.
Even with the benefit of comparative anthropology, however, it is
not obvious why purportedly determinate decision-making techniques
should survive once they are unmasked as indeterminate. Moreover, in a
democratic society, there is reason to be particularly concerned about this
contradiction: In a government "of laws and not of men,"17 judges' con-
tinued use of apparently indeterminate doctrinal techniques threatens the
legitimacy of their legal decisions. After all, at the most basic level, law
is supposed to provide a way to make decisions based on something oth-
er than individual choices.' 8 A judicial technique that only seems to de-
termine outcomes threatens both this basic principle and the democratic
norm of transparency.' 9 Nevertheless, legal scholarship's main approach
to the contradiction between realism and doctrinalism today is uncritical
acceptance.20 This Article confronts the realist challenge in one of law's
15. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 376 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, How
JUDGES THINK]; Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics?, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 821, 841-42 (1993) (noting a "generational change in style" from the first Restate-
ment of Torts in 1935 and the drafts of the third Restatement; the first two made no policy justifica-
tions, but drafts of the third have given policy rationales to explain various tort doctrines); Richard
A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1996) [hereinafter Posner, Prag-
matic Adjudication].
16. The playwright and director Bertolt Brecht adopted a stylistic technique that he called the
"verfremdungseffekt," literally translated as the "making strange effect." Brecht's goal was to pre-
vent his audience from accepting his plays as a naturally unfolding series of events and thus to
engage the audience's critical political judgment of the action on stage.
17. 4 JOHN ADAMS, "Novanglus Papers" No. 7, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 106 (AMS
Press ed., 1971) (1851).
18. See Bybee, supra note 13, at 306 ("[T]he rule of law, in its essence, is a matter of requir-
ing people to 'look outside [their] own will for criteria ofjudgment."' (alteration in original) (quot-
ing LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 147 (7th ed. 2007))).
19. Transparency is generally considered to be one of the fundamental norms of democracy.
For example, see Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REv. 885, 888 (2006),
who describes transparency as "defined broadly as a governing institution's openness to the gaze of
others," and as a "fundamental attribute of democracy." However, Fenster goes on to analyze the
many problems and complications with realizing the virtue of transparency. See id. at 889-92.
20. Of course there are exceptions. Some critics continue to attack the use of doctrinal reason-
ing as hypocritical or delusional. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION
[FIN DE SIEICLE] (1997); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON passim (1998). And,
recently, a few scholars have begun to call attention to the combination of realist attitudes and doc-
trinal forms and to propose new approaches to understanding their coexistence. See KEITH J. BYBEE,
ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL-EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: ACCEPTABLE HYPOCRISES AND THE
RULE OF LAW 4-6, 32-33 (2010); Bybee, supra note 13, at 306-07; Nourse, supra note 3, at 792;
Solum supra note 5, at 207-08; Tamanaha supra note 8, at 85-88, 90-91.
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most problematic doctrinal areas- proximate cause-and offers new
ways to understand the uneasy combination of doctrine and skeptical
critique that characterize judicial decision making.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I establishes proximate
cause as a particularly extreme example of doctrine that has hung on
despite longstanding skepticism about its ability to decide or even con-
strain legal outcomes. Indeed, even those who might challenge my as-
sessment of widespread doctrinal skepticism would likely agree that
proximate cause doctrines are dubious. All three Restatements of Torts
have presented traditional proximate cause tests as deeply vexed.2 1 For
over a century, these doctrinal formulas have been characterized as too
flexible to determine liability.22 Yet courts deciding negligence issues
routinely invoke proximate cause, asking whether a plaintiffs injury was
"foreseeable" or the "direct" consequence of a defendant's conduct.
More important, judges sometimes criticize the tests of proximate cause
as indeterminate and confusing in the same cases where they struggle to
apply those doctrines. For example, an 1876 Supreme Court opinion
notes "the oft-embarrassing question, what is and what is not the proxi-
mate cause of an injury," and then proceeds to the doctrinal analysis.23
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 6 special note (2010) (tak-
ing an explicit "[s]cope of [I]iability" approach and explaining that the term "proximate cause" is an
"especially poor one to describe the idea to which it is connected," i.e., limited liability, and is only
included because its use remains widespread in practice and scholarship); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 435 cmt. d (1965) (discussing the frequent impossibility of reconciling an actor's inabil-
ity to foresee accidents ex ante and a court's ability to declare them foreseeable ex post);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 cmt. e (1965) ("It is impossible to state any definite rules
by which it can be determined that a particular result of the actor's negligent conduct is or is not so
highly extraordinary as to prevent the conduct from being a legal cause of that result.");
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. e (1934); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. f
(1934). But cf H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORI, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 79-102 (1st ed. 1959); Mark
F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 301 (2002) ("The two major doctrines
of proximate cause, direct consequences and reasonable foresight, are not mutually exclusive; in-
stead, they represent different perspectives, both of which can sometimes apply to the same accident.
The best way to approach proximate cause is to break it down into these two perspectives and then to
subdivide the pieces. Each of the perspectives contains distinct paradigms.").
22. See Am. Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Urbanski, 162 F. 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1908) ("The varying
circumstances of each particular case make it difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any general
rule, or establish any test, by which the legal proximate cause of an event may be distinguished from
the remote cause that is outside of legal cognizance."); Evansville Veneer & Lumber Co. v. Clayon,
78 N.E. 1045, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 1906) ("[T]he issue of proximate cause is considered an issue of
fact although its determination sometimes requires the application of difficult and obtuse rules of
law."); Lewis v. Flint & P.M. Ry., 19 N.W. 744, 748-49 (Mich. 1884) ("[A]pplication of the rule
that the proximate and not the remote cause is to be regarded, is obscure and difficult in many cas-
es...."); Huffman v. Sorenson, 76 S.E. 183, 186-87 (Va. 1953) ("Proximate cause is a concept
difficult to define and almost impossible to explain conclusively. Each case must be decided upon its
own facts and circumnstances."); Scobba v. City of Seattle, 198 P.2d 805, 809-11 (Wash. 1948) ("[I]t
is often difficult to apply the rule [of proximate cause] to any given set of facts . . . ."). See generally
LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE passim (1927); Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause,
72 U. PA. L. REV. 211 passim (1924).
23. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474-75 (1876).
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Part II takes off from the realists' critique of doctrinal "word ritu-
al"2 4 to compare aspects of proximate cause analysis with magical prac-
tices in other cultures. Before tackling the role of skepticism in both con-
texts, I identify some similarities between doctrinal practices and magic.
For the legal realists, proximate cause was a paradigmatic example of
law's magic words,25 and it turns out to be possible to identify a number
of magical techniques from other cultures in judges' use of proximate
cause doctrines. Among other things, the familiar proximate cause tests
of foreseeability and direct connection mirror associations of similarity
and contagion that are thought to produce magical effects.
Part III makes the case that incorporating skepticism into doctrinal
analysis actually strengthens doctrinal practice. I argue that the skeptical
critique of proximate cause resembles a ritual unmasking that increases,
rather than diminishes, practitioners' power. What the anthropologist
Michael Taussig calls "the skilled revelation of skilled concealment" 26 is
part of many a magic ritual in other contexts. The comparison with mag-
ic therefore suggests a possible solution to the mystery of proximate
cause's persistence in the face of equally persistent criticism. If revealing
illusion is part of how magic works, revealing proximate cause doctrines'
indeterminacy similarly may strengthen, rather than disrupt, the power of
adjudicative magic.
But anthropological accounts of magic do not offer any definite ex-
planation of how skepticism works to strengthen magical practices. I
propose that in both magical and judicial settings, revealing illusion may
be a way to incorporate and transcend doubts about the authenticity and
efficacy of an obviously artificial practice. When practitioners reveal
artifice, they articulate and embrace doubts about the efficacy of those
techniques. In so doing, practitioners relieve their own, and their audi-
ence's, need to suppress those doubts in order to accept magic or legal
practice as authentic and valuable. Instead of working to hold off skepti-
cism, the participants and audience are freed to concentrate on the skill
of the magical or legal practitioner as he struggles with an admittedly
dubious technique to produce results that appear legitimate. Instead of a
conflict between practitioners' attempts to maintain illusion and skepti-
cism about authenticity, the judge or magician joins skeptics in recogniz-
ing the limits of his practice, freeing them to marvel at the skill with
which he uses those same, limited formal techniques to produce results
that are recognizably magical or legal. Selective exposure of practical
artifice may thus inspire overall confidence in the practitioner's efforts to
circumvent illusion and deliver real results. From this perspective, doc-
24. Green, supranote 11, at 1016.
25. See id. at 1022; Cohen, supra note 11, at 820.
26. Taussig, supra note 1, at 222.
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trinal tests like proximate cause exist in part to be debunked. But do such
revelations tend to legitimize or delegitimize legal power?
In Part IV, I conclude by offering some thoughts about the differ-
ences between the magical and legal contexts, and about how the ritual
unmasking of doctrinal indeterminacy affects law's legitimacy.
I. THE PERSISTENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
There may be no legal term in as widespread usage as proximate
cause that has been as excoriated as it has.
-Restatement (Third) of Torts27
The language of proximate cause is remarkably resilient. For over a
hundred years, lawyers, judges, and juries have analyzed whether a de-
fendant's negligent conduct was the "proximate cause" of a plaintiffs
injury (and so a source of liability) based on the "foreseeability" of the
injury, or its "direct," "natural," or "continuous" connection with the
negligence. For nearly as long, these doctrinal tests, and the term "prox-
imate cause" itself, have been criticized as irrational and confusing.28
Over the years, there have been many highly developed attempts to clari-
fy proximate cause doctrines and to rationalize them as determinate tests
of liability.29 All these Herculean efforts have failed. 30 Generations of
respected critics have argued that doctrinal proximate cause is simply
beside the point, or worse, that it obscures and interferes with whatever
evaluative analysis actually does, or should, determine liability." Wheth-
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYs. & EMOT. HARM § 29 reporters'
note cmt. b (2010).
28. Empirical studies indicate that jurors often think they have been asked to determine
whether a defendant's act was the "approximate" cause of the plaintiffs harm. See Robert P. Char-
row & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study ofJury
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1353 (1979) (finding almost one-fourth of subjects misun-
derstood instruction on proximate cause in this fashion); see also 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING
JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 744 (2d ed. 1986) (arguing that treating scope of
liability as a matter of proximate cause "prevents clarity of thought and meaningful analysis");
JOSEPH A. PAGE, TORTS: PROXIMATE CAUSE 6 (2003) (describing proximate cause as a "cryptic
expression"); Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REV. 103, 106-08
(1911) (collecting critiques of proximate cause usage and characterizing it as the source of "infinite
confusion and error").
29. See, e.g., Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences ofan Act, 33 HARv. L. REV. 633,
636 (1920); Grady, supra note 21, at 293-94; HART & HONORt, supra note 21.
30. "Modem tort theorists have lavished seemingly boundless attention on the problem of
explaining proximate cause, but the consensus of law students and others is that proximate cause
remains a hopeless riddle." Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory,
and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 49-50 (1991).
31. See GREEN, supra note 22, at 76-77; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON
TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 6 special note
(2010); Joseph W. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Common Law, 9
COLUM. L. REV. 16,36 (1909); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH.
L. REV. 543, 544 (1962); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked
Statistics, and Proof Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001,
1011 (1988).
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er they view negligence liability as based on unexamined personal pref-
erences or a rational application of social and economic policies, most
analysts agree that the doctrinal approach to proximate cause cannot pro-
duce predictable results. There have been three Restatements of Torts,
and not one of them has embraced the traditional language of proximate
cause. 32 Yet the doctrines endure. And instead of displacing the doc-
trines, the criticisms appear in some of the same cases that deploy doctri-
nal analysis.
A. Proximate Cause Doctrines: Foreseeability and Continuity
Most courts adjudicating negligence claims involving harm per-
ceived to be in some way extraordinary engage in doctrinal proximate
cause analysis.3 3 They apply some combination of two standard doctrinal
tests that purport to determine when a defendant is still liable to the
plaintiff for the injuries despite the unusual way the defendant's action
contributed to the plaintiffs harm, or the unusual type or amount of
harm. Commentators generally agree that standard doctrinal proximate
cause covers two traditional doctrines: foreseeability and direct continui-
ty.3 4 Courts analyze and describe the causal connections and remedial
ramifications of defendants' conduct by analyzing (1) the foreseeability
of the plaintiffs injury and (2) the extent to which the injury was the
direct, continuous, or natural result of the defendant's risky behavior, or
whether other factors "intervened" to "break the causal chain."35 For
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 (2010) ("An actor's liabil-
ity is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) ("The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of
harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is
no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has
resulted in the harm."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 (1934). The most recent Restatement
expresses some frustrated wonder at this state of affairs:
Although the term "proximate cause" has been in widespread use in judicial opinions,
treatises, casebooks, and scholarship, the term is not generally employed in this Chapter
because it is an especially poor one to describe the idea to which it is connected. See § 29
comment b. Hence, this Chapter is entitled, "Scope of Liability." . . . Nevertheless, to
communicate clearly with judges, lawyers, and academics who understand limitations on
liability under the proximate-cause rubric, the term is included in a parenthetical follow-
ing the Chapter's title. The Institute fervently hopes that the Restatement Fourth of Torts
will not find this parenthetical necessary.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 6 special Note (2010).
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYs. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. f (2010); Patrick
J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and
the Rule ofLaw, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2001).
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 reporters' note cmt. b,
(2010); Kelley, supra note 30, at 52; Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of
Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 996 (2001).
35. See Kellogg v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 26 Wis. 223, 253-54 (1870); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 reporters' note cmt. b (2010); Kelley, supra note 30, at 52;
Kelley, supra note 33. Most commentators frame the tests as "foreseeability" and "directness," or
"direct connection," or "direct consequences." Most commentators also seem to segregate "natural
and continuous" from "direct"; perhaps viewing foreseeability and directness as two different gloss-
es on the more general "natural and continuous" analysis. I read "natural and continuous" and "di-
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instance, in a famous case from 1968 that still appears in the proximate
cause chapter of torts casebooks,36 the Second Circuit concluded that
"recovery was properly denied on the facts of this case because the inju-
ries ... were too 'remote' or 'indirect' a consequence of defendants'
negligence."37
Judges generally articulate the proximate cause issue as a factual
question, and most standard jury instructions have a section on proximate
cause that draws on one or both of the doctrines of foreseeability and
direct connection.38 So, for instance, the New York pattern jury instruc-
tions explain, "If you find that a reasonably prudent person would not
have foreseen an act of the kind committed by [a third person] as a prob-
able consequence of the defendant's negligence, then the defendant is not
responsible for the plaintiff's injuries and plaintiff may not recover."3 9
Alternatively, the Florida jury instruction counsels, "Negligence is a le-
gal cause of [injury] if it directly and in natural and continuous sequence
produces or contributes substantially to producing such [injury], so that it
can reasonably be said that, but for the negligence, the [injury] would not
have occurred."Ao
Some commentators identify a historical trend in which courts have
shifted away from the direct continuity test to focus on foreseeability.41
For example, Jane Stapleton explains that "[h]istorically . . . there have
been two alternative general rules . . .. The directness rule extends to all
outcomes, even if not foreseeable, so long as they are the 'direct' result
of the tortious conduct. The more popular modern rule is that of foresee-
ability: freakish, 'unforeseeable' outcomes are outside the scope of liabil-
ity."42 Although this comment might suggest that the shift to foreseeabil-
ity represents some form of rationalizing progress, and a narrowing of
liability, Stapleton herself points out that it is widely recognized that in
rect" as two ways of stressing the concept of continuous events, and "foreseeable" and "probable" as
expressing the concept of imaginable events.
36. See, e.g., VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 442-
43 (3d ed. 2005); JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 322 (2004).
37. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. b. (2010).
39. New York Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil 2:72 (3d ed. 2012).
40. Florida Standard Jury Instructions: Civil CLE 4-1 § 401.12(a) (2010).
41. See, e.g., Deanna Pollard Sacks, Constitutionalized Negligence, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
1065, 1131 (2012) ("Foreseeability of harm is the cornerstone of modern proximate cause analy-
sis."); Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1241, 1278 & n.220 (2011) ("Today, almost all states use either the foreseeability test or the
scope of the risk test," which "essentially ask the same question," whereas previously "[t]he most
common test was the directness test."); Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules & Immuni-
ty: An Application to Cyberspace, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1, 31 (2007) (stating that previously courts fo-
cused on intervention that broke the chain of causation, but "[m]ore modern cases tend to rely on the
general concept of foreseeability").
42. Stapleton, supra note 34.
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many cases either test will generate "or can be made to produce" the
same result. 43
When one looks at the cases, conceptual and chronological separa-
tions between the two doctrines break down." Many judicial opinions-
both early and recent-combine the concepts of direct continuity and
foreseeability as two aspects of the proximate cause analysis.45 In fact,
since courts began discussing proximate cause, they have employed both
direct continuity and foreseeability and complained about both. For in-
stance, in 1876 the United States Supreme Court explained:
The question always is, Was there an unbroken connection between
the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous operation? Did the facts
constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to
make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause
intervening between the wrong and the injury? ... [I]n order to war-
rant a finding that negligence . .. is the proximate cause of an injury,
it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable conse-
quence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have
been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances.46
This nineteenth century case thus effectively combines foreseeabil-
ity with the test of continuity. 47 Rather than an alternative or limitation to
the standard of direct continuity, in this approach foreseeability is part of
what defines direct connection.48
43. Id ("[1]t is widely acknowledged that in practice both approaches produce, or can be
made to produce, the same results ..... (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 264 (1999); Kelley,
supra note 30, at 52, 94; William J. Powers, Reputology, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 1941, 1948 (1991)).
44. So, for instance, in another case classically included in torts casebooks, Judge Henry
Friendly explained: "The weight of authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to
consequences foreseeable at the time of the negligent conduct when the consequences are 'direct,'
and the damage, although other and greater than expected, is of the same general sort that was
risked." In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964); see also Linder v. Bidner, 270
N.Y.S.2d 427, 429-30 (App. Div. 1966); JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 36, at 439-40; GOLDBERG,
SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, supra note 36, at 311-20.
45. See, e.g., Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469,475 (1876); Williamson v.
Liptzin, 539 S.E.2d 313, 319-20 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("Foresecability is but one element of proxi-
mate cause .... Other equally important considerations include ... whether there is a direct connec-
tion without intervening causes . . . ." (internal quotations marks omitted)).
46. Kellogg, 94 U.S. at 475.
47. Id. at 474.
48. Many old cases combine foreseeability and direct connection in their proximate cause
analyses. See, e.g., Harris v. Union Pac. Ry., 13 F. 591, 592 (C.C.D. Colo. 1882) ("Proximate cause
... must [be] the natural and ordinary result of the cause; or, in other words, the question here may
be stated to be whether a reasonably prudent and cautious person ought to have apprehended that the
injury might result from the act which was done." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ultima Thule
v. Benton, 110 S.W. 1037, 1038 (Ark. 1908) ("It is generally held that, in order to warrant a finding
that negligence is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and
probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in
the light of the attending circumstances." (quoting and adopting Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. v.
Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kleinberg v. Lyons, 148 S.E.
535, 539 (Ga. 1929) ("[I]n order to hold the defendant liable, the evidence must show either that the
act of the defendant complained of was the sole occasion of the injury, or that it put in operation
other causal forces, such as were the direct, natural, and probable consequences of the original act, or
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Although the modem cases often talk more about foreseeability,
they typically still mix that concept with the idea of unbroken continuity,
49as courts have been doing for a very long time. In recent cases, con-
cepts of direct connection and unbroken causal chains remain active.50
Foreseeability has received more attention from academics in recent
years and is often presented as a rationalizing improvement that is gradu-
that the intervening agency could have reasonably been anticipated or foreseen by the original
wrongdoer."); Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 167 N.E. 235, 243 (Mass. 1929) ("The injury
must be the direct result of the wrongful act. By direct and proximate cause is not meant that the
cause of agency which is nearest in time or place to the result is necessarily to be chosen. It will not
be considered too remote if, according to human experience, the defendant ought to have foreseen
that the intervening act was likely to happen."); Lane v. Atlanta Works, Ill Mass. 136, 139-40
(1872) ("The act of a third person, intervening and contributing a condition necessary to the injuri-
ous effect or the original negligence, will not excuse the first wrongdoer, if such act ought to have
been foreseen. The original negligence still remains a culpable and direct cause of the injury.");
Galveston v. Sweeney, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 173, 178 (1894) ("'[P]roximate cause' is ... such an act,
wanting in ordinary care, as actively aided in producing the injury, as a direct and existing cause. It
need not necessarily be the last or sole cause, but it must be a concurring cause, such as might rea-
sonably have been contemplated as involving the result, under the attending circumstances.").
49. See, e.g., Jarosh v. Van Meter, 105 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Neb. 1960) ("To constitute proxi-
mate cause, . . . the injury must be the natural and probable result of the negligence, and be of such a
character as an ordinarily prudent person could have known, or would or ought to have foreseen
might probably occur as the result." (quoting Steenbock v. Omaha Cnty. Club, 195 N.W. 117, 118
(Neb. 1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Welsh v. Zuck, 218 N.W.2d 236, 240 (Neb. 1974)
("[A] person is not legally responsible for an injury if it would not have resulted but for the interpo-
sition of an efficient intervening cause, which he should not have reasonably anticipated."); Wyatt v.
Gilmore, 290 S.E.2d 790, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) ("Foreseeability is only one element of proxi-
mate cause, [others include] whether the cause is . . . likely to produce the result; whether the rela-
tionship between cause and effect is too attenuated; whether there is a direct connection without
intervening causes; . . . and whether there was a . . . continuous sequence between the cause and the
result."); Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 263-4 (Okla. 1982) ("The general
rule is that the causal connection between an act of negligence and an injury is broken by the inter-
vention of a new, independent and efficient cause which was neither anticipated nor reasonably
foreseeable."); Medina v. Air-Mite Devices, Inc., 515 N.E.2d 770, 773 (111. App. Ct. 1987) ("The
causal connection between the defective product and the injury will only be broken if the intervening
acts or omissions of a third party are improbable or unforeseeable, and, thus, superseding.").
50. See, e.g., Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 828-29 (Del. 1995) ("[A]
proximate cause is one 'which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient inter-
vening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.' . . . The
mere occurrence of an intervening cause . . .does not automatically break the chain of causation . . . .
In order to break the causal chain, the intervening cause must also be a superseding cause, that is, the
intervening act or event itself must have been neither anticipated nor reasonably foreseeable by the
original tortfeasor." (quoting Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094,1097 (Del. 1990))); Gibbs v. Her-
nandez, 810 So. 2d 1034, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (blending a "natural, direct and continuous
sequence" requirement with foreseeability); Hassan v. Begley, 836 N.E.2d 303, 308 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) ("The key to determining whether an intervening agency has broken the original chain of
causation is to determine whether, under the circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable that the
agency would intervene in such a way as to cause the resulting injury."); Edwards ex rel. Fryover v.
Anderson Eng'g, Inc., 251 P.3d 660, 665 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) ("[T]he acts or omissions of these
defendants were entirely 'too attenuated' to be a usual, likely, or legally cognizable cause of [the
plaintiff's] fatal injuries.... [N]egligent acts of others ... broke the connection between the initial
negligent acts and the harm caused. .. . These intervening acts or consequences cannot be said to be
foreseeable."); Crowe v. Shaw, 755 A.2d 509, 512 (Me. 2000) (finding that proximate cause may be
proven if "the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
the negligence"); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Caputo, 710 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) ("Prox-
imate cause is an act or failure to act, which in the natural and continuous sequence directly produces
the damage, and without which it would not have occurred. Cause occurs when the damage is the
natural and foreseeable result of the act or failure to act.").
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ally displacing "an even vaguer and more amorphous limit on liability."'
But the history is much more troubled, mixing doctrines of continuity
and foreseeability with critiques of both.
B. Critiques of Proximate Cause
Alongside the continued use of proximate cause doctrines, skepti-
cism abides. And just as the tests of directness and foreseeability do not
fit readily into a narrative of progress, longstanding criticism has failed
to generate a developmental shift away from doctrinal proximate cause
analysis. Rather than displacing doctrine, the critiques coexist. Some-
times the conflict between doctrine and skepticism is presented as an
argument between courts and the academy.52 But that division fails to
capture the extent to which the application and critique of doctrine in-
termingle and thrive alongside one another. Academics rationalize the
doctrines they critique, and judges have long recognized and acknowl-
edged that doctrinal proximate cause analyses are problematic.53
There is an astonishingly broad consensus that the standard doctri-
nal inquiries are deeply flawed to the point of disutility. Moreover, criti-
cism of proximate cause is nearly as old as the doctrines.54 There are two
primary critiques: (1) the doctrines are indeterminate; and (2) doctrinal
proximate cause mixes empirical and normative analysis (and tends to
obscure the normative part). These two main criticisms had crystallized
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM, § 29 cmt. e (2010).
52. "No subject separates torts scholars from practitioners more than proximate cause." Rich-
ard L. Cupp, Jr., Proximate Cause, the Proposed Basic Principles Statement, and Products Liability,
53 S. C. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Am. Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Urbanski, 162 F. 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1908) ("The
question of proximate cause is likely to lead us into undue refinements and subtlety of disquisition, if
we do not guard ourselves therefrom, by taking a common sense view point from which to consider
the happenings of ordinary and everyday life. The varying circumstances of each particular case
make it difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any general rule, or establish any test, by which the
legal proximate cause of an event may be distinguished from the remote cause that is outside of legal
cognizance."); Evansville Veneer & Lumber Co. v. Claybon, 73 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ind. App. 1947)
("[P]roximate cause is considered an issue of fact although its determination sometimes requires the
application of difficult and obtuse rules of law."); Hoover v. Wagner, 189 So. 2d 20, 27 (La. Ct.
App. 1966) ("[T]he various definitions and tests of proximate cause are inadequate to afford a defi-
nite and invariable rule whereby a line can be drawn between those causes which the law regards as
sufficiently proximate and those which are too remote . . . ."); Lewis v. Flint & P.M. Ry., 19 N.W.
744, 748 (Mich. 1884) ("The application of the rule that the proximate and not the remote cause is to
be regarded, is obscure and difficult in many cases, but not in this."); White v. Diaz, 854 N.Y.S.2d
106, 106 (App. Div. 2008) ("The resolution of proximate cause issues has been troubling courts and
legal scholars for centuries..."); Fannin v. Cubric, 255 N.E.2d 270, 278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970)
("The term, 'proximate cause,' is often difficult of exact definition as applied to the facts of a partic-
ular case."); Huffman v. Sorenson, 76 S.E.2d 183, 186 (Va. 1953) ("Proximate cause is a concept
difficult to define and almost impossible to explain conclusively. Each case necessarily must be
decided upon its own facts and circumstances."); Scobba v. City of Seattle, 198 P.2d 805, 810
(Wash. 1948) ("Making [a proximate cause] determination is something like drawing 'a line between
night and day."').
54. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 31, at 25 (arguing that any question beyond the initial but-
for causation question is not a causal question at all and formulating that question in causal terms is
misleading because "[i]t naturally induces misapprehension that the inquiry in any concrete instance
concerns only some subtle distinction between different kinds of causes in the 'chain of causation').
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by at least the 1920s in the writings of the legal realists, although proxi-
mate cause doctrines were questioned long before that time. 5 The cri-
tiques are radical. Many analysts assert directly that foresecability and
continuity have little or nothing to do with the social, economic, and
moral values that actually do, or should, determine negligence liability.
Despite their apparent conflict, both the doctrines and criticism of prox-
imate cause remain central to tort theory.
The most recent serious attempt to reform proximate cause language
in negligence law came in 2010 with the publication of the first volume
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a definitionally mainstream source of
tort commentary.5 6 Eschewing the term proximate cause, the Restatement
reporters proposed assessing the "scope of liability" 5 7 under a "risk
standard"" they deem superior to the traditional tests of direct continuity,
broken and unbroken causal chains, and foreseeability that they
acknowledge most judges and juries still undertake. 9
It was the legal realists, who in the 1920s and 1930s put forward the
most direct and sustained critiques of proximate cause, pointing to the
flexibility of doctrinal tests and suggesting alternative, overtly value-
laden approaches for balancing policy considerations regarding liabil-
ity.60 The realists argued that neither direct continuity nor foreseeabil-
ity-and for that matter no test involving "cause" in the usual sense of
the word-could account for the liability outcomes in cases where courts
55. GREEN, supra note 22, at 76-77.
56. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS ch. 6 (2010).
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. d (2010) ("Central to
the limitation on liability of this Section is the idea that an actor should be held liable only for harm
that was among the potential harms-the risks-that made the actor's conduct tortious. The term
'scope of liability' is employed to distinguish those harms that fall within this standard and, thus, for
which the defendant is subject to liability.").
58. Id. ("[T]he jury should be told that, in deciding whether plaintiffs harm is within the
scope of liability, it should go back to the reasons for finding the defendant engaged in negligent or
other tortious conduct. If the harms risked by that tortious conduct include the general sort of harm
suffered by the plaintiff, the defendant is subject to liability for the plaintiffs harm.. . . The standard
imposed by this Section is often referred to as the requirement that the harm be 'within the scope of
the risk.' . . . For the sake of convenience, this limitation on liability is referred to in the remainder of
this Chapter as the 'risk standard."').
59. Id. at § 29 cmt. e ("Currently, virtually all jurisdictions employ a foresceability (or risk)
standard for some range of scope-of-liability issues in negligence cases. When properly understood
and framed, the foresceability standard is congruent with the risk standard.. . . At least some courts
have employed language that veers closer to the formulation of the risk standard provided in this
Section than does a foresecability test.. .. The primary alternative rule to the risk standard for limit-
ing a tortfeasor's liability is the direct-consequences test.").
60. Critiques of proximate cause go back even farther. In 1870, Nicholas St. John Green, one
of Holmes's colleagues on the Harvard faculty, attacked the direct continuity doctrine as a "danger-
ous metaphor." NICHOLAS ST. JOHN GREEN, Proximate and Remote Cause, in ESSAYS AND NOTES
ON THE LAW OF TORT AND CRIME 124 (1933) [1870], reprinted in 5 KAN. CITY L. REV. 114, 124
(1937). For St. John Green, the notion of a continuous causal "chain" was a "pure fabrication of the
mind." Id. He pointed out that the idea of a sequence of individual causes linking each to each did
not correspond to the way the world actually worked, and that in order to maintain that fiction,
courts were relegating some actual causes to the status of background "conditions." Id. at 125. His
solution, however, was itself doctrinal-he advocated the foreseeability doctrine. Id. at 129.
90 [Vol. 90:1
THE PERSISTENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
talked about proximate cause. In an early influential article, Henry
Edgerton criticized both direct continuity and foreseeability as ambigu-
ous. 61 Edgerton saw these concepts as simply too flexible to meaningful-
ly restrain a judge's liability analysis. 62 Regarding "direct" cause, Edger-
ton asked, "Is not directness a matter of degree?" Answering his own
question, he explained:
In most cases . . . the connection between the defendant's act and the
plaintiffs injury may well be regarded ... as involving a single step,
or as involving several steps. The question is simply how far one's
taste will take him in the subdivision of what is indefinitely, or infi-
nitely, subdivisible. Tastes differ.63
Edgerton recognized foreseeability as a similarly plastic concept:
Is the "foreseen danger" a danger of the intervention of the identical
force which does intervene, or is it enough if there is danger of the
intervention of a force of similar character; and if the latter, how
closely similar must it be?6
Thus, the basic indeterminacy of doctrinal proximate cause, which be-
devils judges, academics, and law students to this day, was fully articu-
lated over eighty years ago.
The most tenacious realist critic of proximate cause was Leon
Green. As far as he was concerned, doctrinal analysis of foreseeability
and direct continuity ignored the policy questions judges should and did
consider in negligence cases.65 The term "cause" properly referred to
only a narrow range of empirical questions and not to the normative is-
sues of responsibility that proximate cause analysis usually included. 6
According to Green, judges' resort to "metaphysical" doctrinal reasoning
in such cases covered up what were really judicial determinations of
"public policy, a balancing of interests, with the conclusion that it is bet-
ter to deny protection to the interest involved under such circumstances
than it is to undertake to give compensation under all the difficulties of
the case."6 7 The real question was the "scope of protection" of the legal
61. See generally Edgerton, supra note 22 passim.
62. Id. at 211.
63. Id. at 215.
64. Id. at 231.
65. Leon Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C. L. REV. 3, 3, 20
(1927) ("The attempt which common law courts have made to resolve every major problem of legal
liability in tort into terms of causal relation marks the most glaring and persistent fallacy in tort
law."); see also GREEN, supra note 22, at 76-77; Kelley, supra note 30, at 98 (citing LEON GREEN,
JUDGE AND JURY 265-67 (1930)).
66. GREEN, supra note 22, at 2-5 ("[Tlhe abortive efforts which have been made to solve the
inquiries of prime importance in terms of causal connection cannot be exaggerated. The deplorable
expenditure and stupendous waste of judicial energy which has been employed in converting this
simple problem into an insoluble riddle beggars description.").




rule or norms on which the claim was based.6 ' That policy determination
had nothing to do with cause or with metaphorical connections between
plaintiff and defendant, whether articulated in terms of direct causal
chains or foreseeability: "This problem, however phrased, is one of bal-
ancing of interests." 6 9
To Green, proximate cause was pure illusion-a fallacy that ob-
scured or displaced the real analyses that courts should and did make.
"[T]he myth of 'proximate cause,"' he said, "finds its only rivals in those
of theological origin."o Courts were using these "fantastic" doctrines to
"do ... under the guise of 'proximate cause' what should have been done
by way of defining the scope of protection" the law provided, an analysis
that was properly conducted by overtly balancing a number of different
policy concerns.7 1
Green did not pull punches. Courts' focus on foreseeability in prox-
imate cause determinations was "stupid" because it repeated a test al-
ready used to determine negligence in the first place.72 The "confused"
doctrinal approach was a "wretched" approach to liability "inexcusably
perpetrated by intelligent judges and utterly devoid of scientific founda-
tion."73 Their "use of all those weighted phrases as 'remote,' 'unfore-
seen,' 'intervening agencies,' 'independent agencies,' and a score of oth-
ers" were "meaningless as solvents" and only functioned to "provide a
smoke screen behind which the court can retire from an awkward posi-
tion."74
For the realists, then, doctrinal determinacy was simply false-a
fraud or a fantasy. They were (mostly) willing to do away with it in favor
of a more overt and rational version of what they believed judges were
really doing anyway, namely policy analysis. Green offered a list of fac-
tors for courts to consider when deciding negligence liability, and
acknowledged that the ultimate balance a court would strike would de-
pend on judges' individual points of view. 75 Edgerton embraced indefi-
niteness as a necessary reality of what he saw as an individual decision-
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. GREEN, supra note 22, at 136. Green's arguments are wonderfully free of the kind of
academic circumspection that characterizes so much legal academic prose today. In another bracing-
ly direct description, he called proximate cause "a bogey, the sort of thing found only in children's
story books-a sort of child's mind creation." Id. at v.
71. Id. at 77; see also Green, supra note I1, at 1034 (listing and discussing the five factors
that should be overtly balanced-administrative, ethical or moral, economic, prophylactic, and
justice-and discussing the administrative factor). See generally Leon Green, The Duty Problem in
Negligence Cases, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255,255-84 (1929) (discussing the remaining four factors).
72. GREEN, supra note 22, at 76.
73. Id. at 77.
74. Id. at 76-77.
75. Green, supra note I1, at 1034 (listing and discussing the five factors that should be overt-
ly balanced-administrative, ethical or moral, economic, prophylactic, and justice-and discussing
the administrative factor).
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making process.76 He was prepared to rely on judicial "intuition" and
"instinct" as the best available methods of legal analysis. 77
Of course, there is a tremendous price to pay for such a shift. Mov-
ing from doctrine to policy means giving up on the central legal concept
of decisions produced by something other than the decision maker's con-
scious choice. It means accepting decision making that, however well
reasoned, is the result of exactly those kinds of deliberate choices. No
wonder, then, that many legal decision makers and scholars today em-
brace the realist view of doctrinal indeterminacy but are unwilling to
accept the realist solution of replacing doctrinal analysis with straight-
forward policy reasoning.
Certainly there are serious jurists and commentators who do not
share the realist view of doctrinal indeterminacy in general. Regarding
proximate cause, however, there are few serious rebuttals.79 Yet despite
near universal agreement that proximate cause doctrines are empty, many
judges and law professors continue to proceed as if those doctrines were
capable of determining, or at least contributing meaningfully to, legal
outcomes that are then subjected to realist criticism. Often, a doctrinal
analysis is followed by questions about whether the results of that analy-
sis fit with the equities in the particular case and broader policy consider-
ations. Indeed, these days the unspoken view often seems to be that doc-
trinal formulas constitute the basic method for legal decision making,
producing inchoate results that are augmented and completed by the de-
cision maker's policy analysis.80 Where doctrines are acknowledged to
be indeterminate, however, this is problematic.
76. Edgerton, supra note 22.
77. Id at 242-43 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Theory ofJudicial Decision, 36 HARv. L. REV.
940, 951-52, 956-57 (1923)).
78. But note that even the original realists did not always follow their prescriptions. Jerome
Frank, for instance, served as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where his
judicial opinions sometimes deride legal doctrines and rules. See, e.g., United States v. Rubenstein,
151 F.2d 915, 923 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur legal concepts often resemble the
necks of the flamingos in Alice in Wonderland which failed to remain sufficiently rigid to be used
effectively as mallets by the croquet-players."). Nonetheless, many of his opinions blend doctrine
and policy. See, e.g., Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102, 106-12 (2d Cir. 1954)
(Frank, J., dissenting) (engaging in traditional doctrinal proximate cause analysis, though asserting
that "[n]o foggier phrase. . . could be contrived for use in negligence cases," and upon finding injury
was foreseeable, adding a policy-based argument to find it unconscionable to allow manufacturers to
escape liability on grounds of a threat to free trade or undue liability burdens).
79. Indeed proximate cause is sometimes used as an object lesson for students about the
extent of doctrinal indeterminacy. For instance, one longtime torts professor told me that she always
brings her crystal ball to class when she teaches proximate cause.
80. See TAMANAHA, supra note 7; L.H. Larue, "Neither Force Nor Will," 12
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 179, 181 (1995) ("[N]one of us believes that our judges are 'bound
down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular
case that comes before them."' (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max
Beloff ed., 1987)); W. Bradley Wendel, Jurisprudence and Judicial Ethics I (Comell Law Faculty
Publ'ns. Paper 96, 2007), http://scholarship.law.comell.eduIlsrp_papers/96 ("American lawyers and
judges do not regard it as improper to rely on 'policy' arguments, which are, in effect, middle-level
principles of political morality that play a role in justifying legal decisions."); Felix Frankfurter,
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In the case of proximate cause, doctrines of foreseeability and direct
connection are simply too malleable to determine a result-initial or fi-
nal-in a particular factual legal problem.8 1 Shifting doctrinal reasoning
to the first step in a purported combination doctrine-policy analysis thus
fails to add any meaningful constraint on the ultimate decision. Indeter-
minate doctrines cannot furnish an initial result to be tweaked by policy
any more than they can furnish the final liability determination. Moreo-
ver, even assuming that doctrine and policy theoretically could be mixed
with integrity, the fact remains that most judges express their decisions
almost entirely in terms of doctrine even when, as in Derdiarian v. Felix
Contracting Corp.,82 they acknowledge that policy must play a role.
Indeed, proximate cause is the rare doctrinal area where judges openly
acknowledge that policy plays a role. 84 At the very least, this suggests
that many, if not most, judicial practitioners view the mixture of policy
and doctrine as problematic, even when they are willing to assert its ne-
cessity.
C. Proximate Cause Case Law's Intermittent Combination ofDoctrine
and Critique
Courts continue to engage in doctrinal proximate cause analysis.
From time to time, though, in the midst of that analysis, judges point to
proximate cause doctrines' inability to determine liability. Again, this is
not a new or even a post-realist phenomenon. In 1876, the U.S. Supreme
Court referred to the "embarrassing question" of proximate cause and
acknowledged "that the rule is difficult of application."85 A hundred
years later, in Derdiarian, the New York court was even more direct:
Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 905 (1953) (noting that judges must bear "alle-
giance to nothing except the effort to find their path through precedent, through policy, through
history,... to the best judgment"); James D. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation ofa Rule of
Law, 37 BROOK. L. REV. 323, 333-34 (1971) (arguing that judges will use public policy to decide
cases and advocating that judges' remain candid and clear when they do so).
81. Examples of cases in which doctrines do appear to determine results often involve obvi-
ous quantitative questions (e.g., whether a deadline has expired). See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United
States, 223 F.3d. 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000). Though even here there are always equitable arguments
available that the deadline should not apply in this particular-case and legal interpretive arguments
that the text that codifies the deadline was not "intended" to apply in such cases.
82. 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980).
83. Id. at 670; see also Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 19 (N.J. 1997); Scobba v. City
of Seattle, 198 P.2d 805, 810 (Wash. 1948).
84. See, e.g., Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Proximate
cause is bottomed on public policy as a limitation on how far society is willing to extend liability for
a defendant's actions."); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 157 P.2d 372, 375 (Cal. 1945) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("'[P]roximate cause' . . . is ordinarily concerned . . . with the various considerations of
policy that limit an actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct."); Fandrey ex rel.
Connell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W. 345, 360-61 (Wis. 2004) (concluding that recovery
was out of proportion to the culpability of the defendant homeowners and would place an unreason-
able burden on similarly situated tortfeasors); Martinez v. Lazaroff, 411 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (App.
Div. 1978) (explaining that proximate cause serves to place reasonable limits on the liability of an
actor as a matter of public policy to avoid burdening human activity in ways that would do little to
prevent freakish accidents).
85. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474-75 (1876).
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"The concept of proximate cause, or more appropriately legal cause, has
proven to be an elusive one, incapable of being precisely defined to cov-
er all situations."86
Indeed, the Derdiarian court expressly invoked the view that prox-
imate cause stands in for judicial policy making, explaining that the doc-
trine's "elusive[ness]" is, "in part, because the concept stems from policy
considerations that serve to place manageable limits upon the liability
that flows from negligent conduct" and depending on the facts of the
individual case, "a variety of factors may be relevant."87 Note that the
court first suggests that "policy considerations" are internal to doctrinal
proximate cause analysis.88 So far, so good, because this is how doctrine
and policy do fit together. The idea is that doctrine encapsulates policy
choices and enforces those choices through tests that replace decision
makers' individual policy judgments. The problem comes in what fol-
lows: the court acknowledged that, as Henry Edgerton and Leon Green
argued, in any given case the application of proximate cause doctrines
depends on "a variety of factors."89 Thus, individual policy judgments
come back in as the judge decides which factors are relevant. Neverthe-
less, Derdiarian proceeded to a full-fledged doctrinal analysis.
Derdiarian is still heavily cited in New York case law90 and includ-
ed in torts casebooks.9' The plaintiff was a workman injured at a street
construction site. He sued his employer-contractor, claiming that the
saw-horse-type barricade protecting the site was a negligently insuffi-
cient safety precaution. 92 After reciting the bizarre facts-an epileptic
driver lost consciousness and careened into the work area, hitting the
plaintiff and a kettle of boiling hot liquid enamel, which splattered and
ignited his body into a fire ball 9 3 -the court proceeded to a doctrinal
analysis that combines the concepts of foreseeability and unbroken con-
tinuity.94 Analyzing whether the epileptic driver's seizure was "a super-
seding cause which interrupted the link between [the defendant contrac-




90. See, e.g., Merino v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 675 N.E.2d 1222, 1222 (N.Y. 1996); Mirand
v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994); Gordon v. E. Ry. Supply, Inc. 6 2 6 N.E.2d
912, 915-16 (N.Y. 1993); Kriz v. Schum, 549 N.E.2d 1155, 1159-61 (N.Y. 1989); Goldsmith Mo-
tors Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 838 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (App. Div. 2007); Soomaroo v. Mainco Elevator
& Elec. Corp., 838 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (App. Div. 2007); Terry v. Danisi Fuel Oil Co., 837 N.Y.S.2d
256, 257 (App. Div. 2007); Fordham-Coleman v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 834 N.Y.S.2d 422,
427-28 (App. Div. 2007); Flynn v. Compton, 833 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (App. Div. 2007); Pierre v.
Lieber, 829 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666 (App. Div. 2007).
91. See, e.g., JOHNSON & GuNN, supra note 36, at 394-96; VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL.,
PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 336-38 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 12th ed. 2010).
92. Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d at 669.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 670-71.
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tor's] negligence and plaintiffs injuries,"9 the court explained that "lia-
bility turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable
consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence."96 If
the epileptic driver's negligence in breaking through the barricade was
"not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far
removed from the defendant's conduct," it might be "a superseding act
which breaks the causal nexus."97 But the court declined to rule that a
"superseding cause . . . interrupted the link between" the defendant's
negligence and the plaintiffs injuries, reasoning that a jury could reason-
ably conclude "that the foreseeable, normal and natural result" of the
defendant contractor's negligent failure to provide better barricades "was
the injury of a worker by a car entering the improperly protected area."9 8
The application of Derdiarian's doctrinal analysis in subsequent
cases wholly confirms the view that proximate cause is an "elusive," that
is, indeterminate, concept.99 Consider two cases involving injuries caused
by dives into shallow swimming pools. In Boltax v. Joy Day Camp,1oo a
twenty-year-old man who knew the depth of the water and was "knowl-
edgeable about the general dangers of diving" nevertheless dove head-
first from a lifeguard chair into the shallow end of a pool.o'0 He alleged
that the defendant day camp that ran the pool knew young people were
using the pool in the evenings and negligently continued to allow them to
gain entrance to its pool with dangerously low water and a lifeguard's
chair at the shallow end.10 2 The court, quoting, inter alia, Derdiarian,
dismissed the case.10 3 The plaintiff diver's "reckless conduct" was an
95. Id. at 671.
96. Id. at 670.
97. Id
98. Id. at 671.
99. See, for example, the following cases, each of which cites Derdiarian, and yet on argua-
bly similar facts produces opposite liability results, finding no proximate cause: Rodriguez v. Her-
nandez, 830 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781-82 (App. Div. 2007) (concluding that it was not foreseeable that
such a crash was likely to occur where plaintiff driver lost control of his vehicle after collision
caused him to crash into a shoddily built shed constructed by the city, one piece of which fell
through the windshield and pierced plaintiff's thigh); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fleury, No. 5:99-CV-1261,
2007 WL 1200137, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2007) (holding that defendant was not liable for
damage resulting from a tree on defendant's property touching power lines that caused an electric
back feed setting fire to plaintiffs home because defendant could not have reasonably foreseen such
a result); Haughton v. T & J Elec. Corp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 664, 666-67 (App. Div. 2003) (upholding
summary judgment for defendant university and electrical company, finding that the plaintiff
handyman-employee was the proximate cause of his own injuries because checking a circuit box
during a campus blackout without protective gear was an intervening act cutting off the university
and company's negligence in mislabeling live wires in the circuit box); Marenghi v. N.Y. City
Transit Auth., 542 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543-44 (1989) (reversing jury verdict for the plaintiff who was
injured when a New York City subway conductor re-opened the doors to allow a rushing commuter
to board the train and knock over and injure the plaintiff, finding the rushing commuter's actions an
unforeseeable, superseding act and citing public-policy concerns).
100. 490 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1986).
101. Id at 528.
102. Id.
103. Id
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"unforeseeable superseding event," said the court, that absolved the de-
fendant pool owners of liability in the accident.'0"
Three years later, however, the same court allowed another pool
case to go forward. In Kriz v. Schum,105 a teenage girl sued the manufac-
turers and distributors of a pool and pool slide, and the contractor who
installed them both.106 The girl was told by the pool's owner that it was
safe to dive from the pool slide, which was set between the deep and
shallow ends of the pool.'07 Indeed, her host exhorted her to dive, in-
forming her that it was a "ritual" for everyone to enter the pool the first
time by diving from the top of the slide. 08 Moreover, the accident took
place at night, the host had neglected to turn on the pool light, and the
plaintiff had removed her contact lenses, so she could not see the depth
of the water.109 The court rejected the slide manufacturer's proximate
cause argument, holding that the lack of posted warnings and the slide's
design and placement between the deep and shallow parts of the pool
"were causative factors" in her injuries.110 This time, the court explained,
again quoting Derdiarian, that "[i]n these circumstances, a superseding
act does not break the causal nexus unless it is 'an intervening act ...
extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal
course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's
conduct.""" The court noted the opposite result in Boltax, and acknowl-
edged that the host's conduct here may have been reckless, but held that
neither his conduct nor the plaintiff's decision to take a blind dive into a
dark, unfamiliar pool were "extraordinary and unforeseeable so as to
break the causal chain."ll 2
There are aspects of these cases that might make their results equi-
table, and even predictable, but they have nothing to do with foreseeabil-
ity or continuity. The Boltax plaintiff precluded from recovery was an
adult man and a trespasser." 3 Arguably his own fault in the accident
would have made it unfair to tag the pool owner-a children's day
camp-with damages."14 The Kriz plaintiff was another story: a teenage
girl pressured by another teenager to take a ridiculous risk. As between
the girl who succumbed to peer pressure to do something stupid and the
companies who built, sold, and installed the equipment that facilitated
her unfortunate stunt, it was arguably fairer and more economically
104. Id.
105. 549 N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. 1989).




110. Id at 1160-61.
111. Id. at 1161 (quoting Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1980)).
112. Id.at1161.
113. Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 493 N.Y.S.2d 590, 590 (App. Div. 1985).
114. Id.
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sound to shift the cost to defendants who surely knew that accidents in-
volving their equipment would happen occasionally and nevertheless
went on building and marketing pools and slides, and who could presum-
ably internalize the cost of liability by increasing their products' costs.,15
It is not possible, however, to say that the relative foreseeability or
directness of the accidents in Boltax and Kriz can account for their dis-
parate results.1 16 Whether the defendants could foresee what happened to
the plaintiffs depends entirely on the level of generality at which one
frames the events to be foreseen. Likewise, the directness of the connec-
tion between the plaintiffs' injuries and defendants' acts depends on
framing rather than on a consistent analysis. Instead of doctrine internal-
izing certain values and determining the liability result accordingly, the
tests of foreseeability and direct connection are so flexible that they in-
vite the decision maker to adjust the level of generality to make the lia-
bility result reflect the decision maker's views about equity and the best
social policies under the circumstances. As Edgerton observed eighty
years earlier, whether one finds a direct connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury in this type of case is a matter of
"taste."I17 The New York pool cases are far from atypical in their use of
proximate cause doctrines to reach results that seem utterly unpredictable
on the basis of those doctrines. Indeed, as the Restatement reports, in
jurisdictions across the country those doctrines continue to be employed
in negligence cases to produce disparate results in apparently similar
circumstances.
115. Of course, this analysis is one basis for strict liability for product "defects."
116. See sources cited supra note 99.
117. Edgerton, supra note 22, at 215.
118. Compare First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1073-74 (111.
1999) (reversing jury verdict for plaintiff and finding defendant not the proximate cause of death of a
student killed crossing the street mid-block where defendant had parked his tanker truck in a no-
parking zone very near a school just as it was letting out-blocking oncoming traffic's view and
partially blocking the driving lanes and pedestrian's view of oncoming traffic-because the student's
jaywalking was the sole cause of the accident), with Biel v. City of Bridgeview, 781 N.E.2d 555,
561-64 (111. App. Ct. 2002) (reversing summary judgment for defendant city, where plaintiffs
decedent was struck and killed while jaywalking late at night, badly intoxicated, stumbling, and
nearly senseless, but street lamps at the location were out and had been for some time, making it
foreseeable that such injury could result). Compare Maroulis v. Elliott, 151 S.E.2d 339, 344-47 (Va.
1966) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiffs where an accident began when a car driving in the wrong
direction caused first car of the group to swerve off the shoulder, leading second car to collide at
high speed with the car driving in the wrong direction and third car to brake to avoid hitting second
car, but defendant driver of fourth car did not brake fast enough and slammed into the back of the
second car and thus was the proximate cause of a substantial portion of the injuries), with Edlow v.
Arnold, 415 S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (Va. 1992) (affirming jury verdict for defendant where plaintiff
traveling on an icy road stopped to pick up a passenger at an intersection and defendant's car struck
plaintiff's car from the rear, and defendant testified that she saw the stopped car five to six car
lengths ahead but did not apply the breaks until two car lengths away, despite the icy conditions).
Compare Gardner v. City of San Jose, 57 Cal. Rptr. 176, 180-81 (Ct. App. 1967) (upholding jury
verdict for the plaintiff because city had created a dangerous trap-whereby drivers would assume
they had the right of way-by constructing but not properly maintaining a subterranean pedestrian
walkway under a busy street, leading to it being poorly lit, smelling of urine, and covered in obscene
graffiti, so that the plaintiff, a fifteen-year-old girl, rather than use the subterranean walkway,
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So we are left with an even deeper puzzle than the one presented in
the standard story. There is no real evidence of any rationalizing trend
toward greater doctrinal clarity and predictability. Even courts that con-
tinue to rely on proximate cause doctrines acknowledge their indetermi-
nacy. And yet, proximate cause persists.
II. THE MAGIC OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
No other formula has found so much affection in the chambers of fi-
nal authority; none other so nearly does the work of Aladdin's lamp.
-Leon Greenll 9
I want to pick up a cue from the realists who criticized proximate
cause to suggest a new way to understand the doctrines' mysterious resil-
ience. More than one realist observed that proximate cause doctrines
were like a form of legal "magic" or "ritual." 20 1 propose to take that
comparison seriously. Using anthropological accounts from a variety of
cultural contexts, I will sketch some ways in which legal doctrines, and
particularly the doctrines of proximate cause, resemble magic practices.
It might seem that uncovering connections between doctrine and magic
would only confirm the critique of proximate cause as judicial fakery and
add to the mystery of its longevity in the face of such criticism. But I will
argue (in Part III below) that a particular shared feature of doctrine and
magic may account for both practices' staying power. Strangely, that
common feature involves exposing the practices' inability to produce
independent results. Incorporating skepticism about proximate cause into
judicial decisions that employ proximate cause doctrines resembles a
technique of magic in other cultures-what anthropologist Michael
Taussig calls "the skilled revelation of skilled concealment."' 2 1 There is a
double surprise here. First, the realists' comparison of doctrine to "magic
words" turns out to be accurate in more literal and complex ways than
one might expect. Second, skeptical revelations perpetuate rather than
destroy both magic and doctrine.
A. The Realist Insight: Doctrinal Magic Language
Leon Green's comparison of negligence doctrines to ritual and mag-
ic is an example of a more general realist theme.12 2 Foundational realist
crossed the street and was struck and severely injured), with Moritz v. City of Santa Clara, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 675, 677-78 (Ct. App. 1970) (upholding summary judgment for city where a pedestrian struck
by a vehicle in a crosswalk argued that the crosswalk, located between a parochial school and a
shopping center, created a trap because it was marked as a school crossing so that after school hours
drivers would assume they had the right of way).
119. Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEXAS L. REV. 471, 471-72
(1950).
120. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 11; Green, supra note 11, at 1016.
121. Taussig, supra note 1, at 222.
122. See generally Jessie Allen, Magical Realism, in LAW AND MAGIC 195, 195-208 (Christine
Corcos ed., 2010); Allen, supra note 13, at 796-97.
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texts criticize doctrinal reasoning, precedential reliance, and formal court
procedures as a kind of illusionistic, legal magic.123 The realist descrip-
tion of the connections between law and magic generally has been dis-
missed as a rhetorical device. But the realists' own writings make clear
that they considered the affinity between adjudication and ritual magic a
practical-and wholly corrupting-reality.12 4
For Green, judges' application of the proximate cause tests of direct
connection and foreseeability was "a sort of necessary ritual." 2 5 More
generally, Green attacked doctrinal reasoning as "legal theology which
requires substituting a symbolic phrase ... for the judgment required of a
judge in giving or denying the protection of government to the interest
involved."l 26 Such doctrinal "[w]ord ritual," he declared, "has always
been one of the primary methods of law administration," 27 and "[w]e
can scarcely realize the part which sacred words, taboo words, magic
words, continue to play in our law." 28 Among Green's realist contempo-
raries, Jerome Frank attacked doctrinal reasoning as a childish belief in
the automatic oracular power of legal formulas, and Felix Cohen offered
a list of doctrinal terms that functioned as "magic 'solving words,"' in-
cluding proximate cause.129
B. The Techniques of Legal Magic
Following up the realist comparison of law and magic, I reviewed
anthropological accounts of magic in other cultures and compared them
with the structures of modern adjudication. In a previous article, I enu-
merated five such structural similarities that I called (1) enacting perfor-
mance, (2) heightened formality, (3) temporal play, (4) performativity,
and (5) transformative analogy.130
Very briefly, both adjudication and magic ritual transform reality
through enacting performances, real-time rituals that aim to protect, re-
store, or change something about the prevailing social circumstances.131
Like other rituals, adjudication's performances (trials, hearings, sen-
tencings, etc.) are characterized by a formal structure that is unusually
rigid (compared with other interactions in the surrounding society) and a
rather transgressive approach to time. As in magic, the heightened for-
mality of law is not just ceremonial. Legal efficacy is bounded by formal
123. FRANK, supra note I1, at 12 ("legal myth"); Cohen, supra note 11 ("legal magic"); id at
820 ("magic solving words"); Green, supra note 11, at 1016 ("word ritual").
124. See Cohen, supra note I1, at 809-11; id. at 820; FRANK, supra note I1, at 181-82; Green,
supra note 11, at 1016.
125. Green, supra note 65, at 9.
126. Green, supra note 11, at 1030.
127. Id. at 1016.
128. Id.
129. FRANK, supra note I1, at 18-20; Cohen, supra note 11, at 820.
130. Allen, supra note 13, at 779-80.
131. Id. at 781-83.
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limits on time and place: for instance, a given piece of information may
be centrally important in a legal decision or utterly beside the point, de-
pending on whether it is received by the decision makers in one or an-
other room in the courthouse, or on Tuesday instead of Monday.13 2 Yet,
alongside rigid temporal restrictions on evidence, common law allows or
even requires temporal play that ignores ordinary temporal limits. Judges
transgress chronology to argue with or adopt judicial reasoning from
long ago and treat the words of their precedential ancestors as though
they had been spoken yesterday.'33 The language of both legal doctrinal
analysis and magic spells has a tendency to narrow the range of terms
used and to imbue particular repeated words and sequences of words
with multiple layers of meaning, condensed symbolic references, and
associations to complex narratives that only practitioners recognize.
Moreover, like magic spells, the words of judicial opinions are often
structured as descriptions but distinguished by their performativity: they
create the realities they describe. 134 Finally, magical or legal performa-
tive speech acts often accomplish their work through transformative
analogies that link legal cases or ritual enactments.'35
C. Proximate Cause's Affinities with Ritual Magic
1. Heightened Formality and Condensed Symbolic Meaning
A comparison with anthropological studies confirms the realist in-
sight that doctrinal "word jugglery" has something in common with the
formal language of magic spells. Bronislaw Malinowski's early twenti-
eth-century study of the Trobriand Islanders of Papua New Guinea is a
seminal work on magic.' 36 Analyzing the language of Trobriand magic,
Malinowski noted that a spell's words "are short, cutting, pithy expres-
sions, each standing for its own cycle of ideas, for a sentence or even a
whole story."' 37 Likewise, the realists describe doctrinal terms as con-
densing complex combinations of facts and evaluative judgments. These
were Felix Cohen's "magic 'solving words,"' and "proximate cause" was
one of them.' 3 8 Such terms, said Leon Green, are "designed to reduce to a
single word a network of ideas."' 39
The terms of Trobriand magic are common words (or variants of
common words) that have acquired additional ritual meanings. For in-
stance, the word "papapa" means "flutter" in ordinary Papuan usage, but
132. Id at 783-84.
133. Id at 787-88.
134. Id. at 784-87.
135. Id at 789-92.
136. See BRONISLAW MALINOWSKl, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC (Dutton & Co.,
Inc. ed., 1950) (1922).
137. Id at 434.
138. Cohen, supra note 11, at 820 (internal quotations marks omitted) (providing other exam-
ples such as contract, property, fair value, and due process).
139. Green, supra note ll, at 1016 n.12.
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when used in a canoe-magic spell the word stands for a phrase that refers
to the special role of fluttering leaves in the decoration of canoes and
evokes "native ideas about magical association between flutter and
speed, and ... the ritual use of pandanus streamers." 140 Such magical
meanings are "intelligible only to those who are acquainted with the part
played" by the words' referents in the magic rituals themselves. 14 1 The
word has its full ritual meaning "only if taken with the context of this
formula, in connection with its aim, with the various associated ideas and
customs." 4 2 Another word in the same spell "is again an elaborate com-
pound carrying the meaning 'to leave behind."' 1 43 In Malinowski's con-
textual interpretation, "'leaving behind' undoubtedly refers to the other
canoes which will be outrun by that of the reciter," but this association is
unspoken.'" Thus, each of these magical terms "stands alone and repre-
sents a self-contained cycle of ideas."1 4 5
Compare courts' use of the term "proximate cause" and the associ-
ated doctrinal concepts and phrases: "superseding cause," "foreseeable
cause," "intervening act," and "break the causal chain." Like the terms
used in Trobriand canoe magic, these words and phrases have ordinary
meanings that operate in their ritual use as well. In everyday usage, "pa-
papa" means "flutter" and "proximate" means "next" or "close." 46 But
to the participants familiar with the use of these terms in magical and
legal contexts, these words evoke different and more complex meanings,
and condense whole statements and narratives in the context of those
rituals.147
140. MALINOWSKI, supra note 136, at 434-35.
141. Id. at 434.
142. Id. at 435.
143. Id
144. Id.
145. Id Similarly, Victor Turner observes that among the Ndembu people of South-Central
Africa, important symbols that are used repeatedly as ritual focal points have "a 'fan' or 'spectrum'
of referents, which are interlinked by what is usually a simple mode of association." VICTOR
TURNER, THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL 50 (1967). For example, the
"mudyi," or milk tree, exudes milky white sap, associated with breast feeding. It is the mythical
location of the ancestress's founding of the Ndembu people and the site of girls' initiation rites. The
tree thus connects the visceral, emotional experience of mother-infant intimacy with Ndembu matri-
lineal social structure. Id. at 20-22. For Turner, this combination of normative and sensory-
emotional content is a definitional property of ritual symbols that works to charge the values rituals
prescribe with emotional associations. Id. at 28.
146. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1828 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinaflter
WEBSTER'S] (defining "proximate" as "very near," "close," "soon forthcoming," or "next preceding
or following").
147. Besides the term "proximate cause" itself, traditional proximate cause analyses deploy a
raft of terms that could be added to the realist list of "magic solving words." Doctrinal analysis in
general makes repeated use of words and phrases that have taken on a special meaning apart from
their ordinary English usage to stand for a complex set of ideas and combine both factual and moral
content. The magic words of proximate cause include "superseding cause," "superseding event,"
"superseding act," "intervening act," "independent intervening acts," "independent superseding
cause," "direct cause," "foreseeability," "foreseeable," "unforeseeable," "foreseeable consequences,"
"foreseeable risk," "foreseeable cause," "causal nexus," "causal connection," "causal chain," and
"chain of causation"-all of which appear, often repeatedly, in the cases.
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Like a magician's use of the word "flutter" in a Trobriand canoe
spell, a judge's statement that a defendant's act was the proximate cause
of a plaintiffs harm both "stands alone and represents a self-contained
cycle of ideas" that has been developed through the repeated use of that
term in previous cases.148 The statement is at once a description of the
situation that led to the lawsuit, a judgment about the legal significance
of that situation, and a statement that in this way the situation, and the
legal case that arose from it, are connected with thousands of other situa-
tions and cases stretching back hundreds of years.
Likewise, the doctrinal language judges use to flesh out proximate
cause analysis incorporates both ordinary meanings and meanings devel-
oped through specialized practice. In ordinary English, to "supersede"
means to set aside or displace.14 9 The dictionary lists "replace," "dis-
place," and "supplant" as synonyms for "supersede." But one rarely en-
counters a proximate cause analysis that speaks of a displacing, supplant-
ing, or replacing cause. Instead, the word "superseding" is repeated over
and over. In Derdiarian, for instance, "superseding" appears once in the
case summary,'50 twice in the "points of counsel"'"' and four times in the
body of the opinion as part of the terms "superseding act" and "supersed-
Ing cause."l52
In legal practice, "superseding" carries connotations of power from
another context. A "supersedeas" is a common law writ commanding a
stay of legal proceedings, preventing the execution of some other writ or
staying the enforcement of judgment.15 3 In contemporary legal usage, a
supersedeaS 54 generally issues when a defendant posts a bond that pre-
vents a victorious litigant from executing the judgment pending appeal.
Judges' tendency to move back and forth between the Latinate term "su-
persedeas" and the English "supersede" is exemplified in this passage
from a 1985 Alabama Supreme Court opinion: "The common law rule
that an appeal automatically superseded the judgment, in and of itself,
148. MALINOWSKI, supra note 136, at 435.
149. WEBSTER'S, supra note 146, at 2298 (providing tie following definitions of "supersede":
"I a: to cause to be set aside b: to force out of use as inferior 2: to take the place, room, or position of
3: to displace in favor of another").
150. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 666 (N.Y. 1980).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 168-70.
153. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1479 (9th ed. 2009). Floyd Abrams tells this story of an
attempt to obtain a writ of supersedeas to prevent enforcement of an injunction in Pitt v. Playgirl,
Inc., No. BI 14591 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997): "Actor Brad Pitt obtained a preliminary injunction
ordering the recall of an entire monthly issue of Playgirl magazine, which contained nude photo-
graphs of Pitt, and prohibiting further sales, distribution and dissemination of the issue.... [T]he
magazine's petition for a writ of supersedeas, arguing that the photographs had been previously
published by others all over the world and that the injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint,
was summarily rejected." Floyd Abrams & Gail Johnston, Prior Restraints, in COMMUNICATIONS
LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2011, at 489 (PLI Practice, Course Handbook, 2011).
154. WEBSTER'S, supra note 146, at 1161. The term comes from the Latin word for "you shall
refrain." Id.
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has been changed to the extent that an appeal does not ordinarily super-
sede the judgment in the absence of a supersedeas bond."155
"Superseding" is thus a word that imports a special kind of legal
power. Like the Trobriand Islanders for whom the word "flutter" in a
magic spell evokes the ritual use of pandanus leaves and "magical asso-
ciations between flutter and speed,"' 56 lawyers and judges familiar with
the longstanding legal use of supersedeas writs hear in the phrase "super-
seding act" or "superseding cause" not only a description of a causal
relationship in fact but an invocation of a specific legal technique for
overcoming liability. Malinowski observes that when a word's use in a
magic spell triggers such contextual meanings and associations, "the
word quivers with magical force."'17 Likewise, for legal practitioners the
term "superseding cause" calls to mind a supersedeas bond used to stay
the execution of a legal judgment and so generates a frisson of legal
power.
Of course, this sort of conflation of factual description and legal en-
actment in a single stroke is exactly what the realists sought to expose
about doctrinal analysis. So far, then, my investigation of the similarities
between judicial proximate cause analysis and magic seems only to re-
confirm the realist critique of proximate cause-and all traditional doc-
trinal analysis-as irrational and false. Certainly it strengthens the cri-
tique that proximate cause analysis employs an argument by association
that lacks both the definite logical connections claimed for doctrine and
the straightforward policy judgments that the realists advocated.
2. Ancestral Bricolage
Both magic spells and legal opinions claim power from ancestral
sources. In the Trobriand spell that Malinowski analyzed, the special
magic terms are followed by a long list of the names of ancestors who
are said to have lived in "the home of this magic. Anyone familiar
with Anglo-American case law's emphasis on precedent will recognize
this pattern. For instance, in Jackson v. Noel,'59 another New York case
citing Derdiarian, the writing judge inserted a list of previous proximate
cause cases decided by his court after his assertion that a non-party's
conduct was a "superseding event" that severed the causal connection
with the defendant. 60 As Annette Weiner observed of magic spells, "Not
155. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Kerlin, 476 So. 2d 64, 66 (Ala. 1985) (emphasis added).
156. MALINOWSKI, supra note 136, at 434-35.
157. Id. at 435.
158. Id.
159. 750 N.Y.S.2d 106 (App. Div. 2002).
160. Id. at 107 ("Rather, Peters' conduct in leaving the roadway and driving his vehicle on to
the grassy shoulder of the road in an apparent effort to avoid delay, was a superseding event which
severed whatever causal connection there might have been between the incident between Hoang Le
and the plaintiff and Hoang Le's alleged negligence." (emphasis added)); see also Dormena v.
Wallace, 723 N.Y.S.2d 72, 74 (App. Div. 2001); Brocato v. Grippe, 702 N.Y.S.2d 901, 901 (App.
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only does the genealogy call on the assistance of the former owners, but
it gives weight to the spell by demonstrating the successful history that
the spell has had in effecting persuasion."1 61 Sure enough, if one looks up
the cases in Jackson's string cite, one finds the exact verbal formula used
by the Jackson court to establish the lack of proximate cause in that
case.162
Through the practice of citing precedential sources, the ancestral
basis for the operative legal language is explicitly called out with each
new usage. In law, as in magic, that basis is not optional. Without a con-
nection to previous precedential cases, doctrinal words become mere
expressions of the individual judge's opinion and lack the authoritative
legacy that gives those words their distinctive power. This focus on past
use as opposed to future utility is one of common law adjudication's
most magical aspects. Distinguishing magic from modem scientific tech-
niques, the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss pointed out that magi-
cians approach their work retrospectively.' 6 3 Whereas science looks for-
ward to invent new tools in order to develop new projects, magicians
must "make do with 'whatever is at hand."'"' Ldvi-Strauss called this
retrospective magical technique "bricolage," after the French "bricoleur,"
or "do-it-yourself man."' 65 Judges' precedential practice shares this
property of referring back to previous doctrinal uses and dragging for-
ward into each new usage associations from the past. Thus, doctrinal
proximate cause analyses are built up out of fragments of previous deci-
sions, which retain some aspects of their previous identity even as they
are redefined by their new usage.
The problem for a judge deciding a new case is that existing doc-
trine, as L6vi-Strauss observed of traditional magic, "bears no relation to
the current project ... but is the contingent result of all the occasions
there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the
remains of previous constructions." 66 The premise of common law adju-
Div. 2000); Shatz v. Kutshers Cnty. Club, 668 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (App. Div. 1998); Wright v. N.Y.
City Transit Auth., 633 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (App. Div. 1995)). Derdiarian also uses this classic
string-cite technique: "If the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseea-
ble in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct, it
may well be a superseding act which breaks the causal nexus." Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting
Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980).
161. Annette B. Weiner, From Words to Objects to Magic: 'Hard Words' and the Boundaries
of Social Interaction, in DANGEROUS WORDS: LANGUAGE & POLITICS IN THE PACIFIC 183 (Donald
Lawrence Brenneis & Fred R. Myers eds., 1984).
162. Brocato v. Grippe, 702 N.Y.S.2d 901, 901 (Sup. Ct. 2000) ("[T]he conduct of Grippe,
who was driving at an excessive rate of speed, was a superseding event which 'severed whatever
causal connection there may have been between the occurrence of the accident and the defendant's
alleged negligence."' (quoting Wright v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 633 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (Sup. Ct.
1995))).
163. CLAUDE LVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 18 (1966).
164. Id at 17.
165. Id at 16-17.
166. Id. at 17.
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dication, however, is that doctrines developed in previous disputes can be
used to determine the results in a new case. Indeed, as every Anglo-
American law student learns, the doctrinal reasoning skill par excellence
is the ability to look into factual descriptions from apparently dissimilar
previous judicial opinions and come up with a way those facts can be
"synthesized" and recategorized to relate to a new set of facts in the case
to be decided. Likewise, magicians find ways to relate old spells to new
situations. For instance, Malinowski described how the Trobrianders
developed new magic spells for the commercial pearl fishing that arose
in modern times, 16 7 a practice that at first seemed to Malinowski to con-
tradict "the native dogma that magic cannot be invented." 6 8 The Trobri-
anders explained, however, that pearling spells are "really an old magic
of shell fishing which refers to all the shells found at the bottom of the
Lagoon."l 69According to the Trobrianders, they had not invented a new
form of magic, they had simply made use of a latent power in traditional
shell magic.17 0
Like magic formulas, to be effective in novel situations, legal doc-
trines must be seen as exploiting a power that was always available or
made available through previous use, as opposed to being dreamed up by
the individual magician or judge who employs them. So judges and law-
yers "discover" previously unused powers in old doctrines. The persua-
sive advocate identifies a "fact pattern" that links all the previous cases,
or parts of them, in a way that allows her to claim that the doctrinal
phrases used in the previous situations apply to the case at hand and pro-
duce the liability result she wants. Unsurprisingly, proximate cause cases
often embed their doctrinal language in quotations from previous opin-
ions by the court on which the writing judge sits. So, for instance, the
swimming pool case Boltax begins with two quotations from Derdiarian
that knit doctrinal language from that precedent into the new opinion.171
The second quotation appears in a sentence that includes the term "fore-
seeable consequence" and repeats the phrase "intervening act" twice, so
that it appears first outside and then inside the quote from the preceden-
tial case.17 2 The effect is to link the judges' use of this term in the new
case to its use by judicial ancestors in a previous case.'73 Like the Trobri-
and pearling spells' use of words previously used in traditional shell
magic, the judicial practice of embedding doctrinal terms in quotations
from previously decided cases signals that the power claimed for the




171. Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 490 N.E.2d 527, 528 (N.Y. 1986).
172. Id.
173. Id. ("When an intervening act also contributes to plaintiffs injuries, 'liability turns upon
whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the
defendant's negligence."' (quoting Derdiarian, v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315
(1980))).
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judicial analysis does not originate with the individual practitioner. In-
stead the words' effect comes from the practitioner's ability to access
words that embody ancestral power and adapt them to address new prob-
lems.
3. Performative Speech Acts
Like magic spells, words spoken in legal proceedings not only say
things, they do things. In the 1950s, J.L. Austin coined the term "per-
formative" to describe utterances that, simply by being spoken in the
appropriate context, accomplish an action. 174 Verdicts, blessings, and
curses are all among the examples Austin gave.' So, for instance, when
the jury says, "We find the defendant guilty," or the magician says, "I
charm thy canoe," the words perform, rather than describe, the act they
reference. Such utterances do not inform listeners that juries convict de-
fendants and magicians cast charms; they convict and charm. For Austin,
legal utterances were paradigms of performative speech acts.
Austin was the first to systematically explicate the performative as-
pect of language, per se. But the potential for language to perform ac-
tions rather than describe them had long been recognized, notably in both
anthropological accounts of magic and the legal realists' critique of legal
"magic." Bronislaw Malinowski observed that magic words with the
syntax of descriptive statements are understood to have "creative power"
to establish what they describe. 17 7 So, when a Trobriand magician says
"the canoe flies" as part of a magic spell, he is not just describing a fly-
ing or speedy canoe. Nor, for that matter, is he expressing a wish that the
canoe could fly. The magician's words are spoken to make the canoe
speedy. A similar relationship of power exists between judges and doc-
trine.
The central realist insight about doctrinal analyses, proximate cause
among them, is that judges' apparently descriptive statements actually
construct, rather than simply report, legally significant connections. Ra-
ther than descriptions of factual scenarios, judges' assertions of a direct
connection or a superseding cause are spell-like enactments of the legally
significant connection or separation they articulate. The realist identifica-
tion of legal word magic was primarily an identification of this performa-
tive aspect of judicial language. "A word is used by the savages," ex-
plained Jerome Frank, "when it can produce an action and not to describe
174. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 4-8 (1962).
175. Id. at 152, 159.
176. Id. at 153. Besides "acquitting" and "convicting," Austin included in his list of "verdic-
tives" legal speech acts that were not assignments of final liability, for instance "find (as a matter of
fact)" and "hold, as a matter of law." Id. at 152-53. Performative speech acts encompass many more
ordinary contexts as well: for instance, agreeing, promising, or betting. Id. at 156-57.
177. STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION AND TILE SCOPE OF
RATIONALITY 73-74, 80 (1990) (discussing BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, THE LANGUAGE OF MAGIC
AND GARDENING (1965)).
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one, still less to translate thoughts. The word therefore has a power of its
own, it is a means of bringing things about. ... "78 Likewise, Frank ar-
gued, the "solving words" of doctrine "become substitutes for action." 79
When a judge says that a plaintiffs reckless dive into what he knew
was the shallow end of a pool "was an unforeseeable superseding
event,"'so the doctrinal words appear to be describing the facts of the
case. But from a realist perspective, what is really going on is the judicial
construction of a legal status. The judge is not just reporting a factual
relationship, he is constructing a relationship-in this case a lack of as-
sociation-that has a legal effect. Even more obviously, a judge or jury's
conclusion that a defendant's negligent act is the "proximate cause" of
the plaintiffs injuries is not so much a factual proposition about a real-
world relationship as a performative speech act that connects the defend-
ant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury in a way that creates legal liability
for the defendant like the more overtly performative statement, "We find
the defendant guilty."
4. The Contagious and Imitative Magic of Proximate Cause
If doctrinal analysis performatively creates connections that facili-
tate legal power, proximate cause doctrines make those connections in a
particularly magical way. The standard proximate cause tests of foresee-
ability and direct connection mirror the classic pathways of sympathetic
magic-similarity and contiguity.
The quintessential magical technique is establishing a relationship
between otherwise unrelated persons, things, and events, so that acting
on one can affect the other. Early on, anthropologists of magic observed
that there were two basic methods of establishing such magical contacts:
(1) contiguity or contagion, and (2) similarity.181 Sir Edward Burnett
Tylor described such "magical associations."' 8 2 He explained that some
magic employs "[t]he simple idea of joining two objects with a cord,
taking for granted that this communication will establish connexion or
carry influence."' 83 So, for instance, a magical healer might fasten "one
178. FRANK, supra note 11 at 85. This passage from Frank is an almost exact quote from
Bronislaw Malinowski. See Bronislaw Malinowski, The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Lan-
guages, in C.K. OGDEN & L.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE
OF LANGUAGE UPON THOUGHT AND THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM 322 (1923). Around the same time
the realists noted that legal language was similar to magic in its performative force, Malinowski was
likening Trobriand magic to law as a way to describe its performative aspect, comparing the power
of magic words to the "creative power" of contracts and wedding vows. Both the realists and Mali-
nowski made those observations well before Austin identified the common "performative" aspect of
language.
179. Id. at 62.
180. Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 490 N.E.2d 527, 528 (N.Y. 1986).
181. JAMES GEORGE FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH 12 (abridged ed. 1930); EDWARD
BURNETT TYLOR, THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE 115-17 (Harper ed., 1958) (1871).
182. TYLOR,supra note 181, at 115-16.
183. Id.atll7.
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end of a string to the ailing part of the patient's body" and then suck on
the string for relief.18 4 Another example is the familiar use of personal
property or hair or nail cuttings to do magical harm to their owners.18 In
other cases, Tylor observed that the magical "connexion is that of mere
analogy or symbolism," as when a "Zulu may be seen chewing a bit of
wood, in order, by this symbolic act, to soften the heart of the man he
wants to buy oxen from," or when Germans leave the locks and bolts in a
dying man's house open so that his soul may escape and Cornishmen eat
fish from tail to head to bring the other fishes' heads toward shore. 86
Another early anthropologist of magic, Sir James Frazer, identified
two organizing principles in Tylor's examples: the "law of contact,"
which produced contagious magic, and the "law of similarity," which
produced magical connections based on resemblance.1 87 So, for instance,
in Tylor's examples above, the nail cuttings, hair, and string work
through the magic of contiguity or contagion, and the wood chewing,
locks and bolts, and headfirst fish work through the magic of similarity
or imitation. Though much of Frazer's theory of magic has fallen into
disfavor, the associational principles of contiguity and similarity have
been further developed by numerous subsequent studies of magic, ritual,
and language.188
The two doctrinal tests of proximate cause can be sorted into Fra-
zer's categories.189 The test of direct connection, in which the question is
whether the "chain of causation" has been "severed" or remains unbro-
ken, is a connection through contiguity. Foreseeability establishes a con-
nection based on similarity. It is a test of the resemblance between the
injury that materialized and the injury that the defendant should have
seen coming as a result of her negligence. In magic, contiguity and simi-
larity are like two pathways along which magical force can travel. 90
Likewise, in proximate cause analysis, legal power exercised by the court
can only reach the defendant if one of these forms of association is estab-
lished. In order to get legal power to flow from the court to the defend-
ant, the plaintiff must establish that her injury was linked to the defend-




186. Id. at 118-19.
187. FRAZER, supra note 181.
188. TAMBIAH, supra note 177, at 52-53 (calling the principles the "molten gold in Frazer's
volcanic overflow"); Michelle Z. Rosaldo, It's All Uphill: The Creative Metaphors ofIlongot Magi-
cal Spells, in SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF LANGUAGE USE 177, 177-78 (Mary Sanches & Ben
G. Blount eds., 1975).
189. See generally FRAZER, supra note 181, at 11-36.
190. Id at 12.
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III. THE SKILLED REVELATION OF SKILLED CONCEALMENT
Faith and skepticism are alike traditional.
-E.E. Evans-Pritchard
The similarities between proximate cause analysis and the tech-
niques of ritual magic were foreshadowed by the realist critique of doc-
trinal "magic words." This takes us back to the original puzzle-Why
have doctrines survived that critique? Why do judges continue to prac-
tice, and citizens continue to accept, doctrinal legal magic in the face of
widespread recognition that, as the courts in Milwaukee and Derdiarian
acknowledged, proximate cause "is not a question of science or legal
knowledge,"' 92 but a matter of "policy considerations"? 9 3 If we know
that doctrines do not determine the results in lawsuits, why do we con-
tinue to practice doctrinal analysis as if it were capable of independently
producing results? Why doesn't skepticism about doctrine do away with
doctrinal practice?
Again expanding on anthropological studies, I want to suggest a
strange possibility: Rather than discrediting doctrinal analyses, courts'
explicit recognition of doctrinal indeterminacy is keeping doctrine alive.
In cultures where ritual magic is a common practice, skepticism about
magical efficacy is not fatal to that practice. Indeed, at least one anthro-
pological observer has concluded that not only does magic survive the
exposure of illusion, it feeds on it.19 4 I will argue that the exposure of
doctrinal indeterminacy has been incorporated into judicial proximate
cause analysis as a sort of ritual of unmasking, comparable to the role of
skeptical revelations by practitioners of magic. That comparison suggests
a partial explanation for the persistence of proximate cause. Like ritual
magic in other cultures, rather than resisting skepticism, doctrinal prac-
tice finds a way to incorporate-and even to thrive on-skeptical attacks.
But the anthropology of magic only takes us so far. We are left with two
important questions-How does skeptical critique become incorporated
191. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 107.
192. Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469,474 (1876).
193. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314 (1980); see also CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2642 (2011) (plurality opinion) ("As we have noted,... the phrase
'proximate cause' is shorthand for the policy-based judgment that not all factual causes contributing
to an injury should be legally cognizable causes."); Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1090-
91 (111. 2004) (finding that the doctrine of public nuisance does not encompass the novel claim of the
plaintiffs owing to a public-policy determination because proximate cause is only a boundary used to
set liability based upon notions of justice and policy); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 20
(N.J. 1997) ("Moreover, the limit of proximate cause is ultimately, an issue of law and similarly
entails a consideration of public policy and fairness."); Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 104
(N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is, that because
of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a
series of events beyond a certain point.").
194. Taussig, supra note 1, at 221-22.
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in a way that ends up sustaining the practice it attacks, and how does the
incorporation of skepticism affect the legitimacy of doctrinal practice?
A. Magic Coexists with Skepticism
It may seem strange to say that magic incorporates, let alone thrives
on, skepticism. We tend to define cultures that practice magic as uncriti-
cal of those practices. Like the realists, we assume that practitioners of
magic are either blindly gullible or deliberate fakers. But anthropological
accounts of magic belie those stereotypes. Even Victorian anthropolo-
gists, who saw magic as the opposite of scientific truth (a kind of fraud
or delusion), described a puzzling combination of faith and fabrication
among magic's practitioners. Writing in 1889, E.B. Tylor mused:
Magic has not its origin in fraud, and seems seldom practised as an
utter imposture. The sorcerer generally learns his time-honoured pro-
fession in good faith, and retains his belief in it more or less from
first to last; at once dupe and cheat, he combines the energy of a be-
liever with the cunning of a hypocrite.195
Modem field anthropologists confirm the complex attitudes of practi-
tioners but cast those attitudes as both less naive and less dishonest.
Mary Douglas, for instance, compared magic rituals with money.'9 6 She
pointed out that like currency, magic performs its social role so long as
the public has faith in it.' 9 7 If I inform you that money is only paper, and
thus worthless, that will not shake your belief in money's value or pre-
vent you from using cash for purchases. Why not? Because you already
know that money is "worthless" in this sense. But that does not mean that
every time you use money to buy something you are engaging in a fraud
or laboring under a delusion. You, and everyone with whom you conduct
those transactions, understand that money has no "real" value but that it
is nevertheless powerful. Likewise, magic's effectiveness as a social
institution does not depend on a belief that false techniques are real.
The analogy to money is useful for pointing out that ritual can par-
take of a pretend or symbolic power without triggering accusations of
hypocrisy or self-delusion. But it does not fully capture the tension be-
tween continued doctrinal practice and skepticism about doctrinal effica-
cy. At least since the nineteenth century, courts' practice of formal doc-
trinal adjudication and pronouncements about doctrinal objectivity have
apparently conflicted with judicial acknowledgements of doctrine's fail-
ure to produce independent outcomes. Unlike our monetary system, legal
practice is apparently fraught with overtly contradictory actions and
195. TYLOR, supra note 181, at 134.
196. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND
TABOO 86 (Routledge Classics ed. 2002).
197. Id.
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statements. Indeed, these contradictions about the role doctrine plays in
determining legal outcomes are basic and longstanding.198
Something much closer to the contradictions in our views of legal
decision making appears in observations of magical rituals. In the early
twentieth century, E.E. Evans-Pritchard spent years living with and stud-
ying the Azande in Sudan, producing one of the most highly regarded
studies of ritual magic.199 The Azande employ witch doctors to identify
witches and heal the sick.2 00 Evans-Pritchard found that Azande do not
necessarily believe that a witch doctor's medicine-induced trance and
ritual dance determine his selection of the witches identified during the
ritual. It was "not difficult to see that a witch-doctor's revelations are
largely based on local scandal, and that to some extent he thinks out his
answers to questions while dancing and strutting about."201 And it was
not only a visiting anthropologist who could see the non-ritual basis of
the witch doctor's choices. Evans-Pritchard was quite clear that "Azande
are aware of this fact."2 02 Moreover, Azande "not only know that witch-
doctors can produce objects from the bodies of their patients by fraud,
but also ... are aware of the kind of fraud they employ." 20 3 As Evans-
Pritchard described it then, doubts about witch doctors' magical tech-
niques are not marginal. 2 04 Nevertheless, "this knowledge does not con-
flict with great faith in witch-doctors." 205 He therefore concluded that
"skepticism is included in the pattern of belief in witch-doctors." 206
Evans-Pritchard hypothesized that the reason for this coexistence of
doubt and faith is that though "Azande ... state that many, even most
witch-doctors are frauds," they believe that some "do actually produce
remarkable cures."207 That explanation is extremely unsatisfying. After
so much time spent detailing the pervasive recognition of the witch doc-
tors' tricks, it is hard to see why Azande should nevertheless keep ex-
pecting that there are some real witch doctors, or for that matter, why
they should continue to put up with the ones they know are "frauds."
Likewise, Franz Boas, in his classic study of Kwakiutl shamans in
the Pacific Northwest, found widespread skepticism about magic power
and never really explained the continued practice of magic despite that
skepticism.2 08 Again, the tension between belief and skepticism is close
198. TAMANAHA, supra note 7, at 228; Solum, supra note 5.
199. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at vii.
200. Id at 65-66.
201. Id at 87.
202. Id. (emphasis added).





208. FRANZ BOAS, THE RELIGION OF THE KWAKUTL INDIANS PART II, at I (Helen Codere ed.,
1966) (1930).
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to the surface and pervasive. Boas's Kwakiutl informant, George Hunt,
himself a shaman, described how he was originally moved to study mag-
ic in an effort to test its authenticity: "I desired to learn about the sham-
an, whether it is true or whether it is made up and whether they pretend
to be shamans." 20 9 Not only was Hunt himself skeptical, he found plenty
of others who shared his view that the shamans were faking it. "Have
you not felt the quartz crystal of the liars, the shamans, the one that they
referred to that was thrown into your stomach?" asks one man Hunt met
on his quest.2 10 When Hunt replies that he did not feel the magic, the man
responds, "You will never feel it, for these are just great lies what the
shamans say." 21 l
Indeed, the Kwakiutl shamans themselves reveal their artifice, at
least to one another.2 12 After Hunt "cures" a patient by pretending to suck
the sickness out of the patient's body, another shaman begs him to reveal
whether the "sickness" that stuck on his palm was real or "was it only
made up," and shows Hunt the nail in the head ring that he uses to
scratch his palm and produce blood when he pretends to suck out sick-
ness so that "[a]ll these fools believe that it is truly biting the palm of my
hand." 2 13 Boas concluded that the Kwakiutl are in no way innocent about
the tricks entailed in their shamans' traditional magic, but they neverthe-
less retain a belief in "the 'true' power of shamanism." 2 14 For some rea-
son, "[e]xposures do not weaken" that belief.2 15
B. Rituals of Unmasking
Discussing Boas and Evans-Pritchard's findings, Michael Taussig
argues that not only does magic survive skepticism, magic needs skepti-
cism in order to thrive.2 16 Taussig contends that the coexistence of faith
and skepticism in cultures where magic is central is founded on "a deep-
seated" but generally unarticulated "public secret as to the existence of a
trick."2 17 In the repeated skeptical exposures described by Evans-
Pritchard, Boas, and others, Taussig finds a "meta-rite" in which magic is
exposed as a trick and yet somehow not discredited. 2 18 He suggests that
when skeptical observers call the authenticity of magic into question,
magicians feed on that exposure: "[S]kepticism and belief actively can-
nibalize one another," he says, "so that continuous injections of recruits
209. Id. In an iconic text of early twentieth-century anthropology, Hunt, also known as
Quesalid, describes his skeptical shamanism. Id.
210. Id at 5.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 32-33.
213. Id. at 31-32.
214. FRANZ BOAS, KWAKIUTL ETHNOGRAPHY 121 (Helen Codere ed., 1966); Taussig, supra
note 1, at 228.
215. Taussig, supra note 1, at 228.
216. Id. at 221.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 243.
2012] 113
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
like [Hunt], who are full of questioning, are required."2 1 9 But he never
explains how the injection of skepticism feeds rather than disables mag-
ic, or for that matter why magic's persistence does not eventually stifle
doubt.
Nevertheless, Taussig contributes a crucial insight by emphasizing
the extent of skeptical interactions in magic-laden cultures.220 In this
way, he turns an aspect of magical practice that has generally been pre-
sented as a marginal exception into a central attribute. So, for instance,
describing Evans-Pritchard's project to learn the secrets of the witch doc-
tors, Taussig remarks that the problem really is that there are no se-
crets.221 According to Evans-Pritchard's own descriptions, everybody
knows the witch doctors are planting the bits of charcoal, splinters, black
222
beetles, or worms that they then pretend to extract from their patients.
Despite this knowledge, however, direct revelations of the witch doctors'
trickery are at least sometimes regarded as shocking.
The complex effect of revealing magic trickery comes through in
Evans-Pritchard's description of a time when he exposed a witch doc-
tor's sleight of hand. During a healing ritual, Evans-Pritchard confronted
the magician with the piece of charcoal the magician had planted so that
he might later "extract" it from a sick man's body.22 3 An apprentice was
present, and Evans-Pritchard describes him as initially devastated by the
trick's revelation.2 24 "When he had recovered from his astonishment he
was in serious doubt whether he ought to continue his initiation." 2 25 But
then a very curious thing happened. A day or two later, the initiate "had
completely recovered his poise and developed a marked degree of self-
assurance" in his healing techniques, a level of confidence that he "had
not shown before this incident."226
Without being able to explain why the Zande initiate wound up
more committed to his craft, law teachers may find his experience famil-
iar. It seems to resemble the journey of law students, as it dawns on them
that the doctrinal reasoning they are struggling to rationalize in the cases
they read cannot be made to produce determinate results. An initial atti-
tude of trusting belief in law's reason is replaced by cynicism or aliena-
tion, which in turn gives way-in some students right away, in others
gradually over time, in still others not at all-to mastery. Through law
professors' and the students' own repeated skilled revelation of the
skilled concealment of judicial sleight of hand, law students acquire that
219. Id. at 235.
220. See id. at 222.
221. Id. at 246.
222. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 107.
223. Id. at 102-04; Taussig, supra note 1, at 243-46.
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"mix of faith and skepticism" that Taussig argues is necessary to the
227
practice of magic.
- Returning to the puzzle of proximate cause's survival, judges' re-
peated revelation of doctrinal indeterminacy looks a good deal like the
ritual unmasking Taussig identifies in magic. Courts have for decades
continued to practice doctrinal analysis in the face of revelations of doc-
trinal indeterminacy. The judges who combine the application and cri-
tique of proximate cause doctrines share with the Zande witch doctors
and Kwakiutl shamans a tendency to reveal the tricks on which their
practice is based. Moreover, in both magic and law, rather than being
destabilized, the traditional practice survives and even thrives after its
exposure as a trick.
It might at first appear that there is a crucial difference between the
exposure of magical and doctrinal tricks. After all, in a sense, the trick of
magic and the trick of doctrine have opposite results. Whereas magicians
use tricks to appear more personally powerful, judges use doctrine to
obscure their personal power. Magicians use tricks to make it look like
they are causing effects that are not really their doing. In contrast, judges
use doctrine to make it look like their liability determinations are not
really their own doing, that the determinations are dictated by impersonal
legal rules beyond their control. Magicians use tricks to boast of powers
they do not have, while judges use tricks to hide power they really exer-
cise.
With these differences in mind, it might seem that skepticism plays
a different role in magic and in law. In one sense, this is true. The skepti-
cal observer of magic says that the sorcerer who claims to be magically
uniting or severing objects with his words is just talking. The realist ob-
server of judicial decision making says that the judge who claims to be
merely describing legally significant connections is actually doing some-
thing, namely making those connections, and thus setting in motion the
coercive government force that backs those decisions. From a skeptic's
perspective, then, a magician is doing less than he claims; a judge is do-
ing more.
Nevertheless, upon consideration, there is a crucial similarity. In
both law and magic, classical practices obscure the fact that the practi-
tioners are making choices. Both magicians and judges are manipulating
practical techniques-whether spells or precedents, palmed bits of char-
coal or analogies of direct connection-to produce effects. In both magic
and doctrinal analysis, the techniques make it appear that something oth-
er than the practitioner's individually motivated choices is producing the
outcome. Because a judge has the power to bring about a decision that
triggers state-sponsored violence, attributing that decision to external,
227. Taussig, supra note 1, at 245.
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impersonal forces in one sense diminishes her personal power. But, of
course, the realists' point was that the aura of legitimacy gained by
masking personal choices ultimately leads to much greater political and
institutional power for judges. Though judicial decisions are backed by
government force, much of society's compliance with those decisions is
achieved not by force or the threat of force but by voluntary adherence
based on the notion that these decisions are the product of recognizably
legal methods, not simply the unconstrained personal preferences of in-
dividual judges. The illusion that judges' decisions come about through
impersonal legal formulas rather than personal choice increases the per-
ceived legitimacy and legality of judicial decisions and thus, presumably,
the likelihood that individuals and the public at large will abide by those
decisions.
The idea that legal compliance is based on illusion raises serious is-
sues of legitimacy. Later in this Article, I will sketch some preliminary
thoughts about how we might consider those issues. For now, however, I
want to set aside normative questions and continue to pursue the compar-
ison of doctrine and ritual performance to see if it can help us to under-
stand more about how doctrinal analysis continues to generate legal
compliance even when practitioners and the public at large recognize that
doctrinal determinacy is illusory.
It seems that the tension between practice and skepticism is aligned
in magic healing and doctrinal legal analysis. The shaman sucks a bloody
tuft of down from the patient's body and removes it to effect a cure, and
the skeptic says the shaman had it in his mouth the whole time. The
judge uncovers a direct connection between the defendant's negligence
and the plaintiffs injury, and skeptics say she picked and chose among
many available precedents to create that connection. In both cases, prac-
titioners behave as if the decisive moves are brought about through a
technique that accesses impersonal power that they engage and channel,
while critical observation and practitioners' own declarations reveal that
the practitioners are dictating the moves themselves. The question, then,
is how, in both magic and law, those skeptical revelations amplify rather
than destroy the practices they expose.
C. How Does Unmasking Work to Sustain Power?
[E]veryone knew that real dancers animated the unicom costume.
That was part of the enchantment.
-Laurel Kendall 228
Michael Taussig interpreted the revelation of the witch doctor's
trick as emblematic of the role skepticism plays in keeping alive tradi-
228. Laurel Kendall, Eye of the Dragon, NAT. HIST., June 2007, at 48, 48.
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tional practices of magical healing. He proposed that, before the revela-
tion, knowledge of the trick was a "public secret," something that "is
known not to know."2 2 9 Exposing the trick was then an "oblique ritual of
exposure of the secret within the ritual of the witch-doctors." 2 30 Taussig
concluded that there is a "need for rites of exposure built into rites of
magic so as to strengthen magic itself' 231 and ultimately that "[m]agic is
efficacious not despite the trick but on account of its exposure."2 32 But he
never really explained why this should be so. How does magic, including
doctrinal magic, not only survive skepticism but feed on it? Why should
exposing an image of power as only an image make that image still more
powerful? Why does unmasking the inability of shamans' rituals to real-
ly pull objects from the bodies of the afflicted and the inability ofjudges'
doctrinal analysis to really determine who should pay for an afflicted
person's injury sustain, or perhaps even increase, confidence in the insti-
tutions and individuals that employ those techniques?
One possibility is that revelations of sleight of hand and acknowl-
edgment of doctrinal indeterminacy amount to what social scientists call
"inoculation" against criticism.233 ioculation theory posits that it is pos-
sible to protect beliefs against outside criticism by confronting believers
23with a relatively weak challenge in advance of a serious critique.234 The
idea, captured by the medical metaphor, is that a calculatedly weak initial
challenge-the "inoculation"-stimulates the believer to mount a de-
fense, a kind of ideological immunity, that she can later use to fend off
actual attacks on her views. 2 35 So, for instance, a salesman who has con-
vinced a customer to order a relatively expensive product might end his
pitch by pointing out that the customer's friends and neighbors may say
he has overpaid and by asking the customer how he will respond if that
happens. The idea is that when the customer later encounters skepticism,
229. Taussig, supra note 1, at 242.
230. Id at 243.
231. Id at 244.
232. Id. at 222.
233. William J. McGuire, The Effectiveness of Supportive and Refutational Defenses in Im-
munizing and Restoring Beliefs Against Persuasion, 24 SOCIOMETRY 184, 184 (1961); William J.
McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion: Some Contemporary Approaches, in ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY VOL. 1, at 192 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1964) [hereinafter
McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion]; William J. McGuire, Persistence of the Resistance to
Persuasion Induced by Various Types of Prior Belief Defenses, 64 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCHOL.
241, 241 (1962); William J. McGuire & Demetrios Papageorgis, The Relative Efficacy of Various
Types of Prior Belief-Defense in Producing Immunity Against Persuasion, 62 J. ABNORM. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 327, 327 (1961) [hereinafter McGuire & Papageorgis, The Relative Efficacy]; William J.
McGuire, Resistance to Persuasion Conferred by Active and Passive Prior Refutation of the Same
andAlternative Arguments, 63 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 326, 326 (1961) [hereinafter McGuire,
Resistance to Persuasion]; Demetrios Papageorgis & William J. McGuire, The Generality oflmmun-
ity to Persuasion Produced by Pre-exposure to Weakened Counterarguments, 62 J. ABNORM. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 475, 475 (1961) [hereinafter Papageorgis & McGuire, The Generality ofImmunity to
Persuasion].
234. McGuire, Resistance to Persuasion, supra note 233.
235. McGuire & Papageorgis, The Relative Efficacy, supra note 233.
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he will be prepared to defend his purchase rather than cancel his order.236
Inoculation theory, originally proposed by William J. McGuire in the
1950s, has been tested and used in a variety of clinical and practical set-
tings.237 The inoculation effect does not appear to depend on generating
specific counterarguments. Challenges to one aspect of an idea seem to
increase believers' ability to fend off later challenges, even when they
238are substantively unrelated to the initial challenge. However it
works,239 inoculation seems to strengthen existing attitudes about every-
thing from the dangers of smoking to the value of democratic govern-
ment.240 Mounting a mild challenge apparently stimulates a defense of
the criticized beliefs.
Could the persistence of magical and doctrinal practices despite
skeptical attacks be explained by inoculation theory? In the inoculation
scheme, isolated revelations of practitioners' illusory techniques build
defenses against more sustained challenges to those practices.241 For in-
236. See McGuire, Resistance to Persuasion, supra note 233 (presenting this theory in the
abstract); Preston Campbell, Inoculation, the Secret Persuasion Strategy to Lock Down Your Sales
and Reinforce Decisions, SALES MARKETING SECRETS (Dec. 4, 2012, 4:22 PM),
http://sales.artcony.com/2012/12/inoculation-the-secret-persuasion-strategy-to-lock-down-your-
sales-and-reinforce-decisions/.
237. McGuire utilized health truisms in his research that were generally held to be true by the
vast majority of persons studied (e.g., that everyone should brush their teeth after a meal). Id. at 328.
Other studies have greatly expanded the reach. See e.g., Mark M. Bernard, Gregory R. Maio, &
James M. Olson, The Vulnerability of Values to Attack: Inoculation of Values and Value-Relevant
Attitudes, 29 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 63, 67 (2003) (testing the widely held value of
equality, rather than a truism, and finding essentially the same results as in McGuire's studies); Bobi
Ivanov, Michael Pfau & Kimberly A. Parker, Can Inoculation Withstand Multiple Attacks? An
Examination of the Effectiveness of the Inoculation Strategy Compared to the Supportive and Resto-
ration Strategies, 36 COMMC'N RESEARCH 655, 671 (2009) (finding that inoculation was superior to
supportive and restoration strategies in an advertising context); Michael Pfau et al., Efficacy of
Inoculation Strategies in Promoting Resistance to Political Attack Messages: Application to Direct
Mail, 57 COMMC'N MONOGRAPHS 25 (1990); Michael Pfau & Steve Van Bockem, The Persistence
of Inoculation in Conferring Resistance to Smoking Initiation Among Adolescents: The Second Year,
20 HUMAN COMMC'N RESEARCH 413, 413 (1994); Michael J. Ross & R. Scott Berger, Effects of
Stress Inoculation Training on Athletes' Postsurgical Pain and Rehabilitation After Orthopedic
Injury, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 406,408 (1996).
238. McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion, supra note 233, at 245; McGuire, Re-
sistance to Persuasion, supra note 233, at 330; see also John A. Banas & Stephen A. Rains, A Meta-
analysis of Research on Inoculation Theory, 77 COMMC'N MONOGRAPHS 281, 281 (2010) (a meta-
analysis of fifty-four cases testing the effectiveness of inoculation theory found no statistically
significant difference in relative effectiveness of refutational same and refutational different inocula-
tion messages).
239. McGuire, Resistance to Persuasion, supra note 233, at 326. McGuire postulates two
potential ways it works, (1) that pre-exposure to the possibility of the belief being attacked leads the
person to begin to develop defenses and reasons to hold the belief valid; and (2) pre-exposure to
attack, along with the refutations of that initial small attack, lead the person to hold all subsequent
attacks less impressive and less valid. In subsequent research, McGuire focused on and considered
paramount the first reasoning. See generally McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion, supra
note 233. But see Ronald W. Rogers & Donald L. Thistlethwaite, An Analysis ofActive and Passive
Defenses in Inducing Resistance to Persuasion, II J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 302, 307 (1969)
(suggesting that it is the second possibility, that of making subsequent attacks less impressive, which
is the stronger motivation in denying subsequent attacks).
240. See generally Pfau et. al, supra note 237 passim; Pfau & Bockern, supra note 237.
241. Papageorgis & McGuire, The Generality of Immunity to Persuasion, supra note 233, at
478.
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stance, confronting the witch doctor with the palmed charcoal would
stimulate believers in his power to mount defenses of that power's au-
thenticity. Likewise, asserting that proximate cause is really about policy
limits on liability (and thus implicitly that doctrines do not really deter-
mine proximate cause outcomes) would stimulate doctrinal practitioners
to defend doctrinal determinacy. In this view, New York judges adjudi-
cating negligence cases look to Derdiarian as a precedent and find there
both an extended doctrinal analysis and a mild skeptical attack on doctri-
nal determinacy. According to inoculation theory, Derdiarian's gentle
critique would stimulate those judges' defenses of their own doctrinal
practice. Perhaps, then, Derdiarian's reference to the policy basis for
proximate cause awakens defenses of doctrinal reasoning and so actually
strengthens faith in proximate cause doctrines. 42 In this way, inoculation
theory might explain both the puzzling persistence of proximate cause
and how Taussig's "skilled revelation of skilled concealment" works to
strengthen rather than diminish faith in magic.24 3
It has to be said, however, that the inoculation account does not
neatly fit either magical or legal confrontations with skepticism. In par-
ticular, in both contexts overt defenses against skeptical attacks are strik-
ingly absent. The Azande do not defend magic as real, and explicit ar-
guments that proximate cause doctrines are really determinate are rare.
Indeed, direct defenses of doctrinal determinacy in general are rare out-
side of certain institutional settings, for example, Supreme Court confir-
mation hearings. Magicians who practice sleight of hand and judges who
use doctrinal techniques apparently feel no need to defend their practices;
they simply maintain them. It is, of course, possible that believers in
magic and doctrine are mounting unspoken defensive arguments in their
heads, but there is no evidence that is the case.
Furthermore, the magical and legal examples differ from the inocu-
lation paradigm in a way that inoculation theorists call crucial.2 '44 Ac-
cording to inoculation theory, it is important that the believer confront
the weak, "inoculating" argument before responding to sustained at-
tacks.245 Otherwise, criticism will likely overwhelm belief before the
believer has a chance to build defenses.246 But the revelation of the char-
coal trick or the reference to the policy in Derdiarian came in the midst
of sustained cultural recognition of the tricks they exposed. Indeed, the
striking feature of both post-realist legal practice and the magical healing
practices anthropologists describe is the longstanding and pervasive in-
242. Id at 475 (discussing the social science underpinnings of immunity to persuasion theo-
ries).
243. Taussig, supra note 1, at 222.
244. McGuire & Papageorgis, The Relative Efficacy, supra note 233, at 333 (noting that pre-
exposure to counterarguments must be monitored carefully so as not to overwhelm, rather than
stimulate, the subject's defenses).
245. Id
246. Id. at 333-34.
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tensity of skepticism about the authenticity of those practices. Rather
than believers facing a discrete, early challenge, practices and critiques
of those practices seem to coexist side by side and even intertwine for
generations. That structure does not fit the inoculation profile.
I want to suggest an alternative explanation for the persistence of
magic and doctrine in the face of equally persistent skepticism. Unmask-
ing the indeterminacy of magic and doctrine strengthens those practices
because it brings into view the real wonder of practitioners' work with
their techniques. Ritual practitioners sustain a contradiction, acting "as
if' the ritual were real while constantly aware of the gap between ritual
and reality.247 Being reminded that ritual order is make-believe may ex-
pose the gap and be momentarily shocking. But ultimately revealing ritu-
al illusions is not destructive to ritual practice because the artificiality
that is revealed was always understood to be present, even if that artifice
was not fully articulated or openly acknowledged. Moreover, unmasking
reorients our attention away from any lingering doubts or ambivalence
about the techniques' authenticity and toward the way those techniques
are being deployed in the particular case at hand.
By temporarily relieving any effort to act as if doctrinal analysis
"really" works, unmasking allows participants to focus completely on the
unfolding performance. Like other complex ritual performances, doctri-
nal analysis "requires coordination, circumspection, precision in practice,
and a well-teipered attention to what one is about." 248 The revelation
that the practitioner's techniques are flawed and artificial does away with
any need to circumvent our knowledge that a technique is not inde-
pendently productive. It frees participants instead to identify with, appre-
ciate, and criticize the genuine struggle of the practitioner who attempts
to produce acceptably legal results with real effects by mastering an arti-
ficial technique.
In this view, the confrontation with artifice does two (related)
things. First, it relieves any need for participants to pretend they believe
that the symbolic techniques are real. Second, after confronting the "pub-
lic secret" of the trick, participants can engage in or witness the genuine
struggle to use the mastery of those artificial tricks to produce acceptable
results. By calling attention to the trick, the practitioner effectively as-
serts that her performance of that trick will nevertheless be able to pro-
duce a result that we will recognize as authentically magical or legal.
Indeed, the implicit claim is that the results of doctrinal or magical tech-
niques will be superior to what could be achieved without the practition-
er's craft, even if those techniques rely on illusion. The unmasking thus
demands faith that the practitioner's performance of the practical tech-
247. As Seligman et al. put it, ritual exists in the subjunctive mode. ADAM B. SELIGMAN ET
AL., RITUAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: AN ESSAY ON THE LIMITS OF SINCERITY 7-8 (2008).
248. Id. at xi.
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niques, however artificial, is itself somehow valuable and can produce
results superior to what the practitioner could create by eschewing the
formal, artificial practices and approaching the problem directly and in-
strumentally.
The idea that an admittedly false technique could be superior to no
technique at all may seem strange. In the legal context, it violates the
value of transparency that is a core norm of both democracy and the rule
of law. 249 But consider a problem that realist critics of doctrinal obfusca-
tion rarely acknowledge. Definitionally, in order to be a "legal" result as
we understand that term, a decision must reflect something other than the
decision maker's point of view. As Keith Bybee puts it, the sine qua non
of a legal decision is that the decision maker "look outside his own will"
for the result.2 5 0 Indeed, the same need for an outside source of some
kind is definitively part of the idea of "magic." Given that requirement, it
may be more "legal" to continue to practice an artificial, communally
sanctioned technique even if that technique is understood to be incapable
of producing the result without the conscious intervention of the practi-
tioner's own will. That is, given the choice between a process that openly
and only relies on the practitioner's own will and one in which the practi-
tioner engages in a formal artificial technique on the way, as it were, to
producing results through her own individual choices, it may be more
"legal" to go through the artificial practice. I do not mean to endorse or
condemn the legitimacy of such a process. I mean to use the term "legal"
in a positive, descriptive sense. That is, I mean that a decision-making
process that includes a technique that looks as if it produces externally
dictated results may conform to our cultural definition of legality more
closely than a process that straightforwardly eschews formal techniques
in favor of transparent individual choice making.
In any case, as a descriptive matter, it seems a mistake to insist that
because doctrine does not determine results, doctrinal analysis is not
really part of legal decision making. E.E. Evans-Pritchard points out that
a Zande witch doctor's ritual dance is likely not the cause of his witch-
craft determinations.251 Yet the dance is still a significant part of the pro-
249. Regarding the centrality of transparency as a democratic value in multiple contexts, see
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3118 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's historical analysis as capable of "smuggl[ing]" or "bur[ying]" subjective judgments, thus
defeating the importance of transparency in adjudication); Ballard v. Comm'r, 544 U.S. 40, 62
(2005) (holding that the tax court could not exclude special trial judge reports from the record on
appeal, the Court noted, "In comparison to the nearly universal practice of transparency in forums in
which one official conducts the trial ... and another official subsequently renders the final decision,
the Tax Court's practice is anomalous"); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003) (noting that
"[t]ransparency is essential to maintaining public respect for the criminal justice system, ensuring its
integrity, and protecting the rights of the accused"). See generally THE RIGHT TO KNow:
TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD passim (Ann Florini ed., 2007); EDWARD A. SHILS, THE
TORMENT OF SECRECY: THE BACKGROUND AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN SECURITY POLICIES
passim (1956).
250. Bybee, supra note 13, at 306-07; see also CARTER & BURKE, supra note 18.
251. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 87.
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cess through which the Azande address injury and misfortune. The witch
doctor probably relies on village gossip and personal observation to think
out the answers to his questions "while dancing and strutting about."2 52
Likewise, judges' decisions are determined by nondoctrinal factors, in-
cluding their individual views of justice and the right policy choices,
influenced by the surrounding culture. To some extent, then, their per-
formance of adjudicating these questions through the application of doc-
trines is just so much legal "dancing and strutting about." 2 5 3 But as Ev-
ans-Pritchard insisted, on another level such rites are the method through
which results are achieved.254 We might call that level enactment, to bor-
row a term from both law and ritual performance, expressing the idea
that the formal public process itself, however artificial, affects the mean-
ing of the results, even if it does not cause those results. 255
As Catherine Bell has observed, a fundamental aspect of ritual is
"the simple imperative to do something in such a way that the doing it-
self gives the acts a special or privileged status."256 We can understand
doctrinal analysis, like magical healing, as a shared, conventional crea-
tion, not as a reflection of individual practitioners' internal state of mind
or beliefs. "A witch 'doctor dances the questions. "257 On the level of
ritual enactment, the dance remains important even if it does not causally
determine the results. "An observer who recorded only questions put to
the witch-doctors and the replies which they gave would leave out the
whole mechanism by which the answers are obtained. .. .,,258 Likewise,
a judge doctrinally analyzes the question. Even if that doctrinal analysis
is not the cause of the judge's liability decision, it remains in this sense
the mechanism by which the case is decided.
From this perspective, setting aside the language of doctrinal prox-
imate cause would remove a large part of the process that makes the
judge's liability decisions recognizably legal answers. This is so even if
those answers are substantively determined by other factors-like the
judge's political views and the relatively sympathetic nature of the par-
ties to the case. A witch doctor dances his questions and a judge goes
through the motions of doctrinal analysis. As Evans-Pritchard saw, "[tihe
252. Id
253. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 175 ("[T]he view that judicial opinions are largely
about making a decision that was the product of choice and discretion appear as if it had been com-
pelled by earlier cases and other legal materials is far more than just a widely held opinion-it is
almost certainly the conventional wisdom.").
254. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 89.
255. As Frederick Schauer points out, in the legal context, doctrinal analyses that do not cause
legal results may nevertheless be used to explain and give reasons for those results in doctrinal
terms. SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 174-75.
256. CATHERINE BELL, RITUAL: PERSPECTIVES AND DIMENSIONS 166 (1997); see also
SELIGMAN ET. AL., supra note 247, at 4 (quoting Catherine Bell for same proposition).
257. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 89.
258. Id. (emphasis added).
122 [Vol. 90:1
THE PERSISTENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
full meaning" of a social practice in which such rituals take place "can
only be grasped when this dancing is understood."2 5 9
That observation brings us back to the question of how skepticism
works with doctrine or dancing to strengthen rather than disable ritual
practice. I want to suggest that it has something to do with a suspension
of conflict. Ritual performance proceeds on two levels. We act as if it
were real at the same time that we know ritual exists as a counterpart, or
even opposite, of real life. In the moment of skeptical revelation, when
the dancing or doctrinal analysis is called out as artifice, we recognize
our own knowledge of the "public secret" that ritual is not reality. Re-
lieved of the need to act as if the ritual is real, we can observe and evalu-
ate the doctrinal or magical practice itself as an artificial technique that
can be more or less effective depending on the particular problem and the
practitioner's specific approach. Moreover, because it brings the tension
between artifice and reality to the surface, unmasking ritual or doctrinal
artifice sets up a new conflict. It reveals the tension between the practi-
tioner's obviously flawed and limited technique and the ideal of a prac-
tice that could produce magical or legal results without individual human
intervention. After the unmasking, we watch the magician or judge's
performance in a new way, freed from the effort to suspend disbelief. We
no longer need to work to avoid recognizing the practitioner's conscious
intervention. Instead, we are freed to watch the practitioner wrestle with
the artificial technique to produce results that are recognizably magical
or legal. Rather than a false struggle to make artifice appear real, we can
watch a real struggle unfold.
Once we are no longer required to treat doctrinal analysis as the
cause of the legal outcome, we may be freer to appreciate its value as the
form of that outcome. In this view, doctrinal analysis is a way of enacting
a liability result that is separate from the will of the decision maker. That
separation comes about not because the liability result was caused by
something other than individual human intelligence. Instead, doctrinal
techniques connect the result to a collective ideal of legality as an imag-
ined and performed subordination of individual will to collective princi-
ples. 2 60 Doctrinal analysis can be seen as an enactment (rather than a
transparent expression) of the individual decision maker's subordination
to a formal, collectively approved legal process. This is a fundamentally
ritual view of doctrine, but it is a rich view of ritual. Judges who
259. Id.
260. A related idea is found in Judith Resnik's suggestion that legal process's constraining
effect on government power comes about in part through adjudication's enactment of equality be-
tween powerful government officials and vulnerable individuals. Judith Resnik, The Role of the
Judge in the Twenty-First Century: Whither and Whether Adjudication, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1103
(2006) ("The literal and material presence of adjudication stems in part from its performative quali-
ties...."); see also Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: "Open Courts," "Terror Trials," and
Public Sphere(s), 4 LAw & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 6 (2011) ("[P]ublicity in courts disciplines gov-
ernments by making visible how they treat both their judges and disputants.").
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acknowledge doctrines' instrumental uselessness arguably make the en-
actment of ritual subordination all the more powerful as ritual. They re-
veal the effort it costs the individual decision maker to enact that subor-
dination properly.
Like the witch doctor's dance, doctrinal analysis is an act-a per-
formance-that is complex and taxing for the practitioner. To some ex-
tent, the power of such a performance is at its zenith when a performer
can simultaneously produce the required form and acknowledge the inev-
itable gap between form and reality. When we need not consider how
convincing the performance is as a representation of reality, we can con-
centrate on the performance itself As the theater director Julie Taymor
explains, "[W]hen you get rid of the masking, then even though the me-
chanics are apparent, the whole effect is more magical. .. . It's not be-
cause it's an illusion and we don't know how it's done. It's because we
know exactly how it's done." 2 6 1
For instance, I vividly recall a play I saw years ago that piled one
arcane and obvious theatricality upon another, with no concessions to
naturalism. 2 62 The part of a grandmother was played by a young male
actor in a crazy grey wig and wheelchair.263 At a certain point in the play,
the grandmother gets some sad news. In response, the actor took a small
plastic bottle from a pocket of his flowered house dress, uncapped the
bottle, tilted up his face, and squeezed a couple of drops into each eye.
After he carefully recapped and replaced the bottle, he sat upright and
immobile, facing the audience, as tears, presumably precipitated by
whatever substance was in the bottle, began streaming down his face.
There was no question of the audience (or for that matter the actor) being
fooled into believing that he was really crying, although of course he was
really crying in the sense that real tears were really coming out of his
eyes. There was no attempt to make us believe that those tears were
caused by real feelings of sadness, or that there was anything real to be
sad about. It was all deliberate artifice.
What could be more artificial than glycerin tears? Yet the image of
the old lady weeping was in some way more affecting than it would have
been if the actor had palmed the bottle and made it appear that his tears
were caused by real sadness, or if an actress who actually looked the part
of a grandmother had burst into tears in a way that looked or perhaps
even was in some sense "authentic," for instance, by recalling some sad
event from her real life. With the artifice on full display, we were moved
by something we knew was real-the actor's unmasked display of tech-
nique itself and, perhaps, by the gap between the limits of technique and
261. Daniel Mendelsohn, Why She Fell, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 12, 2011, at 33.
262. The show was Rumstick Road, a theater piece created by The Wooster Group, circa 1977,
directed by Elizabeth LeCompte.
263. It was the late great actor, Ron Vawter.
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the complex reality of human feeling and the actor's effort to bridge that
gap with nothing but artificial techniques. The wonder is that something
so far from reality could nevertheless produce something so really affect-
mg. Likewise, when a judge performing doctrinal analysis acknowledges
directly that doctrine is not the real cause of her decision, we may find
the doctrinal rationale for that decision more persuasive. We see the ex-
tent to which doctrinal analysis is a constraint, not because it can deter-
mine the outcome but because the judge who determines that outcome
another way is nevertheless compelled to go through the doctrinal analy-
sis publicly and to make that analysis as persuasive as possible. The
compulsion to perform attentively, diligently, and persuasively itself
becomes the basis of the subordination of the individual decision maker
to the doctrine.
The power of these performances does not depend on a belief in a
transcendent magical, emotional, or legal source. The performance does
not persuade us because it fools us into believing that it is a sign of some
other, bigger, more important, or more transcendent cause than the per-
former's art. Confronting the artificiality of the construction does not
derail the drama, ritual, or doctrinal analysis but actually heightens the
effect of the performance by simultaneously highlighting the performer's
mastery and vulnerability. We witness the performing magician, actor, or
judge struggle to manage the artifice of the technique and the gap be-
tween that technique and reality in order to produce results we can accept
as authentic. The struggle can never be completely successful, but the
struggle is genuine, and we can judge its results to be more or less satis-
factory.
IV DANCING DOCTRINAL QUESTIONS AND THE VALUE OF
TRANSPARENCY
Exposing the artifice through which fallible individuals construct
magical, dramatic, or legal results apparently gives those results power
they never would have had if we were still in the realm of the unspoken
public secret. But is that power legitimate? In particular, is it legitimate
to increase legal doctrine's persuasive power without increasing doctrinal
determinacy? It would require another lengthy article to fully examine
the legitimacy issues that arise from exposing doctrinal indeterminacy
while continuing to practice doctrinal analysis. 264 In this final Part then, I
will just offer some preliminary observations.
264. One might, of course, conclude that revelations of doctrinal indeterminacy have no signif-
icant effects on the legitimacy of doctrinal practice because they do not disturb that practice. In this
view, even doctrinal judges' self-critiques are inconsequential because they do not deter the practice
of doctrinal analyses. Thus the legitimacy of doctrinal decisions is simply whatever it would be
without the skeptical critiques. I do not share this perspective. This entire Article springs from the
observation that articulating critiques of doctrinal practice while continuing that practice is a puz-
zling and significant phenomenon.
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It is not hard to see that if unmasking only preserves a misguided
belief in doctrinal determinacy, then unmasking undermines the legiti-
macy of the formal legal process it preserves. I will outline that view
briefly in what amounts to an extension of the realist critique of doctrine.
There is another, contrary perspective, however, that I want to point out
as well without either fully exploring or endorsing it. Through the lens of
ritual theory, we might see the combination of doctrinal illusion and rev-
elation as a morally complex practice that enacts both a ritual for subor-
dinating individual choice to doctrine and the recognition that any such
ritual depends on illusion. In this view, legal practitioners act as if their
collective formal process defers individual choice while acknowledging
the reality that individual choice is always involved in legal results.265
Although it is much harder to see how commitment to illusion can lead
to legitimacy, I do not think that we can rule out altogether such a nor-
mative defense.
From the realists' instrumental perspective, the combination of doc-
trinal analysis with skepticism about doctrinal efficacy is at best incoher-
ent and at worst deceptive. It obfuscates by pretending to come clean. It
legitimizes the illegitimate by inoculating judicial decisions against real-
ist skepticism. Ritual theory offers a response to, or perhaps a reorienta-
tion of, that realist critique exactly because it views ritual practice as not
entirely instrumental. Anthropologists have long pointed to the interac-
tion of belief and make-believe in ritual as a way to bring to the surface,
traffic with, and symbolically reconcile conflicting social norms.2 6 6 We
might see unmasking doctrinal indeterminacy as a ritual enactment of the
apparently irreconcilable tension between objectivity and transparency in
law. Our concept of law requires that legal decisions be based on some-
thing other than individual choice, but our understanding of reality is that
no set of transcendental norms and doctrinal formulas is capable of re-
moving individual choice from legal decision making. From this perspec-
tive, rather than perpetuating a fraud or delusion, ritually unmasking doc-
trinal indeterminacy enacts the problem of this contradiction. To be sure,
it is not a solution to that problem. But neither is it only a hypocritical
disguise.
A. The Realist View: Doctrinal Magic as False Illusion
If revealing doctrinal indeterminacy is ultimately a way to perpetu-
ate naive or cynical acceptance of doctrinal artifice as reality, it is obvi-
ously illegitimate. Considering that combining revelations of doctrinal
265. Cf SELIGMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 7-11.
266. Thurman Arnold, one of the original realists, argued that adjudication enacts similar kinds
of reconciliation. THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT iii-v (1935) (describing a
similar theory of reconciliation as the premise of his work); see also Allen, supra note 13, at 803-04
(compiling citations to Arnold's work supporting this reconciliatory theory); Bybee supra note 13, at
316-22 (analyzing Arnold's scholarship and reaching a similar conclusion).
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indeterminacy with doctrinal analysis seems ultimately to strengthen the
power of doctrinal practice, one can see that combination as another,
more sophisticated form of duplicity. As Michael Taussig observed, "[I]n
its unmasking, magic is in fact made even more opaque."2 67 Unmasking
the trick is basically another trick, a way of further masking power.
Undeniably, there is a way in which exposing the secret of doctrinal
indeterminacy protects that secret. When a judge calls out the indetermi-
nacy of doctrine but still relies on doctrine, she gains credibility for tell-
ing the truth and then proceeds to use that credit to obscure her responsi-
bility for the decision. The revelation is a way to build trust. As one psy-
chologist explains, revealing a weakness in your argument before making
your strongest point disarms your audience: "By mentioning a downside,
you establish yourself as a credible source of information." 26 8 The
judge's acknowledgment of her doctrinal technique's indeterminacy right
before launching into a complicated doctrinal analysis convinces us to let
down our skeptical guard and accept her doctrinal approach. Paradoxical-
ly, the unmasking further masks. Momentary transparency about the un-
certainty and subjectivity of the decision-making process winds up con-
tributing to an illusion of overall objectivity. It produces a more ad-
vanced and more deeply dishonest form of the doctrinal charade that the
realists criticized.
Realists consider doctrinal faith hypocritical or naYve. But there is a
kind of hypocrisy or naivet6 in the realist approach as well. Realism de-
nies the complexity of the problem posed by the requirement that a legal
decision must be based on something other than individual choice and
the realistic understanding that individual choice is necessarily in-
volved.26 9 The point that the realist critique often disregards is that any
process that calls itself "legal" requires a commitment to decision mak-
ing guided by something other than the decision maker's own choices.
When realists suggest that the solution to the problem of doctrinal illu-
sion is simply to have judges spell out clearly their individual views of
the policy factors that should determine the outcome, they ignore the
magnitude of the legitimacy problem raised by that transparently subjec-
tive approach. Calling judges' preferences "policy analysis" as opposed
to "personal taste" does not change the fact that the realist response ef-
fectively does away with the most basic criterion of legality.
Jerome Frank used to rail against the idea that the desire for objec-
tive, determinate legal rules made the existence of such rules real. 27 0 Just
because you might like to have legal certainty doesn't make it possible,
267. Taussig, supra note 1, at 241.
268. Peter Wilby, Persuasion Is a Science, NEWSTATESMAN (Feb. 26, 2007),
http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2007/02/politicians-cialdini-social.
269. See SELIGMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 107-08, for a similar point regarding what they
call the "sincere" view.
270. FRANK, supra note 11, at 52-53.
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he said.2 7 1 But Frank offered no response to the legitimacy problem we
face if we fall back completely on a transparently individual decision-
making process with no formal collective structure. Just as the desire for
magic carpets does not make them real, the reality of indeterminate, sub-
jective judicial decisions does not make them legitimate. In a democratic
society, it is not legitimate for legal decisions that direct government
force to be made by tricks that create an illusion of rule-based determina-
cy. But neither is it legitimate to simply default to individual judicial
choices. In this light, eschewing all formal doctrinal analysis in favor of
transparent policy analysis would not necessarily provide a more legiti-
mate resolution to the problem of doctrinal indeterminacy.
B. The Ritual View: Revealing Doctrinal Illusion Enacts the Problem of
Legal Legitimacy
Perhaps ironically, the realists' own identification of affinities be-
tween doctrinal analysis and ritual magic points to a potential value of
formal doctrinal practice. When a judge both deploys proximate cause
doctrines and points to doctrinal artifice, she makes the trick transparent
and exposes the rock-and-a-hard-place problem faced by courts after the
realist critique. The judge who practices doctrinal reasoning while ac-
knowledging its indeterminacy enacts both a commitment to impersonal
"blind" legal decision making (as opposed to policy making) and the
recognition that her own subjective attitudes shape her legal decisions.
As ritual, judges' exposure of doctrinal indeterminacy is a way for
them to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of doctrinal fiction
and realist skepticism. Given the requirement that a legal decision must
be based on something other than personal choice, it is really not open to
judges to give up all formal doctrinal practices. Continuing doctrinal
practice without acknowledging its indeterminacy leaves judges open to
the kind of "gotcha" moment Evans-Pritchard pulled off when he ex-
posed the witch doctor's palmed charcoal. So judges expose their own
artifice. Such exposure is obviously self-protective. At the same time, the
judicial exposure of indeterminacy invites a different kind of critical
scrutiny of legal decisions. It prompts us to inquire not only whether the
judge correctly interpreted the proximate cause tea leaves but also
whether his deployment of elastic proximate cause doctrines can be
squared with both traditional practices of doctrinal analysis and social
policy objectives in a way that can be properly characterized as a legal
result.
A thoroughgoing realist would say that if we cannot have objective
legal determinations, let us at least preserve legal transparency by mak-
ing judges' subjective policy choices fully apparent. For a realist, the
judge who acknowledges indeterminacy (and thus the impossibility of
271. Id. at 53.
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legal objectivity) but refuses to make her policy analysis clear is only
compounding the problem by adding dishonesty to indeterminacy. But
from the perspective of ritual theory, mixing doctrinal practice with
skepticism may be seen as enacting a continued commitment to both
objectivity and transparency without denying the complexity, or perhaps
the impossibility, of reconciling those values.
CONCLUSION
When the realists criticized doctrine as magic, they doubtless hoped
to put an end to the doctrinal magic show. Instead, something much
stranger has happened. Doctrinal analysis continues, but not because the
realist critique failed. Nearly a hundred years after the realists contended
that doctrines like proximate cause were just a bunch of "magic words,"
both doctrine and skepticism about doctrine are still going strong. I have
argued here that the realists' comparison of law and magic may help us
solve the riddle of doctrine's survival in the face of doctrinal indetermi-
nacy. We can see the apparently contradictory combination of doctrinal
practice and skepticism as another version of magicians' selective revela-
tions of the illusions they construct. I have also offered some ideas about
how such revelations might work to strengthen the practice they expose.
The remaining questions are about efficacy and legitimacy. Does the
comparison of law to magic offer any new reason to think the continued
use of indeterminate doctrinal forms has something to contribute to a
legitimate rule of law? Must we conclude that doctrine revealed is doc-
trine debunked? Or, if ritual theory can explain how skepticism and illu-
sion coexist, might it also provide some basis for reconsidering and
maintaining formal doctrinal practice?
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MIXED MESSAGES, MUDDLED MEANINGS, DRUNK DICKS,
AND BOOBIES BRACELETS: SEXUALLY SUGGESTIVE




More than a quarter-century after the U.S. Supreme Court handed
down its ruling in the student-speech case of Bethel School District v.
Fraser, the problems wrought by the case's meanings-based approach
and exceedingly deferential deployment were exposed in 2012 by several
cases involving censorship of the message "I V Boobies! (Keep A
Breast)." This Article initially explores the U.S. Supreme Court's adop-
tion in Fraser of what amounts to a two-track or bifurcated ap-
proach--one track that focuses on effects and one that centers on mean-
ings-for deciding when censorship of on-campus student speech is
permissible. Using multiple examples from actual cases, the Article then
illustrates the slipperiness of determining meaning when messages are
imbued with sexual overtones but may or may not cross Fraser's suspect
censorial threshold of conveying a sexually vulgar or lewd meaning. The
Article proposes several possible solutions to the problems posed by
Fraser, from completely overruling it to several more nuanced approach-
es, including melding a portion of Justice Alito's controlling concurrence
in Morse v. Frederick onto Fraser.
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The mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear.
-Chief Justice Roberts
That was Chief Justice John Roberts's rather damning observation
conveyed five years ago in the student speech case of Morse v. Frederick
about the Court's 1986 ruling in Bethel School District No. 43 v. Fraser.2
Indeed, as civil libertarian and free speech activist Nat Hentoff opined in
the pages of the Washington Post shortly after Fraser was rendered, the
decision "added a new, large, fog-like category"3 to unprotected student
expression.
Peering through the fog more than a quarter-century later, however,
one thing is readily apparent about Fraser's mode of analysis: it marked
an abrupt departure from what this Article calls an "effects-based ap-
proach" for the censorship of student speech that began in 1969 with the
Court's seminal ruling4 in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District.5 As Chief Justice Roberts remarked in Morse, "Fraser
established that the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.
Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the
1. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,404 (2007).
2. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
3. Nat Hentoff, Student Free Speech Is in Trouble, WASH. PosT, Aug. 30, 1986, at A23.
4. See Nadine Strossen, A Framework for Evaluating Equal Access Claims by Student Reli-
gious Groups: Is There a Window for Free Speech in the Wall Separating Church and State?, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 143, 150 (1985) (calling Tinker the Court's "seminal decision" recognizing the
free speech rights of students).
5. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see generally Clay Calvert, Tinker's Midlife Crisis: Tattered and
Transgressed but Still Standing, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1168-75 (2009) (providing an overview of
the Court's ruling in Tinker and its significance forty years later).
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'substantial disruption' analysis prescribed by Tinker."6 The Fraser
Court pivoted, albeit without overruling Tinker, to what this Article
dubs a "meanings-based approach" to student censorship that it later ex-
tended in Morse.8
What is the difference between these two modes of analysis? The
answer ultimately boils down to the distinction between searching for a
disruptive effect among the student body (Tinker) and rummaging
through message content for an impermissible meaning (Fraser or
Morse).9 The word "rummaging" is suitably employed here because, as
this Article makes evident, student messages may be obtuse, pun-laden,
or polysemic. Divining a definitive, correct, or controlling meaning, to
put it bluntly, often proves a thorny task.
Tinker, in contrast, embodies an effects-based tack because it per-
mits censorship of student speech only if facts indicate to school officials
that the message in question will likely affect or cause a "substantial and
material" disruption or interference.'o In other words, Tinker mandated a
search among school officials for a reaction (or possible reaction) to a
message-a search for a message effect-and the legal question becomes
one of causal attribution: Whether student message X will reasonably
cause a substantially disruptive effect Y.
Conversely, Fraser and Morse embrace a meanings-based method-
ology that permits censorship based purely upon the resolution of the
meaning of a message-regardless of its likely or actual disruptive effect
among students-and whether, in turn, that meaning contradicts some
aspect of a school's educational mission." As Professor Mary-Rose Pa-
pandrea wrote, the Court in Fraser "did not find that the speech was ma-
6. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.
7. See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1591 n.267 (1998) (observing that "Fraser did not overrule the venerable Tinker
decision outright").
8. See discussion infra Part LC (addressing the Court's decision in Morse).
9. The word "meaning" itself can, somewhat ironically, take on multiple meanings. See
generally Louis B. Salomon, "Meaning:" A Word for All Seasons, 41 AM. SPEECH 108 (1966)
(examining varying uses of the words "meaning," "meaningful" and "meaningless" during a three-
month period in 1966).
10. The Court wrote in Tinker that school authorities must demonstrate a set of actual facts
that might reasonably lead them "to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (1969). The Court also suggested that censorship was
permissible when the speech in question "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Id. at 513. It emphasized that an "undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id at
508.
11. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the majority made it clear that Fraser allowed
for censorship of speech based on its meaning rather than on any disruptive effect. Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n.4 (1988) ("The decision in Fraser rested on the 'vulgar,'
'lewd,' and 'plainly offensive' character of a speech delivered at an official school assembly rather
than on any propensity of the speech to 'materially disrup[t] classwork or involv[e] substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others."' (alterations in original) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at
513)).
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terially disruptive nor did it find that the speech interfered with the rights
of other students, as Tinker would seem to require." 2
Instead, censorship is permitted under Fraser whenever a message
can be interpreted-with great deference given by the Court to the lin-
guistic powers of school officials t 3-as conveying a sexually lewd or
vulgar meaning 4 and under Morse when it "can reasonably be regarded
as encouraging illegal drug use."15 When school officials, in other words,
can reasonably take away a disfavored meaning from a muddled mes-
sage-in Morse, it meant wringing a pro-drug-use meaning from the
obscure slogan "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"' 6-censorship is permissible.17
Under Fraser, a message determined to possess a sexual connotation can
be permissibly punished despite the absence of any evidence suggesting
it will have even the slightest disruptive effect among the student body.
The Fraser formula for censorship, as described later in Part I, translates
as follows: Whether student message X conveys a disfavored and inap-
propriate meaning Y that conflicts with educational mission Z. This is a
two-step process: it initially requires school officials (and potentially
courts) to ferret out the meaning of a message and then mandates that
they decide whether that meaning conflicts with some aspect of a
school's educational mission.
That the Fraser Court decided to embrace an approach dependent
upon deciphering meaning rather than evaluating disruptive reaction is
somewhat odd. After all, it was nearly one century ago that Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr.'8 cogently observed that "[a] word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time
12. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027,
1048 (2008).
13. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the School-
house Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 537 (2000) (observing that in Fraser,
"Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion proclaimed the need for judicial deference to the authority
and expertise of school officials"); S. Elizabeth Wilbom, Teaching the New Three R 's-Repression,
Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 136 (1995) (de-
scribing "Fraser's deference to school authorities' regulation of student speech" (emphasis added)).
14. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (allowing for censor-
ship of student speech if the meaning of a student's message is "sexually explicit, indecent, or
lewd").
15. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
16. Id.
17. Cf Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment,
85 IND. L.J. 1113, 1119 (2010) (observing that Fraser and Morse "provide special rules for particu-
lar categories of disfavored student speech-that is, plainly offensive speech and advocacy of illegal
drug use").
18. When it comes to First Amendment speech issues, Justice Holmes is perhaps best known
for bringing the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor into American jurisprudence. See Abrams v. Unit-
ed States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition ofthe market. . . ."); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace ofldeas: A Legit-
imizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1984) (asserting that Holmes first introduced the marketplace of
ideas "concept into American jurisprudence in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States").
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in which it is used."19 Such ambiguity and variance in the meaning of
words is especially true when dealing with, as Fraser purported to do,
vulgarity and lewdness. Indeed, as the Supreme Court memorably wrote
in Cohen v. California,20 just fifteen years before Fraser, it is often true
that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric" 2 1 and that "governmental
officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area." 22 Despite such
dicta, the Court in Fraser charted the very same convoluted and compli-
cated course it astutely advised avoiding in Cohen.23
Fast-forward to the twenty-first century, and battles over meaning
affecting the relatively nascent First Amendment 24 speech rights of pub-
lic-school students are proving a thorny thicket for judges under Fraser
to traverse. When words and messages are ambiguous and arguably carry
multiple meanings-including sexual ones, as well as more noble
ones-judges are placed squarely in the middle, situated between school
officials and students, to determine which meaning should control. In the
process, the judiciary must decide just how much deference 2 5 it will ac-
cord to the institutional authority of adults vested with educating the na-
tion's youth. The problem for the judiciary is compounded by the cultur-
al and generational gaps that separate and distance the minors who speak
the phrases from the adults who squelch them.
As explored in detail later, the split of authority that arose among
federal courts in 2012 on how to interpret the silicone bracelet-
emblazoned message "I V Boobies! (Keep A Breast)" aptly illustrates the
problems with a meanings-based approach that hinges on the subjective
interpretation of whether speech conveys a "vulgar and lewd" 2 6 connota-
tion. In February 2012, U.S. District Judge Barbara B. Crabb in K.J. v.
Sauk Prairie School Distric?7 denied a thirteen-year-old student's mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction to stop officials at Sauk Prairie Middle
School in Wisconsin from prohibiting her from donning this wrist-worn
accessory. Applying Fraser and using what she called "[a] reasonable-
ness standard" 28 of message interpretation, Judge Crabb held that it was
19. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
20. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
21. Id. at 25.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 24-25.
24. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST.
amend. 1. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety years ago
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state
and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
25. See generally Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061,
1078 (2008) (defining deference "as a decisionmaker's decision to follow a determination made by
some other individual or institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same
question independently").
26. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
27. No. 3:11 -cv-00622 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 6, 2012) (order denying preliminary injunction).
28. Id., slip op. at 13.
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indeed "reasonable for school officials to conclude that this phrase is
vulgar."2 9 This holding came despite the fact that the Keep A Breast
Foundation, which sponsors the bracelets, describes the "I V Boobies!"
campaign as
a new approach and positive style of communication about breast
cancer. The campaign is meant to encourage young people to target
their breast health. The t-shirts and bracelets act as an awareness-
raising tool, allowing young people to engage and start talking about
a subject that is scary and taboo and making it positive and upbeat.30
In stark contrast to the pro-censorship result in Sauk Prairie School
District, U.S. District Judge Mary A. McLaughlin in April 2011 in H. v.
Easton Area School District3 ' granted an injunction on behalf of two
female middle-school students in Pennsylvania and concluded that
"[T]hese bracelets cannot reasonably be considered lewd or vulgar under
the standard of Fraser. The bracelets are intended to be and they can
reasonably be viewed as speech designed to raise awareness of breast
cancer and to reduce stigma associated with openly discussing breast
health."3 2 This diametrically opposite result occurred regarding the exact
same message, despite the fact that both Judge McLaughlin 33 and Judge
Crabb34 purported to apply the same reasonableness-meaning standard
under Fraser in precisely the same context of a middle-school setting.
This Article argues that Fraser finally must either be: (1) overruled
and replaced with an effects-based model for censoring arguably sexual-
ly lewd or vulgar messages; or (2) applied in a much more rigorous and
consistent analytical fashion that not only is significantly less deferential
to school authorities but also deploys clear and specific evidentiary pre-
sumptions and standards in the determination-of-meaning process. The
Article further asserts that the crucial and controlling concurrence of
Justice Samuel Alito Jr.3 joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy in Morse
v. Frederick36 actually provides an important mechanism or standard for
resolving meaning disputes under Fraser. Specifically, Justice Alito
wrote that the Court's ruling in Morse does not support the censorship of
even pro-drug messages if those messages "can plausibly be interpreted
29. Id. at 17.
30. "1 Love Boobies!" Campaign, KEEP A BREAST FOUND., http://www.keep-a-
breast.org/programs/i-love-boobies (last visited June 19, 2012).
31. 827 F. Supp. 2d 392 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
32. Id. at 394.
33. See id. at 405 ("The Court concludes that a reasonableness standard properly applies to a
school's Fraser determination.").
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. See Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 508 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009) (ob-
serving that "that Justice Alito's concurrence is 'controlling' for our interpretations of Morse");
Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 874-75 (2008) (observ-
ing that "Justice Alito's controlling concurrence, joined by Justice Kennedy, clarifies the limited
holding of [Morse]" (emphasis added)).
36. 551 U.S. 393, 422-25 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
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as commenting on any political or social issue."37 This Article contends
that if such a "plausibility standard" for the presence of political or social
commentary is enough to protect-at least in the eyes of Justices Alito
and Kennedy-speech that conveys ambiguous messages about illegal
drugs, then so too should it be sufficient to protect messages like "I V
Boobies! (Keep A Breast)" that carry somewhat sophomoric sexual over-
tones in the process of raising awareness of breast cancer. In brief, graft-
ing this strand of reasoning from Morse onto Fraser-moving it from the
realm of drug messages to the province of sexual ones-may help cure
some of the flaws that now plague lower court Fraser analyses.
Part I of this Article explores the U.S. Supreme Court's adoption in
Fraser of what amounts to a bifurcated approach-one track that focuses
on effects and one that centers on meaning-for deciding when censor-
ship of on-campus student speech is permissible. Part II, using multiple
examples from actual cases, illustrates the slipperiness of meaning de-
terminations when messages are imbued with sexual overtones but may
or may not cross Fraser's suspect censorial threshold of conveying a
sexually vulgar or lewd meaning. The phrases used here as analytical
springboards are: (1) "Drugs Suck!"; 38 (2) "See Dick Drink. See Dick
Drive. See Dick Die. Don't be a Dick"; 39 and (3) "If Boobies! (Keep A
Breast)."4A In the process of analyzing the cases involving these phrases,
the Article demonstrates the vast deference paid on the question of mean-
ing to school authorities and the amorphousness of the reasonableness
standard applied by the likes of Judges Crabb and McLaughlin.
Part III then argues, as noted above, that Fraser either should be
overruled or significantly refashioned. It explores several options for
different standards of proof that courts might adopt to approach meaning
determinations in a more First Amendment-friendly fashion. It also ex-
pands on the argument above that Justice Alito's concurrence in Morse
may hold a key for resolving some of the current problems courts face
under Fraser. Finally, the "Conclusion" urges courts, in light of the ar-
guments set forth in Part III and the trio of cases presented in Part II, to
finally abandon Fraser's relaxed and deferential meanings-based ap-
proach to censorship of student expression.
37. Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
38. Broussard ex rel. Lord v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1528 (E.D. Va. 1992).
39. Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Mass. 1994).
40. H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 392, 393 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (order granting
preliminary injunction).
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I. FROM TINKER TO FRASER TO MORSE:
SHIFTING FROM DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS TO INAPPROPRIATE MEANINGS
At least two potential justifications exist for squelching student
speech that is neither school sponsored nor part of the curriculum. 41 One
focuses on the deleterious and disruptive effects of speech, and the other
centers on the inappropriate or educationally incompatible meanings of
speech. This distinction is important. For instance, a student's message
might mean one thing to school administrators-something that is nega-
tive or contrary to the school's educational mission-and quite another to
members of the student body. Furthermore, even if students do take away
the same negative meaning as the one found by school administrators,
the majority of students simply might not care about it or react to it a
disruptive way. In other words, where a school administrator might in-
terpret the phrase "I V Boobies!" on a bracelet worn by a boy as sexually
lewd or vulgar, students might merely view the phrase as an amusing
way to highlight breast cancer and, in turn, not react to it in any way that
it is detrimental or disruptive to the educational process. To put it blunt-
ly, if a school official interprets the meaning of a message in a way that
students either (a) don't understand or (b) don't care about, then (c) there
will be no disruption caused by it. A meaning held in the mind of a
school official thus does not necessarily lead to a disruptive effect among
students.
As this part of the Article makes clear, the Supreme Court has shift-
ed from an effects-based approach adopted more than forty years ago in
Tinker to a meanings-based methodology embraced more recently in
Fraser and Morse. Subpart A initially provides a brief overview of Tink-
er, in which the Court focused on the disruptive effects of student ex-
pression. Subpart B then turns to Fraser, which focused on the meaning
of messages that are contrary to the purpose of a public-school education.
Next, subpart C examines how the majority in Morse extended a mean-
ings-based approach to censorship of student expression.
41. Cases involving school-sponsored student speech are governed by a standard different
from those articulated in both Tinker and Fraser. In particular, the Court held in 1988 that
"[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 261 (1988). The Court reasoned "that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a
school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school
may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression." Id. at 272-73.
Professor Douglas Laycock writes that Kuhimeier stands for the proposition that the Tinker "rule
does not apply if the speech is school-sponsored." Douglas Laycock, High-Value Speech and the
Basic Educational Mission of a Public School: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 111, 112 (2008).
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A. Searching for Message Effects: Causal Disruption and Tinker
In Tinker, the Supreme Court adopted in 1969 an effects-based ap-
proach that permits school officials to punish students for speech only if
their expression is likely to cause a substantial and material disruption of
the educational environment or interference with the rights of other stu-
dents.4 2 The fact that a student's message may carry an offensive mean-
ing is not a sufficient justification for its censorship under the Tinker
tack. As Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority, the "mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness" 3 of a particular expression of
opinion cannot support its prohibition. Instead, there must be evidence
that its suppression "is necessary to avoid material and substantial inter-
ference with schoolwork or discipline."4
Applying this causal-reaction or effects-based approach to censor-
ship to the facts of Tinker, which involved students wearing black arm-
bands "to publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their
support for a truce,"A the majority concluded that "the record does not
demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authori-
ties to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises
in fact occurred." 46 The only thing the armbands "caused [was] discus-
sion outside of the classrooms." 4 7 Tinker, as constitutional law scholar
Erwin Chemerinsky writes, constitutes "the high watermark of the Su-
preme Court protecting the constitutional rights of students." 4 8
B. Searching for Meaning: The Shift to Preserving Educational Mission
and Censoring Mission-Conflicting Messages
Seventeen years after Tinker, the Court in Fraser deviated sharply
from its effects-based approach to student censorship to one that focuses
on the meaning of a message and whether that meaning conflicts with the
educational mission of a public school. The case centered on high school
student Matthew Fraser's sexual innuendo-laden speech nominating a
fellow student for elective office before an estimated 600 minors as part
of a school-sponsored educational program in self-government. 4 9 Thus,
like disputes involving the "I V Boobies! (Keep A Breast)" bracelets de-
scribed earlier, Fraser is, at its very core, a case about sifting and sorting
through mixed messages-one political (nominating a student for gov-
ernment) and one sexual (the innuendos used). Instead of letting student
42. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
43. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
44. Id. at 511.
45. Id. at 504.
46. Id. at 514.
47. Id.
48. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 111,
124 (2004).
49. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
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reaction to Matthew Fraser's mixed message dictate the outcome of the
case--rather, in other words, than examining whether it caused a sub-
stantial and disruptive effect, per Tinker-the majority in Fraser trans-
formed the case into a battle over meaning and, in particular, whether
that meaning conflicted with the educational mission of the school.
Chief Justice Warren Burger, in writing the majority opinion for a
fractured Court, characterized the speech as "an elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor."50 The reaction among the students was mixed.
Some apparently understood the sexual connotations quite well, as they
"hooted and yelled"51 and via "gestures graphically simulated the sexual
activities pointedly alluded to" 52 by Matthew Fraser. Conversely, other
students apparently did not get it, as it were, as they "appeared to be be-
wildered and embarrassed."53 Apparently, only one teacher "found it
necessary to forgo a portion of the scheduled class lesson in order to dis-
cuss the speech with the class."
Matthew Fraser, in fact, likely knew the receptive reaction he would
receive from some of his fellow students by making sexual innuendos.
After all, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's ruling in his favor, writing that Fraser "was a
member of the Honor Society and the debate team and the recipient of
the 'Top Speaker' award in statewide debate championships for two con-
secutive years."5 In brief, Matthew Fraser was a young man who knew
how to turn a phrase, even if it simultaneously meant turning the heads of
school officials with negative shakes of disapproval. Anything but ironi-
cally, Fraser attended college at the home of the 1960s free speech
movement,5 6 the University of California, Berkeley.
50. Id. at 678. Specifically, Matthew Fraser allegedly said the following about the student he
was nominating for student-government office:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character
is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-be drives hard, push-
ing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every one
of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the
best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).




55. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S.
675 (1986).
56. See generally THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT: REFLECTIONS ON BERKELEY IN THE 1960s
(Robert Cohen & Reginald E. Zelnik eds., 2002) (providing a collection of essays regarding the free
speech movement at the University of California, Berkeley).
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In ruling in Matthew Fraser's favor, the Ninth Circuit applied Tink-
er's substantial and material disruption standard and determined that "the
Bethel School District has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that
Fraser's use of sexual innuendo in the nominating speech substantially
disrupted or materially interfered in any way with the educational pro-
cess."58 The Ninth Circuit characterized the crucial facts used to reach a
decision as follows:
Fraser's speech evoked a lively and noisy response from the students,
including applause, and. .. a few of the students reacted with sexual-
ly suggestive movements. The administration had no difficulty in
maintaining order during the assembly and Fraser's speech did not
delay the assembly program. Fraser was the second to last speaker,
followed by his candidate, Jeff Kuhlman, who then made the final
speech of the afternoon without incident. The assembly, which took
place after the last school class of the day, was dismissed on sched-
ule. 59
Rather than apply the same Tinker standard, as did the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the U.S. Supreme Court charted a new course when it took up the
case one year later. This novel approach was telegraphed in the very first
sentence of the majority opinion, in which the Chief Justice framed the
issue as "whether the First Amendment prevents a school district from
disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a school
assembly."60 That framing says naught about the effects of speech but
simply references its content-a student "giving a lewd speech at a
school assembly."6 1 As Chief Justice Roberts wrote about Fraser in
Morse, "The Court was plainly attuned to the content of Fraser's
speech."62
The Court in Fraser soon thereafter parted ways with the reasoning
of the Ninth Circuit by asserting that "[t]he marked distinction between
the political 'message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content
of respondent's speech in this case seems to have been given little weight
by the Court of Appeals." 63 Yet the majority's quick dismissal of the
political nature of Matthew Fraser's speech gives short shrift to a funda-
mental reality: "The purpose of the speech was to get [Kuhlman] elected,
57. See Ruth Marcus, Student Suspended After Speech: Supreme Court Renters Debate Over
Power of School Officials, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1986, at A12 (describing Fraser as "now a junior at
the University of California at Berkeley").
58. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1359.
59. Id. at 1360.
60. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
61. Id.
62. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007).
63. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
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and it worked," as Fraser told a reporter for the Washington Post back in
1986.6
As with its framing of the issue noted above,65 the majority's factual
distinction between the political content of Tinker and the sexual content
of Fraser says nothing about the effects of the speech, but only about its
meaning--specifically, political versus sexual meaning. This too rigid
dichotomy,66 in turn, launched the Fraser majority down an untraveled
road that would require it to analyze (1) the purpose of public-school
education; and (2) whether sexually themed messages conflict with that
purpose, considering the appropriateness of the context and situation in
which such messages arise.
In a nutshell, the majority reasoned that "it is a highly appropriate
function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and of-
fensive terms in public discourse"67 because to allow such speech would
"undermine the school's basic educational mission."68 That mission in-
cludes the inculcation of values, including learning the habits of civility
and taking into account the sensibilities of others, that are essential for
the proper functioning of a self-governing democracy.69
Here, the sensibilities of others, included young females present in
the audience for Matthew Fraser's nominating speech; the majority wrote
that "[b]y glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech
was acutely insulting to teenage girl students."7 In addition, and regard-
less of gender, the majority seemed acutely concerned about the sensibil-
ities of those in the audience who "were only 14 years old and on the
threshold of awareness of human sexuality."7 1
Ultimately, then, the majority's analysis of the purpose of public
education did not concentrate on teaching substantive subjects-math,
English, or geography, for instance-but rather on "teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. Even the most heated politi-
cal discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the per-
sonal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences." 7 2 As Chief
Justice Burger wrote, the "process of educating our youth for citizenship
in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics
64. Marcus, supra note 57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
66. The author uses the term "too rigid" here because Matthew Fraser's speech fused political
content with sexual metaphors; it simply is impossible to clearly demarcate the political from the
sexual.
67. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
68. Id. at 685.
69. Id. at 681.
70. Id. at 683.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 681.
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class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized
social order."7 3
In summing up Fraser, constitutional law scholar Kathleen Sullivan
wrote that the Court "denied First Amendment protection to a student
who made sexual remarks in a mandatory school assembly, holding that
such speech may be restricted as pedagogically inappropriate and contra-
ry to the school's educational mission."7 4 Kenneth Starr, the attorney
who successfully argued on behalf of Principal Deborah Morse in Morse,
wrote that Fraser provides schools with "greater leeway to prevent Fra-
ser-like speakers from undermining public education's communitarian
aims."75
The Court arguably did not need to go down this track in order to
punish Matthew Fraser, however, as the concurrence of Justice William
Brennan intimated. In particular, Brennan scoffed at the notion that Mat-
thew Fraser's speech was obscene, vulgar, lewd, or offensively lewd.7 6
Furthermore, he criticized the idea that Fraser's speech could be pun-
ished because its content was insulting to young girls and damaging to
fourteen-year-olds.77
Instead, Justice Brennan adopted an effects-based approach to ex-
plain why censorship of the speech was justified, writing that it could be
stopped in order "to prevent disruption of school educational activities" 78
and in the interest of "avoiding disruption of educational school activi-
ties." 7 9 Brennan's opinion can be interpreted as an attempt to read a dis-
ruption standard-an effects-based standard-back into the majority's
holding. As Brennan ultimately concluded, "I believe that school offi-
cials did not violate the First Amendment in determining that respondent
should be disciplined for the disruptive language."80 In an effort to nar-
row the majority's holding, he added that "the Court's holding concerns
only the authority that school officials have to restrict a high school stu-
dent's use of disruptive language in a speech given to a high school as-
sembly."81 In brief, Justice Brennan invoked variants of the word "dis-
ruption" four different times in attempting to confine the breadth of Fra-
ser.
73. Id. at 683.
74. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 538 (2008).
75. Kenneth W. Starr, From Fraser to Frederick: Bong Hits and the Decline of Civic Culture,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 661, 672 (2009).
76. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Having read the full text of respond-
ent's remarks, I find it difficult to believe that it is the same speech the Court describes.").
77. See id at 689 n.2 (writing that "[t]he Court speculates that the speech was 'insulting' to
female students, and 'seriously damaging' to 14-year-olds, so that school officials could legitimately
suppress such expression in order to protect these groups," and concluding that "[tihere is no evi-
dence in the record that any students, male or female, found the speech 'insulting').
78. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
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Justice Thurgood Marshall -authored a brief dissent in favor of Mat-
thew Fraser, making it clear that Tinker provided the correct rule to apply
and that "the School District, despite a clear opportunity to do so, failed
to bring in evidence sufficient to convince either of the two lower courts
that education at Bethel School was disrupted by respondent's speech."82
Justice John Paul Stevens also penned a dissent that foreshadowed future
problems with a meanings-based approach to censorship of student
speech. Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote that Matthew Fraser "was
probably in a better position to determine whether an audience composed
of 600 of his contemporaries would be offended by the use of a four-
letter word-or a sexual metaphor--than is a group of judges who are at
least two generations and 3,000 miles away from the scene of the
crime."83 The latter part of this sentence highlights the meaning quagmire
that judges today find themselves trapped in when they are forced to de-
termine whether in-school speech by minors is or is not sexually offen-
sive. In addition, Justice Stevens focused on the due process or lack-of-
notice problem 84 inherent with a meanings-based approach that attempts
to punish metaphorical expression, reasoning that Matthew Fraser should
have been provided with an "unambiguous warning"85 under the school's
disciplinary policy.86 Clear lines related to the meaning of ambiguous
messages and metaphors are simply too difficult to draw in order to pro-
vide fair notice to students about when they will be punished for their
speech activities.
But perhaps the most important part of Justice Stevens's dissent fol-
lows: "I believe a strong presumption in favor of free expression should
apply whenever an issue of this kind is arguable."87 Although the precise
issue to which Justice Stevens may have been referring was whether
Matthew Fraser had sufficient advance notice that he would be suspend-
ed for presenting his speech, the broader point, explored later in Part
III, is that there should be a presumption in favor of protecting speech
whenever it is arguable whether it should be punished because of a
meaning it allegedly conveys.
82. Id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. See David M. Pedersen, A Homemade Switchblade Knife and a Bent Fork: Judicial Place
Setting and Student Discipline, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1053, 1078 (1998) ("Justice Stevens was
concerned about due process not being followed because, in Justice Stevens' view, Fraser was not
given sufficient notice that his speech would subject him to punishment.").
85. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 695, n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 695 (characterizing the school's disciplinary rule as "sufficiently ambiguous that
without a further explanation or construction it could not advise the reader of the student handbook
that the speech would be forbidden").
87. Id. at 696.
88. This meaning is plausible, given that the sentence coming immediately before the previ-
ous quote is: "First, it seems highly unlikely that he would have decided to deliver the speech if he
had known that it would result in his suspension and disqualification from delivering the school
commencement address." Id.
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In summary, three Justices in Fraser-Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens-attempted either to limit or to reject the meanings-based
approach to censorship adopted by the majority. Ironically, for a case
that stands for the proposition that student speech can be squelched when
it conveys a particular meaning that conflicts with rules of civility and
respect for the sensibilities of others, the majority opinion was appalling-
ly loose with its own use of language and what it meant by the words it
deployed. At various points in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger
suggested that it is permissible for schools to restrict student speech that
is "lewd,"8 9 "vulgar and offensive," 90 "lewd, indecent, or offensive,"
"sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd," 9' or "offensively lewd and inde-
cent."92
Maddeningly, the Court never attempted to define what any of these
words or phrases means. If a legislative body had fashioned a statute
featuring such terms but failed to explicate them, the statute likely would
be subject to a successful "void for vagueness" challenge.93 Criticizing
the Supreme Court's ruling in Fraser on the question of meaning, Pro-
fessor Christopher Fairman wrote:
Despite the opportunity to clarify the boundaries of offensive lan-
guage, the Court failed to carefully define the speech at issue. It
called the speech "offensively lewd and indecent," "vulgar and
lewd," and "sexually explicit" all in the same opinion. What then is
the difference between the Fraser-speech subsets of lewd, indecent,
vulgar, offensive, or sexually explicit? 94
A point that seemingly has not been previously addressed in any
law journal article is that the term "vulgarity" actually reflects class-
based distinctions between highbrow and lowbrow culture.9 5 This obser-
vation is troubling if the term is used to distinguish between what is and
is not protected under the U.S. Constitution. That First Amendment pro-
tection should hinge on such a distinction strikes one as antithetical to the
89. Id. at 677 (majority opinion).
90. Id at 683.
91. Id
92. Id at 685.
93. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (observing that "[i]t is a basic
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly
defined" such that they fail to "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited"); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 910 (2d ed. 2002) ("A law is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable person cannot tell
what speech is prohibited and what is permitted. Unduly vague laws violate due process whether or
not speech is regulated.").
94. Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1762 63 (2007).
95. See Emily Ravenwood, The Innocence of Children: Effects of Vulgarity in South Park, 1.2
CLCWEB: COMP. LITERATURE & CULTURE 1, 2 (1999),
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/voll/iss2/5 ("Vulgarity ... has distinct class overtones. Even those
who acknowledge the use of shock-value in bringing an audience to appreciate a new thought or
emotion, probably would not wish to align themselves with the great masses of the common people
who are not cultivated, refined and upper-class.").
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ideal that all individuals, no matter how properly or inarticulately they
express their sentiments, are deserving of equal free speech rights.
Viewed in this light, the word "boobies" is censored as vulgar under
Fraser simply because it is a lowbrow term for the more clinically accu-
rate and correct term "breasts."
The Supreme Court's ruling in Morse began to rein in the potential
reach of Fraser, at least as applied to "offensive" expression. It wrote
that Fraser "should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit
under some definition of 'offensive.' After all, much political and reli-
gious speech might be perceived as offensive to some."96 Although not
explicitly stating as such, at least one federal appellate court had previ-
ously suggested that the statement intimates that Fraser is limited to sex-
ual offensiveness-sexual vulgarity, sexual lewdness, and sexual inde-
97cency.
The bottom line is that the holding in Fraser can be read very nar-
rowly or exceedingly broadly. When confined to its rather peculiar set of
facts, the holding in Fraser would be strictly limited to (1) on-campus
speech 9 8 (2) that transpires in captive-audience scenarios99 (3) and in-
volves spoken, not printed, words (4) that are uttered at school-sponsored
assemblies (5) and that convey a sexually vulgar, lewd, or indecent con-
notation that allegedly overwhelms any political meaning, while simulta-
neously glorifying male sexuality in such a way that "could well be seri-
ously damaging to its less mature audience."100
Under such a narrow reading of Fraser, the "I V Boobies! (Keep A
Breast)" bracelets described in the "Introduction" would never be subject
to a Fraser analysis for several reasons grounded in factual distinctions.
First, the words on the bracelet are printed, not spoken. Second, there is
no captive-audience scenario; no one is forced to stare at the bracelets.
Third, the words do not glorify male sexuality; there is merely one slang-
based reference to a part of the female anatomy. Fourth, the word "boo-
bies" simply cannot be said, at least with a straight face, to be "seriously
96. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007).
97. See Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 2006) (opining that "[w]hat is plainly
offensive for purposes of Fraser must therefore be somewhat narrower than the dictionary defini-
tion," and adding that "[c]ourts that address Fraser appear to treat 'plainly offensive' synonymously
with and as part and parcel of speech that is lewd, vulgar, and indecent-meaning speech that is
something less than obscene but related to that concept, that is to say, speech containing sexual
innuendo and profanity" (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1162 (2007).
98. See T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 779 (N.D. Ind. 2011)
(noting that Fraser does not apply to off-campus expression).
99. See Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online
Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 97, 104 (2010) ("Fraser
holds that three factors are important for schools to assert jurisdiction over student speech: (1) there
must be a captive audience; (2) the speech must involve lewd or indecent sexual content; and (3) the
school must have a need to disassociate itself from the speech." (emphasis added)).
100. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
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damaging" to middle-school students, be it teenage girls or fourteen-
year-old students generally.
When read broadly, however, Fraser permits stifling any manner
and any mode, spoken or printed,'0 ' of any plainly offensive expression,
sexual or otherwise,102 that conflicts with society's "interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."o 3 As one dis-
trict court expansively characterized the holding in an approach that hints
at near judicial abdication of authority, "Fraser teaches that judgments
regarding what speech is appropriate in school matters should be left to
the schools rather than the courts."' 04
Under such an expansive interpretation of Fraser, Marilyn Manson
t-shirts that are completely devoid of any sexual referencestos can be
prohibited because they "contain symbols and words that promote values
that are so patently contrary to the school's educational mission." In
deed, it has been observed that "[m]ost courts apply Fraser beyond its
set of facts and extend Fraser's holding to allow school officials to regu-
late any student speech that is vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive."',0 7 Fra-
ser, as Professor Richard Roe wrote, leaves "little room for freedom of
student speech,"'o with its combined emphasis on the inculcation of
values of civility and the majority's "deference to the schools' determi-
nation of the form and content of those values."'
09
C. Continuing the Battle over Meaning: The Morse Extension from Sex-
ual Innuendos to Drug References
Twenty-one years after Fraser, and in its most recent ruling involv-
ing the speech rights of public-school students, the U.S. Supreme Court
in Morse again adopted a meanings-based approach to censorship."l0
This time, however, the message at issue purportedly carried overtones
of illicit drug use rather than sexual connotations. Morse pivoted on the
101. See, e.g., R.O. v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., No. 5:05-CV-695 (NAM/GJD), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130993, at *59 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2009) (noting that "district courts have extended Fraser
beyond the realm of spoken speech").
102. Id. at *67 (asserting that "[u]nder Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit vulgar,
lewd, indecent or plainly offensive speech" (second emphasis added)).
103. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
104. Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (W.D. Mich. 2005).
105. See Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 467 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The front
of the t-shirt depicted a three-faced Jesus, accompanied by the words 'See No Truth. Hear No Truth.
Speak No Truth.' On the back of the shirt, the word 'BELIEVE' was spelled out in capital letters,
with the letters "LIE" highlighted. Marilyn Manson's name (although not his picture) was displayed
prominently on the front of the shirt.").
106. Id. at 470.
107. David L. Hudson & John E. Ferguson, The Courts' Inconsistent Treatment of Bethel v.
Fraser and the Curtailment ofStudent Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 181, 194 (2002).
108. Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual Devel-
opment, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1271, 1284 (1991).
109. Id. at 1284-85.
110. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-03 (2007).
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meaning of a student-created banner emblazoned with the ambiguous
statement "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.""
The majority held that public-school officials could permissibly
censor student "speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging
illegal drug use."ll2 This constitutes a meanings-based approach to cen-
sorship because speech can be censored simply because it carries a par-
ticular meaning-one that "is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use.""' There is no need for school officials to demonstrate actual
facts that the message in question actually caused illegal drug use among
students. Furthermore, the "BONG HiTS" message need not cause a
Tinker disruption of the educational atmosphere. Indeed, as the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote in favor of student Joseph
Frederick:
The school principal and school board do not claim that the display
disrupted or was expected to disrupt any classroom work. They con-
cede that their objection to the display, and the reason why the prin-
cipal ripped down the banner, was not concern that it would cause
disruption but that its message would be understood as advocating or
promoting illegal drug use.114
Importantly, the Supreme Court's ruling in Morse illustrates the
vast judicial deference granted to school officials in deciphering the
meaning of ambiguous messages, a deference that easily squelches First
Amendment speech rights. In particular, the threshold issue in Morse was
the meaning of the banner. Its student-creator, Joseph Frederick,
"claimed that the words were just nonsense meant to attract television
cameras"' 1 and "meaningless and funny."11 6 Principal Deborah Morse,
however, believed that the banner "would be construed by students, Dis-
trict personnel, parents, and others witnessing the display of the banner,
as advocating or promoting illegal drug use."" 7
In penning the majority opinion against Joseph Frederick, Chief
Justice John Roberts dubbed Principal Morse's interpretation of the ban-
ner "plainly a reasonable one."" 8 This decision came despite Roberts's
open acknowledgement that "[g]ibberish is surely a possible interpreta-
tion of the words on the banner"" 9 and the dissent's characterization of
the banner's meaning as "silly" 2 0 and "nonsensical."21 The Morse ma-
Ill. Id. at 397-99.
112. Id. at 397.
113. Id.at403.
114. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
115. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id.at401.
118. Id
119. Id at 402.
120. Id. at 446 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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jority's decision to adopt the principal's interpretation of a pro-drug-use
meaning is consistent with what Professor Lee Goldman recently called
the Court's "increasing deference to the choices made by school adminis-
trators"l22 since Tinker.
Finally, although the Court found that the sexual meaning it rooted
out in Matthew Fraser's speech conflicted with the educational mission
of teaching students about civility and the sensibilities of others, 23 in
Morse it concluded that the pro-drug-use meaning it found lurking in
Joseph Frederick's banner conflicted with the educational mission of
teaching students that "the illegal use of drugs [is] wrong and harm-
ful."1 24 Morse thus reinforces Fraser's two-step, meanings-based ap-
proach to censorship of student expression: (1) Does a student message
reasonably convey a particular meaning? (2) If the answer to that query
is yes, then does that meaning conflict with some aspect of the educa-
tional mission of a public school?
D. Summary
From Tinker to Fraser (and later reinforced in Morse), the Supreme
Court has pivoted from a search for the disruptive effects of student
speech to a search through metaphorical (Fraser) and obtuse (Morse)
messages for possible meanings that conflict with aspects of a school's
educational mission. As the next part of this Article illustrates, Fraser's
meanings-based approach is particularly troubling when applied to real-
life cases in which multiple meanings-including some very laudable
ones, such as messages against illegal drugs, against drunk driving, and
in favor of raising breast-cancer awareness-reasonably can be derived.
The Fraser methodology proves especially dangerous for First Amend-
ment speech rights due to the vast deference courts continually grant to
school officials when deciphering ambiguous or polysemic messages.
II. DIVING INTO THE MORASS OF MIXED MEANINGS:
A TRIO OF LOWER COURT EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATE PROBLEMS WITH
FRASER'S MEANINGS-BASED APPROACH TO CENSORSHIP
This part of the Article uses three real-life examples of student ex-
pression that demonstrate the problems for freedom of speech when
courts deploy Fraser's meanings-based approach to censorship and, in
the process, give a heaping helping of deference to the interpretative
powers of school authorities. In each instance, the message in question is
polysemic and thus places courts deeply into a linguistic quicksand.
12 1. Id.
122. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63
FLA. L. REV. 395, 398 (2011).
123. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
124. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (2006)) (intemal quotation mark
omitted).
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A. Drugs Suck: A Sexually Vulgar Anti-drug Message?
Six years after the Supreme Court's ruling in Fraser, U.S. District
Judge Robert G. Doumar found himself bogged down in a semantic
quagmire in Broussard ex rel. Lord v. School Board.125 The case centered
on a message emblazoned on the front of a New Kids on the Block t-shirt
worn by a twelve-year-old seventh grader, Kimberly Broussard.12 6 The
blunt two-word message at issue was "Drugs Suck!"I 27 Officials at Blair
Middle School found it offensive, contending the word suck "had sexual
connotations."1 28
Broussard, however, testified otherwise about the nature of the mes-
sage. She claimed:
[T]he word "suck" did not have an offensive, vulgar, or sexual con-
notation to her. She testified that the shirt's message was that it is
"not right to use drugs," a message that she wanted to convey to oth-
ers. She intended the shirt to be provocative in its anti-drug message.
Plaintiff asserts that children her age generally do not consider the
word "suck" to have a vulgar or sexual connotation.129
Two of Broussard's classmates also testified that the message meant
"drugs are bad,"o30  although they acknowledged during cross-
examination that the word suck carries a vulgar connotation.'3 '
The massive efforts in Broussard to determine the meaning of one
word-suck-worn on a seventh grader's boy-band t-shirt demonstrate
the utter foolishness of Fraser's meanings-based approach to censorship.
As described in the opinion:
Both sides presented experts to testify on the etymology and meaning
of the word in the usage "X sucks," "X" being a noun used as a sub-
ject, and "sucks" being an intransitive verb. The experts presented
their interpretations of the derivation and meaning of the word
"suck," after consulting dictionaries and articles on slang usage and
searching the popular press for usage of the phrase "X sucks." 32
Expert witnesses often are expensive, and apparently, in Broussard,
public officials from Norfolk, Virginia expended taxpayer money to hire
two expert witnesses: a professor from Virginia Wesleyan College and a
professor from Old Dominion University.1 33 The former explained "that
125. 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992).
126. Id. at 1528.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1528-29.




133. Id. at 1534.
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'sucks' may have a sexual connotation even when used as an intransitive
verb, as in 'X sucks.' She testified that the Oxford English Dictionary
listed a usage of the word 'suck' without a direct object that had the sex-
ual meaning of 'fellatio."'l
3 4
Kimberly Broussard's attorneys, in turn, hired their own expert-a
Duke University English professor who testified that the word suck "has
a meaning of disapproval or disparagement among younger people."13 5
He added that suck "is in a state of amelioration in that its recent mean-
ing of disapproval is not as crude as its older meaning of oral-genital
sexual contact." 36
Clearly, Fraser's meanings-based test for censorship is flawed, if
for no other reason than because it too easily can become mired in in-
court battles between expensive and time-consuming expert witnesses.
Perhaps the Justices never anticipated such a result because the sexual
innuendo was so clear to them in Fraser, but the fact that Broussard re-
quired testimony from three college professors to help determine if cen-
sorship of a seventh grader's two-word, anti-drug message was justified
seems absurd.
Ultimately, Judge Doumar sided with the school and concluded that
it was reasonable for officials to find that suck conveys "a sexual conno-
tation of oral-genital contact."' 3 7 Under Fraser, the Broussard court did
not violate Kimberly Broussard's speech rights.'3 8 The judge reasoned
"that Blair Middle School officials had an interest in protecting their
young students from exposure to vulgar and offensive language." 39 In-
terpreting Fraser to stand for the proposition that "speech that is merely
lewd, indecent, or offensive is subject to limitation," Judge Doumar en-
gaged in an approach to meaning that was vastly deferential to school
authorities.14 0 Asserting that "[t]he Supreme Court has given great defer-
ence to school boards, as in Fraser,"'41 Judge Doumar wrote that "[t]he
federal courts, ill-suited as they are to second guess decisions of school
authorities, should interfere only in the most stringent circumstances.
This is not such a case." 4 2 Although Judge Doumar also found the shirt





138. See id. at 1537 ("Under either Tinker, a content-based case, or Fraser, which, like this
case, is content-neutral, the defendants did not violate Kimberly's First Amendment rights by sus-
pending her for refusing to change her shirt.").
139. Id.
140. Id at 1535-36.
141. Id at 1536.
142. Id. at 1536-37 (citation omitted).
143. See id. at 1535 ("Even if Tinker were the appropriate test, however, the school met the
Tinker requirements.").
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deferred to school officials to decide what language may be proscribed as
offensive, indecent, or lewd."1"
And what was the reaction of the case's young protagonist, Kimber-
ly Broussard, to Judge Doumar's decision? "I'm kind of surprised.. . . I
don't think they should be able to get away with it," she is quoted as stat-
ing in a Washington Post article.14 5 Her mother, Ruth Lord, expressed
similar dismay, stating, "I'm amazed-absolutely. I expected that the
First Amendment would prevail." 46 This mother and daughter were not
the only people to question the outcome.
Criticizing Judge Doumar's decision, Professor Fairman wrote that
"courts often sexualize other nonsexual language to enforce a prohibition
against the speech. For example, a federal district court upheld the sus-
pension of a middle school student for wearing a t-shirt that said 'Drugs
Suck!' because the message was vulgar and offensive." 47 More im-
portantly, cases like Broussard highlight what Fairman calls the "level of
confusion among the courts on both linguistics and the legal standard of
vulgar and offensive speech." 48
Also using Broussard to illustrate problems under Fraser, First
Amendment Center attorneys David Hudson and John Ferguson wrote
that the battle over vernacular in Broussard "belies one of the difficulties
of defining vulgarities. While at one time in American history theaters
refused to show a movie with the word 'damn,' it has now fallen in vul-
garity below 'suck."'l
4 9
. In line with Professor Fairman's point about the Broussard court
sexualizing non-sexual language,so attorney Andrew Miller adds that
"[e]ven if one accepts the courts [sic] dubious assumption that the word
'suck,' standing alone, is a sexual innuendo, it is very hard to imagine the
erotic nature of the student's t-shirt."' 5 ' In order for "suck" to take on an
erotic or sexual meaning in the phrase used by Kimberly Broussard, Mil-
ler writes that the court would have had to be "concerned that someone
may read the t-shirt to connote drugs-inanimate objects often consisting
of powders, fluids, pills, weeds, etc.--engaging in the act of fellatio.
144. Clay Weisenberger, Constitution or Conformity: When the Shirt Hits the Fan in Public
Schools, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 51, 56 (2000); see also Christopher Cavaliere, Student Work, Category
Shopping: Cracking the Student Speech Categories, 40 STETSON L. REV. 877, 904 (2011) ("One
court even used [Fraser] to uphold a school's decision to punish a student for wearing a shirt reading
'Drugs Suck!').
145. Va. Judge Rejects Free Speech Claim, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1992, at B5 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
146. Anti-drug Message Not Free Speech, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, at A12 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
147. Fairman, supra note 94, at 1764.
148. Id. at 1764-65.
149. Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 107, at 201-02.
150. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
151. Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L.
REV. 623, 656 (2002).
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This, however, is a very unlikely concern." 52 Miller's reasoning, of
course, channels the Supreme Court's logic in Cohen v. California'53 that
even the phrase "Fuck the Draft" would not conjure up "psychic stimula-
tion."1 54
Beyond these points, the decision in Broussard also overlooks the
emotive function of speech-that saying "Drugs Suck!" is a much more
powerful and attention grabbing anti-drug message than "Drugs are
Bad." Writing the majority opinion in Cohen and protecting an adult's
right to wear a jacket emblazoned with the message "Fuck the Draft" in a
Los Angeles courthouse corridor, Justice John Marshall Harlan observed
"that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explica-
tion, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force."'55 Put
differently, uttering "Fuck the Draft" deserves protection because it
packs an emotional power that an alternative message such as "The Draft
is Bad" simply cannot muster.
Kimberly Broussard, it must be remembered, was not even using
the alternative term "fuck." The fact that some people might feel there is
a substantial degree of difference between a seventh-grader saying
"suck," rather than "fuck," is illustrative of another problem with Fraser-
based censorship. In particular, Fraser embraces a dichotomized, black-
and-white tack to meaning. It assumes that speech either is or is not
lewd, vulgar, or indecent, regardless of how those terms ultimately are
defined. In other words, Fraser knows no nuance when it comes to
shades and variations of meaning. Fraser's all-or-nothing approach to
meaning fails to account for and acknowledge shades of sexual over-
tones.
Broussard, however, represents one of only several decisions in-
volving ambiguous messages with such sexual connotations that illus-
trate problems with Fraser's meanings-based approach to censorship.
B. OfDicks and Drunks: "Pyling" on the Censorship
In a memorable scene from the 1998 movie The Big Lebowski, the
character Maude Lebowski, played by Julianne Moore, explained to the
character Jeffrey Lebowski, performed by Jeff Bridges, that "without
batting an eye a man will refer to his dick or his rod or his Johnson" 56
instead of using the term "penis."
152. Id. at 656 & n.217.
153. 403 U.S. 15, 23-26 (1971).
154. Id.atl6,20.
155. Id. at 26.
156. See THE BIG LEBOWKSI (Universal Studios 1998) (emphasis added).
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Administrators at South Hadley High School, however, batted far
more than an eye when they spotted sophomore Jonathan Pyle on May 3,
1993, wearing a t-shirt emblazoned with the words "See Dick Drink. See
Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don't Be A Dick."' 57 In fact, they told Pyle
his shirt was unacceptable and gave him "the usual three options: First,
turn the T-shirt inside out; second, change into another T-shirt, or third,
go home and change." 58
As the word "usual" in the above-quoted sentence connotes, it was
not the first time that Jonathan Pyle and his brother, Jeffrey, had chal-
lenged school authorities with their sartorial choices. On March 24,
1993, for instance, Jeffrey Pyle wore a shirt that read "Coed Naked
Band; Do It To The Rhythm."' In fact, the Pyle brothers repeatedly
pressed and pushed the boundaries of school censorship with a series of
t-shirts bearing slogans such as "Coed Naked Censorship--They Do It In
South Hadley"l 60 and "Coed Naked Civil Liberties: Do It To The
Amendments."' 6' As U.S. Judge Michael Ponsor observed, the brothers
"both admit that they selected these T-shirts to protest censorship and to
test the capacity of the administration to distinguish prohibited from
permitted messages."'62
In June 1993, Judge Ponsor denied a motion for a temporary re-
straining order filed by the Pyle brothers that sought to stop school offi-
cials from prohibiting the wearing of the "Coed Naked Band" and "Don't
Be a Dick" shirts.163 After initially finding that the case more closely
resembled Fraser than Tinker, Judge Ponsor launched into an opinion
that although ultimately going in the school's favor, brilliantly made the
point about the problematic nature of Fraser-based censorship. Among
Judge Ponsor's observations, the following stand out as targeting specific
aspects of Fraser analyses:
Measuring Offensiveness: "[T]he T-shirts themselves are not horri-
bly offensive. Particularly when compared to other influences twelve-
year-olds encounter in today's world, they could be seen as fairly innoc-
uous."'6 This remark illustrates the vagueness inherent in the concept of
offensiveness as well as Fraser's inability to recognize degrees and
shades of gray-that not all speech that is offensive at some minimal
level (as compared to that which, to use the judge's term, is "horribly
offensive") requires its in-school censorship. It arguably is even healthy
157. Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 162 (D. Mass. 1994).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 161.
160. Id at 163.
161. Id. at 162.
162. Id. at 163.
163. See Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7, 9, 11 (D. Mass. 1993) ("[T]he T-shirts
in question bear the slogans: 'Coed Naked Band; Do It To The Rhythm' and 'See Dick Drink. See
Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don't Be A Dick."').
164. Id at 10.
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for students to be exposed to some modest levels of offensiveness in
school settings to prepare them for much more offensive content they
may need to cope with as adults in real-world settings.i6 s
The statement also intimates that what adults may find or believe is
offensive for minors is not coextensive with what minors themselves find
offensive. In other words, there is likely a generational gap regarding
what adults over a certain age may find offensive for minors and what
adolescents and juveniles consider offensive. This is not surprising be-
cause communication research supports the proposition that we tend to
believe that others are more affected by media messages than we are.'66
In brief, adults may believe that minors are going to be more harmed
than they actually are by hearing an occasional in-school sexual expletive
or double entendre.
Drawing Lines: "[L]ine-drawing with adolescents is never simple;
instances falling on one side or the other of the boundary will be forever
subject to debate,"' 67 and "[t]he difficulty of establishing and maintaining
boundaries in this area was highlighted by plaintiffs' counsel's hint that,
while his present motion only deals with two T-shirts, he might at some
future date apply for relief with regard to others."I 6 8 These quotations tap
directly into the disconnect between the slipperiness of message meaning
on the one hand, and the desire of both the legal and school systems to
impose clear-cut, black-and-white rules, on the other.169 The creation of
meaning has been described as "a process that modem linguistic and
literary theory has shown is fraught with ambiguity, subjectivity, and
complexity." 7 0 In brief, creating and imposing bright-line legal doctrines
around message meanings is an extremely problematic task.
Deference Due School Officials: "[I]t is important to emphasize that
the First Amendment does not require the court to substitute its own
judgment on these issues for that of the defendants, but only to determine
based on the record whether [their] concerns are reasonable,"' 7' and "this
165. Cf Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)
("[Tihe right of parents to enlist the aid of the state to shield their children from ideas of which the
parents disapprove cannot be plenary either. People are unlikely to become well-functioning, inde-
pendent-minded adults and responsible citizens if they are raised in an intellectual bubble.").
166. See generally Clay Calvert, The First Amendment and the Third Person: Perceptual
Biases of Media Harms & Cries for Government Censorship, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 165 (1998)
(describing the third-person-effect theory in communication research).
167. Pyle, 824 F. Supp. at 10.
168. Id. at l0 n.2.
169. This is not the only area of First Amendment jurisprudence where such line drawing and
distinction making are difficult tasks. See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on
the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1085 (1985) (observ-
ing that efforts to punish subversive speech, "like those which arguably characterize political giving
and spending, have been fraught with the line-drawing difficulties of accurately distinguishing
between inherently valuable speech on the one hand and clearly punishable speech on the other").
170. David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41 CATH.
U. L. REv. 81, 85 (1991).
171. Pyle, 824 F. Supp. at 10.
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case is not about the policy that this judge, if he were a member of the
School Committee, might personally argue for." 72 Ultimately, this
stance reflects the type of broad deference that courts consistently give to
the censorial decisions of school officials today.17 3 Such deference is
given, as the Eleventh Circuit put it, because the First Amendment rights
of students "should not interfere with a school administrator's profes-
sional observation that certain expressions have led to, and therefore
could lead to, an unhealthy and potentially unsafe learning environment
for the children they serve." 7 4
Such deference provided to school officials, rather than to students,
stacks the deck from the start against free speech interests when there is a
battle over meaning under Fraser. For instance, if two meanings of a
message are equally plausible-a political meaning asserted by a student
and a sexually vulgar meaning asserted by school officials-the defer-
ence granted to school officials seems to virtually ensure that their inter-
pretation will prevail and that censorship, in turn, will be permissible.
In August 1994, fourteen months after denying the Pyle brothers'
motion for a temporary restraining order, Judge Ponsor issued an opinion
after a four-day bench trial considering the prohibition of both the "Don't
Be A Dick" and "Coed Naked Band" t-shirts, as well as selected portions
of the school's dress code.17 5 Judge Ponsor again ruled in favor of the
school as to both t-shirts, writing that under Fraser "the school's exercise
of its authority to limit the sexual double entendre on these T-shirts, even
where there was no immediate prospect of disruption, did not run afoul
of the First Amendment." 7 6 Seemingly sensing that Judge Ponsor was
not particularly offended by t-shirts, which he characterized rather be-
nignly as carrying "sexual witticism," 77 the Pyle brothers during the trial
made a new argument-that Judge Ponsor and the "court must itself
weigh the slogans on its own scale of offensiveness and conclude that
these particular T-shirts simply were not vulgar."' 78 Parsed differently,
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 505, 510-11, 513 (5th
Cir. 2009) (observing, in the context of a case involving and upholding the censorship of a student's
t-shirt carrying the overtly political and non-sexual message "John Edwards for President '08," that
"federal courts should give substantial deference to schools where they present their reasons for
passing a given dress code" (emphasis added)); Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (9th
Cir. 2001) (writing that "[i]n the school context, we have granted educators substantial deference as
to what speech is appropriate" (emphasis added)); T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F.
Supp. 2d 767, 784 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (describing as "considerable" the level of deference "that is so
often due" public-school authorities); Deana Pollard Sacks, Children's Developmental Vulnerability
and the Roberts Court's Child-Protective Jurisprudence: An Emerging Trend?, 40 STETSON L. REV.
777, 778-79 (2011) (noting "the longstanding deference conferred upon local officials in the educa-
tional setting").
174. Scott v. Sch. Bd., 324 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003).
175. Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 158- 59 (D. Mass. 1994).
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the Pyles contended that the ultimate arbiter of message mean-
ings-vulgar meanings, in particular-should not be school officials but
rather members of the judiciary.
Judge Ponsor rejected this proposition, asserting that the limits of
acceptability of vulgarity in school settings "are to be debated and decid-
ed within the community; the rules may even vary from one school dis-
trict to another as the diversity of culture dictates. The administrators
here acted within reason, and the court's inquiry need go no further."179
The interpretation, of course, is highly deferential to school administra-
tors because (1) it recognizes that school districts can establish their own,
localized community standards of vulgarity rather than being subjected
to a national standard; and (2) it subjects school officials' determinations
merely to a reasonableness standard of judicial review (i.e., "[t]he admin-
istrators here acted within reason"). 80
Fleshing out these two points, Judge Ponsor described "the inappro-
priateness of setting up a federal judge to second guess school adminis-
trators' decisions regarding student messages containing sexual innuen-
do." 18' Rather than the judiciary taking on this obligation, "the limits on
vulgarity in secondary schools, assuming a general standard of reasona-
bleness, are to be defined by school administrators, answerable to school
boards and ultimately to the voters of a community."' 82
Judge Ponsor also rejected the Pyles argument that the "Don't Be A
Dick" shirt should be protected because of its political message against
drunk driving. "At least in high school, a political message does not justi-
fy a vulgar medium," Judge Ponsor wrote. 83 Ultimately, Judge Ponsor
summed up his decision in a rather colorful statement, writing that "on
the question of when the pungency of sexual foolery becomes unac-
ceptable, the school board of South Hadley is in the best position to
weigh the strengths and vulnerabilities of the town's 785 high school
students. The First Amendment does not compel the court into this are-
na." 8 4 Such a judicial hands-off approach to Fraser gives school admin-
istrators latitude for censorship, bounded only by a standard of reasona-
bleness.
The case of Pyle v. South Hadley School Committee features an in-
teresting post-script. In a 2002 article written several years after the case,
then-law student Jonathan Pyle asserted that the primary legal point he
and his brother sought to make in court was "that the Constitution makes
the reasonable person's measure of appropriateness irrelevant and denies
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. [d. at 169-70.
182. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 169.
184. Id. at 170.
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school officials the power to curtail any student speech that is not materi-
ally disruptive."' 8 5 In other words, Fraser's meanings-based approach to
censorship of inappropriate language needed to be replaced with Tinker's
effects-based model. "[T]he [Tinker] disruption standard, and nothing
more, should govern the school's regulation of independent student
speech," as Pyle succinctly put it.186
C. OfBoobies and Bracelets: A Split ofAuthority Emerges over a Slang
Term for Breasts
Whereas Jonathan Pyle ran afoul of school administrators in the
1990s for deploying a slang term for penis, students in the second decade
of the twenty-first century are finding themselves in trouble for using a
slang term for breasts. The on-campus wearing by public-school students
of bracelets bearing the message "I V Boobies! Keep A Breast" has
sparked instances of censorship across the nation, from Plant City, Flori-
da'87 to Saratoga Springs, New York'88 and from Kitsap County, Wash-
ingtonl89 to Fort Wayne, Indiana.' 90 Indeed, as the Tampa Bay Times
reported in March 2012, there is "an ongoing nationwide clash between
students and school officials who contend the word 'boobies'-even in
the context of cancer awareness-is inappropriate in schools."' 91
From a cultural perspective, the battles may reflect the reality that in
the United States "the female bosom has been elevated to a kind of para-
doxical cultural touchstone-ubiquitous in helping sell everything from
cars to candy yet so controversial we have to pass laws to protect women
185. Jonathan Pyle, Comment, Speech in Public Schools: Different Context or Different
Rights?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 586, 588 (2002).
186. Id. at 633.
187. See Keith Morelli & Jose Patifio Girona, 'Boobies' Bracelet Gets Kid in Trouble, TAMPA
TRIB., Mar. 31, 2010, at Local News 4 (describing a controversy involving the bracelets at the Tom-
lin Middle School in Plant City, Florida, in which a teacher and an administrator found the message
to be "disruptive and sexually harassing" and, as a result, seized the bracelet from a fourteen-year-
old student and punished him with a one-day, in-school suspension).
1 88. See Mareesa Nicosia, Anti-breast Cancer Bracelet Controversy Spurs Debate, TROY
RECORD, Mar. 25, 2010,
http://www.troyrecord.com/articles/2010/03/25/news/doc4baae9fd86dfd811320446.txt (describing
how two sixth-grade twin brothers at Maple Avenue Middle School in Saratoga Springs, New York,
were "sent to the principal's office several times" for wearing the bracelets because school officials
believed the word boobies "is offensive and should not be visible on students' clothing or accesso-
ries").
189. See Marietta Nelson, Bracelet Raises Ire ofKitsap School Officials, KITSAP SuN (Bremer-
ton, Wash.), May 10, 2010, at A2 (reporting that school administrators at Klahowya Secondary
School in Central Kitsap, Washington, asked students to either "leave their ['I V Boobies' bracelets]
at home, or to wear them turned inside out").
190. See Jeff Wiehe, Teen Sues FWCS to Wear 'Boobies' Bracelet, J. GAZErrE (Fort Wayne,
Ind.), May 22, 2012,
http://www.joumalgazette.net/article/20120522/LOCALO4/305229985/1002/LOCAL (reporting that
"[a] teenage girl and her mother are suing the superintendent of Fort Wayne Community Schools
because the student had a bracelet with the words 'I (heart) boobies' taken away from her by an
assistant principal this year").
191. Tony Marrero, Wearing Their Heart, and More, on Their Wrist, TAMPA BAY TtMES (Fla.),
Mar. 18, 2012, at 1.
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who want to breastfeed in public." 1 92 As one journalist recently put it, the
in-school skirmish "is as much about the way we perceive our bodies as
it is about the appropriateness of certain types of language for middle-
schoolers." 93 The "I V Boobies!" campaign also has been criticized as
one of several "sexy breast cancer"l 9 4 and "[k]ittenish"l 95 campaigns that
result in "pathologizing and fetishizing women's breasts at the expense
of the bodies, hearts and minds attached to them. In that way, they actu-
ally suppress discussion of real cancer, rendering its sufferers-those of
us whom all this is supposed to be for-invisible."l96
But from a legal perspective, the bracelets provide the perfect prov-
ing ground for demonstrating the futility of Fraser's meanings-based
approach to censorship. The recent split of authority described in the
"Introduction" further illustrates this point well,'97 even as more lawsuits
were being filed over bracelet bans in 2012 that surely will continue to
test the limits of student speech under Fraser.98
In April 2012, during oral argument before a panel of judges from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in B.H. v. Easton Area
School District, the attorney for the school district uttered, in apparently
irony-free fashion, the following phrase: "We're not here to demonize
boobies." 99 Yes, the city that is home to the Liberty Bell-long "consid-
ered a crucial representative of the heritage of the American Revolu-
tion"200 -had in 2012 become ground zero for a seemingly silly semantic
and censorial battle over the word boobies. Indeed, Amy Martinez, the
192. Chris Rickert, Bracelet Brouhaha Exposes Obsession, WIS. ST. J. (Madison), Feb. 9,
2012, at A3.
193. Id.
194. Peggy Orenstein, The Problem with Boobies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2011, at A15.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. For a discussion of a recent split at the federal district court level over whether schools
may appropriately censor "I T Boobies" bracelets, see sources cited supra notes 26-34 and accom-
panying text.
198. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, L.G. v. Twin Lakes Sch. Corp., No.
4:12-CV-00004 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2012); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, J.A. v.
Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., No. 1:12-CV-00155 (N.D. Ind. May 18, 2012); Press Release, Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Ind., "I T BOOBIES" Protected First Amendment Speech (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://www.aclu-in.org/LG%20v.%20Twin%20Lakes%2OSchool%2OCorp%202-6-2012.pdf (de-
scribing the factual underpinnings in L.G. v. Twin Lakes School Corp.); Wiehe, supra note 190
(describing the lawsuit of J.A. v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, filed on behalf of a female high-
school sophomore and based upon the confiscation of her bracelet by school officials in March 2012
after she allegedly had worn "the bracelet for months without incident"); Student Sues to Wear
Breast Cancer Bracelet, EVENING NEWS & TRIB. (Jeffersonville, Ind.), Feb. 6, 2012,
http://newsandtribune.com/clarkcounty/x318441913/Student-sues-to-wear-breast-cancer-bracelet
(describing the federal lawsuit of L.G. v. Twin Lakes School Corp. filed on behalf of a male eighth-
grade student, at Roosevelt Middle School in Monticello, Indiana, who was ordered to turn the
bracelet inside out after having worn it for two days without allegedly causing a disruption).
199. Zach Lindsey, 'I Heart Boobies' Bracelet Ban Appeal Under Way in Philadelphia,
EXPRESs-TIMES (Lehigh Valley, Pa.), Apr. 11, 2012,
http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/easton/index.ssfl2012/04/arguments in i heart boobies b.htmi.
200. 2 PAUL A. GILJE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 416 (2010).
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mother of Kayla Martinez, one of the litigants in the case along with Bri-
anna Hawk expressed shock that the dispute wound up in federal court.201
But then again, as Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote in the
opening sentence of Cohen v. California where the dispute pivoted on
the phrase "Fuck the Draft,"202 "[t]his case may seem at first blush too
inconsequential to find its way into our books, but the issue it presents is
of no small constitutional significance." 203 Indeed, the dispute over the
word "boobies," as used in the phrase "I V Boobies," is of no small con-
stitutional significance to students who want to wear a bracelet to their
public school bearing that phrase. These students have found themselves,
as Matthew Fraser might put it in pun-intended fashion, caught in a cen-
sorial booby trap 204 with suspensions doled out as booby prizes. 20 5
The issue carries more than just constitutional significance. It also
comes at a large monetary cost for schools that seemingly have no better
way to spend their budgets than to fight cases in court rather than to set-
tle them expeditiously. By June 2011, for instance, "Easton Area School
District ha[d] rung up nearly $50,000 in legal bills defending its ban on
breast cancer awareness bracelets."2 06
The "I V Boobies" disputes also illustrate the generational gap prob-
lem that Fraser carries with it, as older adults who hold the reins of cen-
sorship may interpret words in very different ways than the minors who
are subjected to their censorial wrath. For instance, in the Pennsylvania
case, plaintiffs Brianna Hawk and Kayla Martinez both testified that
"they used the word 'boobies' at home to refer to breasts and considered
it harmless slang." 207 In contrast, school officials interpreted the word
boobies to be lewd and vulgar.208 Yet, other minors might wear the
bracelets as reminder of a loved one who has passed away from breast
209cancer.
201. Peter Hall, Students Can Wear 'Boobies' Bracelets, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2011, at Al5.
202. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
203. Id at 15.
204. See generally 1. Willis Russell, Among the New Words, 20 AM. SPEECH 221, 222 (1945)
(noting that the term "booby trap" was originally used in a military sense dating from the end of
World War 1).
205. See, e.g., Marisa Guthrie, The Networks Take Out the Trash, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Nov. 16, 2009, at 3 (using the phrase "booby prize" in the negative sense of the cancellation of a
television show).
206. Samantha Marcus, 'Boobies' Case Costs District $17,500 So Far, MORNING CALL (Allen-
town, Pa.), June 14, 2011, at A6 (explaining that district's out-of-pocket costs are $17,500, with its
insurance policy covering the rest).
207. Christopher Baxter, Students Defend Wearing 'Boobies' Bracelets in Class, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2010, at A27.
208. Id.
209. See Pia Hallenberg, Teen Presses on Toward Graduation Day, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spo-
kane, Wash.), May 24, 2012, at 2S (reporting that Washington state high school student Frank Hern-
er Ill "wears a black 'I love boobies' rubber bracelet in his mother's memory").
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This conundrum illustrates the most obvious problem with Fraser:
trying to comprehend which words, at any given time, will be considered
vulgar or lewd in the eyes of school officials. A study published in 2002
in the journal American Speech does not include the word "boobies"
among a list of forty taboo words for human body parts, but the word
"tit" does make the inventory as a taboo term for breasts. 210 On the other
hand, the key word from Pyle -"dick"--does appear on the list,2 11 but it
can be used to mean "nothing" rather than "penis," as in the phrase "No-
body saw dick."2 12 Radio talk-show host Howard Stern, however, fre-
quently uses "boobies," along with the term "cans," as synonyms for
breasts.213
With the multitude of problems posed by Fraser in mind, the next
part of the Article turns to possible solutions to these difficulties. These
options stretch from overruling Fraser in outright fashion and replacing
it with a Tinker analysis to modifying Fraser by grafting onto it a key
aspect from Justice Alito's controlling concurrence in Morse.
HI. FINDING A SOLUTION TO FRASER: OVERRULE IT OR REFASHION IT
There are several potential ways to address the problems posed by
Fraser's meanings-based approach to censorship. This part proposes and
explores three possible ways to ameliorate the difficulties wrought by
Fraser censorship, ranging from completely overruling Fraser and sub-
stituting in its place the Tinker standard to embracing a more modified
approach in which a portion of Justice Alito's Morse concurrence is
melded onto Fraser in a concerted effort to address polysemic messages
that fuse the sexual with the political.
Each of the three proposed tacks are set forth below merely as start-
ing points for spurring further academic and judicial discussion about the
ways in which Fraser analyses might be improved. These tacks, of
course, are not the only possibilities nor are they necessarily the most
viable or best ones.
A. Overruling Fraser and Replacing It with Tinker
Perhaps the easiest and cleanest way to address the problems with
Fraser's meanings-based to student censorship is to adopt the advice
provided by Jonathan Pyle in his 2002 law review comment: "[T]he
[Tinker] disruption standard, and nothing more, should govern the
school's regulation of independent student speech." 2 14 This approach, of
210. Robert S. Wachal, Taboo or Not Taboo: That Is the Question, 77 AM. SPEECH 195, 196
(2002).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 204.
213. Lawrence Soley, Sex and Shock Jocks: An Analysis of the Howard Stern and Bob & Tom
Shows, 13 J. PROMOTION MGMT. 75,89 (2007).
214. Pyle, supra note 185, at 633.
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course, entails jettisoning Fraser to the ashcan of quickly overruled
precedents.215
This would mean that censorship of sexual expression, including
polysemic messages imbued with sexual overtones but simultaneously
possessing political meaning like those described in Part II, would be
subjected to Tinker's substantial and material disruption standard. Tinker,
it must be emphasized, is already deployed by courts to address polysem-
ic messages. Specifically, Tinker is used to determine whether censorship
of clothing and other objects bearing the Confederate flag, about which
heated disputes in meaning exist,216 is justified.
For instance, in 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit applied Tinker to uphold a policy adopted by Burleson High School
(BHS) in Texas that prohibits the display of the Confederate flag on
school grounds.2 17 The appellate court concluded that school officials
"reasonably anticipated that visible displays of the Confederate flag
would cause substantial disruption of or material interference with school
218 . ,219activities," in part because of "ample, uncontroverted evidence
demonstrating that certain elements
of the BHS student body have continually manifested racial hostility
and tension. This tension has become evident in the various events
described above, including racially hostile graffiti and vandalism,
multiple disciplinary referrals involving racial epithets, and a physi-
cal confrontation between white BHS students and the African-
American students of another high school. 220
Similarly, in 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
applied Tinker and held that a "school's dress code as applied to ban the
Confederate flag is constitutional because of the disruptive potential of
the flag in a school where racial tension is high and serious racially mo-
215. For instance, the Supreme Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
handed down the same year as Fraser, was reversed just seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
216. It has been observed that "the most widespread and vitriolic debates over southern sym-
bols have pertained to the public display and meaning of the Confederate battle flag." Gerald R.
Webster & Jonathan I. Leib, Whose South Is It Anyway? Race and the Confederate Battle Flag in
South Carolina, 20 POL. GEOGRAPHY 271, 272 (2001). Professors Webster and Leib add:
Various polls have indicated that most African Americans view the Confederate battle
flag as racist and emblematic of 19th century efforts to preserve slavery as well as 20th
century efforts to maintain a segregated South. The battle flag is thus seen as an icon of
hate. In contrast, a significant majority of white Southerners view the battle flag as sym-
bolic of their ancestors' struggle, sacrifice and heroism against the perceived destructive
power and tyranny of the federal government during the Civil War and Reconstruction.
Id. at 275; see generally Robert E. Bonner, Flag Culture and the Consolidation of Confederate
Nationalism, 68 J. S. HIST. 293 (2002) (providing a comprehensive examination of the history of the
confederate flag).
217. A.M. v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 220,224 (5th Cir. 2009).
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tivated incidents, such as physical altercations or threats of violence,
have occurred."22 1 Other circuits are in accord.222 Surely if Tinker is ca-
pable of coping with a polysemic message like the Confederate flag that
might cause a violent disruption among students, then it should be more
than able to handle far less dangerous polysemic messages like "I V
Boobies! (Keep A Breast)" and Jonathan Pyle's "Don't Be A Dick" t-
shirt-messages that might provoke laughter not fisticuffs.
Under such a Confederate flag-like Tinker analysis, school officials
could permissibly censor sexually suggestive t-shirts like "Don't Be A
Dick" if (1) in the recent past, their wearing had caused substantial and
material disruptions of the educational atmosphere, thus providing school
officials with actual facts and reasons to forecast their future wearing
will cause future disruptions; or (2) on the occasion of their current wear-
ing, they create substantial and material disruptions of the educational
atmosphere. A teacher trying to hush or stifle a few giggles that might
arise from wearing such shirts should not, of course, constitute a substan-
tial and material disruption. Worries about scattered giggles aroused by
words like "dick" or "boobies" simply won't cut it because "Tinker re-
quires a specific and significant fear of disruption, not just some remote
apprehension of disturbance." 2 23 Repeated instances of classroom inter-
ruptions due to such laughter, however, might eventually rise to a level
where censorship would be permissible.
Even if sexually suggestive t-shirts draw no reaction whatsoever
from students and thus would be permitted under Tinker, teachers would
still be able to present their own views to students about whether or not
they considered the messages emblazoned on them appropriate or im-
proper. In other words, rather than engage in censorship, teachers could
use a non-disruptive, sexual-overtoned message as a starting point for an
in-class conversation about precisely the same points stressed by the
Fraser majority--civility, respect, and consideration of the sensibilities
of others.
This approach would embrace the logic and reasoning of the late
Justice Louis Brandeis, who wrote for the Court eighty-five years ago,
"[I]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and falla-
221. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 568 (6th Cir. 2008).
222. See, e.g., B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009) (ob-
serving that "Tinker and its progeny allow a school to 'forecast' a disruption and take necessary
precautions before racial tensions escalate out of hand," concluding in the case at bar that "[a]s a
result of race-related incidents both in and out of the school, the administration reasonably denied
the display of the Confederate flag within the school," and noting that "[olur holding is in line with
our sister circuits that have addressed this issue"); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358,
1365 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying Tinker in concluding that a school district did not violate a student's
"First Amendment right to free speech when it suspended him from school for three days after he
drew a picture of the Confederate flag during class in violation of the school district's harassment
and intimidation policy").
223. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).
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cies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence."224 Put differently, a teach-
er who feels that an otherwise non-disruptive t-shirt is somehow offen-
sive and inappropriate possesses the opportunity to educate through
counterspeech. 225 This approach could prove to be an extremely valuable
pedagogical opportunity, especially if a teacher explained that in the
United States, citizens demonstrate strength by tolerating a diversity of
opinions, including offensive ones,226 and a diversity of ways of express-
ing them. 22 7 Such education amounts to teaching minors about the limits
of free speech through in-class discussion rather than through the blunt
force of censorship.
Yet school officials-who reject such a self-help, counterspeech
remedy yet who also fear that, under Tinker, students will get away with
too much ribald and naughty yet non-disruptive on-campus speech-still
possess a remedy: adopt a uniform policy that prohibits students from
displaying any printed messages on their clothing and accessories. Such
uniform policies amount to content-neutral restrictions on speech and,
importantly, are upheld by courts.2 2 8 Implementing such uniform policies
may seem like administrative overkill, however, as the measures would
squelch all clothing and accessory-based messages rather than merely
sexual ones. But given the immense deference courts have provided to
school officials over the years, it would be within their educational pre-
rogative to adopt such an all-or-nothing option.
B. Revamping Fraser by Shifting Presumptions, Crafting Concise Defini-
tions, and Ramping Up Standards ofReview
An alternative approach to overruling Fraser is to add significantly
more analytical rigor to its application to help ensure that student speech
rights are not given short shrift. A starting point here is to circle back to
Justice Stevens's remark in his dissenting opinion in Fraser that "a
224. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
225. See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at
the Old Remedy for "Bad" Speech, 2000 BYU L. REV. 553, 553-56 (2000) (discussing the counter-
speech doctrine and providing examples of its use).
226. See Lee C. Bollinger, Commentary, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 979, 979 (1990) ("1 also felt a strong intuition that free speech has powerful mean-
ing for society, that somehow it seems to strengthen society even by protecting the most appalling
speech acts." (emphasis added)).
227. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) ("To many, the immediate consequence
of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.
These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring
values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled
with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose sight
of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distaste-
ful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly implicated.").
228. See Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 428 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[C]ontent-
neutral school uniform policies need only survive intermediate scrutiny to be constitutional-a level
of scrutiny we find the uniform policies easily withstand.").
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strong presumption in favor of free expression should apply whenever an
issue of this kind is arguable." 2 29 Although school administrators may
initially be entitled to judicial deference and a presumption that their
censorial decisions are valid, one must ask whether such deference still is
due once a student has demonstrated that another meaning-a political
meaning or social commentary-for the same message is reasonably
possible. In other words, if a student can demonstrate an alternative
meaning to a message that school officials interpret as vulgar or lewd,
then why should school administrators still be afforded a presumption in
their favor that censorship is the preferred or correct interpretation? In
baseball terms, shouldn't a tie on first base go to the free speech runner?
Riffing from Justice Stevens's assertion, the question becomes,
Why should there not be a strong presumption (a constitutional one un-
der the First Amendment, no less) of protecting a student's message if
the student has demonstrated to school officials that a message carrying
political or social commentary is equally plausible? At this stage, when a
student has, in a sense, rebutted school officials' initial interpretation of a
message by offering up an equally viable one, Why should the initial
level ofjudicial deference due school officials continue?
In addition to reducing deference to school authorities after a stu-
dent has proffered a plausible non-sexual meaning, the judiciary could
also take up the obvious, albeit exceedingly difficult, task of explicating
the key terms used by the Court in Fraser: lewd, vulgar, indecent, and
offensive. 23 0 The vagueness of such words provides educational authori-
ties with immense flexibility and broad discretion when they want to
squelch student speech. Defining such terms is not impossible; after all,
the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted and used the same definition of ob-
scenity for nearly forty years.231 Furthermore, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission has adopted its own definition of indecency for the
terrestrial broadcast medium. 232
Yet the reality, of course, is that not only would defining terms like
lewd and vulgar prove difficult for courts, but the resulting definitions
229. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 696 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. See supra Part L.B.
231. Obscenity is one of the few categories of expression that is not protected by the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
("[O]bscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."). The Supreme
Court's current three-part test for obscenity asks the factfinder to determine if the material in ques-
tion (1) appeals to a prurient interest in sex, when taken as a whole and as judged by contemporary
community standards from the perspective of the average person; (2) is patently offensive, as de-
fined by applicable state law; and (3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
232. The FCC today defines indecent content as "language or material that, in context, depicts
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities." Guide: Obscenity, Indecency and Pro-
fanity, FED. COMMC'NS. COMM'N, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/obscenity-indecency-and-profanity
(last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
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might also be quite different among the multiple federal appellate circuit
courts. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
might define "lewd" differently than would the Fourth Circuit. The result
would be a patchwork of definitions across the United States, with judi-
cial variance doing little to clarify matters. Unifying and binding defini-
tions would need to be supplied by the Supreme Court, of course, were
the Court ever (1) to hear a Fraser-based case (i.e., were one of the many
"I V Boobies!" cases described earlier2 33 ever to reach the Supreme
Court); and, in turn, (2) to decide not to completely overrule Fraser (if
given the opportunity) but to invest the time and effort into refining and
explicating is critical terms.
Another mechanism that courts might adopt to make Fraser more
rigorous (and more free speech friendly) is to reconsider the current "rea-
sonableness" approach to meaning interpretations and determinations.23 4
Reasonableness is such a low and deferential threshold that it arguably is
akin to traditional "rational basis" review in Equal Protection Clause2 35
cases involving non-suspect classes and non-fundamental interests.2 36 For
instance, the Supreme Court recently wrote that "rational basis review
requires deference to reasonable underlying legislative judgments."2 37
More specifically, under rational basis review, "legislation is presumed
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."23 8 Similarly, since the
1980s and Fraser, "school authorities have broad discretion to restrict
student speech that ostensibly interferes with the school's intended cur-
riculum. In short, when school-sponsored speech is involved, govern-
ment need act with only minimal rationality."239
The problem with applying such a low rational basis threshold,
cloaked in Fraser's reasonableness and deferential approach, is that free
speech is a fundamental interest under the First Amendment, and sin-
gling out particular types of content-content that is lewd, vulgar, and
233. See supra notes 27-34 and Part II.C (referencing these cases).
234. See supra notes 28-29, 33-34 & 118 and accompanying text (referencing judicial use of a
reasonableness standard in meaning interpretations in student-speech cases).
235. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
236. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) ("[A] classification neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validi-
ty. . . . Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.").
237. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012).
238. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. Wilborn, supra note 13, at 122 (emphasis added).
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offensive-typically would trigger a much stricter standard of review.240
Because the setting is educational and the speech involves minors, how-
ever, Fraser veered off this normal course and down an easy path toward
censorship. Replacing a reasonableness and rationality approach under
Fraser with at least an "intermediate scrutiny" standard of review in cas-
es involving messages that allegedly carry sexual overtones would mod-
erately ramp up First Amendment safeguards. 2 4 1
C. Refashioning Fraser in Light ofJustice Alito's Morse Concurrence
Whereas the vast deference to school officials exhibited by the ma-
jority in Morse v. Frederick illustrates the problem for safeguarding stu-
dent speech under a meanings-based approach,242 Justice Alito's concur-
ring opinion in Morse took pains to make clear that mixed and muddled
drug-themed messages merit First Amendment protection if they "can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social is-
sue."243 Justice Alito noted that this would include commentary on topics
such as the advisability of the war on drugs and the usefulness of medical
marijuana laws. 244 The only limit on such messages for Justice Alito pre-
sumably would come under Tinker's substantial and material disruption
standard, as Alito expressed his agreement several times in Morse with
the rule created in Tinker.24 5
Now imagine grafting Justice Alito's Morse principle-that student
speech, which is plausibly interpretable as commenting on any political
or social issue, merits First Amendment protection unless it causes a
Tinker disruption-onto the Court's ruling in Fraser. In other words,
envision his concurrence as applicable not only to speech with a muddled
message that reasonably may be about illegal drug use but also to student
expression tinged with sexual innuendos or double entendres. More spe-
cifically, What would the outcome be in a case involving a public-school
student who wears an "I I Boobies!" bracelet to his or her school?
The inquiry under this Morse-modified Fraser standard would in-
volve the application of a three-step rule:
1. Is it reasonable for a school administrator to conclude that
the message in question carries a sexually vulgar or sexual-
240. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (observing, in the
context of a state statute targeting minors' access to violent video games, that because the law in
question "imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny-that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government
interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest").
241. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 783 (2007) (providing a timely and compre-
hensive review of intermediate scrutiny).
242. See discussion supra Part I.C.
243. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 422-23.
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ly lewd message? If the answer is no, then the message is
presumptively protected and the inquiry would skip the sec-
ond step and proceed directly to the third question. Con-
versely, if the answer to this threshold question is yes, then
the second step--the part borrowed from Justice Alito's
concurrence in Morse-is triggered.
2. Can the same sexually vulgar or sexually lewd message
nonetheless plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issue? If the answer to this question is no,
then the message may be permissibly censored. Alternative-
ly, if the answer to this question is yes, then the message is
presumptively protected by the First Amendment, unless the
answer to the third and final step-the Tinker part of the
analysis-also is in the affirmative.
3. Do school officials have actual facts-"something more
than a mere desire to avoid. . . discomfort and unpleasant-
ness"246 and more than an "undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension of disturbance'"247 -"to forecast substantial dis-
ruption of or material interference with school activities"248
that would be caused by the message in question? If the an-
swer to this final query is yes, then the speech may permis-
sibly be squelched per this Tinker-fashioned step.
Applying this three-part test to any case involving the wearing of an
"I T Boobies! (Keep A Breast)" bracelet would almost inevitably and
invariably proceed to the third and final step: a Tinker analysis. For in-
stance, if a court were to find that "I V Boobies! (Keep a Breast)" does
not convey a sexually lewd or vulgar meaning-the finding reached by
U.S. District Judge Mary A. McLaughlin in H. v. Easton Area School
District24 9 -then the message is presumptively protected, the second step
is rendered moot, and the inquiry proceeds directly to the third step (the
Tinker analysis).
On the other hand, if a court were to find that "I V Boobies! (Keep
A Breast)" connotes a sexually lewd or vulgar meaning-the conclusion
reached by U.S. District Judge Barbara A. Crabb in KJ. v. Sauk Prairie
School District250-then the court would need to proceed to the second
246. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
247. Id. at 508.
248. Id. at 514.
249. 827 F. Supp. 2d 392, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
250. No. 3:1 1-cv-00622, slip op. at 17 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 6, 2012) (order denying preliminary
injunction) ("It is reasonable for school officials to conclude that this phrase is vulgar and incon-
sistent with their goal of fostering respectful discourse by encouraging students to use 'correct ana-
tomical terminology' for human body parts.").
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step to determine if the message nonetheless was plausibly imbued with
any political or social commentary. Speech designed to raise awareness
about breast cancer would clearly seem to fit this bill. In fact, even Judge
Crabb acknowledged that "the bracelets promote a worthy cause,"25 1 and
she wrote that "as plaintiffs argue, the phrase "I V Boobies!" is always
accompanied by the phrase '(Keep A Breast).' When one reads the entire
phrase, it is clearly a message designed to promote breast cancer aware-
ness."252
Thus, a finding of mixed meanings-affirmative answers to both
questions one and two-leads to the third step: the Tinker analysis. It is
here where courts must not conflate or confuse a few scattered giggles
and laughs over the word "boobies" with a substantial or material dis-
ruption of the educational environment. Assuming a teacher could cap-
ture the proverbial "teachable moment" 253 and simply take one or two
minutes to explain to his or her pupils, "Yes, boobies is a funny word for
breasts, but the cause promoted here by these bracelets-raising aware-
ness of breast cancer-is extremely serious, as breast cancer affects and
afflicts many, many women every year," then whatever fleeting or minor
disturbance that might occur would be resolved.
The same analysis would hold true for the primary statement at is-
sue in Pyle: "See Dick Drink. See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don't be a
Dick."25 4 The word "dick," at step one of the test, may reasonably be
found to convey a sexually vulgar or sexually lewd message, at least to
the extent that it is a commonly used slang term for penis. As one federal
court in a post-Pyle case wrote, "dick" is "a term widely considered to be
lewd or vulgar and, especially when used towards a person in authority,
disrespectful." 2 55
But at step two, the overall statement, when viewed in its totality of
four short sentences, plausibly conveys social commentary about drink-
ing and driving and, in particular, an anti-drunk-driving message (that
those who drink and drive are dicks). T-shirts conveying this message
could thus be stopped only if a court answered the third and final query
in the affirmative. It is hard to imagine such a t-shirt causing a substantial
and material disruption of the educational atmosphere; a teacher could
simply ignore it, and the few brief chuckles that it probably would attract
in a classroom of teenagers would not rise to a substantial disruption. Of
251. Id. at 14.
252. Id. at 13.
253. See generally Stephen R. White & George A. Maycock, College Teaching and Synchro-
nicity: Exploring the Other Side of Teachable Moments, 36 CMTY. COLL. J. RES. & PRAC. 321, 322-
23 (2012) (addressing the "teachable moment" concept and the various ways it has been interpreted
and defined).
254. Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Mass. 1994).




course, the specific facts of any given case must be determined to resolve
the Tinker analysis at step three.
What, then, would be the outcome for Kimberly Broussard's "Drugs
Suck" t-shirt? Even if, at the first stage of the analysis, one assumes that
"suck" still can reasonably be interpreted to convey a sexually vulgar or
lewd message-even when used adjacent to a word like "drugs" that has
no sexual reference or connotation-it does not take a cunning linguist to
also plausibly decipher a dose of social commentary that drugs are bad,
given the reality that "sucks" to many people is a slang term for "bad."
Censorship of Kimberly Broussard's t-shirt thus would only be justified
if, at stage three of the analysis, there were actual facts to support the
prediction that it would cause a substantial and material disruption of the
educational process.
On the other hand, a t-shirt such as that printed with the message
"Coed Naked Band; Do It To The Rhythm"2 5 6 and wom by Jeffrey Pyle
likely would be prohibited under this three-part, modified Fraser test.
This would be the case if, at the first stage, school administrators found
the sexual references of "naked" and "do it" to be vulgar or lewd. Such a
finding would trigger the second stage, and it is here where the First
Amendment side of the equation would probably lose out. Why? Be-
cause, as Judge Michael Ponsor wrote, "Except for the sexual innuendo,
it is hard to discern any substance in the invocation to, 'Do It To The
Rhythm."' 25 7 In other words, no political or social commentary plausibly
is conveyed. The sexual innuendo of naked band members having
rhythmic coitus may be humorous, but it is not humorous in the name of
advancing or commenting on some larger cause like that against drunk
driving or raising breast-cancer awareness. In brief, then, the "Coed Na-
ked Band; Do It To The Rhythm" t-shirt could permissibly be censored
after the second stage of analysis; there would be no need to conduct a
third-stage Tinker analysis.
The ultimate litmus test for this three-part test, of course, is the
resolution of the dispute in Fraser. The ruling would hinge, at the end of
the legal day, on the third stage of the analysis-whether Matthew Fra-
ser's speech caused a substantial and material disruptive effect under
Tinker. That's because, at the first stage of the analysis, it seems reason-
able to find that the double entendres of pounding and climaxing created
a sexually lewd message. Yet at the second stage, it also is more than
plausible that Matthew Fraser was engaging in political commentary
because his speech was part of a forum on government and because he
was praising and nominating a fellow student for elected office. Thus,
because Fraser's speech was one consisting of mixed meanings--both
256. Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 161.
257. Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D. Mass. 1993).
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sexual and political-4he test for censorship should boil down to one of
message effects not message meaning. The Supreme Court in Fraser, of
course, never addressed this issue, although Justice Brennan suggested
the speech was disruptive,258 whereas Justice Marshall suggested it was
not.2 59 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, applied
Tinker and determined that "the record now before us yields no evidence
that Fraser's use of a sexual innuendo in his speech materially interfered
with activities at Bethel High School. While the students' reaction to
Fraser's speech may fairly be characterized as boisterous, it was hardly
,,260disruptive of the educational process.
In summary, there are multiple options for dealing with the prob-
lems wrought by Fraser's meanings-based methodology for the censor-
ship of student messages that allegedly are vulgar, lewd, indecent, or
otherwise offensive. Overruling Fraser and replacing it with Tinker pro-
vides one clear-cut option, whereas melding Justice Alito's principle of
plausible social or political commentary from Morse onto Fraser pro-
vides a more nuanced, three-step solution.
CONCLUSION
Feel for lumps, save your bumps.
-Gilbert High School cheerleaders 261
Cheerleaders at Arizona's Gilbert High School planned to wear t-
shirts printed with that message in fall 2011 in an effort to raise money
for breast-cancer awareness during a football game.2 6 2 The school's prin-
cipal took exception to the slogan, however, and prohibited the t-shirts
from being worn.263 The cheerleaders found it particularly galling be-
cause members of the school's choir were permitted to wear shirts with
the message "I'd Hit That," 26 and members of the sign-language club
had worn shirts sporting the message "I'm good with my hands." 26 5
School officials, however, took the "bumps" message so seriously that
during one football game they reportedly did "not allow anyone wearing
the shirt to speak with a newspaper reporter threatened with arrest, and
they barred a television crew from entering the stadium."266
258. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
260. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43, 755 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985).
261. Hayley Ringle, School Calls Slogan on T-shirts Inappropriate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoe-





266. Jim Walsh & Hayley Ringle, Students' Cancer T-shirts Become Hit, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(Phoenix), Oct. 15, 2011, at B3.
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This incident indicates that there never will be a shortage of contro-
versies involving the wearing of mixed messages that carry sexual over-
tones. But, as Professor Wat Hopkins recently observed, "[W]e can
maintain hope that the Court recognizes the inherent benefits of abandon-
ing efforts to define words for the public, and then restrict those words
based on narrow judicial definitions."267 This Article, in turn, argues that
abandoning a meanings-based approach to the censorship of student ex-
pression embraced in Fraser and restoring an effects-based model adopt-
ed in Tinker provides one feasible solution.268
Viewed at a macro-level, Fraser's embrace of the principle that the
meaning of a message, standing alone and without proof of any harm
caused by it, can lead to its censorship directly conflicts with the heart of
modem First Amendment theory, which holds that society must tolerate
some level of demonstrable harm. As Professor Frederick Schauer ob-
served two decades ago:
[E]xisting understandings of the First Amendment presuppose that
legal toleration of speech-related harm is the currency with which we
as a society pay for First Amendment protection. Paying a higher
price by legally tolerating more harm is thus taken to be necessary in
order to get more First Amendment protection.269
Although the content of Matthew Fraser's speech recently was dis-
paraged by one legal scholar as "idiotic juvenilia,"2 70 the Court's ap-
proach to resolving the case that Fraser's speech spawned was arguably
anything but transparent and coherent. From Chief Justice Roberts's ob-
servation in Morse about the ambiguity of Fraser's mode of analysis that
was quoted at the start of this Article 27 1 to Professor Scott Moss's more
recent characterization that "Fraser's various ill-explained rationales
made it a Rorschach precedent,"2 72 it becomes obvious that Fraser was
plagued from the start as a precedent for censoring student expression.
Fraser's problems, from a pro-free speech perspective, are compounded
by the vast deference courts traditionally give to the decisions of school
officials.273
267. W. Wat Hopkins, When Does F*** Not Mean F***?: FCC v. Fox Television Stations and
a Callfor Protecting Emotive Speech, 64 FED. COMMC'Ns L.J. 1, 45 (2011).
268. See discussion supra Part III.A.
269. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (1992).
270. John M. Kang, In Praise of Hostility: Antiauthoritarianism as Free Speech Principle, 35
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 419 (2012).
271. See supra note 1.
272. Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Pathfrom Tinker to Morse: How the Student Speech Cases
Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions-For the Law and for the Litigants, 63 FLA. L. REV.
1407, 1425 (2011).
273. See, e.g., Augustus v. Sch. Bd. Escambia Cnty., 507 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Only
as a last resort should the court arrogate to itself the position of administering any part of the day-to-
day operation of the school system.").
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This Article has emphasized Fraser's core problems. The decision
provides a meanings-based approach to censorship that deploys vague
words like lewd, vulgar, and offensive, while simultaneously granting
expansive deference to school administrators to decide whether any giv-
en instance of student speech can be made to fit within the reaches of
such terms, even when such speech is polysemic, obtuse, or simultane-
ously conveys a political meaning. Furthermore, Fraser gives school
administrators vast deference to assert what constitutes an educational
mission of public schools with which such meanings may conflict. Addi-
tionally, the debate in 2012 over the seemingly simple phrase "I V Boo-
bies! (Keep A Breast)" captures exceedingly well the problems for free
expression proponents wrought by Fraser in cases such as Broussard and
Pyle.
Finally, the Article suggested in Part III a trio of possible and dif-
ferent paths forward. Ultimately, whereas overruling Fraser and replac-
ing it with a traditional Tinker analysis in cases involving speech that
allegedly carries sexual overtones would provide a bright-line solution,
the proposal of merging and melding part of Justice Alito's concurrence
from Morse onto Fraser's extant precedent provides a more nuanced
tack. In particular, sexually lewd messages that lack any plausible social
or political commentary can be censored under Fraser, yet those mes-
sages that do contain such commentary-those that contain mixed mean-
ings-would only be censored under Tinker. The bottom line is that until
courts act to revamp Fraser in one manner or another, the now twenty-
six-year-old case provides a far too easy vehicle for school officials to
censor mixed messages with political and worthy meanings.
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NEW LIFE FOR THE DEATH TAX DEBATE
ELIZABETH R. CARTERt
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the ascendancy of wealth redistribution as the
policy underpinning the federal estate tax through the lens of sociology
and argues that by attempting to ensure equal access to the American
dream by penalizing only those who have fulfilled its promise, the feder-
al estate tax places fundamental American values in irreconcilable con-
flict. The reason that the current system does not work, I argue, is rooted
more in history and sociology than it is in economics. The solution is not
necessarily the repeal of the federal estate tax. Nor is the solution replac-
ing the estate tax with an inheritance tax, an accessions tax, or taxing
inheritances as income, as proposed by other commentators. The estate
tax plays, or should play, an important role in ensuring vertical and hori-
zontal equity in our federal tax system. Perhaps more importantly, it also
has the potential to provide a safety net of revenue during times of exi-
gency, such as that currently faced by our nation. In order to achieve
these goals, however, we must first correctly recognize the fundamental
problem with the current system. When the history of the tax is examined
from a sociological and historical vantage point, the real problem be-
comes clear.
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Pop Quiz. Which of the following quotes best describes the necessi-
ty of the federal estate tax?
(a) "Dynastic wealth, the enemy of a meritocracy, is on the rise.
Equality of opportunity has been on the decline .... A pro-
gressive and meaningful estate tax is needed to curb the
movement of a democracy toward plutocracy."
Warren Buffett'
(b) "[T]he death tax ... taxes income that has already been taxed
once before, and which encourages elaborate schemes for
transferring wealth."
-Mitt Romney2
(c) "The death tax results in the double taxation of many family
assets while hurting the source of most new jobs in this coun-
try-America's small business and farms."
-George W. Bush
(d) "I believe that those of us who have benefited so greatly from
our country's investment in our lives should be asked to give a
portion of our wealth back to invest in opportunities for the fu-
ture. Society has a just claim on our fortunes and that claim
goes by the name estate tax."
-Bill Gates Sr."
1. Kevin Drawbaugh, Buffett Backs Estate Tax, Decries Wealth Gap, REUTERS, Nov. 14,
2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/14/us-buffett-congress-
idUSN1442383020071114 (quoting Warren Buffett).
2. Mitt Romney, Obama Would Tax Economy to Death, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 1, 2012, at
19.
3. Chelsea Trull, House Votes Down Federal Estate Taxes, MICH. DAILY, Apr. 13, 2005,




Feeling confused? Ambivalent? Outraged? Vindicated? In any case,
you are probably in good company. These men know how to pull at your
heartstrings. They intentionally framed the issue in terms of your core
values. How do they know what values are important to you? That part is
easy. Sociology tells us that Americans have a collective set of core val-
ues and that they use these values to evaluate political issues.' Politicians
and other public figures vying for our support on a particular issue know
this, and they will frame their particular stance in terms of these values.
However, when we are presented with the issue already framed in terms
of conflicting core values or conflicting interpretations of the same core
values, many of us become confused, fail to evaluate the issue ourselves,
or become ambivalent.6
The men in your pop quiz are not helping matters. All four men are
college-educated Americans.7 All four earned graduate degrees in law,
economics, or business.8 All four are millionaires, and at least one is a
billionaire.9 And yet, this seemingly homogenous group cannot agree on
the mere existence of the federal estate tax. They all framed the issue
slightly differently, and yet you likely felt some sort of emotional re-
sponse to each argument. That gut feeling you experience when con-
fronted with issues framed in terms of ideas like equality, democracy,
and opportunity is natural, but it is also the federal estate tax's biggest
problem.
This Article examines the ascendancy of wealth redistribution as the
policy underpinning the federal estate tax through the lens of sociology,
and argues that by attempting to ensure equal access to the American
4. Bill Gates, Sr., Strengthening the Estate Tax to Strengthen the Country, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 17, 2009, 6:16PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-gates-senior/strengthening-the-
estate b_396444,html.
5. See Paul R. Brewer, Values, Political Knowledge, and Public Opinion About Gay Rights,
67 PUB. OPINION. Q. 173, 173 (2003).
6. See id. at 177-78.
7. See About Mitt, Mirr ROMNEY, http://www.mittromney.com/learn/mitt (last visited Sept.
14, 2012); George W. Bush, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewbush (last visited Sept. 14, 2012); Warren
Buffett, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/warren-buffett-9230729 (last visited Sept.
14, 2012); William H. Gates, Sr., BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND.,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/leadership/Pages/william-gates-sr.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. See Steve Holland & Kim Dixon, Milt Romney Tax Returns Released: Paid Just 13.9%
Rate in 2010, Had Swiss Bank Account, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2012, 11:24PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/24/mitt-romney-tax-retums-released-n 1225247.html; The
Net Worth of the American Presidents: From Washington to Obama to _, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 9,
2012, 1:26PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/american-presidents-republican-candidates-net-
worth-2012-1?op=l; Warren Buffett, supra note 7. William H. Gates Sr.'s millionaire status is in-
ferred based upon his son's approximate net worth of $61 billion and status as the second wealthiest
person in the world, in addition to Gates Sr.'s professional background as a founding partner at K&L
Gates (formerly Preston Gates & Ellis), a Seattle law firm where partners averaged $890,000 in
profits in 2012. Cf Firm Profiles: K&L Gates, AM. LAW.,
http://www.americanlawyer.com/firmProfile.jsp?name=K%26L+Gates (last updated Jan. 1, 2012);
The World's Billionaires, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/ (Apr. 24, 2012); William H.
Gates, Sr., supra note 7.
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dream by penalizing only those who have fulfilled its promise, the feder-
al estate tax places fundamental American values in irreconcilable con-
flict. The reason that the current system does not work, I argue, is rooted
more in history and sociology than in economics. The solution is not
necessarily the repeal of the federal estate tax. Nor is the solution as sim-
ple as replacing the estate tax with an inheritance tax, implementing an
accessions tax, or taxing inheritances as income, as proposed by other
commentators.' 0 The estate tax plays, or should play, an important role in
ensuring vertical and horizontal equity in our federal tax system. Perhaps
more importantly, it also has the potential to provide a safety net of reve-
nue during times of financial exigency, such as that currently faced by
our nation. In order to achieve these goals, however, we must first cor-
rectly recognize the fundamental problem with the current system. When
the history of the tax is examined from a sociological and historical van-
tage point, the real problem becomes clear.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary goal of any system of taxation is to raise revenue."
However, the federal estate tax, and by extension the federal gift tax, has
two concurrent goals. In addition to providing a source of revenue, the
tax promotes a supposedly important social goal of preventing "exces-
sive" accumulations of inherited wealth.12 This social aspect of the tax
pits conservatives and liberals against each other in an increasingly toxic
debate. Yet, the modem federal estate tax has not accomplished either
goal with much success.
Understanding the evolution of the wealth redistribution goal and
the public reaction to that goal is critical to understanding the futility of
the current debate and in analyzing how to move forward. The current
rhetoric surrounding the estate tax is no different from that of the past.
This Article argues that the real source of this debate is a conflict be-
tween several core American values. Regardless of where your personal
opinions may lie in this debate, the sociological history of the estate tax
reveals several truths: (1) we are unlikely to ever reach a consensus re-
garding the appropriateness of the supposed wealth redistribution policy;
(2) that policy is what converts a useful and potentially fair tax to a polit-
ically polarizing one; and (3) the estate tax has the potential to provide
much needed revenue during times of national exigency. To achieve this
potential, we must remove any wealth redistribution policy from the tax.
10. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and
Bequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1178-79 (1978).
11. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Joseph J. Thomdike, What's the Estate Tax Supposed to Do, Anyway?,




Part II of this Article explores what sociologists call our "core
American values" and examines how these values affect our political
attitudes. Part III of this Article briefly summarizes the various methods
of taxing gratuitous property transfers at death. Part IV summarizes the
nature of a tax policy debate and argues that the federal estate tax debate
is somewhat unique. Part V examines the history of the federal estate tax
through a sociological lens in an effort to provide insight to the current
debate. Part V argues that the current debate can be traced back to two
sources, both of which are utterly inapplicable in modem times. Propo-
nents of the tax owe their lineage to revolutionary Americans and their
efforts to change a political system that was stacked against them. Oppo-
nents of the tax owe their lineage largely to Andrew Mellon, a Treasury
Secretary who embarked on a mission to destroy the estate tax. The Arti-
cle concludes in Part VI by refraining the federal estate tax as an efficient
and practical mechanism for raising revenue during times of crisis.
II. SOCIOLOGY AND CORE AMERICAN VALUES
A. Sociological Values
What characteristics define Americans? What is American culture?
Sociologist Robin M. Williams Jr. went in search of the answers to these
questions more than sixty years ago. In his seminal text, American Socie-
ty: A Sociological Interpretation, Williams identified a list of core Amer-
ican "values." In the sociological context, the term "value" refers to
"broad cultural principles that most people in a society consider desira-
ble."' 3 Values, as Williams explained, "are not the concrete goals of ac-
tion, but rather the criteria by which goals are chosen."l 4 As a result,
people sharing the same values might express those values differently, or
they might extrapolate them into different expressions of sociological
norms.
Looking at the work of other observers, Williams noted that several
traits could be seen in American society during all major historical peri-
ods. These traits included
associational activity, democracy, and belief and faith in it; belief in
the equality of all as a fact and as a right; freedom of the individual in
ideal and in fact; disregard of law-"direct action;" local govern-
ment; practicality; prosperity and general material well-being; puri-
tanism; emphasis on religion, and its great influence in national life;
uniformity and conformity.16
13. JON M. SHEPARD, SOCIOLOGY 67 (10th ed. 2010).
14. ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 440
(3ded. 1970).
15. See SHEPARD, supra note 13.
16. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 453.
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Williams saw these recurring themes and sought to reduce them to their
abstract forms-that is, their core essence as a "value."1 7 Williams ex-
plained that from a historical standpoint, our values developed "out of
religious tradition, frontier experience, ceaseless change, vast opportuni-
ty, and fluid social structure."' 8 The experiences of colonial and revolu-
tionary Americans set the course for development of an American culture
that is distinct and identifiable in terms of our collection of values. In his
quest to understand America, Williams eventually identified fifteen core
American values. Those values were later summarized as follows:
Table 1: Williams List of Central American Values 9
1. Achievement and success as the primary goal of every individual.
2. Activity and work, with little emphasis on leisure and a disdain for
laziness.
3. Moral orientation, including the absolute judgments of good and bad
or right and wrong.
4. Humanitarianism realized through philanthropy and aid to those in
need or crisis.
5. Efficiency and practicality, as demonstrated by seeking the fastest
and least costly means of achieving a goal.
6. Process and progress-a belief in future development and techno-
logical advancement.
7. Material comfort, sometimes articulated as "the American Dream."
8. Equality in its most abstract form-as an ideal rather than a policy.
9. Freedom expressed by emphasizing rights of the individual over the
state.
10. External conformity, meaning that one strives to be a "team player"
and does not "rock the boat."
11. Science and rationality as the primary vehicles by which to master
the environment for material benefits.
12. Nationalism and the belief that U.S. values and institutions are the
very best in the world.
13. Democracy based on personal freedom and equal opportunity.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 458-59 (citation omitted).
19. Karen A. Cerulo, Social Relations, Core Values, and the Polyphony of the American
Experience, 23 Soc. F. 351, 352 (2008).
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14. Individualism or the emphasis of personal rights and responsibilities.
15. Racism and group superiority or the edification of a white, Anglo-
Saxon, or northern European racial background.
The values Williams identified are both interrelated and contradic-
tory.20 For instance, the value of achievement/success is clearly related to
activity/work and material comfort. On the other hand, the values of in-
dividualism and freedom are, in some respects, contradictory to the val-
ues of external conformity and group superiority. Williams recognized
the potential for conflict, explaining that "persistent and widespread val-
ue-tension leads to political struggle, schismatic cleavages, or the segre-
gation of various groupings into a kind of mosaic society." 21 Later soci-
ologists expanded on this theme, finding that although these core values
are always present, they also shift in terms of importance over time and
among individuals.22 The expression of these values as societal norms
23and behaviors changes over time and from person to person.
B. Values and Political Attitudes
Our values play an important role in shaping public opinion regard-
ing political issues. 24 Not only do Americans use their core values to
decide where they stand on a specific issue, the manner in which public
figures frame those issues for us directly impacts our opinions.25 "Values
are within everyone's mental grasp, so they [can] be employed as a gen-
eral evaluative standard for generating and organizing reactions to politi-
cal issues."26 Politicians and pundits know this, and they use it to their
advantage. The "ability to frame issues . . . is undoubtedly one of the
most important 'tools' that political elites have at their disposal." 2 7 As a
result, "policy controversies confronting the public are, themselves, al-
most always phrased in terms of values." 2 8 When politicians disagree on
an issue, for whatever reason, they often frame the issue in terms of
"widely shared values."29
Politicians know that framing an issue in the light of a core Ameri-
can value affects how people react to that issue.30 Of course, in the realm
20. SHEPARD, supra note 13, at 68.
21. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 452.
22. See Cerulo, supra note 19, at 353.
23. See SHEPARD, supra note 13, at 68; Cerulo, supra note 19, at 353.
24. See William G. Jacoby, Value Choices and American Public Opinion, 50 AM. J. POL. Sl.
706, 716 (2006).
25. See id.
26. Id at 715-16.
27. Brewer, supra note 5, at 176 (alterations in original) (quoting William G. Jacoby, Issue
Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending, 44 AM. J. POL. SC. 750, 751 (2000)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
28. Jacoby, supra note 24.




of politics, we are usually presented with conflicting interpretations of
the same value or with competing values. The manner in which politi-
cians and other public figures frame the issues for us significantly im-
pacts our ultimate opinions. "[T]he specific language employed to con-
vey information about the opposing positions on an issue could well
prime individuals to think about certain values and ignore others while
working out their own responses."31
When we are presented with conflicting applications of the same
values, several things can happen. Consider the value of equality in the
context of the estate tax. Suppose opponents of the tax tell you that it
works against equality because it results in family farms and businesses
being taxed on the same income twice. Suppose proponents of the tax tell
you that it is necessary to ensure equality of opportunity for all Ameri-
cans by limiting inherited wealth. Sociology and public opinion research
suggests several possible reactions. You might just become confused and
fail to form an opinion on the issue. 3 2 You might feel some connection to
both arguments and end up feeling confused or ambivalent.33 You might
reject both arguments and conclude that equality is not relevant to the
issue of the estate tax.3 4
Similar responses can occur when an issue is framed in terms of
competing values. Suppose that opponents of the estate tax tell you that it
punishes hard work and success. Therefore, in order to protect those val-
ues, you should eliminate the tax. Meanwhile, proponents of the tax tell
you that it is necessary to ensure equality of opportunity and democracy
by limiting inherited wealth. Therefore, we must keep the tax in order to
protect those values. You could have some of the same responses you
had when presented with competing views of the same value. But, you
might find the argument framed in terms of success and work more com-
pelling than the argument framed in terms of equality and democracy.
Or, you might find the equality and democracy argument more compel-
ling than the success and work argument.
Research suggests that when presented with competing values, your
opinion may be shaped by which value you find more important.35 We
are all different, so it comes as no surprise that "there is extremely wide
variability in personal judgments about value importance."36 Most people
have "meaningful value hierarchies."3 7 In other words, most people
31. Jacoby, supra note 24.
32. See Brewer, supra note 5, at 177.
33. See id. at 178.
34. See id.





"seem to recognize that some values are more important than others, and
[such people] make the requisite choices between them."08
Your pop quiz illustrates the most popular competing frames con-
structed around the federal estate tax. As discussed in Part V below,
these frames have existed for a century or more. In that time, they have
proven to be deeply divisive. I argue that these frames are also outdated,
misguided, and utterly unsupported by the facts. Public figures on both
sides of the debate who perpetuate these frames are irresponsible. They
needlessly perpetuate an illogical debate. As a result, they impede the
possibility for us to make an important and useful safety net of revenue
available during a time of national financial crisis. If we are going to
move forward, we should reframe the issue in terms of efficiency and
practicality. 3 9
III. TAXING DEATH
The goal of the federal tax system, as a whole, is to raise revenue
for the federal government in a manner that is "fair." 4 0 To achieve "fair-
ness," we evaluate the tax system in light of concerns for vertical and
horizontal equity.41 Principles of horizontal equity require that "similarly
situated individuals ... be taxed similarly . . . ."42 Meanwhile, principles
of vertical equity provide that "individuals .. . be taxed according to their
ability to pay."A' To achieve both horizontal and vertical equity, most tax
scholars agree that the system should include multiple tax bases." For
example, in an effort to achieve "fairness," the current federal tax system
includes "income, property or wealth, and consumption" in the mix of
tax bases.45 Of course, this is a grossly generalized description. People
fundamentally disagree about what is "fair," which persons are "similarly
situated," and how we determine an individual's "ability to pay." 4 6
To understand the debate surrounding the federal estate tax, it is al-
so important to understand, in basic terms, what the federal estate tax is
and what other options are available. A good portion of the scholarly
debate over the federal estate tax examines the possibility of moving
3 8. Id.
39. See infra Part VI.
40. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle America Burns: Amending the
AMT (and Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811, 818 (2004); Leo P. Martinez, "To Lay and Collect
Taxes ": The Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 111, 115
(1999); Nancy E. Shurtz, A Critical View of Traditional Tax Policy Theory: A Pragmatic Alterna-
tive, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1665,1669-71 (1986).
41. See STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, FEDERAL TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 10 (2d ed. 2008).
42. Id.; see also David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 43, 43 (2006).
43. WILLBANKS, supra note 41; see also Shurtz, supra note 40, at 1671.
44. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41; Shurtz, supra note 40.
45. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 40; Shurtz, supra note 40, at 1671.
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from a federal estate tax to some other taxing regime. 47 These other re-
gimes could affect aspects of horizontal or vertical equity. The merits of
those arguments are beyond the scope of this Article.
Any time money or property changes hands we have an opportunity
to tax the transaction. In an overly simplistic sense, we have two options:
(1) tax the transferee on the receipt of property; or (2) tax the transferor
on the transfer of property. The federal tax system utilizes both options.
With respect to the gratuitous transfer of property occurring at death,
both options are feasible and likely constitutional.
A. Tax the Receipt ofProperty
Two methods of taxing the receipt of property from a decedent are
commonly proposed: (1) including inheritances within the income tax;
and (2) imposing an inheritance tax. The proposals are similar in many
respects.
1. Income Tax Approach
A relatively simple way to tax property transferred at death is to in-
clude inheritances within the scope of gross income. 4 8 The federal in-
come tax imposes a tax on the receipt of "income" by a taxpayer during
the calendar year.4 9 Every law student in an introductory income tax
course learns that income includes all "undeniable accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete domin-
ion."50 If not for a specific exception, this broad definition of income
would clearly include any inheritance received by a taxpayer. However,
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) specifically excludes inheritances and
gifts from the definition of gross income.5 1 A very simple way to tax
gratuitous transfers of property is to simply repeal that exclusion and
include the receipt of any inheritance within gross income of a taxpay-
er.52 This approach would likely meet constitutional requirements and
47. See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV.
469, 493-96 (2007); Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect From Heirs? The Case for a
Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (2009); Dodge, supra note 10, at 1178-80;
Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an Income-
Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 551 passim
(2003); Joseph M. Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax With a Reimagined Accessions Tax, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 997 passim (2009); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Gratuitous Transfers Under a Con-
sumption Tax, 51 TAx L. REV. 529 passim (1996); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 350-56 (1994).
48. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 8.
49. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
50. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 346 U.S. 426,431 (1955).
51. See 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
52. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 8.
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would be fairly simple to administer.53 Additionally, taxing inheritances
as income could simplify the tax code.54
In all likelihood, the real problem with implementing this approach
is that gifts and inheritances have specifically been excluded from the
scope of the federal income tax for 100 years. Scholars and politicians
have many explanations and justifications for the exclusion.55 In reality,
it may just be a historical accident of sorts.56 For instance, some contend
that including inheritances in the federal income tax system might be
somehow "unfair." The federal income tax imposes a tax based on the
57value of property received by an individual taxpayer in any given year.
Income taxes are typically subject to a progressive rate scale, meaning
that larger accumulations of wealth in a given year are subject to pro-
gressively higher tax rates.58 If a taxpayer receives an exceptionally and
uncharacteristically large amount of income in one year, the IRC gener-
ally treats him no differently than a taxpayer receiving that amount of
income every year. In other words, this approach essentially treats an
inheritance as a windfall and would tax it no differently from any other
windfall-for example, lottery winnings. Some people perceive a distinc-
tion between property passing to you by death-often from a close fami-
ly member-and a winning lottery ticket or exceptionally large earnings.
As a result, some people believe the income tax approach is inherently
unfair because it would "tax[] unusually large receipts at progressively
higher rates."5 In other words, including inheritances within the scope of
the income tax would run afoul of principles of horizontal equity. A per-
son receiving an inheritance is, perhaps, not similarly situated to other
taxpayers with comparable amounts of income. Moreover, taxing inher-
itances as income could violate principles of vertical equity where the
property is illiquid or not fungible. In that case, the taxpayer would not
have the same ability to pay as a taxpayer holding cash.o On the other
hand, some commentators specifically endorse including inheritances
within the scope of gross income as a way to regulate inherited wealth.6
As one advocate of this approach explains, "[B]y imposing the tax direct-
ly on those who receive the money, Congress could have a more honest
discussion regarding the appropriate taxation of inherited wealth."62
53. See id. at 8-9.
54. See Dodge, supra note 10, at 1191.
55. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1992).
56. See id.
57. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
58. See id.
59. wILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 9.
60. See Sergio Pareja, Taxation Without Liquidation: Rethinking "Ability to Pay," 2008 WiS.
L. REV. 841, 858-59 (proposing a wealth transfer system that treats liquid and illiquid assets differ-
ently in light of ability-to-pay concerns).




2. Inheritance Tax Approach
A second way to tax the gratuitous receipt of property at death is the
inheritance tax.6 3 Like an income tax, an inheritance tax taxes the receipt
of property by a particular beneficiary.64 However, inheritance taxes,
which are fairly common at the state and local tax level, typically operate
independently of the income tax system. Inheritance taxes, therefore,
are not subject to the same rate scales as income taxes. That result could
be achieved within the income tax setting by simply imposing a different
66rate of tax on inheritances, much as we do for long-term capital gains.
However, every existing inheritance tax ties the rate of tax imposed to
the familial relationship between the decedent and the recipient.6 1 Specif-
ically, receipts from close relatives are subject to lower rates of tax than
68receipts from distant relatives or non-relatives. For that reason, the pol-
icy implications are somewhat distinct from the implications of taxing an
inheritance as income.
The familial relationship-based rate structure essentially requires the
government to enact legislation defining a taxpayer's family and effec-
tively ranking degrees of familial relations, a particularly problematic
prospect given the changing views of family and society. Furthermore,
familial relationship-based rate structures can create horizontal and verti-
cal inequity. By treating taxpayers differently based on government no-
tions of family, an inheritance tax may ignore economic reality.6 9 The
inheritance tax presupposes that close relatives are not similarly situated
to other heirs. Furthermore, by favoring transfers to close relatives, an
inheritance tax wholly ignores their ability to pay. Finally, this approach
seems to actually encourage accumulating wealth within the family ra-
ther than spreading the wealth around.
B. Tax the Transfer of Property
The modem estate tax imposes a tax on the transferor of property,
the decedent, and his estate.70 Sometimes described as "an excise tax on
the privilege of transferring property at death," 7 1 the estate tax looks at
63. By extension, this could include an accessions tax.
64. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 8.
65. See, e.g., Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not to Die in 2012, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2011, 1:11PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/201 11 2/22/where-not-to-die-in-2012 (providing an
interactive map of state-level inheritance and estate taxes).
66. See 26 U.S.C. § I(h) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
67. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a
Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 78 (2009) ("It is true that every U.S. state and
nineteen of the twenty-three countries with an inheritance tax impose higher taxes on gifts and
bequests received from nonrelatives. Often, the tax rate rises or the exempt amount falls as the
relationship to the donor becomes more attenuated.").
68. Id.
69. See Bridget J. Crawford, The Profits and Penalties of Kinship: Conflicting Meanings of
Family in Estate Tax Law, 3 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 1, 5-6 (2006).
70. See 26 U.S.C. § 2002 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1 (1960).
71. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 7.
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the value of all of the property a decedent owned at the time of his death
and applies a tax directly on the gratuitous transfer of that property.72
Unlike the income tax and the inheritance tax approaches, the estate tax
looks at the property in the hands of the decedent rather than the property
received by any particular beneficiary. Thus, the decedent's estate, not
the beneficiary is primarily liable for the payment of the tax.74 The cur-
rent federal system employs an estate tax.75 However, the current system
does not apply an estate tax in the strict sense. For instance, like an inher-
itance tax, transfers to certain beneficiaries-namely charities and sur-
viving spouses-are treated favorably.76 In fact, these transfers are essen-
tially exempt from the estate tax.77 Furthermore, decedents receive a
credit against the tax.78 Under the current system, the credit is so large
the decedent will not face any estate tax until the amount of property he
transfers to someone other than a charity or his surviving spouse exceeds
$5 million.79 As a result, very few estates are subject to the tax, and it
does not raise a significant amount of revenue.80 However, keeping the
current federal estate tax system in place, this could easily be changed by
adjusting the various credits and deductions available.
IV. TAX POLICY AND THE NATURE OF POLICY DEBATES
Congress uses tax laws in order to promote a variety of social and
political policies. The heart of most current tax debates stems from the
non-revenue purposes of the tax laws, namely (1) the redistribution of
wealth, and (2) the regulation of private sector activity.8 ' Although
Americans disagree about the amount of revenue that should be raised,
the simple notion of imposing a variety of taxes to raise revenue is not
particularly controversial. Using the federal tax system to achieve some
social-engineering function, however, is a different story,82 and that is the
source of a good deal of policy debate. Because the federal tax system is
one of the federal government's most powerful tools, regulatory and re-
distributive policies are absolutely pervasive in the federal tax system.
A. Typical Policy Debate: Home-Mortgage Interest Deduction
To understand the nature of a tax policy debate from a sociological
perspective, let's begin with a familiar example: the income tax deduc-
72. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
73. See id.
74. See 26 U.S.C. § 2002.
75. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001.
76. See 26 U.S.C. § 2055 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (charitable deduction); 26 U.S.C. § 2056
(2006) (marital deduction).
77. See sources cited supra note 76.
78. 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493,
1493 (2000).
81. Avi-Yonah, supra note I1.
82. See id.
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tion allowed for home-mortgage interest. Few people seriously debate
the fundamental legitimacy of the federal income tax as a means for rais-
ing government revenue. Rather, the major arguments surround the so-
cial engineering aspects of the tax. Congress often expresses a redistribu-
tive or regulatory goal in the form of a deduction or credit, which
amounts to a government expenditure promoting the activity.
The home-mortgage interest tax deduction is an example most
Americans will understand and is a good illustration of this idea. The
IRC allows individual taxpayers to deduct the interest paid on their home
mortgage from their gross income. As a deduction, this aspect of the
federal income tax does not raise revenue. Rather, its main goals relate to
taxation's other two purposes: redistribution and regulation. The deduc-
tion is redistributive because it amounts to a governmental expenditure
84aimed at assisting taxpayers in acquiring property. This would help
taxpayers literally buy in to the American dream of home ownership.
The deduction is regulatory because it supposedly "steer[s] private sector
activity in the directions desired by government[]."8 In theory, home
ownership results in many societal economic benefits; therefore, our
government seeks to incentivize ownership through this deduction.87
After the housing market collapse, some commentators questioned
the wisdom of this incredibly popular deduction. 8 Opponents of the de-
duction argue that it incentivized overinvestment in housing, which con-
tributed to the collapse in the housing market. 89 Moreover, the benefits of
the deduction increase with the taxpayer's income and the size of his
mortgage, prompting opponents to characterize it as "the most inequita-
ble and inefficient provision in the Internal Revenue Code." 90 Both sides
of this argument have merit.91 But, repeal is very unlikely: this deduction
is incredibly popular. Naturally, many Americans support the deductions
for which they are eligible. But it is more than that. Knowing what we do
about issue framing, that is unsurprising. Proponents framed their argu-
ment in terms of promoting the "American dream," and this dream drew
on a number of core values. The opposition, in contrast, primarily frames
83. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h) (2006).
84. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1352-53 (2000).
85. See Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and
Effect, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33, 51-52 (2009); see also Mann, supra note 84, at 1348-50; Ben
Steverman, A Taxing Debate: The Mortgage-Interest Deduction, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2011,
9:13AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-17/a-taxing-debate-the-mortgage-interest-
deduction.html.
86. Avi-Yonah, supra note 11.
87. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 84, at 1354 (discussing various arguments that homeowner-
ship improves society and the economy).
88. See, e.g., Hardaway, supra note 85, at 33; Steverman, supra note 85.
89. See, e.g., Hardaway, supra note 85, at 46; Steverman, supra note 85.
90. Steverman, supra note 85 (quoting Dennis J. Ventry Jr., a tax law specialist from the
University of California Davis School of Law); see also Hardaway, supra note 85, at 50-51.
91. See Mann, supra note 84, at 1353.
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its argument in terms of practicality and efficiency-values which may
rank lower in many Americans' value hierarchies. And, perhaps more
importantly, the opposition has not attained a significant level of media
saturation compared to proponents. As a result, many Americans are
likely unfamiliar with the opposition's frame.92
B. Atypical Policy Debate: The Federal Estate Tax
The federal estate tax, and by extension the federal gift tax and gen-
eration-skipping transfer tax, is an example of this type of debate taken
to the extreme. Unlike other tax policy debates, the extreme positions are
expressed not only by academics, but also by widely recognized public
figures, as illustrated by your pop quiz. And their positions are truly ex-
treme. Given what we know about sociology, issue framing, and public
opinion, their positions are problematic and irresponsible. Rather than
challenging a single aspect of the overall estate tax system, like a specific
credit or deduction, opponents advocate eliminating the tax in its entire-
ty.9 3 And some proponents go so far as to advocate using it to entirely
eliminate inherited wealth. 94 Other proponents would keep the tax re-
gardless of actual revenue need.
For that reason, this debate is inherently different from other tax
policy debates. The debate concerning the redistributive and regulatory
policies of the home-mortgage interest deduction, for instance, rarely
results in calls for repeal of the federal income tax in its entirety. That
debate, and similar debates, focuses on the legitimacy of the policy ad-
vanced and the effectiveness of the IRC in promoting the policy. The
estate tax debate, however, is full of extremists and particularly plagued
by misleading rhetoric framed in terms of core American values. Oppo-
nents are willing to fully abandon a constitutional source of federal reve-
nue, during a time when that revenue is badly needed, because of the
social engineering goals of the tax. Some proponents support the social
aspects of the tax so passionately that they would keep the tax even dur-
ing times of government surplus. And these arguments are particularly
infuriating when we consider that in its century-long existence, the mod-
ern estate tax has never actually accomplished its purported goal of regu-
lating inherited wealth.
Your pop quiz illustrates the current debate and the fundamental fal-
lacies it perpetuates. Both sides frame the debate in terms of fundamental
American values. The values they point to are contradictory. To propo-
92. See Brewer, supra note 5.
93. See, e.g., Does the Death Tax Have a Date with the Grim Reaper?, LIFEHEALTHPRO
(Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.1ifehealthpro.com/2012/03/01/does-the-death-tax-have-a-date-with-the-
gnm-reape.
94. See Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 72-73 (1990).
95. See DANIEL MILLER, JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., THE ECONOMICS OF THE
ESTATE TAx 5-6 (1999).
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nents, the estate tax ensures the core American values of democracy and
equality of opportunity by taking wealth out of the hands of the richest
Americans and returning it back into society. 9 6 The redistribution fur-
thers democracy by ensuring equality of opportunity." It ensures that no
one starts life on better footing simply by winning the "parent lottery."
These are emotionally powerful arguments supported by few facts. For
instance, consider Warren Buffett's argument: "Dynastic wealth, the
enemy of a meritocracy, is on the rise. Equality of opportunity has been
on the decline.. . . A progressive and meaningful estate tax is needed to
curb the movement of a democracy toward plutocracy., 98 Recent reports
do seem to support a part of Buffett's argument-that is, that America's
wealth is concentrated in the hands of relatively few Americans.9 9 Fur-
thermore, excessive concentrations of wealth do result in very real social
harms and tend to undermine our values of equality and democracy. 00
However, very little, if any, evidence indicates this situation directly
results from inherited wealth.io' Although Buffett and others correctly
identify a potential problem, little evidence supports the argument that
the estate tax is an appropriate or even effective remedy to that prob-
lem. 102 Despite its existence for nearly 100 years, "[n]o one knows
whether the estate tax minimizes concentrations of wealth." 03 In truth,
the modern problem of wealth inequalities more likely stems from prob-
lems with our economic system, not our political system.'0
The quotation from Bill Gates Sr. takes a slightly different approach
by arguing that those Americans who financially benefit the most during
life owe a debt to this country. o Gates is appealing, in part, to our hu-
manitarian values. He is also appealing to our equality values. To Gates
and other proponents, our core American values enabled their families to
achieve such great success, and as a result, those who benefit the most
from American society owe society a debt for that success. In Gates's
words: "Society has a just claim on our fortunes and that claim goes by
the name estate tax."' 06 However, that is merely political rhetoric.'o7 Alt-
hough wealthy Americans might have some moral obligation to give
96. See Drawbaugh, supra note 1.
97. See id
98. Id. (quoting Warren Buffett).
99. See Income Distribution: Poor, Rich, and Richest, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2011,
12:53PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/25/income-distribution-in
2008 n 1030201.html.
100. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 13.
101. See id.
102. See id at 14.
103. Id.
104. See e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 831-
33 (2001).
105. See Gates, supra note 4.
106. Id.
107. Cf William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, Rhetoric and Economics in the Estate Tax Debate,
54 NAT'L TAx J. 613,623-24 (2001).
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back to society, this does not necessarily mean Americans should have a
legal obligation to do so. Moreover, it is unclear whether the estate tax,
or any tax for that matter, is an appropriate, effective, or efficient mecha-
nism for compelling compliance with that obligation. In fact, history
* 108indicates the contrary is true.
Arguments made by opponents of the tax are equally flawed. To
opponents, the estate tax is antithetical to many of our core American
values, including achievement/success, activity/work, and material com-
fort. The estate tax punishes achievement and success by taxing income
that has already been taxed once during life. Similarly, the estate tax pre-
vents activity and work by harming family farms and businesses. Again,
these are emotionally powerful arguments. But they are also arguments
unsupported by the facts. Both Mitt Romney and George W. Bush make
the double-taxation argument in your pop quiz. That argument is flawed
in some respects and an oversimplification in others. The federal tax sys-
tem taxes taxpayers, not assets, and "[i]t is a fact that money used to
make bequests ... may be taxed more than once." 09 In truth, many as-
sets in our economy are subject to multiple layers of tax, of which the
estate tax is only one." 0 Nothing is inherently unfair about that outcome.
On the flip side, many assets taxed at death were never taxed by the in-
come tax.'' And, if they were taxed, they were likely taxed at preferen-
tial capital gains rates.112
The quote from former President Bush reflects the other prominent
argument made by opponents: the estate tax "hurt[s] the source of most
new jobs in this country-America's small business and farms."" 3 The
family-farm-and-small-business argument invokes another aspect of the
American dream: work and activity should be rewarded, not punished.
We should not impose burdens on those job creators. By framing the
issue this way, opponents make an incredibly powerful argument, partic-
ularly in a struggling economy when people tend to place a high value on
their own immediate job security. At its core, this argument supposedly
reflects the concern that some business owners may lack the cash liquidi-
ty at death to pay the estate tax without having to sell an interest in their
business.114 As a result, opponents contend, hard work is punished, busi-
nesses are destroyed, and jobs are lost. But the facts do not support this
argument."' Quite simply, the contention that the estate tax destroys
108. See infra Part V.
109. Gale & Slemrod, supra note 107, at 624.
110. Id. at 624-25.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Trull, supra note 3 (quoting George W. Bush).
114. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 17.
115. See id. at 17-18; see also Gale & Slemrod, supra note 107, at 618; Robert Frank, Does the
Estate Tax Hurt Farmers and Family Businesses?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2010, 11:51AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2010/12/16/does-the-estate-tax-hurt-farmers-and-family-businesses/.
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family farms and small businesses is a myth.' 16 Moreover, the IRC itself
provides many accommodations aimed at alleviating harsh results of this
largely illusory problem.1 17
V. VIEWING THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAx
THROUGH A SOCIOLOGY LENS
The issue framing in the current federal estate tax debate is toxic
and irresponsible. In a time of national exigency, when revenue is des-
perately needed, the federal estate tax has the potential to provide a safe-
ty net. History shows us that potential. But history also shows us where
we went wrong. Attaching a social policy to the tax in its entirety, rather
than one credit or deduction, rendered that safety net unusable. The so-
cial policy placed fundamental and deeply entrenched American values
in irreconcilable conflict with each other. Moreover, history shows us
that the manner in which the debate is presently framed no longer makes
sense, if it ever did. Proponents frame the issue in terms that made sense
during colonial and revolutionary times. The economic landscape of our
country has obviously changed dramatically since those days. As a result,
this argument is no longer applicable. Opponents frame the issue in the
manner outlined by Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon in the 1920s. His
positions were largely motivated by a single unique case, the Estate of
Frick. His positions were not really supported by the facts when he made
them nearly 100 years ago. They remain equally unsupportable today.
Yet, because both sides framed the issue so powerfully in terms of core
American values, the debate continued along the same lines relatively
unaltered. Enough is enough. The time has come to reframe the issue in
terms that are actually supported by facts.
A. Revolutionary Core American Values and Politics
Many of our core American values developed as a result of the
shared experiences of colonial and revolutionary Americans, and that is
particularly true of the values commonly seen in the federal estate tax
debate. Williams explained that from a historical standpoint, our values
developed "out of religious tradition, frontier experience, ceaseless
change, vast opportunity, and fluid social structure."' 18 For instance, ac-
tivity and work were "required for group survival along the moving fron-
tier from the first settlements until the continent had been won.""'9 The
Protestant religious tradition supported this value, viewing successful
work and activity as a "sign of grace." 20 Furthermore, the bulk of Amer-
ica's early population originated from the working classes in Europe and
116. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 17-18; see also David Cay Johnston, Talk of Lost
Fanns Reflects Muddle ofEstate Tax Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,2001, at Al.
117. wlLLBANKS, supra note 41, at 18.
118. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 458-59 (citation omitted).




Britain.'12 These same factors resulted in the emergence of equality of
opportunity as a core value. Most colonists, being from middle- and low-
er-class origins, expressly rejected the class distinctions of Britain and
Europe.122 As Williams observed, "Mass accessibility to abundant re-
sources made it seem possible for 'anyone to become a king on his own'
and thus helped to dissolve old hierarchies and social forms through
movement, acquisition, and independence."' 23 The value of equality of
opportunity was further made a part of our culture through "the deeply
individualistic tendencies in Protestantism." 24
These same factors shaped early American views on economics and
politics. Revolutionary leaders were deeply concerned about the appro-
priate distribution of wealth and wanted to ensure equitable, but not nec-
essarily equal, distribution.125 To these leaders, appropriate wealth distri-
bution could only be attained through appropriate political structures.
Given the revolutionaries' firsthand experience with the European and
British class structures and monarchies, their concerns and beliefs were
understandable. Political institutions had enabled and maintained these
class distinctions. The decision to form a republic government was, in
many ways, truly revolutionary. Americans understood that "if property
were concentrated in the hands of a few in a republic, those few would
use their wealth to control other citizens, seize political power, and warp
the republic into an oligarchy." 26 In the view of these early Americans,
the political systems of Europe and Britain were the source of inequity.127
The solution, in their minds, rested on the rejection of those political
institutions. Specifically, they had to reject the political institutions that
had enabled and maintained the aristocracy.
To the revolutionaries, appropriate wealth distribution depended on
adopting a political system that utilized the labor theory of property, as
epitomized by John Locke. Under this theory, "only an individual's labor
created property, and therefore the individual had sole right to possession
and disposition of that property." 2 8 "[P]roperty was the just reward of
those who toiled" under this view.129 Wealth achieved in a manner con-
sistent with the American values of work and activity was acceptable and






126. James L. Huston, The American Revolutionaries, the Political Economy of Aristocracy,
and the American Concept of the Distribution of Wealth, 1765-1900, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 1079, 1080
(1993).
127. Id. at 1103-04.
128. Id. at 1081.
129. Id.
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Britain, was the enemy of an appropriate distribution of wealth. 3 0 Given
that mindset, the evolution of American inheritance laws is unsurprising.
B. Early American Inheritance Law and Policy
The origins of the federal estate tax, and the ensuing debate, are tied
to the evolution of American inheritance laws. Early Americans relied
heavily on English law in designing their own legal systems. The case of
inheritance laws, however, was complicated by America's newly formed
values, which were distinct from those of Britain.' 3' It was also compli-
cated by America's desire to eradicate the political institutions that had
enabled the aristocracy. From a philosophical standpoint, two views of
inheritance were popular at the time. America could view the right to
transfer property at death as a natural right or as a civil right, philoso-
phies advocated by John Locke and William Blackstone, respectively.' 3 2
Both men, of course, were influential in shaping American law.
John Locke believed that men possessed certain inalienable, natural
rights, including life, liberty, and property.133 By extension, Locke con-
tended that inheritance was similarly a natural right belonging to chil-
dren.' 3 4 This right, as Locke explained, went far beyond merely ensuring
a decedent's children did not end up destitute.
For children being by the course of nature born weak and unable to
provide for themselves, they have by the appointment of God him-
self, who hath thus ordered the course of nature, a right to be nour-
ished and maintained by their parents; nay, a right not only to a bare
subsistence, but to the conveniences and comforts of life as far as the
conditions of their parents can afford it.135
As a natural right, the right to inheritance was inalienable and could not
be altered by law.
On the other hand, Blackstone took the position that inheritance was
merely a civil right.
The right of inheritance, or descent to the children and relations of
the deceased, seems to have been allowed much earlier than the right
of devising by testament. We are apt to conceive at first view that it
has nature on its side; yet we often mistake for nature what we find
established by long and inveterate custom. It is certainly a wise and
effectual, but clearly a political, establishment; since the permanent
130. See id.
131. See Repetti, supra note 104, at 831.
132. Id. at 828-29.
133. Robert R. Baugh, American Values: The Ties that Bind, 112 EDUC. 217, 221 (2001).




right of property, vested in the ancestor himself, was no natural, but
merely a civil, right.136
Blackstone acknowledged that it was customary in many countries to
leave property to your immediate family at your death.137 However, in
Blackstone's view, the fact that a decedent's family and children tended
to be the recipients of his property did not mean that they were entitled to
it as a matter of natural law.
America, ostensibly at least, adopted Blackstone's view of inher-
itance as a civil right.'3 8 Acceptance of that view had important conse-
quences. As a civil right, inheritance was not necessarily a right that
would later be protected by the Constitution.139 As a civil, rather than a
natural, right, government possessed a theoretically unlimited ability to
regulate inheritances.140 As one observer noted:
A right which exists solely by the creative act of the law can, of
course, be taken away by law, or it can be limited or modified in any
way which seems desirable. If the government should take the half or
whole of every inheritance by its taxing power, no natural right
would be violated.141
However, Americans probably never fully bought in to Blackstone's
approach followed to its natural conclusion-that is, being able to trans-
fer property at death is merely a privilege that government grants and that
government can take away. That view would ultimately prove incon-
sistent with American values.
To colonial and revolutionary Americans, however, the civil-rights-
versus-natural-rights debate was probably less important than the actual
enactment of positive law. Although Americans accepted Blackstone's
underlying theory of inheritance, they soon rejected the English law of
inheritance as memorialized by Blackstone.142 English inheritance law in
the time of Blackstone still maintained many aspects of its own compli-
cated feudal past.143 Eighteenth-century English inheritance law provided
for the disposition of a decedent's property either pursuant to a will or, in
the absence of a will, by the law of intestacy. Progressive in some re-
spects, feudal in others, "[t]he law controlling both testamentary and
136. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 (photo. reprint
2006) (1766).
137. See id. at l1-12.
138. See Ascher, supra note 94, at 77-78.
139. See id. at 84.
140. See id at 78.
141. The Federal Inheritance Tax, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 19, 1909, at 10.
142. See Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolu-
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intestate succession was, to modem eyes, a frightfully complicated me-
lange of half-modernized medievalisms."l 4 5
Englishmen enjoyed fairly expansive freedom to dispose of proper-
ty by will in whatever manner they deemed fit.146 This was, in some re-
spects, a departure from England's feudal past. However, some feudal
practices remained. For instance, the doctrine of entail, a remnant of feu-
dal England, allowed the testator to prevent certain beneficiaries from
alienating the real property bequeathed to them, thus allowing the testa-
tor to continue controlling property from the grave.147 The intestate
scheme of property distribution showed even more aspects of feudal ide-
ology. Primogeniture was the default intestacy scheme.14 8 If a decedent
died intestate, his eldest son inherited his real estate to the exclusion of
other children.14 9 The decedent's personal property was distributed
among his children and his surviving spouse.150
Both primogeniture and entail were critical to establishing and
maintaining a landed aristocracy in England. To revolutionary Ameri-
cans, these practices "were among the most important props of aristocrat-
ic society and generators of inequality."'' Initially, these practices con-
tinued in Colonial America.152 By the end of the Revolution, however,
virtually all of the colonies expressly rejected primogeniture and en-
tail.' At the time, Americans saw the abolition of primogeniture and
entail "as one of the revolution's greatest achievements and guarantors of
republican equality."' 54 Revolutionary Americans knew from their own
British and European experiences that large inheritances prohibited elec-
tive representative government.'55 Money is power and large accumula-
tions of money via inheritance prevented men from having equal oppor-
tunity to participate in government.156 Thus, Revolutionary Americans
expressly rejected practices such as primogeniture and entail, which
served mainly to preserve inherited wealth. Moreover, these English
practices had "furnished the principle that defined the succession to the
Crown and the peerage."' 57 These were precisely the institutions Ameri-
cans sought to eradicate.






151. Huston, supra note 126, at 1090.
152. Katz, supra note 142, at 10-11.
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Looking to break with English tradition and embracing the new
"American" values, Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson were two of the
most vocal opponents of inherited wealth at the time.158 Both men framed
the issue in terms of core American values. These frames remain rela-
tively unaltered in the modern federal estate tax debate-a debate for
which they are no longer well suited. Thomas Jefferson argued that in-
herited wealth led to an "artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and
birth, without either talent or virtue."' 59 Paine similarly viewed inher-
itance as a possible threat to representative government.
To the evil of monarchy we have added that of hereditary succession;
and as the first is a degradation and lessening of ourselves, so the
second, claimed as a matter of right, is an insult and an imposition on
posterity. For all men being originally equals, no one by birth could
have a right to set up his own family in perpetual preference to all
others for ever, and through himself might deserve some decent de-
gree of honors of his contemporaries, yet his descendants might be
far too unworthy to inherit them. 160
Both Paine and Jefferson presented various ideas for eliminating
and preventing the perceived injustices perpetuated by English inher-
itance practices.16' They advocated for abolishing entail and primogeni-
ture.16 2 They proposed more egalitarian schemes of intestacy that divided
property among all children, or at least all male children, equally.163
These propositions found their way into positive law. But Paine and Jef-
ferson went further. Viewing inheritance as a merely civil right, both
men suggested that government could limit the ability of any man to in-
herit a vast fortune.M For instance, Paine proposed a progressive inher-
itance tax that would limit the amount of wealth that could be inherited
by any individual.165 Under Paine's proposal, the marginal tax rates rose
to 100% on the largest estates, thereby prohibiting the inheritance of
wealth beyond a certain predetermined point.'6 6 Paine and Jefferson
painted their proposals as breaking from the English traditions of monar-
chy and aristocracy. Rather, their proposals promoted freedom and
equality of opportunity. It is easy to see why these arguments were fairly
well received. They appealed to the American values most prevalent at
the time.
158. See Repetti, supra note 104, at 830-31.
159. Alica Lerud, Note, Looking to the Past in Planning for the Future: Does the Modern
Estate Tax Fit Within the Ideals of the Founding Fathers?, 6 NEv. L.L 516, 538 (2005).
160. Id.
161. See id.; see also Katz, supra note 142, at 12-13.
162. See Lerud, supra note 159.
163. Id. at 538-39.
164. See id.




C. Early Federal Death Taxes
Early federal estate and inheritance taxes had little, if anything, to
do with promoting any social policies related to inherited wealth. These
taxes were enacted with the rather modest goal of generating needed
revenue during times of war or crisis.1 67 The American experience with
taxing property transfers taking place at death officially began with the
Stamp Act of July 6, 1797.168 Despite its stated policy of neutrality, the
United States was increasingly impacted by the unrest in Europe stem-
ming from the French Revolution, which had begun some years earli-
er.16 9 The various international tensions prompted Congress to improve
and expand the American naval forces. 170 To raise the necessary revenue
for this naval development, Congress enacted a system of stamp duties,
which included certain stamp duties relating to death and probate.17 1
Specifically, the 1797 Stamp Act required the purchase and use of feder-
al stamps in connection with various estate-related legal documents such
as inventories, receipts for legacies, probates of wills, and letters of ad-
ministration.172 Rates were fairly modest, and shares of the estate passing
to surviving wives, children, or grandchildren were exempt.17 3 Eventual-
ly, the international tensions abated and with them the need for additional
revenue. Congress repealed the 1797 Stamp Act in 1802.174
Americans did not see this sort of federal tax again until the Civil
War, some sixty years later. Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1862 in
order to raise the additional funds necessitated by the Civil War.17 5 The
Revenue Act of 1862 included a federal stamp tax on the probate of wills
and letters of administration, much like the prior Stamp Act.17 6 However,
the new tax imposed an inheritance tax on the receipt of personal proper-
ty rather than a stamp tax.177 Like most inheritance taxes, the 1862 tax
consisted of graduated rates depending on the closeness in the familial
relationship between the decedent and the recipient of the property.7
Once again, the rates were fairly modest.17 9 Pursuant to the Revenue Act
167. See Lerud, supra note 159, at 517.
168. See JOHN R. LUCKEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A HISTORY OF FEDERAL ESTATE, GIFT,
AND GENERATION-SKIPPING TAXES 2 (2005); Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate
Tax, 11 TAx L. REV. 223, 225 (1956).
169. See LUCKEY, supra note 168.
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of 1864, Congress increased the inheritance tax rates and included the
transfer of real property within the scope of the inheritance tax.'s After
the war, Congress quickly repealed these taxes.' 8'
Along with the Spanish-American War came the re-emergence of
federal taxes on transfers of property at death. These taxes were still not
aimed at preventing inherited wealth. Congress passed the War Revenue
Act of 1898, again with the simple goal of financing a war.' 8 2 The 1898
Act included a tax on the transfer of personal property at death."s As
with prior incarnations of federal transfer taxes, the 1898 tax exempted
transfers to surviving spouses.184 Rates depended on both the size of the
estate and the degree of familial relationship between the decedent and
the beneficiary, resulting in a tax with characteristics of both an inher-
itance tax and an estate tax.'85 Once again, Congress repealed the tax
shortly after the end of the war.'86
These first few incarnations of federal inheritance taxes were pri-
marily, if not exclusively, motivated by the need for revenue. 87 Alt-
hough the election to impose an inheritance tax rather than an estate tax
could be indicative of some underlying social policy, it does not appear
that much thought was given to any social policy at the time.' Rather,
the taxes quite simply existed to raise revenue in a manner that would not
place any undue hardship on taxpayers. The taxes were relatively uncon-
troversial, and most people assumed that death taxes would only be used
in times of exigency.189
D. Rise of the Manufacturing Aristocracy and an Era of Change
By the late 1800s, America's economic landscape had changed sig-
nificantly.' 90 By that point, achievement and success-particularly secu-
lar occupational achievement and success-were thoroughly entrenched
in the American value system.191 For the first time, however, Americans
faced a conflict between those values and the equally fundamental value
of equality of opportunity.19 2 Rejecting the economic and social restraints
faced in Britain and Europe "could only lead under the historical circum-
stances to the emergence of what [Tocqueville] called a manufacturing
180. Under the 1864 Act, rates ranged from 1% to 6%. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 120.
183. Lerud, supra note 159, at 523.
184. Id. at 524.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 525.
187. Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 226.
188. Id.
189. See id.; see also LUCKEY, supra note 168, at 3.
190. Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 226.
191. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 454.
192. Id. at 473.
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aristocracy."l 9 3 The era of the robber barons laid the groundwork for a
major, unavoidable, and continuing tension between American values.
The Industrial Revolution and the transforming economy changed
the concentration of wealth in America in measurable ways by the late
nineteenth century. Americans saw vast amounts of wealth become con-
centrated in the hands of a few industrialists.194 This "manufacturing
aristocracy" presented a dilemma. On the one hand, Americans embraced
the "rags to riches" stories embodied by these elite few.' 95 As Williams
observed, "The 'success story' and the respect accorded to the self-made
man are distinctly American, if anything is."1 96 Therefore, the members
of this manufacturing aristocracy embodied the upward mobility that was
part of the promised American dream.197 1Through hard work, anyone
could achieve great success.
On the other hand, the growing wealth inequities revived some of
the concerns expressed by Jefferson and Paine regarding inherited
wealth. Many Americans continued to believe that inherited wealth ran
afoul of the principle of equality of opportunity because it gave some
individuals a decided advantage due simply to parentage.'9 8 The econom-
ics seemed to support the concern that the dangers of inherited wealth
would be soon realized. By the late 1800s, wealth inequality reached a
high point. In the period between 1774 and 1900, the concentration of the
country's total wealth in the hands of the richest 1% of Americans rose
dramatically: from 15% in 1774; to 29% in 1860; to 50% by 1900.'99
Thus, by 1900, Americans saw great disparities between the richest
Americans and the poorest-and even between the richest Americans
and everyone else.
Americans were conflicted. To many, the promise of America and
capitalism was the potential for upward mobility. The industry barons of
the era embodied this dream. But whether the descendants of these bar-
ons should inherit these vast fortunes was another story. The Jefferson
and Paine position re-emerged, this time taking aim at the American
manufacturing aristocrats. Jefferson and Paine argued against the evils of
a political system that had enabled European and British aristocrats to
maintain their power. That political system prevented non-aristocrats
from participating in the government, economy, and society. Thus, the
Jefferson-Paine argument seemed well founded at the time of the Revo-
193. Id. at 474.
194. J. Bradford DeLong, A History of Bequests in the United States, in DEATH AND DOLLARS:
THE ROLE OF GIFTS AND BEQUESTS IN AMERICA 33, 35 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sunddn eds.,
Brookings Institution Press 2003).
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lution. To avoid exclusively aristocratic participation, America had to
design a political system that would not enable an aristocracy. By the
1900s, Americans saw a new "aristocracy" formed on their own soil, and
they used the same revolutionary-era arguments to advocate political
changes aimed at suppressing it. But times had changed.
The wealth disparity seen during the turn of the century had little, if
anything, to do with inherited wealth. The rather extreme wealth dispari-
ties resulted from capitalism, industry, and the changing economic land-
scape of America. There is scant data to support the assertion that these
numbers resulted from inherited wealth. 2 00 Rather, this era was "witness
to an unprecedented number of mergers in the manufacturing sector of
the economy, fueled by the development of a new form of corporate
ownership, the holding company." 2 0' These economic changes "resulted
in the concentration of wealth in a relatively small number of powerful
companies and ... the businessmen who headed them." 2 02 An estate tax
would not likely do anything to remedy this wealth-disparity problem. 203
Yet, progressives argued that an estate tax was essential to remedy the
* . 204inequity. Proponents of the tax framed the issue in terms of core
American values, and the public found that framing irresistible.
One of the prominent voices in the growing movement to prevent
inherited wealth was Andrew Carnegie. In his influential essay, Wealth,
Carnegie epitomized the country's uncomfortable position with its new
economic landscape.205 On the one hand, Carnegie championed industry
and wealth accumulation.
The price which society pays for the law of competition, like the
price it pays for cheap comforts and luxuries, is also great; but the
advantages of this law are also greater still, for it is to this law that
we owe our wonderful material development, which brings improved
conditions in its train. . . .We accept and welcome, therefore, as con-
ditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of
environment, the concentration of business, industrial and commer-
cial, in the hands of a few, and the law of competition between these,
as being not only beneficial, but essential for the future progress of
the race.206
To Carnegie and others, lifetime wealth accumulation was their just
reward for great talent: "That this talent for organization and manage-
ment is rare among men is proved by the fact that it invariably secures
for its possessor enormous rewards, no matter where or under what laws
200. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 13.
201. Jacobson et al., supra note 179, at 120.
202. Id.
203. See infra Part VI.
204. Jacobson et al., supra note 179, at 120.
205. Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REV. 653, 653 (1889).
206. Id. at 655.
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or conditions."207 On the other hand, with this great wealth and power,
came a duty to dispose of that wealth in a manner that benefitted society
as a whole. Those who benefitted most from living in America, like Car-
negie, owed the country the largest debt. To Carnegie, that did not mean
leaving it to heirs who had done nothing to earn it.2 08 His sentiments ech-
oed those of Paine and Jefferson. Simply allowing a child to inherit the
wealth would cause irreparable harm to society.
Why should men leave great fortunes to their children? If this is done
from affection, is it not misguided affection? Observation teaches
that, generally speaking, it is not well for the children that they
should be so burdened. Neither is it well for the state. Beyond provid-
ing for the wife and daughters moderate sources of income, and very
moderate allowances indeed, if any, for the sons, men may well hesi-
tate, for it is no longer questionable that great sums bequeathed of-
tener work more for the injury than for the good of the recipients.
Wise men will soon conclude that, for the best interests of the mem-
bers of their families and of the state, such bequests are an improper
use of their means.209
210
The movement against inherited wealth found other supporters.
However, it was still some time before the policy made its way into a
serious political debate.
E. Enactment of the "Modern" Estate Tax
By the turn of the century, America embarked upon the beginning
of several decades of sweeping social and political change. The great
disparity in the concentration of wealth in America and the resulting con-
flict in fundamental American values provided the political will to make
these changes. Much like the recent "Occupy" protestors, late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century reformers sought a variety of changes aimed
at evening the playing field. The various reform movements largely re-
flected the attempt by the "little man" to impose some limits on the pow-
er of "big business." 2 11 The little man asked the government to step in
and ensure equality of opportunity. However, some perceived this as an
assault on achievement, success, and individualism. Although changes
were widely popular, opposition began to grow.
Reformers sought to regulate corrupt corporations, eradicate the
corrupting influences of alcohol and brothels, and break up large concen-
trations of wealth. Activists looked to the government as a mechanism
for enforcing social change, rather than as an impediment to it. Congress
established the Federal Trade Commission and passed the Clayton Anti-
207. Id.
208. Id. at 658.
209. Id.
210. See Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 235.
211. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 478.
[Vol. 90:1202
DEATH TAX DEBATE
trust Act. In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act and the
Meat Inspection Act. In 1911, the Supreme Court used the 1890 Sherman
Antitrust Act to break up Standard Oil. In 1913, the Sixteenth Amend-
ment was ratified, allowing the federal government to impose an income
tax. These economic changes had a meaningful impact on America's
economic landscape.
Against this backdrop of change, talk soon turned to using a federal
tax in order to restrict inherited wealth. The proponents framed the ar-
gument in the same manner as did Paine and Jefferson, a frame that had
wide popular appeal but was now inherently flawed. In 1906, President
Theodore Roosevelt proposed
the adoption of some such scheme as that of a progressive tax on all
fortunes, beyond a certain amount, either given in life or devised or
bequeathed upon death to any individual-a tax so framed as to put it
out of the power of the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to
hand on more than a certain amount to any one individual. 212
Echoing Jefferson and Paine, Roosevelt continued to promote a tax to
regulate inheritances. In his 1907 State of the Union Address, Roosevelt
again framed the tax in terms of equality of opportunity.
The Government has the absolute right to decide as to the terms upon
which a man shall receive a bequest or devise from another, and this
point in the devolution of property is especially appropriate for the
imposition of a tax.
... A heavy progressive tax upon a very large fortune is in no way
such a tax upon thrift or industry as a like would be on a small for-
tune. No advantage comes either to the country as a whole or to the
individuals inheriting the money by permitting the transmission in
their entirety of the enormous fortunes which would be affected by
such a tax; and as an incident to its function of revenue raising, such
a tax would help to preserve a measurable equality of opportunity for
the people of the generations growing to manhood.213
This equality of opportunity frame caught on. In 1912, the Progres-
sive Party announced: "We believe in a graduated inheritance tax as a
national means of equalizing the holders of property." 2 14 The issue, how-
ever, was not without controversy. The debate generally turned on
whether inheritance taxes should be reserved to state governments.2 15
212. Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 228.
213. Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 3, 1907), in H.R. Doc. No. 60-1, at
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Opponents of the federal tax argued that it would impede the states' abil-
ity to raise much needed revenue.216 Congress twice rejected the imposi-
tion of a federal estate or inheritance tax: once in 1909 and again in
1913.217 But by 1916, things had changed.
Once again, America faced war. The First World War, and the
events surrounding it, naturally caused Americans' value focus to tempo-
rarily shift. President Woodrow Wilson declared that "[t]he world must
be made safe for democracy." 2 18 Making the world safe for democracy
was an expensive proposition. Anticipating that, the Ways and Means
219Committee began investigating how best to raise additional revenue.
The Committee reported, "No civilized nation ... collects so large a part
of its revenues through consumption taxes as does the United States, and
it is conceded by all that such taxes bear most heavily upon those least
able to pay them." 2 20 Thus, the Committee recommended a progressive
estate tax as one of several mechanisms to more fairly raise the needed
221money. Congress agreed and enacted the 1916 Revenue Act, which
imposed a federal estate tax that is largely credited as being the first
"permanent" federal estate tax.222
The 1916 tax shared many features with the current federal estate
tax and is often referred to as the first "modem" estate tax. The tax was
223
designed as an estate tax rather than an inheritance tax. As an estate
tax, the 1916 tax was assessed based on the value of the decedent's estate
224
as opposed to the value of any particular inheritance. Like the current
estate tax, the value of the estate was increased for certain lifetime trans-
fers made in contemplation of death, not intended to take effect at death,
or for inadequate consideration. 225 After taking into account certain ex-
emptions for funeral expenses, administrative expenses, debts, losses,
claims against the estate, and a general $50,000 exemption, the 1916 tax
was levied at progressive rates ranging from 1% to 10%.226
Some members of Congress might have been influenced by the
popular equality of opportunity frame. However, the 1916 tax was not
aimed at regulating inherited wealth. The primary reason Congress en-
acted the tax was the immediate need for additional revenue.227 In fact,
216. Id
217. Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 229.
218. Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress Requesting Declaration of War on Germany (Apr.
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with a maximum rate of 10%, the tax could not impact inherited wealth
in a meaningful way.22 8 Rates increased several times during the course
of World War I, but each time was in response to an increased need for
revenue. 2 29 Some members of congress who voted in favor of increased
rates may also have been looking to regulate inherited wealth, but that
was not the overarching legislative intent. 230 Nor was it the effect of the
estate tax legislation. 2 3 1 As World War I ended, legislators considered
whether to repeal or reduce the federal estate tax.232 Before the 1916 tax,
Americans largely assumed that an estate tax would only be used to raise
the additional revenue needed in times of crisis. 233 Although some politi-
cal groups had advocated using the tax to regulate inherited wealth,234
most Americans probably never viewed that proposal as a serious possi-
bility. In fact, the modem federal tax system was still very much in its
infancy. Congress was just beginning to fully explore its ability to regu-
late the states and their citizens through its taxing and spending powers.
F. Andrew Mellon and the Framing of the Opposition
When Congress reduced but did not repeal the 1916 tax at the con-
clusion of the war, some people began questioning the appropriateness of
the tax, and the modem debate began in full. The tenor of this debate was
different from prior debates. Wealth disparities remained high in the ear-
ly 1920s, and the idea of regulating inherited wealth retained popular
appeal.2 35 If anything, the war had only made the members of the "manu-
facturing aristocracy" even richer.236 Thus, advocates of reform were
237anxious to retain the economic reforms attained during the war. In
1924, Congress actually raised the top rate from 25% to 40%.238 Con-
gress additionally enacted a new gift tax to prevent evasion of estate tax
through inter vivos gifts. 239 Opponents of the tax were outraged.
Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon called the rate increase "nation-
al suicide" 240 and immediately embarked upon a very public campaign to
repeal the tax in its entirety. 241 The estate tax was not Mellon's only ob-
228. See id.
229. LUCKEY, supra note 168, at 6-7; Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 231.
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jective. Congress soon repealed a number of the taxes enacted during the
war, repeals which largely benefitted the wealthy.242
Mellon was instrumental in framing the opposition's argument, and
that frame remains the prominent frame today. Mellon recognized that
when a business owner died, his estate might consist largely of stock in
the business.24 3 Forcing a sale of that stock in order to pay estate taxes
would cause the value of the stock to drop. The problem was described
as follows:
[I]f the estate should consist of corporation shares, then 40 percent of
those would have to be unloaded, perhaps on a market not at the time
prepared to absorb them. There then might not merely be a loss to the
heirs but also an unwarranted harm might be done the company in-
volved by having a large block of stock poured into a nonreceptive
market. Other and quite innocent stockholders might find their hold-
ings depreciated in value merely because the government was getting
out its death due.244
Although this aspect of Mellon's argument seems plausible, many ex-
perts contend that it is fundamentally flawed from a legal standpoint245
and unsupported by economic data.246 Mellon's conflict of interest in the
matter was obvious. Mellon's hatred of estate and inheritance taxes part-
ly resulted from a rather unusual and widely publicized case involving
the death of Mellon's friend, wealthy industrialist Henry Clay Frick.247
The administration of Frick's estate was incredibly complicated for rea-
sons largely unrelated to the federal estate tax. Mellon believed that sell-
ing assets in Frick's estatein order to pay estate taxes unduly flooded the
market with a supply in excess of demand.24 8 Mellon repeatedly pointed
to this highly publicized case in support of his economic theory.249 How-
ever, the decline in value of the assets in Frick's estate after his death
was more likely a result of a depressed national economy than an excess
supply occasioned from a single estate. 25 0
Mellon was not alone in challenging the estate tax, but he did lead
the charge. Mellon grasped the problem with the way proponents framed
the issue.
242. See id; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes
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The social necessity for breaking up large fortunes in this country
does not exist. Very wisely our forefathers declined to implant in this
country the principle of primogeniture under which the eldest son
alone inherited and kept the properties intact. Under our American
law, it is customary for estates to be divided equally among the chil-
dren; and in a few generations any single large fortune is split into
many moderate inheritances. As a usual thing, the continuation of a
single fortune through several generations has been proven to be im-
possible. It is an often quoted saying that "there are three generations
from shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves."
25'
The lasting aspects of Mellon's opposition are those framed by ref-
erence to core American values. Mellon argued that the tax would punish
activity and work.252 It would destroy the value of the property Ameri-
cans worked so hard to earn. 253 It was the enemy of the American dream.
Casting his argument in terms of equality, Mellon argued:
The theory upon which this country was founded is equality of op-
portunity. So long as a man uses his abilities within the bounds of the
moral sense of the community, monetary success is not a crime, but
on the contrary adds to the total wealth of the country and to an in-
crease in the standard of living as a whole. 254
Mellon was aided by the emerging criticisms of Marxism, painting
it as antithetical to American thought, thus playing to our nationalism
values. 255 For instance, Mellon argued that with an inheritance tax of
40%, "it would then be only two or three generations until private own-
ership of property would cease to exist."25 6 "Estate taxes, carried to an
excess, in no way differ from the methods of the revolutionists in Rus-
sia. 
257
In the wake of the Great Depression, however, even Mellon capitu-
lated.258 The Depression reduced income tax revenues while also increas-
ing the need for revenue to finance new projects.259 Faced with that prob-
lem, Mellon himself advocated for an increase in the estate tax rate.260
Although ultimately unsuccessful in repealing the estate tax, Mellon and
his colleagues were successful in framing opposition to the tax in terms
of core American values.
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G. Subsequent Developments
The federal estate tax underwent many changes in the following
years. In anticipation of the Second World War, Congress raised estate
taxes in order to finance military development.261 Congress raised rates
again after America's entry into the war in response to revenue de-
mands.262 Beginning in 1976, the tax underwent major revisions aimed at
modernizing the assessment and collection of taxes.263 In the end, eco-
nomics research supported Mellon's "shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves in
three generations" contention. 264 But that economic reality was lost amid
the political rhetoric of family farms and ensuring equality of opportuni-
ty.
VI. REFRAMING THE ISSUE
The current public federal estate tax debate remains relatively un-
changed. The men in your pop quiz, along with numerous other politi-
cians and public figures, are irresponsible in the way they perpetuate this
debate. Both sides of the argument are based upon "facts" that have not
existed in more than ninety years. Yet America faces the largest wealth
gap it has seen since the 1920s.2 65 That fact will undoubtedly shape poli-
tics and political debate for the next several years. We know from history
that when that situation occurs, the "result has been a political realign-
ment that tilted power and policy at least modestly away from the rich
and big business." 266
The Progressive Era of the 1900s is a prime example of that phe-
nomenon. America moved from an agrarian society to a manufacturing
society, and that change, not inherited wealth, fundamentally altered the
distribution of wealth in this country. The changes in the American
economy were not immediately accompanied by corresponding changes
in law and policy. By the 1920s, the disparity in wealth reached record
levels. 2 67 When that disparity became the focus of popular discourse, the
country was willing to support change. 268 Legislation and policies enact-
ed during the Progressive Era fundamentally changed the relationship
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between government and its citizens. 26 9 This theme has repeated itself
often in our history.270
We are in the midst of that repeated theme again. Our economy no
longer looks like it did in the 1900s or during the Revolution. But the
concentration of wealth and its relationship to democracy remains a con-
cern for many Americans.27 1 Inherited wealth no longer plays a meaning-
ful role in that very legitimate concern. Revolutionary Americans justifi-
ably believed that inherited wealth prevented equal opportunity to partic-
ipate in government because it fostered an elite ruling class of aristo-
crats.272 Eradicating the institutions that had promoted that system was an
important and meaningful decision. By the 1900s, inherited wealth, as
Mellon pointed out, was not the problem. Wealth disparity was high, but
inherited wealth was not the cause. As Tocqueville anticipated, equal
access to participate in the economy without restraint led to the devel-
opment of a "manufacturing aristocracy." Although aimed at redressing
that problem, the federal estate tax was not responsible for the changes
seen in following decades.
A federal estate tax will not affect wealth inequities in the coming
years. Money, and as a result political power, is again concentrated in the
hands of a few. 273 But our economy looks much different from what it
looked like in earlier eras. Today our "aristocrats" look different. They
are not the landed aristocracy or the manufacturing aristocracy of bygone
eras. Rather, today's "aristocrat" is the corporation and the political lob-
byist. 274 Through lobbying efforts, super PACs, 275 and the like, corpora-
tions have an incredible ability to affect politics and legislation, particu-
larly after the landmark Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion276 decision.277 The federal estate tax is ill suited to address those
problems and it is certainly ill suited to affect how much wealth and, in
turn, political power corporations hold.
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That does not mean the estate tax is irrelevant. Many public figures
and politicians will continue to debate the estate tax in the context of
wealth disparity and will continue to utilize the same flawed frames of
the past and they will base their frames in "facts" that no longer exist.
Perpetuating the flawed issue framing of the past century is irresponsible
and destructive because it prevents us from considering the real opportu-
nities afforded by the tax. If properly refrained by both sides of the de-
bate, the estate tax debate could be productive. In the aftermath of war
and economic collapse, America is again in the throes of a financial cri-
sis. The public is at odds as to how or if the government should raise
additional revenue. The federal estate tax, if properly reframed, could
play a meaningful role in that debate.
As Americans, we value efficiency and practicality.27 8 In practice,
that means "seeking the fastest and least costly means of achieving a
goal."2 79 Efficiency and practicality are not always at the top of our per-
sonal or collective value hierarchies-but in the context of budget deci-
sions, they are values that probably should be. Where do we find the
revenue needed to address current government needs? A fast, inexpen-
sive, and effective solution seems ideal.280 When facing the need for ex-
tra revenue in times of war or financial crisis in our early years, we as a
nation turned to federal estate and inheritance taxes.281' These taxes were
fairly modest and applied to a wide array of estates. 2 8 2 They were not
intended to cause social change283 and they did not seem to unduly bur-
den taxpayers. They were effective and practical. These taxes repeatedly
provided a revenue safety net. Perhaps for those reasons, they were ini-
tially uncontroversial. By helping to finance, among other exigencies, the
Civil War, World War I, the New Deal, and World War II, the taxes un-
doubtedly helped America accomplish meaningful and important change.
But the taxes themselves were not the instrument of that change. They
were merely a practical and efficient mechanism for financing that
change.
Not until politicians refrained the estate tax debate as a struggle be-
tween two compelling and irreconcilable American values-values on
which the estate tax really had no bearing-did the tax become contro-
versial. By moving from a tax whose primary goal was to raise revenue
to a tax aimed at battling income inequality by curbing the accumulation
of wealth across generations, we made the tax itself so controversial and
divisive that using it to raise revenue proved challenging. And yet, the
tax did not, and perhaps could not, ever achieve its redistributive and
278. Cerulo, supra note 19, at 352.
279. Id.
280. See Repetti, supra note 80, at 1495.
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regulatory goals of wealth distribution. Nor did the tax cause the litany of
harms alleged by its opponents. Our politics were so shaped by argu-
ments that were improperly framed at the outset that we kept missing the
real potential of the federal estate tax. Rather than considering how best
to use the tax to raise revenue in a manner that is efficient, administrable,
and equitable, the debate centered on issues that are not meaningfully
impacted by the tax. The federal estate tax currently provides a small, but
meaningful, portion of federal revenue. Not only could the tax continue
to do so, but if we reframe the debate in proper terms, we could rational-
ly consider using it to provide an even greater-and much needed-
source of revenue in the future.
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the product of fateful choices during the fin de si6cle-a period of both
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I. INTRODUCTION
In twenty-first century American courts, dysfunctional outcomes
invariably follow the formalistic application of the most salient doctrinal
distinctions. Attempts by legal taxonomists to delineate the boundaries
between contract and tort law are especially ineffectual. Deciding wheth-
er a claim "sounds" in contract or tort would be farcical if not for the
injustice thereby wrought. Courts irregularly determine the obtainable
remedies for legally cognizable injuries based on the way these capri-
cious taxonomic boundaries are drawn. Doctrinal distinctions that de-
monstrably operate poorly unfairly persist.
Tellingly, contemporary challenges arising out of the flawed system
of classification typified by the tort and contract taxa are not the result of
ineluctable progress in the legal system of the United States. To the con-
trary, these classifications are rooted in competing crosscurrents of legal
theory debated both in the United States and England during a period
roughly measured from the mid-nineteenth until the early twentieth cen-
tury (generally, thefin de sijcle).
A burst of intellectual vigor and systemic reform during the fin de
sidcle put at risk and nearly stifled the then-nascent but now familiar
taxonomy of legal claims. Instead, since this period, purported doctrinal
distinctions typified by the tort and contract taxa have become ever more
firmly embedded in the American judicial psyche and legal practice.
Contemporary legal taxonomists uncannily devote considerable en-
ergy to the classification of claims according to fuzzy doctrinal lines that
are often illogical. Their ongoing efforts to fine-tune and thereby ration-
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alize inherently unreliable taxa are rewarded only when an injured party
is denied relief based on invented and often arbitrary taxonomic distinc-
tions. The pursuit of legal taxonomy, as it is presently conceived, is thus
revealed as an inherently insufferable enterprise.
Legal taxonomists cannot justify the imprecise classification of le-
gal claims by claiming that precise classification of legal claims is im-
possible. The fault lies not in the stars. Worse still, contemporary legal
taxonomists tend also to blame jurists and attorneys for misapplying or
failing to understand the incongruous and indefensible classifications
they have devised. Responsibility for the inconsistent classification of
like claims instead falls squarely on the proponents of legal taxa that
cannot be consistently applied by highly trained professionals. If equal
treatment under the law is the essence of what is just, then for the con-
temporary legal taxonomist apparently there must be injustice every-
where to preserve an existing but defective classification of legal claims.
No system based on this unbefitting premise can (or will) long endure.
This Article exposes the dysfunctional role that contemporary legal
taxonomy plays in legal scholarship and practice today, and then ac-
counts for and laments this product of fateful choices during the fin de
sidcle-a period of both great progress and regression in the develop-
ment of the legal system in the United States. This account delivers a
fresh perspective on current legal taxonomy and uncovers an understand-
ing of primary rights and plenary forms of relief proposed during the fin
de sidcle as an alternative to abjure it. The neoteric, rights-based juridical
model presented herein is a better alternative to parsing claims and re-
stricting relief based on the fuzzy contemporary legal taxa and a viable
means to relegate contemporary legal taxonomy to the dustbin of legal
history in which it belongs.
II. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY FAILS TO RELIABLY CLASSIFY
TORT AND CONTRACT CLAMS
As Dean William Prosser noted in 1953, the now-venerated foci of
the civil law canon known as tort and contract were derived from pre-
cisely the same medieval English writs.' Indeed, the contemporary doc-
trinal categories of contract and tort are the product of a relatively recent
advent and did not take root in American courts until the latter half of the
nineteenth century.2 Encrusted now like barnacles, supposed distinctions
1. See WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Torts and Contract, in SELECTED
TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 381 (1953); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Contortions Along the
Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457, 461 (1994) ("Although opposing
philosophies underlie torts and contracts, the two bodies of law exist side-by-side the world over
.... Dean Prosser pointed out in 1954 that the historical relations between common law contract and
tort were not antagonistic and that contract law actually grew from the same writs that lawyers used
for what we now think of as tort claims.").
2. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 161 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995)
("Until the late nineteenth century, the dividing line between 'contract' and 'tort' had never been
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between tort and contract law render almost entirely unrecognizable the
structure of a system better suited to vindicate the violation of primary
rights (a topic to which this Article will turn in Part III). Scraping these
barnacles away reveals a theory of rights and remedies far superior to the
contemporary miasma of indistinct and ambiguous limitations on reme-
dies based on hide-bound doctrinal classifications.
Before turning to a rights-based alternative to contemporary legal
taxonomy, whimsical and wishful thinking on the part of some that all is
well on the border between the law of torts and contracts first must be
dispelled. Some courts and scholars are in denial about the erosion of this
boundary and will hold fast to the fiction that contract law governs ex-
clusively, or at least should govern exclusively, the range of available
remedies arising out of breach of purely consensual obligations. Below,
several examples demonstrate contrariwise that unalloyed doctrinal dis-
tinctions between tort and contract theory are a chimera.
A. A Categorical Muddle: The Failure to Reliably Classify Claims Aris-
ing from the Negligent Performance of Contractual Duties
The negligent performance of a contractual duty presents a particu-
larly thorny problem of doctrinal classification. A perceived need for
such classification arises more often than not when remedies or defenses
sharply drawn .... ); Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1246 (2001)
("[T]he recognition of contract as a fundamental department of substantive law by 1870 did not
entail the acceptance of tort as well."); David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 475 (2010) ("The familiar
doctrinal categories of contract and tort did not exist before the latter half of the nineteenth centu-
ry."); Mark P. Gergen, Negligent Misrepresentation as Contract 16 (Berkeley Program in Law and
Economics, Working Paper Series, 2011), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/lvcoj5x5
("Contract is not written about as a generic category of obligation by common lawyers until the late
18th and early 19th century. As late as 1800, if a lawyer bungled your case, a carrier damaged your
goods, or a farrier bungled in shoeing your horse, and you sought legal redress in an English or
American court, you would not bring an action for negligence, professional malpractice, or breach of
contract. Instead you would bring an action either for assumpsit or for trespass on the case.").
3. Some scholars believe that contmct law reigns supreme within clearly defined boundaries.
See, e.g., William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1224-26 (1994) ("In fact, [the]
Balkanized structure [of tort, property and contract law] reveals that the paradigms of the different
bodies of law are not really coequal. The negligence paradigm takes a back seat. . .. [C]ontract law
embodies the ideology of autonomy and consent and assigns decision-making power to markets.
Sometimes, however, the predicates for the application of contract law are not present, for example,
when disputes arise between noncontracting strangers or when a party to a contract is mentally
incompetent. Thus, we do not need to refer either to another body of law-such as tort law-or to
some extradoctrinal normative system in order to keep contract law from devouring the entire legal
world. Contract law, along with its accompanying prime directive of agreement and consent, sets its
own limits. Tort law waits in the background to step in and resolve the disputes that occur when no
contractual relationship is present. In other words, tort law fills in when, due to contract law's own
rules about its applicability, we do not have the option of using contract law."); Dennis Patterson,
Good Faith in Tort and Contract Law: A Comment, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1994) ("Ever since
it emerged as a distinct body of law, contract law has consistently been under the threat of reabsorp-
tion into tort law. However, despite the persistence of this theme in academic literature, one sees in
the actual work of courts little serious threat to the autonomy of contract. In short, even given the
distinct overlap and occasional congruence, a merger of tort law and contract law appears most
unlikely.").
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that are typically allowed only in an action by one who has been
"wronged" are sought in an action for breach of contract.
A breach of contract, it is oft said, constitutes no legal wrong.4 Ra-
ther, a contract adjusts the volitional relation of autonomous parties, re-
quiring them to "consider" one another only insofar as they have agreed.
As thus conceived, scholars and courts that adhere to rigid doctrinal dis-
tinctions between tort and contract agree that breach of a contractual
obligation gives rise to a claim only by a party to the contract that created
it, and only for those consequential losses that were contemplated by the
parties to the agreement at the time of its formation.5 Thus, a promisor
may breach a contract "efficiently" and without moral opprobrium or
legal penalty.6
Are these legal aphorisms even putatively sound? If a doctor botch-
es a surgery without justification, should it matter whether a contract
with the patient required the doctor to exercise ordinary care? Should the
nature and scope of the liability of a painter contracted to paint a home
turn on whether the painter drips paint on a surface not within an agreed
scope of work? Answering these questions sheds light on two principal
approaches taken by courts struggling to stay within the strictures that
contemporary doctrinal distinctions between tort and contract law im-
pose.
Courts have understood a case involving a doctor's botched surgery
to afford an opportunity to distinguish tort from contract theory based on
the nature of the conduct at issue. The location of the painter's drip has
been understood to afford the opportunity to distinguish tort from con-
tract theory based on the consequence of the conduct at issue. Each of
these approaches is considered below in turn. Each approach is unman-
ageable and thus leads inexorably to a dilution of sought-after, clear doc-
trinal divisions between tort and contract law.
4. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLuM. L.
REv. 1145, 1147 (1970) ("Our system, then, is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent
breach; rather, it is aimed at relief to promisees to redress breach.... [This] adds to the celebrated
freedom to make contracts, a considerable freedom to break them as well.").
5. See, e.g., Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 275 (Cal. 2004) ("A
breach of contract remedy assumes that the parties to a contract can negotiate the risk of loss occa-
sioned by a breach. '[W]hen two parties make a contract, they agree upon the rules and regulations
which will govern their relationship; the risks inherent in the agreement and the likelihood of its
breach. The parties to the contract in essence create a mini-universe for themselves, in which each
voluntarily chooses his contracting partner, each trusts the other's willingness to keep his word and
honor his commitments, and in which they define their respective obligations, rewards and risks.
Under such a scenario, it is appropriate to enforce only such obligations as each party voluntarily
assumed, and to give him only such benefits as he expected to receive; this is the function of contract
law."' (alteration in original) (quoting Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d
454, 461 (Cal. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. See id.; Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1147.
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1. Distinguishing a Tort from a Pure Breach of Contract Based on
the Nature of the Actor's Conduct
Attempts since the fin de si~cle to classify claims against a physi-
cian for avoidable injury to a patient demonstrate an impressive shift in
significant doctrinal distinctions. During the nineteenth century, Ameri-
can courts usually found that a duty to perform with ordinary profession-
al skill and care arose out of a contract to provide medical services. An
"implied in fact" promise to perform medical services competently was
understood not only as an implied in fact term of a physician's contract
with a patient but also as an independently enforceable obligation with-
out regard to a general common law duty of care independent of the con-
tract.
The nascent tort of "medical malpractice" was analytically keyed to
this implied promise by a physician to act competently and skillfully. By
the outset of the twentieth century, courts nearly uniformly recognized
the implied promise by a physician to perform with "reasonable care" to
be indistinguishable from the duty to act with care imposed by operation
of law in negligence actions.9 Pure contract theory could then be under-
stood in these cases as too incompatible with the nature or gravamen of
an action for medical malpractice to allow the hallmarks of contract law
to prevail. Thus, as time passed and experience with this category of cas-
es grew, courts became increasingly reluctant to permit in an action
against a careless physician any resort to the statute of limitations on
contract claims'o and progressively more precautious about attempts to
assert the contractual right to disclaim tort liability in such cases."
7. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Collins, 25 N.W. 632, 633 (Minn. 1885) ("[l1t seems to us clear
that this is an action on the contract. The gist and gravamen is the breach of its terms, which, wheth-
er express or implied, were that these physicians and surgeons would treat the plaintiff with ordinary
professional skill and care. It would have been impossible for plaintiff to state his cause of action
without alleging the contract, for the liability of the defendant arose solely out of it, and not out of
some general common-law duty independent of contract.").
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Miller v. Toles, 150 N.W. 118, 120 (Mich. 1914) ("[T]he implied contract
between the surgeon and patient is ... to use that degree of diligence and skill which is ordinarily
possessed by the average of the members of the profession in similar localities, giving due consid-
eration to the state of the art at the time.... [On] testimony of an expert character tending to show
malpractice, [the jury] should be permitted to draw inferences of negligent conduct on the part of
defendant.").
10. See, e.g., Frankel v. Wolper, 169 N.Y.S. 15, 16-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918) ("The question
is whether this action against a physician is for breach of contract or malpractice. If for the latter, it
is barred by a statute of limitations, whether it arose from lack of requisite skill or negligent exercise
of it. The question is not whether the plaintiff could declare on a contract to cure her, and for the
breach of it recover damages for failure to make the cure. . . . [H]ere the damages alleged are unsuit-
ed to an action on contract, and help to characterize the complaint as one for malpractice and negli-
gence. It is useless to discuss the authorities, as the decision [that the tort statute of limitations ap-
plies] is placed upon the ground that the complaint does not declare on contract.").
11. See, e.g., Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 79-80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (find-
ing that an exculpatory contract executed between the patient and health care providers was no
defense because it was contrary to public policy).
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By the mid-twentieth century, courts forthrightly declared tort theo-
ry de rigueur in cases of medical malpractice. As definitively stated by
the once oft-cited opinion in Kozan v. Comstockl2: "On principle ... we
consider a [medical] malpractice action as tortious in nature whether the
duty grows out of a contractual relation or has no origin in contract."' 3
At present, a cause of action against a physician for careless per-
formance typically sounds solely in tort, and any implied promise to act
with care is considered to be mainly immaterial. 14 Although the physi-
cian-patient relationship is nearly invariably consensual (and accompa-
nied by a myriad of adhesive contractual terms),' 5 most contemporary
American courts will hold a physician to a duty and standard of care that
arises by operation of law (rather than by reason of express or implied
contractual assent). 16
Because a duty of due care imposed by operation of law is consid-
ered to supplant any similar contractual duty, a physician generally may
not avoid liability to a patient in tort for careless performance.' 7 Thus,
with respect to consensual relations between a physician and patient,
contemporary legal taxonomy fails to recognize the principal signet im-
pressed on the contract taxa: judicial deference to the private ordering of
obligations that are voluntarily assumed."
The doctrinal distinctions applicable to breach of a physician's con-
tract have not been universally applied to service contracts generally,
however. The nature of the contracted services is sometimes claimed to
12. 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
13. Id. at 845.
14. Contemporary American courts often reject outright the theory that breach of an implied
promise to act with care undergirds the liability of a physician for malpractice. See, e.g., Woolley v.
Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1135 (Me. 1980) ("In addition to the inadequacy of implied contract as a
comprehensive liability base in malpractice actions, we discern additional reasons for eschewing any
reliance upon a theory that a physician has breached an implied contractual duty of due care. First,
the reasonableness of a physician's conduct can be adequately determined under familiar tort princi-
ples without the necessity of importing into malpractice actions commercial concepts with tradition-
ally distinct rules as to theory, proof, damages, limitation periods and venue. Second, and related to
the foregoing, recognizing the continued vitality of implied contract as an independent cause of
action would be fundamentally inconsistent with the modern view that malpractice actions should be
predicated on a single basis of liability-deviation from the professional standard of care-with the
application of common evidentiary and procedural rules." (citations omitted)).
15. Some scholars still believe the patient-physician relationship to be principally contractual
and eerily suggest that a physician should gain therefrom even more than mere monetary remunera-
tion. See, e.g., John Portmann, Physician-Patient Relationship: Like Marriage, Without the Ro-
mance, 173 W.J. MED. 279, 280 (2000) ("No matter what else it aims to be, the patient-physician
relationship is a contract involving the exchange of money and services. . .. [Four] assumptions
underlie the physician-patient contract: both the physician and the patient have unique responsibili-
ties; the physician-patient relationship is consensual, not obligatory; both the physician and the
patient must be willing to negotiate; and physician and patient each must gain something in their
encounters. Nothing in this list contradicts a contractual description of marriage, which similarly
stands on an exchange of money and services.").
16. See, e.g., Woolley, 418 A.2d at 1134; Kozan, 270 F.2d at 845.
17. See, e.g., Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
18. See, e.g., Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 275 (Cal. 2004).
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be a reference point by which courts can ascertain whether an action aris-
ing out of careless performance of a contract sounds in tort, contract, or
both. A common statement on this point is as follows:
There is in truth sometimes a thin distinction drawn between
whether an action is grounded in tort or a contract. Generally, the test
of distinction seems to be that if the claim is based on a breach of
specific terms of the contract without any reference to the legal duties
implied by law upon the relationship created thereby, the action is in
contract; whereas, if there is a contract for services which places the
parties in such relation to each other that in an attempt to perform the
promised service, a duty imposed by law as a result of the contractual
relationship is breached, then the gravamen of the action is the breach
of the legal duty rather than a breach of the contract, and so is a
tort. 19
This widely accepted formulation is the juridical equivalent of an-
swering the question "under what circumstances does a careless breach
of a service contract sound in tort?" with the answer "when a court states
that the services entail a duty enforceable in tort." The rule stated above
is pure tautology. It fails as a reliable basis to distinguish negligent
breaches of contract that give rise to a cause of action in tort from those
that do not because courts do not discover duties imposed by law in con-
tractual relations but rather declare them. 20
By claiming that a tort action arises out of the misperformance of
duties "imposed by law," a court presupposes discretion (within the
bounds of precedent) to pick and choose those relations that qualify for
the imposition of a legal duty to perform carefully enforceable in tort.2 1
By implicitly stating that a court decides whether certain consensual rela-
tionships implicate duties that are "imposed by law," a court presupposes
the power to transform any breach of contract that gives rise to a cause of
action that sounds exclusively in contract into a breach that gives rise to
a cause of action that sounds exclusively or concurrently in tort.22
There is no principled basis to distinguish contractual relationships
that entail a duty to perform with care and skill enforceable in tort from
19. Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899, 908 (Mont. 1990).
20. This point was generally conceded by the court in Annett Holdings, Inc. v. Kum & Go,
L.C., 801 N.W.2d 499, 506 n.3 (Iowa 2011) ("In our view, it does not advance the analysis to assert
that [the defendant] owed an 'independent duty' . . . to use ordinary care. This rephrases the ques-
tion, but does not answer it. We have said 'the existence of a duty is a policy decision, based on the
relevant circumstances, that the law should protect a particular person from a particular type of
harm.' . . . Whether [or not] the issue is framed in terms of... the scope of an actor's duty, we still
need to make the underlying determination whether tort law affords a potential remedy." (quoting
Van Essen v. McCormick Enters. Co., 599 N.W.2d 716, 719 (lowa 1999))).
21. Id.
22. Billings Clinic, 797 P.2d at 909 ("A scissors more sharp than we command is required to
pare away the contract implications from the tort claim here. The claims exist mutually in contract
and in tort.").
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those that do not. Courts often concede this point by stating categorically
that accompanying every contract is a common law duty to perform with
care and skill, and that a failure to do so is a tort as well as a breach of
23contract. Despite this axiom, however, even with respect to contracts
that call for specialized or so-called professional services, not all courts
and scholars can agree that breach of a common law duty to perform
with care and skill is always a tort. The axiom is disregarded with regu-
larity in practice, giving lie to the law and further undermining the taxo-
. . . . 24nomic classification of essentially similar claims.
Thus, when it comes to the liability of accountants for avoidable er-
rors in the course and scope of contractually undertaken services, varying
25results in the Unites States are, as the expression goes, all over the map.
Many, perhaps most, states presently adhere to the view that tort is the
exclusive theory of recovery against an accountant for misfeasance. 26
Yet, some jurisdictions suggest that a contract theory might still be
viable in such cases, even in the absence of a promise to obtain a specific
23. E.g., N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466, 470-71 (Ct. App. 1997)
("[F]or over fifty years California has ... recognized the fundamental principle that
'[a]ccompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expe-
dience, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these
conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract.' The rule which imposes this duty is of uni-
versal application as to all persons who by contract undertake professional or other business en-
gagements requiring the exercise of care, skill and knowledge; the obligation is implied by law and
need not be stated in the agreement.' . . . A contract to perform services gives rise to a duty of care
which requires that such services be performed in a competent and reasonable manner. A negligent
failure to do so may be both a breach of contract and a tort. In such a hybrid circumstance, the plain-
tiff is entitled to pursue both legal theories until an occasion for an election of remedies arises."
(citations omitted) (quoting Roscoe Moss Co. v. Jenkins, 130 P.2d 477, 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1942))); see also Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 470 (Wis. 2004)
("[C]ontract law is not better suited than tort law for dealing with negligently provided services. Tort
law provides an incentive generally to guard against negligent conduct in the provision of services. If
tort law is avoided, the ability to deter certain activity is impaired because contract remedies and
warranties may be easily disclaimed. Tort principles address more than merely a private interest
between two commercial companies; they also address society's interest in minimizing harm by
deterring negligent conduct.").
24. See, e.g., Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 280 (Cal. 2004) (Werde-
gar, J., dissenting) ("[The] taxonomy of contract cases where tort liability may be found is descrip-
tive, not prescriptive. It offers no specific rationale for the characteristics shared by past cases allow-
ing tort recovery, nor does it purport to say that all cases that fall within one or another category will
necessarily give rise to tort liability. It thus does not advance the analysis.").
25. See, e.g., Howard M. Garfield & Thomas Weathers, A Survey ofAccountant Malpractice:
Breach of Contract or Tort?, in ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY 1995, at 275 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. H-526, 1995) ("States divide on whether a claim by a client
against its auditor for malpractice sounds in contract as well as in tort.").
26. See, e.g., Swartz v. KPMG, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ("[T]he
breach of contract allegations amount to nothing more than the re-framing of a negligence or mal-
practice claim against the accounting firm."). But see Garfield & Weathers, supra note 25, at 275-76
("According to one commentator, '[t]he rule in a majority of states is that a plaintiff cannot sue a
professional for breach of contract on the professional's failure to render services with due profes-
sional care.' This may or may not be an accurate statement. Apparently, an almost equal number of
states divide on whether a plaintiff can or cannot base a malpractice cause of action against an ac-
countant on breach of contract." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Samuel J. Winer
et al., Accountant's Liability for Audits of Savings & Loan Associations, C646 ALl-ABA 157, 167
(1991))).
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result.2 7 In these jurisdictions, courts may find that a claim against an
accountant for careless performance sounds concurrently in tort and con-
tract.28 Other jurisdictions might still cling to the old implied in fact
promise to exercise care to justify finding that an action against an ac-
countant for malpractice sounds in contract. 29 Regrettably, under the pre-
sent system, the wrong choice of legal theory may result in dire conse-
30
quences.
Paradoxical examples of courts attempting to distinguish tort from
contract claims arising out of the careless performance of contractually
undertaken obligations abound. Examining these attempts with respect to
claims against doctors and accountants only begins to survey the field.
For example, cases deciding whether attorney malpractice sounds in tort
or contract are often equally incoherent.
A case in point is Jackson State Bank v. King.32 In 1993, the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court held:
Even though legal malpractice may be attributable to negligence on
the part of the attorney, still the right to recompense is based upon the
breach of the contract with the client. It follows that, because this re-
27. See, e.g., Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922, 927 (Ala. 1987) ("[W]e are
certain that New York would allow a contract action against an accountant for the accountant's
failure to exercise due care."); Allied Int'l Bancorp, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 530
N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (finding contract action against accountant for failure to exercise
due care in performance of contract permissible so long as client seeks recovery for pecuniary harm).
Some commentators believe that the trend in the United States is to recognize both tort and contract
liability arising out of accountant malpractice. See Garfield & Weathers, supra note 25, at 289 ("[As
certain] cases illustrate, disparity exists between the states as to whether a plaintiff can bring an
accountant malpractice action in contract as well as tort. Several jurisdictions hold that a plaintiff can
state a claim under either or both theories, but offer little reasoning supporting such a rule. Nonethe-
less, the trend, as evidenced by New York, may be toward permitting claims for both negligence
and/or breach of contract against an accountant who fails to adhere to the standard of professional
care. ... [l]f the trend is true and a plaintiff can sue under one or both theories, a plaintiff should
take care to appreciate the differences between the theories, particularly any applicable statute of
limitations.").
28. See, e.g., Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899, 909 (Mont. 1990)
("We cannot therefore agree with Peat Marwick that the Clinic had only a single form of claim
against the Peat Marwick defendants.... The claims exist mutually in contract and in tort.").
29. See, e.g., In re Am. Reserve Corp., 70 B.R. 729, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) ("Under
Illinois law . . . a professional may impliedly contract to render services in a manner consistent with
the skill and care of those in the profession. Actions in contract may be based on this implied obliga-
tion; in such actions, liability is predicated on the failure to perform an agreed undertaking rather
than upon negligence." (citations omitted)).
30. See, e.g., Garfield & Weathers, supra note 25, at 274 (describing several distinctions
between "an action ... based in contract and an action based in tort law" including "(1) a longer
statute of limitations may apply to contract actions; (2) the defense of contributory or comparative
negligence may be unavailable in a contract action; (3) a nonclient plaintiff may claim that it was an
intended third-party beneficiary of a contract . . ; (4) expert witness testimony may be unnecessary
to prove a breach of contract; (5) different jury instructions might apply; (6) in a contract action the
plaintiff may have to be the party with whom the [defendant] had the contract; and (7) the contract
measure of damages might differ from the tort measure of damages").
31. See Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292, 1292 (1963) ("American
courts have exhibited disagreement and inconsistency regarding the theory underlying actions for
[legal] malpractice."); id. at 1292 n.4 (listing cases exhibiting such inconsistencies).
32. 844 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 1993).
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lationship is contractual in nature[, it] is to be treated according to the
law of contracts .... .3
Then, nine years later in Long-Russell v. Hampe,34 the same court
found that a legal malpractice action sounded in negligence (but refused
to affirm an award of damages for emotional distress because such re-
covery is ambiguously reserved for other subcategories of tort claims).35
Summarily stated, results in this area of the law remain intolerably
inconsistent despite decades of judicial tinkering. The law imposes a
duty to perform all contractual duties with care, but not all negligently
performed contractual duties give rise to an action in tort. Even those that
do don't necessarily give rise to every otherwise available tort remedy. In
addition, as demonstrated immediately below, there is yet another crite-
rion that often plays a determinative role in the attempt to distinguish tort
from contract theory in cases arising out of the misperformance of agreed
services.
2. Distinguishing a Tort from a Breach of Contract Based on the
Consequence of an Actor's Conduct
May a homebuyer recover in tort from a contractor who built her
home a money judgment representing the cost to repair construction de-
fects attributable to the builder's negligent deviations from the applicable
building codes or industry standards? In a case that highlights perfectly
the incongruous state of American law on this subject at the beginning of
the twenty-first century, the California Supreme Court answered, "No." 36
In Aas v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court surveyed
the prevailing law in other jurisdictions and forthrightly acknowledged
that many of those jurisdictions had answered the question differently,
though any hope for uniformity would have been misplaced.37 In South
Carolina, a builder stood liable in tort for the diminished value of a house
caused by negligent deviations from applicable building codes or indus-
33. Id. at 1096; see also id at 1094-95 (noting that Wyoming's comparative negligence
statute did not bar plaintiffs recovery in a legal malpractice action based on claims for breach of
contract, even though the jury apportioned fault to plaintiff, because a legal malpractice action is
based on an implied warranty that the work performed by an attorney for his client will be performed
in a skillful and professional manner).
34. 39 P.3d 1015 (Wyo. 2002).
35. See id. at 1019-20 ("Our analysis is complicated by the hybrid nature of claims for legal
malpractice. To state a claim for legal malpractice, one must show that the 'defendant acted negli-
gently or in breach of contract.' We have recognized that the two theories will frequently be inter-
changeable in legal malpractice cases. However, . . . [i]f we were to affirm the award of damages for
emotional distress in this case, we would be sanctioning a similar award whenever a lawyer breached
his or her contract with a client by negligently performing the promised legal services. This we are
not willing to do." (citations omitted)).
36. Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1130-33 (Cal. 2000), superseded by statute, 2003
Cal. Stat. 722, as recognized in Rosen v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 70 P.3d 351, 356-57 (Cal. 2003).
37. Aas, 12 P.3d at 1130-33, 1131 n.7.
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try standards.38 In Maryland, a homeowner could recover in a negligence
action the reasonable cost of correcting only construction defects that
presented "a clear danger of death or personal injury." 39 The Supreme
Court of Indiana permitted a tort action arising out of negligent construc-
tion to avoid a risk of physical harm.40 In North Carolina, a homeowner
could state a cause of action for negligence against the builder of her
home by alleging that she was "forced to undergo extensive demolition
and repair work to correct . . . defective, dangerous and unsafe conditions
caused by the defendant's negligence." 4 1 The Nevada Supreme Court,
after first indicating that a homeowner could recover in tort for the negli-
gent framing of her home,4 2 then held on appeal after remand in the same
case that no tort liability arose from negligent construction that resulted
in damage to only the home and its components.4 3
In light of these irregular decisions and those from other jurisdic-
tions, the California Supreme Court in Aas rightly noted that whether a
cause of action arising out of a contractor's negligence sounds in tort,
contract, or both is "not [a] simple [question], because it arises from the
nebulous and troublesome margin between tort and contract law."" That
was, to say the least, an understatement.
The court in Aas chose a familiar criterion to determine whether the
contractor's negligence gave rise to a cause of action in tort. The Aas
38. See Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 384 S.E.2d 730, 738 (S.C. 1989).
39. See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 517
A.2d 336, 345 n.5 (Md. 1986); see also id. at 345 ("We conclude that the determination of whether a
duty will be imposed in this type of case should depend upon the risk generated by the negligent
conduct, rather than upon the fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the resultant damage. Where
the risk is of death or personal injury the action will lie for recovery of the reasonable cost of cor-
recting the dangerous condition.").
40. See Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619, 620-21 (Ind. 1976). But see Fisher v.
Simon, 112 N.W.2d 705, 708-10 (Wis. 1961) ("[A]ccompanying every contract is a common law
duty to perform it with care and skill, and a failure to do so is a tort as well as a breach of con-
tract.... [W]e can perceive of no public policy which would be promoted by relieving a builder-
vendor from liability for damages caused by defective construction due to his failure to exercise
ordinary care. As between the vendee and the builder-vendor, we deem it more equitable that the
loss resulting from negligent construction, in a case of a latent defect, should be borne by the latter
rather than the former.").
41. Oates v. Jag, Inc., 333 S.E.2d 222, 224 (N.C. 1985).
42. Calloway v. City of Reno, 939 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Nev. 1997), superseded by statute, 2003
Nev. Stat. 362, as recognized in Olson v. Richard, 89 P.3d 31, 33 (Nev. 2004) ("Subcontractors
could clearly foresee that homeowners would live in the homes they framed. The Subcontractors
could also foresee that if they negligently performed their framing work, structural damage and
water intrusion could develop and force each homeowner to pay repair costs. Further, the costs of
repairing the framing defects and water damage are reasonably calculable by a person in the trade.
Therefore, we conclude that the Subcontractors need not be protected by the shield of the economic
loss rule."). The court in Olson v. Richard, recognized that Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.600-40.770 super-
sedes Calloway. Olson, 89 P.3d 31, 33 (Nev. 2004).
43. See Calloway, 993 P.2d 1259, 1269-70 (Nev. 2000) (holding negligence claims against
subcontractors alleging that defective framing caused water intrusion and structural decay without
merit because the allegations involved pure economic loss).
44. See Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1130 (Cal. 2000).
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majority essentially asked: "What harm has the negligence caused?"45
Though the contractor may have had a common law duty to perform the
contract to build the home with care and skill, the negligent failure to do
so, according to a majority of the California Supreme Court, was not
actionable in tort until and unless a particular type of harm resulted from
the breach.46
The Aas court carefully traced the history of recovery in tort for
negligently performed services to reach this conclusion. 4 7 After observ-
ing that "this [question of taxonomy] implicates [many considerations of
social policy]," the court denied recovery in tort because it could not
"justify[] ... the imposition of liability for construction defects that have
not caused harm of the sort traditionally compensable in tort . . . ."" The
"sort" of harm to which the court referred was "physical harm."4 9
To be sure, reasoning backward from the "sort" of harm claimed
has often been used as a proxy for a better means to distinguish tort from
contract claims. Some courts sometimes have required a showing of
some modicum of some kind of physical harm to maintain a cause of
action in tort. For example, early in the twentieth century, the illustrious
jurist Benjamin Cardozo disavowed the doctrine of contractual privity
and found tort liability to the ultimate user of a negligently manufactured
chattel that caused bodily injury.o Judge Cardozo made clear that a duty
45. Dissenting in Aas, Justice Mosk refrained the majority's question and then answered it
himself as follows: "[T]he majority's rhetorical question [is] 'What harm?' I would say, the harm
that will arise when homeowners, believing, as humans are wont to do, that injury only befalls oth-
ers, fail to repair hazardous conditions." Id at 1156 (Mosk, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
46. Id. at 1135 (majority opinion).
47. Id.atll31-34.
48. Id. at 1142.
49. Use of the term of art "physical harm" can be ambiguous. For example, the authors of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability refer to "harm to persons or property, commonly
referred to as personal injury and property damage." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § I cmt. d (1998). Ambiguity in use of these terms arises, inter alia, because "personal
injury" can be physical, emotional, or some other sort of harm. For ease of reference, the term
"physical harm" will be used herein to connote a measurable physical change in the condition of a
human being or property, recognizing that physiological changes can be manifested by psychologi-
cal conditions and vice versa.
50. Compare MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916) (holding
that a manufacturer is subject to tort liability without regard to privity whenever "the nature of a
[manufactured] thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negli-
gently made"), with Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.) (holding that a post-
man seriously injured when a mail coach collapsed was unable to state a claim against the mail
coach repairer in tort, because the repairer's contract was with the postman's employer). Courts and
scholars often appear at the ready to spin Winterboltom to point to some idiosyncratic contention
about the holding in the case. Two aspects of contract law compelled the result: first, the postman
was not a party to the contract with the repairer (i.e., not in privity); and second, the court did not
find that the contractual relationship between the repairer and the postman's employer implicated a
duty to the postman that would be "imposed by law" (i.e., a tort duty). The court in Winterbottom
stated: "There is also a class of cases in which the law permits a contract to be turned into a tort; but
[only if| there has been some public duty undertaken, or public nuisance committed." Id. Rather than
solely an "assault upon the citadel of privity" (to which then-New York Court of Appeals Judge
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arose by operation of law to avoid negligently created risks of bodily
injury.51 His path-breaking decision was a major step along the way to
unifying the tort and contract law canon; liability did not depend on con-
tractual niceties. However, by focusing (at times inferentially) on the
manifested result that the risk of bodily injury produced as the pro-
nounced rationale to avoid the privity rules in contract, the great Cardozo
perhaps inadvertently helped to nurture the seeds of an artificial distinc-
tion upon which the Aas court seized nearly a century later.
The Aas court found that the mere presence of defects in a home as
a result of negligent construction would not qualify as the type of physi-
cal harm "traditionally" required to support a cause of action in tort.52 in
a very Cardozian vein, the Aas court speculated that the conduct of the
builder might give rise to tort liability because someone might scratch a
finger or bruise a toe owing to the negligent construction. But, according
to the court in Aas, no tort liability would lie to compensate for the costs
to ameliorate a negligently created risk of not yet realized bodily injury
or property damage:
For .. . negligent services that have caused neither property damage
nor personal injury, . . . tort remedies have been uncertain....
[D]eviations from standards of quality that have not resulted in prop-
erty damage or personal injury. . . are primarily the domain of con-
tract and warranty law ... rather than of negligence. In actions for
negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for phys-
ical injuries; no recovery is allowed for economic loss alone. .. . This
general principle, the so-called economic loss rule, is the primary ob-
stacle to plaintiffs' claim.53
Cardozo referred in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931)), the second aspect
of the Winterbottom rationale correspondingly was assaulted by Judge Cardozo in MacPherson.
51. See MacPherson, Ill N.E. at 1051 ("We have put aside the notion that the duty to safe-
guard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract
and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought not be. We have put its
source in the law.").
52. The terribly convoluted and illogical analysis that is required to determine whether negli-
gent construction has caused "property damage" is exemplified by this passage:
In a single paragraph and without significant analysis, the majority . .. substantially
erodes the demarcation between contract and tort'law in California. Plaintiffs allege they
bought a product (a mass-produced home) that included defective components (the win-
dows), which malfunctioned, damaging the product [the home] as a whole but otherwise
causing no personal injury or property damage.. . . As such, [this] is a purely commercial
dispute involving failure to deliver bargained-for value (monetary harm) and dependent
for its resolution on the terms of the parties' agreement.
Jimenez v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 450, 459-60 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Calloway v. City of Reno, 999 P.2d
1259, 1273, 1275 (Nev. 2000) (Maupin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting, in
dictum, that a tort claim could have been maintained against negligent framing subcontractors had
the water intrusion caused by their negligence ruined, instead of the structure, a non-fixed carpet
within it, i.e., personal property not part of the "single integrated entity" at issue (the home) that the
subcontractor framed).
53. Aas, 12 P.3d at 1130-31 (citations omitted); see also infra note 104.
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The "economic loss rule" to which the court referred is a product of
the struggle to distinguish tort from contract law. By focusing on the
consequence of carelessly performed services, the economic loss rule
purportedly "defines the boundary between the overlapping theories of
tort law and contract law ... particularly in . . . negligence cases."54 As
one court recently stated, "The purpose of the rule is to strike an equita-
ble balance between countervailing public policies[] that exist in tort and
contracts law."55 The rule is thought by its proponents to honor the voli-
tional ordering of essentially private obligations that arise by consent by
barring the recovery of purely economic loss in tort.56 Contemporary
legal taxonomists thus claim that if a breach of contract gives rise to eco-
nomic harm absent manifested physical injury, then the "pure" economic
nature of the injury is a reliable means to distinguish a contract claim
from one in tort.
Once again, however, inherent in these platitudes are unadorned fal-
lacies. First, the economic loss rule is not always invoked to honor the
ordering of private, voluntarily assumed obligations. Instead, the rule is
used frequently as a substitute for a difficult "proximate cause" analysis
to determine the scope of liability in cases involving garden-variety neg-
ligence that causes far-reaching economic harm (arising out of the per-
formance of contractual duties or otherwise).57 In this context, the "rule"
is an arbitrary pretext for principle that is grounded in a desire for ease of
judicial administration.
54. Dean v. Barrett Homes, Inc., 968 A.2d 192, 202 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2009) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 244 (3d Cir. 2010) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIz. L.
REV. 813, 814 (2006) ("[C]ases [implicating the rule] originate[] ... in a contract entered into by the
defendant and its contracting partner. The defendant and its partner have allocated the risks and
benefits of performance in their contract, and the court upsets that allocation when it imposes liabil-
ity on the defendant. Imposing such liability outside the contract is unfair to the defendant, who has
ordered its affairs on the expectations created in the contract, and undermines the process of con-
tracting. Although there are other justifications for the rule, the argument about private ordering is
primary. . . . The logic of private ordering is, of course, the logic of contract law: individuals are the
best judges of their own interests; individuals maximize those interests through contracts; the expec-
tation and reliance interests created by contracts deserve protection; promoting private contracting
produces a social benefit; contract law provides the framework through which the individual and
social benefits are realized in practice. In economic loss cases, private ordering is advanced when
courts recognize contract law as the primary structure for regulating relationships. Applying tort law,
on the other hand, could upset the parties' private ordering. As a result, recovery is allowed only
within the bounds of contract law. . . ."); see also id. at 817 n.23 ("Other elements of the rationale
for the economic loss rule include avoiding indeterminate liability, the difficulty in measuring fault,
causation, and damages, the adequacy of other remedies in providing deterrence, and preserving the
defendant's assets for the most deserving victims." (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON.
TORTS & RELATED WRONGS § 8 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2006))).
57. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 715 (2006) (arguing that the "stranger economic loss rule" is justified in a com-
plex society where "[s]tand-alone economic loss often spreads without limit").
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The latter observation was essentially conceded by the Fifth Circuit
in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MV Testbank." The injured parties argued
that "[t]he [economic loss rule] is arbitrary, unfair, and illogical, as it
denies recovery for foreseeable injury caused by negligent acts."5 9
In response, the court demurred:
Those who would delete the requirement of physical damage have
no rule or principle to substitute. Their approach fails to recognize
limits upon the adjudicating ability of courts. We do not mean just
the ability to supply a judgment; prerequisite to this adjudicatory
function are preexisting rules, whether the creature of courts or legis-
latures. Courts can decide cases without preexisting normative guid-
ance but the result becomes less judicial and more the product of a
managerial, legislative or negotiated function.
... Plaintiffs point to seemingly perverse results, where claims the
rule allows and those it disallows are juxtaposed ... . The answer is
that when lines are drawn sufficiently sharp in their definitional edg-
es to be reasonable and predictable, such differing results are the in-
evitable result-indeed, decisions are the desired product. 60
Conceptions of judicial efficiency may be thought by some to com-
pel limiting the scope of the liability of actors who cause widespread
harm in a crowded, industrialized society to damages for physical harm
(and consequential economic loss). But in attempts to apply the distinc-
tions required by the economic loss rule as between contracting parties,
the utter incoherencies of the rule are disturbingly apparent.
For whatever the merits of the economic loss rule when used to
foreclose liability in tort to third parties not physically injured as a result
of a negligent breach of a contract with another, the rule intolerably fails
to reliably identify whether a negligent breach of contract should be ad-
judicated according to the principles of tort or contract law in a dispute
between the parties to the agreement. The economic loss rule is patently
incongruous when considered in the latter context. As the court ex-
plained in Moransais v. Heathman6
[T]he economic loss rule may have some genuine, but limited, value
in our damages law, [but was never] intended to bar well-established
common law causes of action, such as those for neglect in providing
58. 752 F.2d 1019, 1030 (5th Cir. 1985).
59. Id. at 1028.
60. Id. at 1028-29.
61. 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).
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professional services.. .. The rule, in any case, should not be in-
voked to bar well-established causes of actions in tort .... 62
The Moransais court correctly alluded to an entire body of tort law
that pertains precisely to recovery for purely economic loss arising out of
negligently performed contractual duties.63 Any attempt to wall recovery
of negligently caused "pure economic loss" arising out of contractual
services within the bounds of contract law necessarily fails. Attempts by
courts to do so inevitably lead to even more inconsistencies and conse-
quent incoherency in the application of the economic loss rule.
For example, not much more than a decade ago, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts was called upon to decide whether the eco-
nomic loss rule precludes viewing attorney malpractice as a tort.64 An
attorney's client argued that legal malpractice that causes purely eco-
nomic harm gives rise to an action sounding solely in contract in order to
avoid the attorney's defense based on the client's alleged comparative
negligence. 6 5 Remarkably, in 1998, the court labeled the question "unan-
swered" by precedent. 66
In response to this classification gambit, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts first noted that it had never applied "the economic loss
rule to claims of negligence by a fiduciary, such as a lawyer."67 The court
62. Id. at 983 (footnote omitted). In Moransais, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that
our pronouncements on the [economic loss] rule have not always been clear and, accordingly, have
been the subject of legitimate criticism and commentary." Id. at 980. The court found that, as a
consequence, courts in Florida had "[u]nfortunately" extended the economic loss doctrine "beyond
its principled origins and .. . appli[ed] the rule ... well beyond our original intent." Id. In order to
avoid precluding traditional and well-established actions in tort, the Moransais court limited future
application of the economic loss rule generally to the product liability context or to situations where
the policy considerations are substantially identical to those underlying its "product liability-type
analysis." Id. at 983; see also In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F.
Supp. 2d 108, 126-27 (D. Me. 2009) (holding that customers had stated a claim in tort for alleged
negligence in handling electronic payment data because economic loss rule was restricted to product
liability cases).
63. See Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 984 ("[W]e again emphasize that by recognizing that the
economic loss rule may have some genuine, but limited, value in our damages law, we never intend-
ed to bar well-established common law causes of action.").
64. See Clark v. Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Mass. 1998).
65. Id.
66. Id
67. Id. Professor Dan B. Dobbs agrees that lawyers and other fiduciaries should be liable in
tort for negligent performance, and he would foreclose contractual disclaimers in such cases as
follows:
[B]ases for subjecting lawyers and perhaps some other professionals to negligence liabil-
ity do indeed exist. When you retain someone for the express purpose of being on your
side, he cannot rightly contract to be your adversary instead or to be on your side but free
to be negligent. This suggests that contract limits on lawyer liability for negligence would
be inappropriate. That is not the whole story, because lawyers can limit the scope of their
representation by contract, but it is enough to justify holding lawyers and fiduciaries lia-
ble in negligence and foreclosing any broad self-exculpatory contract.
That line of reasoning does not apply to all services, so you can say that while pro-
fessionals may not readily limit their liability to clients by contract, other service provid-
ers might well be allowed to do so. Yet, for non-professional service providers it would
be more in line with contractual autonomy to ask what the parties actually provided, ex-
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could not leave the matter at that, however. To be sure, the Massachu-
setts courts had imputed a duty "enforceable in law" to carefully perform
services that are likely to cause only economic harm in instances involv-
ing a service by one who owes a fiduciary duty. Yet, a breach of profes-
sional standards by an attorney does not always give rise to a fully real-
ized remedy in tort for breach of fiduciary duty,68 and attorney malprac-
tice does not always entail a breach of fiduciary duty.
Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts could not elide
the question presented by the attorney's client. The client asked the court
to decide whether the economic loss rule applies in cases arising out of
legal services likely from the outset to cause only economic harm if neg-
ligently performed. The court rejected the client's claimed immunity
pressly or impliedly, rather than to determine by a rule of law that none of them can be li-
able for negligence.
Dobbs, supra note 57, at 727-28. Unfortunately, the means suggested by Professor Dobbs to distin-
guish tort from contract liability is too vague to be of much practical benefit. Deciding what service
providers are "on your side" is a rather nebulous standard. For example, auditors are usually required
to take no side other than the truth, yet, their misfeasance is considered a tort, sometimes even as to
third parties. Moreover, reference to "lawyers and perhaps some other professionals" is intelligible
to only a self-referential elite. The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts correctly considered
nearly all trades in parity with "professionals" when stating the applicable standard of care in tort.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, (1965) ("Skill ... is something more than the mere
minimum competence required of any person who does an act .... It is that special form of compe-
tence which is not part of the ordinary equipment of the reasonable man, but which is the result of
acquired learning, and aptitude developed by special training and experience. All professions, and
most trades, are necessarily skilled, and the word is used to refer to the special competence which
they require."). Wisely, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical & Emotional Harm thus provides
that "[i]f an actor has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or
knowledge are circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the actor has behaved
as a reasonably careful person." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 12 (2010). As the American Law Institute authors explain, "This Section can be easily applied to
cases involving the liability of professionals," but it is not limited thereto. Id. § 12, cmt. a (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A). Defining negligent services as tortious based on the
identity of an actor as a "professional" at long last should be rejected outright; it is, at best, problem-
atic and vague, and, at worst, an inappropriate throwback to outdated notions of noblesse oblige.
68. See, e.g., Medina v. Bryk, No. FBT-CV-5008762-S, 2007 WL 4754990, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 2007) ("Although the Connecticut Supreme Court has never expressly limited
the application of claims of breach of fiduciary duty to those involving fraud, self-dealing or conflict
of interest, all of the cases decided by the court have involved such egregious deviations from proper
and ethical conduct. Superior Courts which have considered the issue have further limited the type of
conflict of interest which will give rise to a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty to those involving
self-dealing. No cause of action [in tort for emotional distress] has been recognized, when the claims
involve a breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct, in the absence of self-dealing or actions
placing the interest of the attorney above those of the client." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
69. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289-90 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) ("While legal malpractice actions based on breach of contract are conceptually distinct, legal
malpractice actions based on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are more difficult to differenti-
ate.... [A]n attorney's fiduciary duty is two-fold: undivided loyalty and confidentiality. An attor-
ney's failure to provide undivided loyalty to a client does not necessarily mean that an attorney has
performed legal services negligently. . . . Legal malpractice based on negligence concerns violations
of a standard of care; whereas, legal malpractice based on breach of fiduciary duty concerns viola-
tions of a standard of conduct. Breach of fiduciary duty, therefore, provides a basis for legal mal-
practice separate and apart from professional negligence." (citations omitted)).
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from tort defenses in such a case and approved a standard broad enough
to nearly destroy the economic loss rule in like circumstances:
[A] defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures to
avoid the risk of causing economic damages, aside from physical in-
jury, to particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an identifiable
class [who] defendant knows or has reason to know are likely to suf-
fer such damages from its conduct. A defendant failing to adhere to
this duty of care may be found liable [in tort] for such economic
damages proximately caused by its breach of duty.70
Defining tort liability for economic loss in terms that measure the
scope of the risk created by a defendant's conduct is a fulsome capitula-
tion to logic that displaces the economic loss rule as a means to distin-
guish a breach of contract from a tort. The negligent breach of almost
any contract to perform services (such as construction services) will fore-
seeably cause economic loss.7 ' The standard recognized by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts might adequately resolve a "scope of
liability" problem in some cases by reference to a foreseeable class of
injured parties, but that standard does not reliably distinguish negligently
performed services that give rise to a cause of action in tort for economic
harm from those that do not.
Against this backdrop, in 2004, the American Law Institute (AID72
set out to "restate" tort law governing economic losses in the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Economic Torts and Related Wrongs.73 The sec-
ond draft of this proposed Restatement adopted a rule not entirely unlike
the standard accepted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Clark v. Rowe.74 That rule provided that an actor owes a duty of care to
another to avoid negligently inflicted economic harm when the actor
11 ,'75
"appears to invite the other to rely on the actor to render a service ....
In the view of some, this formulation adequately .'mediate[d] between
70. Clark v. Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 626-29 (Mass. 1998) (quoting People Express Airlines,
Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 (N.J. 1985)); see also People Express Airlines, 495
A.2d at 118 ("[E]conomic losses are recoverable as damages when they are the natural and probable
consequence of a defendant's negligence in the sense that they are . . . demonstrably within the risk
created by defendant's negligence.").
71. See, e.g., Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 329 N.W.2d 411, 413-14 (Wis. 1983) ("[Plain-
tiffj contends 'that there [should] be liability in tort whenever ... misperformance involves a fore-
seeable, unreasonable risk of harm to the interests of the plaintiff.' We agree with the courts below
that this theory, which focuses on foreseeability . . . would destroy the distinction between tort and
contract, since some kind of foreseeable injury or damage is present in virtually all contractual
breaches." (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 617-18 (4th ed. 1971)).
72. "The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the United States
producing scholarly work to clarify, modemize, and otherwise improve the law." THE AM. LAW
INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cftn?fuseaction=about.overview (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
73. Past and Present ALI Projects, THE AM. LAW INST., (Apr. 2010),
http://www.ali.org/doc/past present ALlprojects.pdf.
74. Feinman, supra note 56, at 818-19.
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS § 9(2) (Prelimi-
nary Draft No. 2, 2006) quoted in Feinman, supra note 56, at 819.
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the rules of tort liability for physical harm and the rules of contract liabil-
ity," owing to the required relation to another and numerous proposed
exceptions to the primary rule. Unfortunately, those exceptions pre-
scribed taxonomic distinctions nearly impossible to apply in practice.7 7
Professor Mark F. Gergen was the reporter for this project. By De-
cember 2007, he stepped down. The second draft failed to garner suffi-
cient support. As Professor Gergen explained in his letter of resignation:
I presented Council Draft No. 2 covering much of the field of eco-
nomic negligence. There was strong disagreement voiced at the meet-
ing about the direction taken in the draft. The draft states the law of
economic negligence (and in particular negligent misrepresentation)
in terms that emphasize its relation to contract law and that distin-
guish the law of economic negligence from accident law involving
physical harm. The criticism was that the law of economic negli-
gence should be situated within a general tort of negligence .... 78
76. See Feinman, supra note 56, at 819. In 2006, Professor Feinman argued that the breadth
suggested by the primary rule was tempered by several exceptions deferential to contractual relations
in that
[iun a number of circumstances, the general principle of section 9(2) is explicitly
subordinated to private ordering. First, the principle does not apply if an actor "effective-
ly disclaims liability." Second, when the invitation to rely comes in the course of per-
forming a contract governed by an integrated document, the parol evidence rule trumps
what might otherwise be a duty of care. Third, there is no duty of care when "the actor's
obligation to the plaintiff is resolved by another body of law," which includes contract
law. "Resolved by" apparently does not mean "provides a remedy for," but rather "ad-
dresses the issue," which would result in no liability in many cases. Fourth, "a tort action
usually is unnecessary" when "the plaintiff could obtain redress for the harm by contract
from the actor or an intermediate party."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS § 9(3)(c) (Pre-
liminary Draft No. 2, 2006)); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liability for Pure
Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 749, 764-65 (2006) (discussing Jane Stapleton's view that tort
liability can be precluded when contract law regulates an actor's unreasonable conduct or is availa-
ble to prevent or redress the alleged harm).
77. See Feinman, supra note 56, at 819 (noting that an exception from the primary rule pro-
vided that "there is no duty of care when the actor's obligation to the plaintiff is resolved by another
body of law" (emphasis added)). Stating that tort law applies when contract law does not "resolve[]"
the matter is not a workable standard because it provides no normative guidance whatsoever. If a
contract "addresses the issue" in dispute by "effectively disclaim[ing] liability" in tort or provides
"redress" so limited that the outcome will be "no liability in many cases," then yet another standard
will be necessary to test the validity of such provisions to preserve tort liability in a wide range of
cases. Contra id.; Gergen, supra note 76, at 768, 771 (recognizing that in certain cases absent tort
liability alternative means may be inadequate to "deter unreasonable conduct, or to prevent or re-
dress the [alleged] harm," allowing that in such instances a court might "weigh[] the need for tort
liability against concerns about its efficacy," and accepting that "the particular balance struck [might
vary based] on institutional and social considerations, legal culture, judicial philosophy, and judicial
temperament").
78. Bruce Feldthusen, What the United States Taught the Commonwealth About Pure Eco-
nomic Loss: Time To Repay the Favor, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 309, 319-20 (2011); see also Gergen, supra
note 2, at 4-5 (explaining his resignation, Professor Gergen stated: "[My] taxonomic claim [regard-
ing negligent misrepresentation] goes to the heart of a disagreement between me and some other
participants in the American Law Institute project on Economic Torts that led to my resignation as
Reporter for the project. They think the law of negligent misrepresentation (or negligent misstate-
ment, as it is known elsewhere in the common law world) is best understood as part of negligence
law. [I don't.] Taxonomy matters.").
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The so recent inability of a group of scholars so prominent as these
to agree on a question of the taxonomy of legal claims so basic tells us a
great deal about the inability of contemporary legal taxonomy to serve
the interests of those who are so considerably affected by its inadequa-
cies.
Despite the "strong disagreement" to which Professor Gergen re-
ferred in his letter of resignation, the circulated draft garnered some ex-
pectable support notably from stalwarts of economic loss theory. For
example, Professor Bruce Feldthusen, who has focused his research and
writing on the economic loss rule for more than thirty-five years, de-
scribed the debate in the following terms:
Professor Gergen resigned over a fundamental disagreement as to
whether the distinction between economic loss and physical damage
was justified, and whether the close relationship between economic
loss cases and contract law, in which Professor Gergen believed, ac-
tually existed. Having attended some of the American Law Institute
meetings, I can tell you that those who saw economic negligence as a
wrinkle on the general law of physical damage negligence law be-
lieved equally that it is productive to group all negligence cases to-
gether and to resolve them with reference to high level principles ra-
ther than relatively clear rules that apply in easily identified catego-
ries of cases. Of course I believe this is a totally misguided ap-
proach. 79
Professor Feldthusen's conclusion about the misguided nature of
unifying themes in the common law may be a triumph of academic aspi-
rations over real world experience. His observation that pure economic
loss and its relation to contract law is "easily identified" is demonstrably
belied by the cases.
For however sincere some scholars (and courts) may be in implicit
assurances to the contrary, views about "pure economic harm" that
prominent and respected contemporary legal theorists like Professors
Gergen and Feldthusen propound would wreak havoc in the common law
if ever fully implemented.80 Attempts to codify rules to reliably distin-
guish contract from tort claims based on whether a claim is for solely
economic loss cannot and will not succeed. The cases are just too incon-
gruent to "easily" distinguish those circumstances in which courts will
79. Feldthusen, supra note 78, at 320 (emphasis added).
80. As stated by the dissent in Aas: "[T]hose courts [that] have addressed [the economic loss
rule] from ... a commonsense perspective ... have reached conclusions very different from that
adopted by the majority in the present case. ... [TI]he majority today embraces a ruling that offends
both established common law and basic common sense." Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1143
(Cal. 2000) (George, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Moransais v. Heath-
man, 744 So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999) ("If the [economic loss] doctrine were genuinely applied to bar
all tort claims for economic losses without accompanying personal injury or property damage, the
rule would wreak havoc on the common law of torts." (citing Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss
Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate Commercial Torts, 69 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (1995)).
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permit recovery in tort based on a breach of contract that causes only
economic harm from those in which courts will not, as the court in Aas
so cogently demonstrated.8'
In practice, fluctuating classifications result in fluctuating remedies.
For example, one can recover in tort for emotional distress arising out of
the negligence of a notary that causes "pure economic loss"82 but not for
emotional distress that arises out of a veterinarian's negligence that caus-
es physical harm (e.g., the death of a cat or dog). 83 The latter result may
be the same even if the veterinarian intentionally causes the death of
one's beloved pet, and yet, punitive damages might be awarded. 8 4
In sum, one cannot help but be amazed by the volume of conflicting
and contradictory precedent governing the matter of distinguishing tort
from contact theory in cases involving the rendering of services. Some
courts are so completely befuddled by the illogical distinctions swirling
around them that they cannot keep the supposed taxa distinct and in the
final analysis misapply the putative taxonomic rules of recovery without
85any legitimate basis for deviation owing seemingly to pure confusion.
81. Aas, 12 P.3d at 1143. Compare City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 840
(Haw. 1998) (holding that recovery of pure economic loss for professional negligence of architect is
precluded), with Robinson Redevelopment Co. v. Anderson, 547 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 (App. Div.
1989) (holding that recovery of pure economic loss for professional negligence of architect is not
precluded). See Peter Benson, The Problem with Pure Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 824-825
(2009) ("[B]oth defenders and critics of the traditional bar against recovery [in tort for pure econom-
ic loss] share the assumption that it cannot be justified on the basis of ordinary principles of negli-
gence. They take as given that these principles would allow recovery in the very circumstances
where courts have consistently denied it. The rationale must lie elsewhere. Thus pure economic loss
claims are to be governed by a special rule-the 'economic loss rule.' On this view, economic loss
represents a distinct topic within tort law that apparently raises its own special policy considerations
and concerns.").
82. See, e.g., Webb v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 530 So. 2d 115, 118-119 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (holding negligent notary liable for emotional distress damages); McComber v. Wells, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 376, 379 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding negligent notary liable for emotional distress damages).
83. See Tracy Bateman Farrell, Animals, 4 AM. JUR. § 116 (2d ed. 2012) ("Most jurisdictions
deny recovery of damages for emotional distress arising from injury or death of animals caused by
ordinary negligence on the ground that animals are, at common law, and sometimes by statute,
deemed personal property."); McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 563 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that a contract between veterinarian and owner to treat Tootsie [the dog] did not demonstrate that
defendants undertook a duty to protect owner's mental and emotional tranquility (citing Selden v.
Dinner, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 158-59 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a duty to protect patient's emo-
tional health does not arise by virtue of physician-patient relationship))); see also Erlich v. Menezes,
981 P.2d 978, 982 (Cal. 1999) ("The[] uncertain boundaries and the apparent breadth of the recovery
available for tort actions create pressure to obliterate the distinction between contracts and torts-an
expansion of tort law at the expense of contract principles which Grant Gilmore aptly dubbed 'con-
torts.' In this case we consider whether a negligent breach of a contract will support an award of
damages for emotional distress . . .. [I]s the mere negligent breach of a contract sufficient? The
answer is no.").
84. See, e.g., Scheele v. Dustin, 998 A.2d 697, 701 (Vt. 2010) (surveying authority from
several jurisdictions, court adopts nearly universal rule and denies plaintiffs' recovery for emotional
damages for the intentional killing of their pet dog but postulates that punitive damages may be
"available to a party who has suffered from an intentional ... tort").
85. See, e.g., Boone v. C. Arthur Weaver Co., 365 S.E.2d 764, 766 (Va. 1988) (reasoning that
because there would have been no duty to a client in the absence of a contract, the court applied the
contract statute of limitations to a tort action based on professional negligence).
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The types of harm that "traditionally" have been compensable in
tort are not carved in immutable stone tablets. The failure to have derived
coherent taxa to reliably describe legally cognizable claims and available
remedies arising out of a conceded harm not only deprives litigants of
remedies based on steady principles but also speaks volumes about the
likely success of building on the shaky foundation of archaic doctrinal
distinctions.86 A legal structure able to provide a more coherent and pre-
dictable forum for adjudicating rights and remedies is sorely required.
B. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability; A Useful but
Piecemeal Measure to Abjure Contemporary Legal Taxonomy
If regulating the boundary between tort and contract theory is chal-
lenging in the area of service contracts, doing so has proved even more
maddening in the area of liability arising out of the defective manufac-
ture of consumer goods. The legal theory of liability applicable to claims
by a consumer injured by a defectively made chattel is a matter of im-
pressive juridical vagueness and striking sidestepping by courts and leg-
islatures. Perhaps no aspect of the legal canon in contemporary America
demonstrates better the futility of parsing claims based on faulty taxo-
nomic distinctions.
To get a sense of the conflicting precedents governing "product lia-
bility," consider the frustration evident in this passage, penned by a judge
trying to make sense of the nonsensical patchwork of state law in the
United States prevailing at the outset of the twenty-first century:
In [New York], a products liability plaintiff may sue in negligence,
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, breach of express war-
ranty, strict liability in tort, as well as intentional or negligent misrep-
resentation. In [Connecticut, Kansas, Oregon, or Washington], that
same plaintiff would have only a single cause of action under the
state products liability act. Somewhere else, such as Indiana, that
identical plaintiff could sue in negligence or strict liability but not
warranty, while a few miles away in Michigan, he or she could only
sue in negligence or warranty.87
These confused and contradictory precedents are directly attributa-
ble to the uncertain but relentless morphing in fits and starts of tort and
contract theory. As the legatees of Prosser's famous torts casebook state:
86. See Current Projects, Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, AM. LAW
INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction-projects.proj ip&projectid=15 (last visited Nov. 10,
2012) ("[The] project [which resumed in 2010] will focus on torts that involve economic loss, or
pecuniary harm not resulting from physical harm or physical contact to a person or property. The
project will update coverage of economic torts in Restatement Second, Torts and address some
topics not covered in prior Restatements.").
87. Drooger v. Carlisle Tire & Wheel Co., No. 1:05-CV-73, 2006 WL 1008719, at *7 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 18, 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Fisher v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 181
F.R.D. 365, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"[An] action by the buyer of goods against the seller for breach of war-
ranty is a hybrid, 'born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract,' and
partaking the characteristics of both."8 8 They further note:
Originally the action was in tort, in an action of trespass on the case
for breach of an assumed duty, and the wrong was conceived to be a
form of misrepresentation, in the nature of deceit, and not at all clear-
ly distinguished from it. . .. In the latter part of the seventeenth cen-
tury, decisions ... established the fact that the tort action would lie
for an affirmation of fact ("express warranty"), even one made
without knowledge of its falsity and without negligence. . . .
In [1778], it was first held that assumpsit would lie for breach of
an express warranty as a part of the contract of sale. After that deci-
sion, and over a period of more than a century, warranties gradually
came to be regarded as express or implied terms of the contract of
sale, and the action on the contract became the usual remedy for any
breach.89
Since the end of the nineteenth century, tort theory gradually has
come to play an important role again with respect to liability for defec-
tively made chattels. 90 But, as noted above, old theories do not die, and
they do not even fade away. Instead, a party injured by a defective prod-
uct in most jurisdictions today must choose from an awkward, confusing,
and sometimes conflicting array of "causes of action" to plead her case.
The consequence of this accumulation of legal theories is not of simply
or solely academic interest: the wrong choice of theory by a litigant or
the court may result in no recovery at all for injuries caused by a defec-
tively manufactured chattel.
In 1998, the authors of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability discernibly moved toward recognizing a true uniform canon
governing liability arising out of defectively manufactured chattels.9' The
black-letter rule of product liability proposed by this Restatement pre-
scribes liability based on a "functional" analysis that abandons doctrinal
88. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE, AND
SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 748 (12th ed. 2010).
89. Id. at 748-49.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § I cmt. a (1998) ("In the late 1800s,
courts in many states began imposing negligence and strict warranty liability on commercial sellers
of defective goods. In the early 1960s, American courts began to recognize that a commercial seller
of any product having a manufacturing defect should be liable in tort for harm caused by the defect
regardless of the plaintiffs ability to maintain a traditional negligence or warranty action. . . . Strict
liability in tort for defectively manufactured products merges the concept of implied warranty, in
which negligence is not required, with the tort concept of negligence, in which contractual privity is
not required.")
91. See id § I ("One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the defect.").
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distinctions between tort and contract law in favor of liability based on
categories of product defect. As the ALI explains:
[P]roducts liability is a discrete area of tort law which borrows from
both negligence and warranty. It is not fully congruent with classical
tort or contract law. Rather than perpetuating confusion spawned by
existing doctrinal categories, [this Restatement] define[s] the liability
for each form of defect in terms directly addressing the various kinds
of defects. As long as these functional criteria are met, courts may
utilize the terminology of negligence, strict liability, or the implied
warranty of merchantability, or simply define liability in the terms set
forth in the black letter.92
This praiseworthy effort to locate the source of liability for defec-
tively made products in the operative facts, while leaving to the courts
the prerogative to classify a claim however they please, is consonant with
other efforts by the ALI to begin the process of abandoning the artificial
and unworkable doctrinal categories that haunt the legal canon in the
United States. 9 3 However, laudable as may be the efforts by the ALI au-
thors to simplify substantive claims arising out of the defective manufac-
ture of chattels, the liability regime they recommend regrettably contin-
ues to distinguish "pure economic loss" from "physical harm" and con-
signs claims of "economic loss traditionally excluded from the realm of
tort law" to the law of contracts (here, the Uniform Commercial Code)-
thereby perpetuating the very confusion caused by the existing doctrinal
categories of claims that the authors sought to avoid at the outset.94
The authors of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
specify three categories of economic loss that cannot be recovered under
the unified theory of product liability. The first category is consequential
economic loss (unaccompanied by physical harm) owing to the failure of
a product to perform; 95 the second is loss owing to the need to replace a
92. Id. § I cmt. a.
93. For example, the ALl has taken a major step toward supplanting archaic doctrinal distinc-
tions with respect to the apportionment of liability. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1, cmt. b (2000) ("This Restatement applies to all claims to recover
compensation for death, personal injury, or physical damage to tangible property, including inten-
tional torts, negligence, strict liability, nuisance, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, or any other
theory of liability.").
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § I cmt. d. (1998) ("The rule stated in
this Section applies only to harm to persons or property, commonly referred to as personal injury and
property damage. For rules governing economic loss, see § 21."); id. § 21 cmt. a. ("This Section
limits the kinds of harm for which recovery is available under this Restatement. Two major con-
straints on tort recovery give content to this Section. First, products liability law lies at the boundary
between tort and contract. Some categories of loss, including those often referred to as 'pure eco-
nomic loss,' are more appropriately assigned to contract law and the remedies set forth in Articles 2
and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code. ... Second, some forms of economic loss have tradition-
ally been excluded from the realm of tort law even when the plaintiff has no contractual remedy for a
claim.").
95. Id. § 21 cmt. d. ("Such a defect may also result in consequential loss to the buyer. For
example, a machine that becomes inoperative may cause the assembly line in which it is being used
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product that poses a risk of physical harm that has not yet occurred; 96 and
the third is economic loss caused by physical harm that affects only the
product. 97
Despite vigorous defense by some courts" and scholars,99 these
rules cannot be applied with any regularity. To the contrary, these are
precisely the sort of taxonomic guidelines that compel pointless efforts to
classify claims by the nature of the remedies sought.
For example, advocates of the economic loss rule argue that reject-
ing a claim in tort for the costs to repair a structure that suffers from "an
internal construction defect" is necessary to respect contractual alloca-
tions of loss in the commercial context.100 Yet, as the authors of the Re-
to break down and may lead to a wide range of consequential economic losses to the business that
owns the machine. These losses are not recoverable in tort under the rules of this Restatement.").
96. Id. ("A somewhat more difficult question is presented when the defect in the product
renders it unreasonably dangerous, but the product does not cause harm to persons or property.... A
plausible argument can be made that products that are dangerous, rather than merely ineffectual,
should be governed by the rules governing products liability law. However, a majority of courts have
concluded that the remedies provided under the Uniform Commercial Code-repair and replacement
costs and, in appropriate circumstances, consequential economic loss-are sufficient. Thus, the rules
of this Restatement do not apply in such situations.").
97. Id. § 21 cmt. e ("A defective product that causes harm to property other than the defective
product itself is governed by the rules of this Restatement. What constitutes harm to other property
rather than harm to the product itself may be difficult to determine. A product that nondangerously
fails to function due to a product defect has clearly caused harm only to itself. A product that fails to
function and causes harm to surrounding property has clearly caused harm to other property. How-
ever, when a component part of a machine or a system destroys the rest of the machine or system,
the characterization process becomes more difficult. When the product or system is deemed to be an
integrated whole, courts treat such damage as harm to the product itself. When so characterized, the
damage is excluded from the coverage of this Restatement. A contrary holding would require a
finding of property damage in virtually every case in which a product harms itself and would prevent
contractual rules from serving their legitimate function in governing commercial transactions.").
98. The California Supreme Court explained the operation of the economic loss rule in the
context of product liability as follows:
Economic loss consists of "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement
of the defective product or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal in-
jury or damages to other property." Simply stated, the economic loss rule provides:
"[W]here a purchaser's expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he
bought is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suf-
fered only economic losses. This doctrine hinges on a distinction drawn between transac-
tions involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic expectations
are protected by commercial and contract law, and those involving the sale of defective
products to individual consumers who are injured in a manner which has traditionally
been remedied by resort to the law of torts." . . . Quite simply, the economic loss rule
"prevent[s] the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other."
Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 272-73 (Cal. 2004) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Jimenez v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 450, 456 (Cal.
2004), Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Mich. 1992), and Rich
Products Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 969 (E.D. Wis.1999), respectively).
99. Feldthusen, supra note 78, at 319 ("Indeed, the U.S. product liability cases are among the
most impressive of all judicial decisions in explaining the distinctions between economic loss and
physical damage.").
100. Id. at 314-16 ("[I1n . .. the product liability field . . . pure economic loss ... refers to a
claim to recover the cost of repairing or replacing a product or structure that suffers from an internal
manufacturing or construction defect.... [T]he ... rule [denying recovery in this circumstance] is
based on respect for contractual allocations of risk primarily in commercial law.").
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statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability acknowledge, there is a
glaring exception to the economic loss rule in product liability cases in-
volving the incorporation of asbestos-containing materials in build-
ings. 01
In such cases, the only arguable loss is the depreciated value of a
building owing to the risk of future harmful release of asbestos fibers.
Recovery in tort for the costs of remediation in such cases ostensibly
should be precluded by that aspect of the economic loss rule expressed
by the Restatement that purportedly governs cases involving the need to
replace a product that poses a risk of physical harm that has not yet oc-
curred. And yet, such recovery is usually allowed. Courts have held that
the mere incorporation of asbestos-containing materials constitutes
"physical harm" to a building, even if the asbestos is not "friable"-even
if it is stable in situ and poses no immediate risk of physical harm to the
building or its users.102
The troubling nature of this "asbestos exception" from the economic
loss rule is illustrated dramatically by comparing the outcome in the as-
bestos cases with the outcome in other cases involving the risk of bodily
injury arising out of negligently made products. Courts are less solicitous
of claims by a person who might die instantly as a result of the anticipat-
ed failure of a presently functioning but allegedly defective heart valvel 03
or who might be seriously injured when the risk of collapse or fire creat-
ed by the negligent manufacture of a home is finally realized.'" Anoma-
lous and unfair distinctions like these-all in the name of an untrustwor-
thy and completely unnecessary doctrinal purity-abound.
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (acknowledging the
exception).
102. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for Asbestos Removal Costs, 73 OR. L. REV.
505, 530 (1994) ("Because property owners seek reimbursement for abatement expenses (economic
harm) rather than compensation for structural damage to their buildings (physical damage), one
would expect courts to consider only contract remedies, at least in jurisdictions that adhere to the
'physical injury' rule of tort law. In fact, most courts have done just the opposite, freely allowing
property owners to sue in tort by adopting a 'liberal' definition of physical injury.").
103. See Khan v. Shiley Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that despite
plaintiff's claim that her implanted heart valve was defective because the valve was allegedly unrea-
sonably prone to fracture and end her life instantly upon failure, plaintiff could state no tort claim
until the implanted heart valve actually malfunctioned, leaving plaintiff only the possibility of post-
humous vindication).
104. See Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1140 (Cal. 2000) ("[W]hether the economic loss
rule applies depends on whether property damage has occurred rather than on the possible gravity of
damages that have not yet occurred."). In his dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court stated:
Other courts faced with the question we address today have asked: Why should a
homeowner have to wait for a personal tragedy to occur in order to recover damages to
repair known serious building code safety defects caused by negligent construction? ...
[T]hose courts [that] have addressed the matter from such a commonsense perspective
... have reached conclusions very different from that adopted by the majority in the pre-
sent case.
Id. at 1143 (George, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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III. THE FIN DE SItCLE AND NEAR ELIMINATION OF THE DOCTRINAL
DISTINCTIONS UPON WHICH CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY
RELIES
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, dysfunctional out-
comes invariably follow the formalistic application of the most salient
contemporary doctrinal distinctions. Attempts to delineate the boundaries
between contract and tort law are especially ineffectual. The true ques-
tion in such cases is the choice of available remedies for a legally cog-
nizable breach of obligation and not one of drawing capricious taxonom-
ic lines in the sand to dictate relief therefor.'0 5
Tellingly, challenges arising out of the contemporary. taxonomy of
legal claims are rooted in competing crosscurrents of legal theory debat-
ed both in the United States and England during period from the mid-
nineteenth until the early twentieth century (generally, the fin de sidcle).
During this period, three salutary developments nearly put an end to
then-nascent efforts to institute the doctrinal classification of legal claims
known today.
First, a movement to unify the courts of law and equity succeed-
ed.106 Second, newly propounded "codes of civil procedure" sought to
divorce completely the art of pleading from the substance and merit of
underlying claims.' 0 7 Third, and perhaps most importantly, legal scholars
offered an elegant theory of primary rights that would have put into prac-
tice in earnest an iteration of the old Roman maxim ubi jus, ibi remedi-
um. 08 Each of these developments will be considered below in turn.
A. The Merger of the Courts ofLaw and Equity
During the fin de si~cle, a merger of the courts of law and equity in
the United States put at risk a nascent form of the legal taxonomy known
today. Prior to this merger, the branched court system that predominated
in England was adopted by its colonies in North America and carried on
after they formed the United States.109 Apprehending the impetus for the
105. The dissent in Aas properly framed the fundamental question the majority elided: "What
remedy is there [arising out of a negligently constructed home] when there is no privity, and hence
there are no contract rights, or when there is privity, but disclaimers or technical notice rules pre-
clude enforcement of contract rights ... ?" Id. at 153.
106. See, e.g., City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257 (1949) ("The coalesc-
ing of law and equity procedure was completed [in the federal courts] in 1938 .... ); Marcus, supra
note 2, at 476-77 (noting that, beginning in 1848, the New York state legislature adopted David
Dudley Field's code of civil procedure that abolished the formal distinction between law and equity).
107. See infra Part IlI.B.
108. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.
109. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REv. 777, 783-84
(2004) ("At the time of the American Founding, the question whether a plaintiff had a cause of
action was generally inseparable from the question whether the forms of proceeding at law and in
equity afforded the plaintiff a remedy for an asserted grievance. ... Most of the states that ratified
the Constitution adopted in some measure the common law of England. Thus, to discern what the
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merger of the courts of law and equity in the United States uncovers the
risks that merger posed to the contemporary classification of legal claims
and requires a brief overview of the reasons the bifurcated English judi-
cial system arose.
Although the history of legal taxonomy stretches back at least to
Ancient Rome, 10 efforts to classify legal claims into forms of action
known as writs reached an apogee in the medieval English courts of law.
In these courts, rigid and inflexible rules of pleading and procedure pre-
cluded relief for conceded wrongs based on a hidebound taxonomy of
claims. Immediately preceding the American Revolution, any plea "at
law" was subject to such strict scrutiny that the inability to fit a claim or
defense within the tightly prescribed writs (developed over at least five
centuries) resulted in no relief at all.1 In other words, taxonomy was not
relevant: it was determinative.
In the English courts of law from the late eighteenth until the early
nineteenth century, "a plaintiff had a cause of action . . . only if judicial
relief was available through a particular form of proceeding. Each form
of proceeding carried with it unique procedural incidents, a particular
form of relief, and specific forms of judgment and execution." 1 2 Thus,
although the English courts at this time sometimes paid deference to the
Latin maxim ubijus, ibi remedium, that deference was entirely illusory:
It is true that Bracton wrote in the thirteenth century that "[t]here may
be as many forms of actions as there are causes of action," suggest-
ing, as F.W. Maitland puts it, that "[t]here ought to be a remedy for
term cause of action denoted in American law during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries, it is useful to begin with what it denoted in English law during that time period.").
110. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1225, 1234 (2001) ("The
structure originally established for Roman law by the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, and thereafter
generally followed by the writers in the civilian tradition, was roughly as follows. Public law (in-
cluding criminal law) was distinguished from private law, and later came to be largely ignored by
the post-medieval civilians, for whom Roman law essentially meant Roman private law. Private law
was then divided into three basic categories: the law of persons (status), the law of things, and the
law of actions (remedies and procedure). The widest category, the law of things, was further divided
into bodies of law governing property, successions, and obligations. Obligations, finally, were sub-
divided into those arising out of promise or agreement (ex contractu), and out of wrongs or torts (ex
delicto).").
Ill. See, e.g., Eric A. White, Note, Examining Presidential Power Through the Rubric of
Equity, 108 MICH. L. REV. 113, 118-19 (2009) ("By [the seventeenth century], the common law
courts had been around a great while, and over the years common law procedure had become in-
creasingly rigid.... Indeed, in some cases litigants could not even manipulate the pleas to get into
common law courts. For such actions as disputes over ordinary contracts, negligence, and nuisance,
there was for a long time simply no common law remedy at all."); Marcus, supra note 2, at 473
("[D]etractors criticized [the writ system] as a 'fossilized formalism.' Common law pleading re-
quired that the contours of the forms of action, not practical considerations or concerns of justice,
dictate the boundaries and progress of suits. A nineteenth-century plaintiff, for example, could not
obtain relief unless his claims fit one of what amounted to a fourteenth -century writ. If the plaintiff
chose a writ that did not precisely match the facts at issue, his case would be dismissed, no matter
how meritorious." (quoting CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE
PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 51-52 (1897)).
112. Bellia, supra note 109, at 784.
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every wrong; if some new wrong be perpetrated then a new writ may
be invented to meet it." The subsequent recitation of this phrase
through the centuries left some with the misimpression that at com-
mon law in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (and at all
times since the Middle Ages) judicial inquiry proceeded by first dis-
cerning the existence of a right and then crafting an appropriate rem-
edy for its violation-that, in other words, if . . . a plaintiff could
identify a right that had been invaded, the existence of a cause of ac-
tion necessarily followed. This was not, however, the mode of judi-
cial proceeding that generally prevailed in the courts of England
around the time of the American Founding... . Ubijus, ibi remedium
was not a black letter legal doctrine; it was merely a platitude." 3
All was not lost, however, for a litigant whose claims could not fit
within the tightly prescribed writs in the English courts of law. A means
to escape from that rigid form of legal taxonomy evolved. Starting as
early as the medieval period, an entirely separate tribunal arose to ame-
liorate the straightjacketed system of cognizable claims at law. In spite of
the writ system, or perhaps because of it, two court systems developed,
in parallel and sometimes in competition, as many as a thousand years
ago.1 14 Refuge from prevailing rules of practice in the King's courts of
law could be found in the "courts of equity."
The Chancery, a separate court of equity apart from the courts of
law, offered a means to meet the widely acknowledged need to provide
relief in many cases not viable in a system that otherwise failed to afford
it."' To address the taxonomic rigidity of the writ system, a "Chancellor"
in the court of equity was afforded great power and flexibility.116 The
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., White, supra note 111, at 113 ("[I]n the eleventh century ... the judicial system
in England was fragmented between an informal court of equity, known as Chancery, and two courts
at common law, known as King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas."); Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Foreword to SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY, at iv (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) ("How absurd for us to
go on until the year 2000 obliging judges and lawyers to climb over a barrier which was put up by
historical accident in 14th century England and built higher by the eagerness of three extinct courts
to keep as much business as possible in their own hands. . . .").
115. See, e.g., Newton v. Aitken, 633 N.E.2d 213, 216 (1ll. App. Ct. 1994) ("An equitable
remedy is not available where there is an adequate remedy at law."); White, supra note Il1 ("The
principle virtue of equity was the flexible escape route it provided. As one seventeenth-century
chancellor put it, equity was necessary because 'men's actions are so diverse and infinite that it is
impossible to make a general law which may aptly meet with every particular and not fail in some
circumstances.' . . . [T]he Court of Chancery .. . had the power to issue new writs and hear actions
'on the case.'... '[T]he chancellor was free from . . . rigid procedures .... His court was a court of
conscience, in which defendants could be coerced into doing whatever conscience required in the
full circumstances of the case."' (quoting J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 106 (4th ed. 2002))).
116. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) ("The essence of equity jurisdic-
tion has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of
the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it."); David A. Smith, The Error
of Young Cyrus: The Bill of Conformity and Jacobean Kingship, 1603-1624, 28 LAw & HIST. REV.
307, 309 (2010) ("[L]egal historians have frequently commented on the 'triumph' of equity in the
seventeenth century as necessary to remedy the deficiencies in the common law. The equitable
courts of Chancery and Requests departed from the strict course of the common law in order to
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Chancellor's decisions were guided by subjective notions about "right
and wrong"" 7 but not entirely subjective. Chancellors in the English
courts of equity were guided not only by their views about morality and
"Divine Law" but also by the maxims of Roman law and the decisions of
Roman jurists." 8
The composition of the common law courts of England as just de-
scribed was "received" by the American Judiciary at the founding of the
United States."'9 To be sure, courts in the newly formed United States did
not and could not in most instances fully adopt the English legal system.
The process of transference was inevitably imperfect, and some elements
of the English system were simply lost in translation.120 Yet, perhaps just
remedy injustice by exercising a more discretionary jurisprudence."); Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging
Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role ofJudgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 949 (2010)
("It has long been taken for granted that in order to achieve justice in particular cases, the law must
provide consistency, and equity must allow judges the flexibility to do justice in the cases to which
the general rule does not seem to apply for one reason or another."); Marcus, supra note 2, at 474
("The development of equity as an escape valve from the rigidities of the common law underscores
the latter's formalism. The language of equity (the chancellor would act as the 'Court of Con-
science,' with morality and common sense deciding claims), and the practice of equity (in Stephen
Subrin's words, 'flexible, discretionary, and individualized')-distinguished it from the formal
common law system." (quoting Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 920 (1987))).
117. See, e.g., I SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 467 (A.L.
Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956) ("In early days there were no fixed principles upon
which the Chancellors exercised their equitable jurisdiction. The rule applied depended very much
upon the ideas as to right and wrong possessed by each Chancellor.").
118. Despite initial reliance on morality and "Divine Law," the early Chancellors were guided
also by the maxims of Roman law and influenced by the decisions of Roman jurists. See, e.g.,
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 55, at 71 (Spencer W. Symons
ed., 5th ed. 1941) ("There can be no doubt that [Chancellors] took their conception of equity from
the general description of it given by the Roman jurists, understood and interpreted, however, ac-
cording to their own theory of morality as a Divine law, and also borrowed many of the particular
rules by which this equity was applied from the Roman law."); see also Hon. H. Brent McKnight,
How Shall We Then Reason? The Historical Setting of Equity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 919, 923 (1994)
("There was a time when the chancellor, as the only judge in equity, had the power to override
ordinary law to achieve 'equity and good conscience' as determined by a more superior set of moral
principles than those governing the ordinary courts. Equity was closely identified with the preroga-
tives and personal conscience of the King. The chancellor's broad discretion was supposed to be
guided by natural law as expounded by Christian philosophers and divine law expressed in the Ten
Commandments and Roman Catholic moral doctrines.").
119. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137 (1996) (finding that virtually
all of the constitutions of the newly United States of America contained explicit provisions providing
for "reception" (or incorporation by reference) of the English common law, except to the extent
inconsistent with unique local circumstances); see also Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Ac-
count of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 805 (1951) ("[A] review of the
cases shows that no matter what the wording of the reception statute or constitutional provision of
the particular state, the rule developed, which was sooner or later to be repeated in practically every
American jurisdiction, that only those principles of the common law were received which were
applicable to the local situation."); Richard C. Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the Amer-
ican Colonies, 30 AM. L. REG. 553, 554 (1882).
120. See, e.g., Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 41 N.E.2d 801, 802-03 (Ind. 1942) ("It is true that the
fundamental principles (of the law of equity) are the same as those which were developed through
the past centuries by the English chancery; but the application of these principles, and the particular
rules which have been deduced from them, have been shaped and determined by the modem Ameri-
can national life, and have received the impress of the American national character." (quoting I
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as inevitably, a juridical model that fit the English mold prevailed in the
courts of England's colonies in North America both before and after
those colonies formed the United States.12 1
Thus, although separate courts of equity as known in England were
not established in the United States, from the outset of the American
judicial system it was understood that a jurist could and would exercise
122legal and equitable "jurisdiction" on two fictional "sides" of the court.
This notional structure permitted an American jurist, within the confines
of precedent, to simply don a different hat to afford a remedy in cases
thought to demand relief unavailable according to the strict system of
writs inherited from the English common law. 2 3
Underscoring the power to forego formalism by so transparent an
artifice as a fictional move to another "side" of the court (while remain-
ing seated on the same bench), beginning in the mid-nineteenth century
any formal distinction between the jurisdiction of the courts of law and
equity in the United States was expressly abolished.12 4 This "merger"
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, As ADAPTED IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA xiv (4th ed. 1914)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
121. See, e.g., John T. Crossal, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 210 (1999)
("Th[e] basic model of separate courts traveled across the Atlantic Ocean to England's North Ameri-
can colonies. Although thirteen of these colonies threw off the yoke of English sovereignty, they did
not discard all English ways. When the framers of the Constitution began to design a system of
national courts, they naturally used the English model.... When they divided the federal courts
along the same lines as the English system, the framers undoubtedly envisioned that each of the
national courts would function in the same basic way as the English counterpart."); see also Thomas
0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 449-50 (2003)
("[Tihe early American courts were modeling the English method of complementary systems of law
and equity. Even prior to the American Revolution, 'courts of chancery had existed in some shape or
other in every one of the thirteen colonies.' Pursuant to Article Ill, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the federal courts could extend to certain cases in Law and Equity.
Although Congress did not create a separate court of equity in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it contem-
plated that the federal court system would administer law and equity on different sides of the court
and by different procedures." (quoting Solon Dyke Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the American
Colonies, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779 (Comm. Ass'n Am. L.
Sch. ed. 1907))).
122. See, e.g., Main, supra note 121, at 450 ("Congress did not create a separate court of equity
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, [however] it contemplated that the federal court system would adminis-
ter law and equity on different 'sides' of the court and by different procedures."). But see City of
Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257-58 (1949). Admonishing the lower courts, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
This is not a situation where a 'chancellor' . . . can be said to be enjoining a 'judge' who
has cognizance of a pending action at law. This is rather a case of a judge making a ruling
as to the manner in which he will try one issue in a civil action pending before himself.
The fiction ofa court with two sides . .. is not applicable where there is no other proceed-
ing in existence. . .
Id. at 257-58.
123. City of Morgantown, 337 U.S. at 256-58.
124. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 476 (explaining that in 1848, the New York State
Legislature adopted David Dudley Field's code of civil procedure that abolished the formal distinc-
tion between the courts of law and equity); Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute:
Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 78-79 (1989) ("After Roscoe Pound's famous 1906 address to the American Bar Associa-
tion critical of late nineteenth century procedure, the Association took up the reform challenge with
renewed vigor and pressed for the merger of law and equity in the federal system and for a uniform
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cemented the notion that the same judge in the same case on the same
facts could afford relief not cognizable at law. Critics warned that this
merger in theory would empower jurists to simply disregard established
taxa to afford any relief thought to be just. 125 These critics' fears proved
ultimately to be without much merit, however. The merger of the courts
of law and equity did not break down American legal formalism beyond
the point of recognition in the courts of the United States, as the forego-
ing discussion of contemporary legal taxonomy demonstrates.
Still, the merger of the courts of law and equity was an augury that
portended a troubled future for the type of taxonomy epitomized by the
writ system. The merger of the courts of law and equity in the United
States during the fin de si~cle afforded an opportunity to forswear the
formalistic taxonomy typified by the English writ system. Unfortunately,
this merger proved to be a necessary but ultimately insufficient condition
for abjuring legal taxonomy as it is known today.
B. The Newly Adopted Codes of Civil Procedure
A second major development during the fin de si~cle signaled a
movement to do away with the then-dominant form of legal taxonomy.
Complementing the merger of the courts of law and equity, a movement
to reform the injustice of the old English writ system included a growing
understanding that civil procedure could and should be conceived and
regulated separately from the merits of a legal claim. In England and in
the United States, a distinction between "procedure" and "substance"
gained widespread acceptance during the fin de sidcle. The English legal
scholar Jeremy Bentham keenly described a distinction between civil
set of federal rules governing all civil actions. The ensuing struggle culminated in the Rules Ena-
bling Act of 1934 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective in 1938.").
125. This understanding of the merger was not without critics, especially insofar as it did not
dispel the long-standing presumption that a single jurist may exercise legal and equitable "jurisdic-
tion" on two fictional "sides" of an American court. Even before the federal courts of the United
States were created, critics in England and in its North American colonies warned that a "merger" of
legal and equitable jurisdiction in the same judge would foster this dogma. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 128 n.4 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Federal Farmer [a commentator
writing at the time of the formation of the American judicial system] particularly feared the combi-
nation of equity and law in the same federal courts: 'It is a very dangerous thing to vest in the same
judge power to decide on the law, and also general powers in equity; for if the law restrain him, he is
only to step into his shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate; we
have no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in Great Britain;
equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be mere discretion."'); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1043 n.267 (2001) ("The identity of the Federal
Farmer is contested."); see also W.S. Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 3 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1929) ("Should there be a judge who, enlightened by genius, stimulated by zeal to the
honest work of reformation, sick of the caprice, the delays, the prejudices, the ignorance, the malice,
the fickleness, the suspicious ingratitude of popular assemblies, should seek with his sole hand to
expunge the effusions of traditionary imbecility, and write down in their room the dictates of pure
and native justice, let him but reflect that partial amendment is bought at the expense of universal
certainty; that partial good thus purchased is universal evil; and that amendment from the Judgment
seat is confusion." (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 214 (Everett
ed. 1928)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
245
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW
procedure and the substance of a legal claim in support of the reforms
that would ultimately replace the writ system:
Bentham . . . provided much of the ideological fuel for the procedural
reforms that were sweeping away the writ system in the latter years
of the century. The same analysis that supported the abolition of the
forms of action also portrayed as incoherent and indefensible the
Roman/civil categories of "personal actions" and "obligations," sub-
divided into parallel categories of contract and tort.
Bentham ... insisted that law should be analyzed on the basis of a
firm distinction between substantive law and procedure. This new
conceptual distinction helped Bentham and [others] make the case
that English law remained intellectually and practically incoherent
because substantive legal rights and duties were learned and classi-
fied for practice under the jumbled array of procedural forms that had
grown up over the centuries to enforce them. This had it backwards,
Bentham insisted; procedure should be designed functionally to serve
as the handmaiden of substance.126
In practical terms, Bentham's insights about the distinction between
the procedural aspects and the substantive merits of a claim for relief
found some parallel in newly propounded Codes of Procedure in Ameri-
ca. In 1848, for example, the New York State Legislature adopted David
Dudley Field's code of procedure.127 The "Field Code" was considered a
major advance. The Field Code was
premised on the idea that a single procedural form, the "civil action,"
could regulate the adjudication of all civil disputes, without altering
either the pre-existing legal rights and duties of the parties or the re-
lief triggered by their violation. . . . Th[e] substantive law was the
substratum [that would be] left unchanged by the purely procedural
reforms, which affected only the machinations of lawyers and judges
inside the system. The reforms were only intended to make the ma-
chinery of justice run with less delay and expense.
The reformers ... believed that the simplified procedure would
create pressure for systematic reclassification of the law, which
would make it easier to teach and learn and more accessible to the
126. See Grey, supra note 2, at 1239-40.
127. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 476 ("The epoch of code pleading, the first major
domestic system of American procedure, began when the New York State Legislature adopted David
Dudley Field's code in 1848. Field listed the 'grotesque forms of action' and their primacy over
substantive justice, as well as the confusing and occasionally unjust separation between law and
equity, as motives for reform. The Field Code's 'crowning achievement' in [Charles] Clark's mind
was its replacement of the multifarious and confusing forms of action with a single form of action,
the 'civil action."' (quoting CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 18-19
(1940))); Grey, supra note 2, at 1231 ("Starting with New York's Field Code in 1848, legislatures
throughout the common-law world abolished the old writs and their offshoots in favor of the unitary
'civil action,' under which plaintiffs were simply to plead facts that established grounds for the relief
sought.").
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public. But a new arrangement of the law would not change its sub-
stance, except insofar as a better taxonomy exposed inconsistencies
and anomalies to the kind of scrutiny that might lead . . . to substan-
tive reform.128
By 1938, Charles Clark's newly minted Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure eschewed even the term "cause of action" with the hope to clearly
separate procedural questions from the substantive merits of a claim in
every possible way.129 The reformers of the fin de sicle anticipated that
the gap-filling tendencies of the common law would lead to a new and
better taxonomy of legal claims.1
30
This second major development set the stage for the abolition of le-
gal taxonomy as it is known today. In newly enacted codes of procedure,
the reformers of the fin de si~cle set out to create the conditions that
would permit a more rational classification of legal claims to take hold. It
was the hope of the reformers that leaving this classification to the vagar-
ies of legal scholarship and practice would inspire a "better taxonomy"
that would "expose[] inconsistencies and anomalies to the kind of scruti-
ny that might lead ... to substantive reform."' 3 Lamentably, these hopes
were misguided and the faith of the fin de sidcle reformers was mis-
placed.
C. "Primary Rights" Theory and a Fateful Consensus to Abjure It
Certain scholars during the fin de si~cle, notably John Norton
Pomeroy, capitalized on some of the same assumptions that propelled the
merger of law and equity, and reform of the rules of civil procedure, to
conceive a better means to ascertain and classify legally cognizable
claims. Pomeroy saw the opening that the substance-procedure fissure
created, and worked into that fissure his vision of substantive legal
claims based on "primary rights."l3 2 An iteration of Pomeroy's theory of
primary rights was described in Crowley v. Katleman'33 as follows:
[P]rimary right theory ... provides that a cause of action is com-
prised of a primary right of the plaintiff .... The most salient charac-
teristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a
single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. ...
128. See Grey, supra note 2, at 1240-41.
129. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 439-40. Charles Clark was "the primary and most
important author of the Federal Rules" adopted in 1938. Id. at 496 ("Clark recommended that the
term cause of action, 'worst of all in its capacity for mischief,' appear nowhere in the Federal
Rules." (quoting Memorandum from Charles Clark to the Advisory Committee (Jan. 23, 1936) (on
file with Yale University Library))).
130. See supra note 126.
131. Grey, supra note 2, at 1241.
132. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 481-82 (describing the approach advocated by John
Norton Pomeroy).
133. 881 P.2d 1083 (1994).
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As far as its content is concerned, the primary right is simply the
plaintiffs right to be free from the particular injury suffered.... It
must therefore be distinguished from the legal theory on which liabil-
ity for that injury is premised: "Even where there are multiple legal
theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives
rise to only one claim for relief." The primary right must also be dis-
tinguished from the remedy sought: "The violation of one primary
right constitutes a single cause of action, though it may entitle the in-
jured party to many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be con-
founded with the cause of action, one not being determinative of the
other."134
Thus, just as the courts of law and equity were merging in the late
nineteenth century, a true synthesis of the best attributes of those systems
was persuasively propounded. In truly unified courts, infringement of a
legally cognizable primary right would give rise to a palette of possible
remedies: secondary, plenary, and tailored to "naturally fit" the viola-
tion."
Pomeroy's theory of primary rights did not depend upon scholarly
musings or judicial whim and caprice. Instead, Pomeroy's primary rights
theory built upon the firm foundation of precedent established over time
within the strictures of the courts of law and equity as inherited from
England and developed in America. Identification of primary rights was
as elegant as it was expansive; a logical culmination of the reform of the
writ system of magnificent proportions. As Professor Robert G. Bone
explains:
Pomeroy believed that it was possible to reduce law ... to a system
of internally consistent and complete general principles. The general
principles were not directly knowable through reason.... [T]hose
principles emerged gradually through a process of judicial delibera-
tion that combined reliance on precedent with the application of the
"natural justice" ideal to the facts of particular cases. Natural justice
was the fountainhead of legal principle, for it served as a bridge be-
tween law and the society's moral sense. In the early stages of equity,
judges had applied the natural justice norm to decide individual cas-
es, thereby building a body of precedent from which principles could
be extracted. Those judges had gradually perfected those principles
134. Id. at 1090 (quoting Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal.3d 791, 795 (1975); Wulfjen v. Dolton,
24 Cal.2d 891, 895-96 (1944)).
135. See, e.g., Christopher Columbus Langdell, A BriefSurvey ofEquity Jurisdiction, I HARV.
L. REv. Ill, 111 (1887) ("It is because rights exist and because they are sometimes violated that
remedies are necessary. The object of all remedies is the protection of rights. . . . An action may
protect a right in three ways, namely, by preventing the violation of it, by compelling a specific
reparation of it when it has been violated, and by compelling a compensation in money for a viola-
tion of it."); see also Bone, supra note 124, at 13 ("The ideal remedy was the one that best fit the
right in the sense of most perfectly restoring the right to its preinfringement state. A person was
entitled to a legal remedy only if she suffered an infringement of a legal right, and conversely,
whenever a legal right was infringed the rightholder was entitled to a legal remedy adequate to
restore the right.").
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by testing that precedent against the developing natural justice ideal
in particular cases.136
This well-reasoned construct prefers the grand process of the com-
mon law to its grand theorists. Pomeroy's view of primary rights was
based on extant and discernible legal principles. Conceptually, Pome-
roy's theories fit perfectly both with his times and the zeitgeist of the
American enterprise. Not surprisingly, Pomeroy's primary rights "were
roughly the standard natural rights of liberal theory: personal security,
subdivided into rights to life, body and limb, and reputation; the right to
personal liberty; the right to acquire and enjoy private property; and fi-
nally, the right of religious belief and worship."1 37 These values were
embodied in the foundational documents of the United States.13 8 Indeed,
it is entirely possible to view certain rights that today are considered
"constitutional" as simply codified variants of independently established
primary rights.139 Apart from and in addition to constitutional bases,
these values have stood the test of time despite well-founded concerns
about proliferation. 140 Subject to these and other concerns, a legal system
based on the recognition of primary rights promotes respect for the law
and a common-sense approach to justice.141
136. Bone, supra note 124, at 41-42.
137. Grey, supra note 2, at 1254.
138. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights . . . ."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). Indeed,
the government of the United States was founded in no small measure on the rights-based approach
typified by the work of John Locke. See, e.g., THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, CENTER FOR ETHICAL DELIBERATION,
http://mcb.unco.edu/ced/perspectives/rights.cfn (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) ("Since his thought has
had such an influence on American political life, a study of the ethics of John Locke (and rights-
based perspectives in general) is needed. . . . [T]he US is based on a system of individual
rights. .. .").
139. See, e.g., Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Rights Done Right: A Critique of Libertarian Original-
ism, 78 UMKC L. REV. 661, 696 (2010) ("I contend, then, that the Ninth Amendment, in particular,
requires judges to apply a presumption in favor of the protection of natural rights as they.are embod-
ied in common law rights, meaning natural rights limited legitimately under the natural law princi-
ples incorporated in the traditional common law.... I agree ... that, under the principles of our
constitutional regime, the common law serves as the background or presumptive source of legal
rules and thus is the foundation of the people's rights and responsibilities.").
140. There are some who decry a potentially problematic explosion of discourse about "rights."
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 919 21 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (postulating a nonhuman right of free speech); Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of
Rights, 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 978 (1986) ("[T]he persuasiveness of rights discourse is to a signifi-
cant extent semantic. That is to say, the language of rights tends to persuade not by illuminating the
matters at issue, but by concealing them through linguistic sleight of hand. The rhetoric of rights
derives its force from a deep-seated ambiguity in the ordinary meaning of the word 'rights'-an
ambiguity that causes disputing parties to assume away the very issues they purport to be address-
ing.... [W]e find ourselves facing a proliferation of 'rights'-such as ... animal rights-rather than
a proliferation of 'liberties,' 'freedoms,' or 'entitlements."'); STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edulentries/legal-rights/#l (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (surveying
various approaches to determining legal rights).
141. See, e.g., Alan Calnan, The Instrumental Justice of Private Law, 78 UMKC L. REV. 559,
591-92 (2010) ("Rights work better than rules for two reasons. First, rights are what people want out
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Unfortunately, Pomeroy's primary rights theory gained less than
enduring and widespread acceptance, with long-lasting consequences.142
The "reformers" of the legal system in the United States, beginning in
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, with varying in-
tensity rejected a rights-based approach. 14 3 Ironically, leading scholars of
the day who figured prominently in the "reform" movement during the
fin de si-cle hastened (unwittingly it seems) the advance of unworkable
theoretical distinctions between tort and contract law that have morphed
into the incoherent taxa we know today.
For example, Charles Clark, the principal author of the highly influ-
ential Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a leader of the reform
movement during the fin de silcle,'" was unhesitatingly critical of a le-
gal system based on the vindication of infringements upon primary
of private law. As a general rule, people will obey specific laws only if they believe the larger legal
system is just; and they will consider the system just only if it protects individual rights. . . . Second,
and concomitantly, rights work better because they come equipped with informal policing mecha-
nisms. It is difficult enough to get people to do things they do not want or are not inclined to do. It is
more difficult still if, as is true of rules, the state is the only overseer. The state simply cannot be
everywhere it needs to be, and its authority as 'outside' rule enforcer only goes so far. Thus, it must
rely on people to control other people. This is what rights do best. By inspiring a belief in and a
commitment to the law, rights get ordinary citizens to enforce the rules from the inside out.").
142. See Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law's Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 633-34
(2008) ("We know now, of course, that Pomeroy's classification lost the intellectual debate over a
century ago. Today's legal canon, reflected in the mandatory first-year courses and in the shape and
division of legal scholarship generally, is organized primarily around differences in forms of law
rather than upon legal protections for primary substantive interests. The adoption of a classification
scheme hinging on legal form, rather than some version of a primary rights approach, carried with it
dramatic implications for the development of American legal scholarship. These implications vary in
severity for different fields of law, as certain disciplines would have thrived under either ap-
proach.... For other fields, however, the choice of a typology based on legal form rather than pri-
mary rights had dramatic ramifications, which still resonate more than a century later.").
143. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 124, at 79 82 ("Early twentieth century reformers ... rejected
the late nineteenth century natural-rights-based theory . . .. The reformers adopted a pragmatic view
instead. They envisioned substantive law in terms of an ideal fit with the facts of social life, not with
the abstract structure of rights, and they relied on professional expertise and community experience
to achieve the law-society fit.... In 1913, [Wesley Newcomb] Hohfeld published his seminal article
challenging the late nineteenth century conception of 'legal right,' an article that triggered a major
jurisprudential debate about the idea of right and the proper classification of legal relations. While
participants disagreed about the implications of Hohfeld's analysis, most agreed with Hohfeld's
central propositions-that there was no universally ideal system of legal rights; that legal rights were
the result of socially contingent policy choices, and that legal relations could not all be derived from
or reduced to the concept of 'right."'); see also Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 978 (1982) ("Hohfeld's
article [was] a landmark in the history of legal thought.").
144. See Bone, supra note 124, at 80 ("Charles Clark and Roscoe Pound [are noteworthy]
because of their prominence in the reform movement. Clark and Pound shaped the movement's
public rhetoric and its constructive agenda. Both men were avid publicists for reform; both wrote a
great deal on the subject, and both participated actively in concrete reform efforts. Furthermore, the
legal community saw Clark and Pound as the intellectual leaders of procedural reform, and other
reform advocates frequently referred to their work to support criticism of existing practice and
proposals for change. Clark's and Pound's jurisprudential views thus provide a window onto the
beliefs that shaped the reform program.").
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rights. He rejected the taxonomy that primary rights theory supposedly
required, on primarily practical grounds. 14 5
Ironically, however, by rejecting a more fulsome classification of
legal claims based on primary rights established in the common law,
Clark encouraged a form of taxonomy far worse. Clark's fears about
fostering useless taxonomic debates owing to use of the term "cause of
action" have been manifested a thousand-fold, albeit perhaps not in the
way he envisioned. The threat has come not from a system proposed
during the fin de si~cle based on discernible and enforceable primary
rights but from attempts by courts and scholars to describe the substan-
tive law of actions after the writ system fell by reference to the same old
regime that gave rise to the writ system in the first place.
Contrary to the belief of "reformers [like Clark] that ... simplified
procedure would create pressure for [a] systematic reclassification of the
law [that] would make it easier to teach and learn and more accessible to
the public,"1 46 legal scholars during the fin de si~cle sought and found
comfort in the old scholarship with which they were already familiar.
Roman law distinguished obligations arising out of promise or agreement
(ex contractu) from obligations arising out of wrongs (ex delicto).1 47
When confronted with the challenge the reformers laid down, instead of
preferring Pomeroy's vision of a reformed system founded on primary
rights discernible in the common law, legal theorists in particular revert-
ed to views that had been prevalent since Roman times:
Sophisticated English and American legal writers had long pro-
moted the study of Roman and civil law on the ground that it sup-
145. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 439-40. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure architect
Charles Clark's critique of primary rights theory can be described as follows:
Clark recommended that the term cause of action, "worst of all in its capacity for mis-
chief," appear nowhere in the Federal Rules. By 1938, he had soured on the term entirely,
after struggling with his own stab at defining it.... [He claimed the very idea ofa "cause
of action"] had misled generations of lawyers to waste time in conceptual disputes over
primary rights and the like at the expense of efficient trial work-an end procedural rules
could actually serve.
Id at 496.
Clark's approach to the cause of action neatly illustrates realism in pleading. His decon-
struction of the primary rights approach is a textbook illustration of a realist attack on
conceptualistic doctrine. [Clark contended that] the concept of a primary right 'seem[ed]
to be precise, and yet upon application in practice [failed to] carry any exact mean-
ing . . . .' To say that a plaintiff had a primary right simply begged the question of what
the primary right consisted of and, more importantly, why.
Id. at 488 (alteration in original) (quoting Charles E. Clark, The Cause ofAction, 82 U. PA. L. REV.
354, 386 (1934)); see also Bellia, supra note 109, at 796 ("Charles Clark believed that Pomeroy's
'primary right' theory was vague and unworkable.").
146. Grey, supra note 2, at 1241.
147. Id. at 1234. Notably, the legal tradition expressed by the highly influential legal scholar
Sir William Blackstone (July 10, 1723-February 14, 1780) might have served as a potential beacon
to guide a different course because certain of Blackstone's views were more consistent with Pome-
roy's vision than with Roman law: "Blackstone's formulation of the modem 'absolute rights of
individuals,' the natural rights to life, liberty, property, and personal security . .. had no parallel in
Roman law." Id. at 1248.
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plied a more logical and elegant arrangement than the common-law
writ system. So when in the mid-nineteenth century the abolition of
the forms of action required a new arrangement based on substantive
law categories, it was natural to look to the civil law-where an im-
pressive body of literature defined and elaborated the distinctions be-
tween property and obligations and then between contract and tort.
During the final period of transition from the writ system to the
new simplified civil procedure, from about 1850 on, English and
American legal writers came to agree that contracts would be one
fundamental branch of the new substantive private law, and their
treatment of the subject was much influenced by civilian scholarship.
Since the civilian tradition paired tort with contract as the two fun-
damental subdivisions of the law of obligations, recognition of con-
tract as one basic category naturally suggested that tort should be an-
other. 148
An epic and infamous flip-flop by a prominent legal theorist exem-
plifies the lost opportunity to strangle in its infancy the reinstitution of
this archaic but now-familiar taxonomy of civil law claims. As Professor
Thomas Grey notes, a scholar as notable as Oliver Wendell Holmes
wrote as late as 1871 that "[t]orts is not a proper subject for a law
book" 49 because "[v]iewed from the perspective of the classification of
primary rights or duties, the category of tort [is] . . . entirely incoher-
ent.""o Yet, only two years later Holmes capitulated and wrote an essay
titled "The Theory of Torts" in which "he formulated a structural account
of tort law very close to the one we use today."'5 ' When the time came to
fulfill the hopes of the reformers, and to help others to see the way for-
ward more clearly, Holmes (and others) blinked. Just as the time was at
hand to finally envision a better means to more coherently classify legal-
ly cognizable claims, the great Holmes and his contemporaries suc-
cumbed to the ancien regime.152
The observations of Roscoe Pound, another prominent beacon of
the fin de si~cle, cast more light on the lamentable reasons underlying the
failure to jettison the most untoward aspects of a nascent form of the
fundamentally flawed legal taxonomy known today-just when it
seemed the stars were so perfectly aligned to do so. Pound saw the merits
148. Id. at 1235-36.
149. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 5 AM. L. REv. 340, 341 (1871) (reviewing C.G.
ADDISON, THE LAW OF TORTS (1870)).
150. Grey, supra note 2, at 1244.
151. Id. at 1232; see also id. at 1252 ("Holmes . . . conclude[d] that, whatever the abstract
merits of the analytical critique of tort, any practical taxonomy of Anglo-American substantive law
had to incltide it as a primary category.").
152. Grey, supra note 2, at 1282 ("In the law, theories, however brilliant, do not thrive unless
they also serve significant interests. John Norton Pomeroy had ideas about the organization of the
law that, simply regarded as ideas, may have been as good as Holmes'-yet no one remembers
them. Holmes' theory of torts turned out to have practical strengths that he never claimed for it, and
that he may never have realized it possessed.").
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of primary rights theory, but he found it to be merely the fourth of five
stages in the evolution of legal thought.153 The fifth stage, Pound rea-
soned, was attainable and at hand in the early twentieth century.
In this fifth stage of legal development, at least in the essential re-
spects that Pound described, Pound believed that legally enforceable
rights would be fashioned from "interests" that arise out of a socially
connected society. 154 Perhaps some threads of the "sociological" law that
Pound projected can be teased out of contemporary decisions. 55 But
today there are also signs of a distinct strain of scholarly advocacy that
harkens back to the second rung on Pound's ladder of legal develop-
ment.' 56
Regrettably, if there is a force of progress that impels the develop-
ment of better functioning legal systems, there is no rule that such pro-
gress is linear. Even though there is ample historical support for the con-
clusion that the elimination of outdated doctrinal classifications is prefer-
able to a system of ever-increasing hair-splitting with respect to the
forms of action, today instead there are signs of a distinct strain of schol-
arly advocacy in which echoes can be heard of the justifications for the
rigid writs that gave rise to the courts of equity in the first place. Some
contemporary legal scholars apply their talents still in the futile effort to
properly discern the "taxonomy" of particular claims, laden by the bur-
dens imposed by the current system of doctrinal classification.1 7
153. See Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27
HARv. L. REv. 195, 220 (1914); see also Bone, supra note 124, at 90-91 ("[According to Pound,]
the fourth stage [of legal development is] 'the maturity of law.' . . . American law entered this fourth
stage during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and its most important contribution was the
idea of right .... Late nineteenth century jurists . . . celebrated Pound's fourth stage as the fulfill-
ment of law's teleological end, as the perfection of a rational legal system embodying general prin-
ciples structured around an ideal system of primary rights.").
154. See Bone, supra note 124, at 91-92 ("Pound believed that mature law was deeply
flawed.... Pound thought that the law of his time was entering a fifth stage, the 'socialization of
law,' spurred on by recognition of the interconnected and interdependent web of social [lives]....
'Interest' for Pound had nothing to do with relationships among or arrangements of legal rights. The
idea of 'interest' was logically and normatively prior to legal right. Interests were a matter of social
fact, and legal righLs were created in order to promote social interests.").
155. In one sense, decisions like Citizens United may evoke Pound's fifth stage of legal devel-
opment. As Justice Stevens explained, "The Framers ... took it as a given that corporations could be
comprehensively regulated in the service of the public welfare. Unlike our colleagues [in the majori-
ty], they had little trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings . . . ." Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949-50 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). But the majority's decision in Citizens United instead characterized a corporation's right of
free speech in a manner that may serve as an iteration of the thesis that "[i]nterests [are] a matter of
social fact, and legal rights [are] created in order to promote [those] social interests." Bone, supra
note 124, at 92.
156. In the second of five stages of legal development postulated by Pound, scholars and courts
struggle to fit claims within defined classifications. Bone, supra note 124, at 90 ("In the second
stage, that of 'strict law,' . . . the desired level of certainty and security could only be achieved by the
formal application of rigid rules. The common law writ system was the quintessential example of
this rigidity.").
157. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 2, at 5 ("They [certain of my colleagues] think the law of
negligent misrepresentation ... is best understood as part of negligence law. [I don't.] Taxonomy
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The work of contemporary legal taxonomists thus not only impedes
the path to progress in the development of the legal system in the United
States but also harkens back to an earlier era that was demonstrably in
need of fundamental reforms. Among the imperfect alternatives, the legal
taxonomy of today is the more regressive and perhaps the least attractive
choice. A contemporary legal taxonomist must "learn to live with" the
"fuzzy" and "sloppy" boundaries he purports to describe.'58 To be sure,
this may be a slight demand in some respects, as the taxonomist may
suffer only intellectual discomfiture as a result of the inability to draw
reliable doctrinal distinctions. But the contemporary legal taxonomist
must also indulge the near certainty that the result of indistinct designs
will be distinct harm unrecompensed in the real world. For someone,
some legal remedies will be made unavailable owing to the vaguely
drawn doctrinal classifications with which the contemporary legal taxon-
omist has "learned to live."' 59 Any such legal regime is in design and
effect defective.
matters." (emphasis added)). Adherence to "core" legal taxa resembles in some respects what some
have called "[c]lassical legal science" based on "antebellum understandings of the natural sciences."
Marcus, supra note 2, at 444.
From judicial opinions, the raw data or fossil record of the law, a legal scholar would in-
ductively uncover general principles, then classify them in a taxonomy akin to the order-
ing of species. The resulting classificatory schemes had practical utility. After fitting a
case into the right category, the judge would derive appropriate rules from the fundamen-
tal principles using a rigidly deductive logical method; these rules would become the ma-
jor premise, and the case's facts the minor premise, in a syllogism that would generate re-
sults.
Classical legal science was conceptualistic. It rested on the premise that fundamental
principles or concepts of law existed independently of any particular case in an autono-
mous legal order.
Id. at 444-45.
158. Gergen, supra note 2, at 38 ("A workable taxonomy of law requires either we live with
some sloppiness in the theory we use to define a field or we live with some sloppiness in the specifi-
cation of the periphery of the field. We can have a tight theory to define a field and a fuzzily defined
periphery or we can have a fuzzy theory to define a field. The success of classical theories of con-
tract and the modem theory of negligence suggest tight theories are going to win out over fuzzy
theories in defining the core of a field in any event. This is to be expected. Most teaching and theo-
rizing about a field focuses on the core. A tight theory will always beat out a fuzzy theory in explain-
ing the core. If I am right about this, then we need to learn to live with some sloppiness in specifying
the periphery.").
159. To his credit, in a recent article that addresses the proper taxonomy of a claim for negli-
gent misrepresentation, Professor Gergen recognizes (in another context) that the practical conse-
quences of a strict taxonomy of claims based on economic loss might be "unjust":
Liability is not imposed for nakedly-some would say offensively-prudential and poli-
cy reasons despite the dictates of ordinary morality. In particular, a claim is denied even
though the result seems unjust in a specific case because of the need for a bright-line rule
and concerns for the cost and risk of error in processing similar claims in future cases.
Gergen, supra note 2, at 49 (citing the "stranger" economic loss rule). Elsewhere, and in yet another
context, Professor Gergen allows that in certain cases "a situation-specific cause of action or liability
rule [is necessary] to protect especially vulnerable claimants from what is in retrospect clearly unrea-
sonable conduct." Id. at 6. The latter formulation may ameliorate the former, but it is not sufficient,
as it depends too much on ad hoc determinations by courts and attomeys, about the majority of
whom Professor Gergen opines: "We may realistically expect nonspecialist judges and lawyers to be
familiar with the core principles of a few major fields of the law. More than this is unrealistic." Id. at
38 (emphasis added). Further, given that disagreement by Professor Gergen's colleagues about the
proper taxonomy of certain long-seasoned tort claims (typified by claims for negligent misrepresen-
2012] LEAVING CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY 255
Although the battle to abjure legal taxonomy as we now know it
was lost during the fin de sidcle, over time the sort of legal taxonomy in
vogue today surely will lose the war for survival in right-thinking com-
mon law courts. Studied indifference to the maxim ubijus, ibi remedium
will not prevail in the long term if the essential common law character of
the American juridical system survives.1 60 For in the development of the
law in the United States, the clamor for a rights-based approach has be-
gun again.
IV. LEAVING CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY
Echoes of primary legal rights theory are heard in certain interstices
of current legal practice. For example, California relies on a variant of
this theory to determine the issue of res judicata in a civil law suit.'61 The
thinking of some early twentieth-century scholars about interests and
enforceable primary rights was also evidenced in the organization of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, at least insofar as the categories of torts
were grouped with reference to invasions of interests of "[a] person [in
self], [in] land, or [in] chattels."'1 62 These echoes are hardly more than
whispers in the grand scheme of American jurisprudence, however. Con-
tation) compelled his resignation as an ALl reporter, hope for anything more than the permanent
confusion inherent in contemporary legal taxonomy would not well-founded. After all, were it not
so, it would be hard to imagine so great a loss to the ALl of so fine a reporter over so basic a ques-
tion about contemporary legal taxonomy. That this regrettable loss occurred (and was perceived to
be necessary) speaks volumes about the disadvantages of contemporary legal taxonomy.
160. Although real harm is done by reason of attempts to adopt the theoretical classification of
claims propounded by legal theorists of the contemporary legal taxonomist stripe, there is some
reason to admire their works of pure abstraction. As was once said of criticism leveled at Joseph
Beale's work and theories:
[Beale's] approach would ultimately be judged not for its theoretical niceties but for its
real-world results.... Metaphysical observations about the nature of law do not resolve
concrete problems, and ... theoretical purity [is] purchased at the price of ignoring prac-
tical issues. This preference for theory over praxis [is] an easy target for criticism[,] ...
as an arbitrary metaphysics, based on "jejune notions of an omnipresence."... But it is
more a vessel of reflection, and less a bark of dogma, than such appraisals indicate. The
internal structure is really rather elegant, its concepts interacting with a smoothness and
complexity suspiciously reminiscent of celestial spheres, phlogiston, luminiferous ether,
and other refined illusions.
Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448,
2457-58 (1999) (quoting Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Recipro-
cal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1096 (1956)).
161. See, e.g., Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (1994) ("The primary right theory
has a fairly narrow field of application. It is invoked most often when a plaintiff attempts to divide a
primary right and enforce it in two suits."). For a critique of the California system, see Walter W.
Heiser, California's Confusing Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) Doctrine, 35 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 509, 521-22 (1998) ("[T]he California Supreme Court has continued to employ the primary
rights theory as the basis of California's res judicata doctrine. In current res judicata determinations,
the court typically defines the scope of a primary right by reference to the 'harm suffered,' by the
litigant, as opposed to the particular theory of recovery asserted or remedy sought. . . . By focusing
on the 'harm suffered' by the plaintiff, the primary rights theory provides an ambiguous and unpre-
dictable test for determining whether a defendant's conduct creates one or more causes of action.
This abstract approach to claim preclusion requires further judicial interpretation of what categories
of harms are 'primary' harms. Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court has not developed clear
guidelines for the classification of harms for the purpose of primary rights distinctions.").
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
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temporary legal taxonomy, by and large, remains based on the now fa-
miliar classifications that replaced the old writs. 163
Despite this state of affairs and the marginalization of Pomeroy's
primary rights theory during the fin de siacle, a variant of rights-based
analysis has emerged in contemporary scholarship. Professor Randy
Barnett observed three decades ago a renewed interest in a form of
"normative legal philosophy" that might displace legal realism and posi-
tivism.'64 Different in the main from Pomeroy's vision, a normative legal
philosopher nevertheless similarly asks not what the "law is" but rather
what the "law ought to be." Normative legal philosophers, as just de-
scribed, joined a "new coalition [that] agree[d] that . . . refining legal
doctrine through traditional forms of legal analysis grounded on the iden-
tification of moral principles is a defensible and worthwhile activity."l 65
Professor Richard S. Markovits's work reflects views of this sort.
Professor Markovits focuses on moral rights in a schema of idealized
integrity that he denominates a "rights-based society."166 He recognizes
the instantiation of "moral" rights in part in the common law of torts, but
he also finds that this method is not a sufficiently reliable means to ascer-
tain rights rooted in moral precepts.16 7 Professor Markovits would instead
163. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts As Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
953 (2010) ("[O]ur legal tradition[] [treats] Torts as among a handful of fundamental legal categories
such as Contracts, Property, and Criminal Law.").
164. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy,
97 HARv. L. REV. 1223, 1224, 1233 (1984) (tracing the recent development of "normative legal
philosophy which . . . has been displacing the schools of legal positivism and realism that once
dominated legal thinking" and undermining the "amoralism and pragmatism of both the efficiency
approach of law and economics and the views of the legal realists."). Legal positivism eschews
normative and moralistic considerations in favor of a more "empirical" approach. See, e.g., David
Lyons, Founders and Foundations of Legal Positivism, 82 MICH. L. REV. 722, 722 (1984) ("The
tradition of legal theorizing that we call 'positivism' embraces two principal, related ideas: first, law
is a species of empirical fact; second, law must be distinguished from morality-in particular, we
must not confuse the law that we actually have with the law as we would like it to be.").
165. Id. at 1224-25. Professor Barnett goes so far as to say that "[a]lthough legal positivism
still exerts a powerful hold over many legal academics and students, the growing strength of the new
normative philosophy may indicate that the positivist separation of law from morals is currently on
the wane." Id. at 1227.
166. Richard S. Markovits, Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the Corrective-Justice-
Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society, U. ILL. L. REV. 243, 245 (2006) ("(1)
[R]ights-based societies are morally and constitutionally obligated both (A) to protect the primary
moral rights of their members and participants and (B) to give them an appropriate opportunity to
secure redress from wrongdoers who have violated their primary rights-i.e., to secure their second-
ary, corrective-justice rights-and (2) various actual countries-e.g., the United States (and such
other countries as Germany)-are liberal, rights-based societies of moral integrity.").
167. Id. at 256 ("[A] type of tort-law study that has a normative component tries to infer the
normative underpinnings of the primary tort rights of a society's members and participants that are
legally enforceable from some mixture of the arguments judges have made in their tort-case opinions
and the conclusions they have reached in such cases. Although such analyses can make a valuable
contribution, I believe that their value is reduced by three 'facts': (1) the fact that the moral rights
and obligations of the members of any society should be inferred from the society's members' mor-
al-rights discourse, conclusions, perceptions, and conduct outside as well as inside legal fora; (2) the
'fact' that, since Lochner, American judges have hesitated to articulate much less discuss the moral
foundations of their decisions even when their decisions were based on moral argument; and (3) the
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permit and perhaps compel judges to expressly base their decisions on
rights recognized as a matter of moral integrity.'68 (In this, one hears the
echoes of an eleventh-century Chancellor's views.) Professor Markovits
looks as well to extra-judicial fora to ascertain "moral" rights, although
the means by which he proposes the content of moral rights may be so
derived remain, in some respects, oblique.16 9
It can be cogently contended that even a well-conceived and rich
conception of tort law is an imperfect means to instantiate moral princi-
ples and effect corrective justice. And one cannot reasonably disagree
that "taking justice seriously may require going beyond doctrinal analy-
sis. When a doctrine runs into trouble or when conflicts between doc-
trines arise, [one] may need to look to more fundamental notions of jus-
tice."l 70 Yet, the advocates of contemporary legal taxonomy can be ex-
pected to oppose the duplication of moral values in a system of legal
classification nearly devoid in any formal sense of such considerations.
For instance, as Professors Goldberg and Zipursky rightly note, one
who trespasses believing land to be one's own has engaged in no moral
wrong but is nevertheless liable in tort. One who exercises one's best
judgment but is honestly mistaken about the objectively unreasonable
nature of a risk is at "fault" in tort, despite the fact that few would say
that actor has behaved "immorally."1 71 Goldberg and Zipursky correctly
observe (to an end different from mine) that imposing the condition of
moral wrong upon tort law as it is presently conceived therefore has been
resisted:
For sound doctrinal reasons, tort theorists have been disinclined to
cast torts as moral wrongs. For a different set of jurisprudential rea-
sons, they have instead treated torts as legal wrongs. Yet in doing so,
they have felt compelled to concede that this choice necessarily
'fact' that the concrete moral rights of a rights-based society's members and participants are legal
rights, regardless of whether such legal rights have been recognized in courts of law.").
168. Id. at 250 ("[C]ommon-law courts can make the tort-related moral rights of their society's
members and participants legally enforceable without promulgating new legislation-indeed, are
obligated to do so (i.e., to enable their society's members and participants to secure corrective jus-
tice).").
169. Id. Professor Markovits would allow "government officials" to "promulgate goal-oriented
tort legislation if, but only if, 'the People' have explicitly authorized them to do so and the legisla-
tion in question does not on balance disserve the rights-related interests of the relevant society's
members and participants." Id. Professor Markovits would forbid delegation by the legislature of this
power to the courts: "[U]nless the People have explicitly authorized the legislature to redelegate their
tort-law-making power to judges or administrative-agency officials, the legislature may not authorize
such officials to promulgate new legislation-inter alia, may not authorize courts to create new law
(as opposed to announcing preexisting law that had not previously been articulated)." Id
170. See Barnett, supra note 164, at 1236.
171. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 163, at 951 (citing Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 3 BING.
N.C. 467, 132 E.R. 490 (C.P.)) (noting that individual judgment and good faith are generally irrele-
vant to the applicable negligence standard).
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drains the normative aspect of the idea of a wrong from torts, leaving
only an empty conceptual shell.172
Instead of concluding that the doctrinal category known as "torts"
therefore should be abjured, however, Goldberg and Zipursky embrace
the doctrinal classification by recasting torts as private wrongs according
to a "civil-recourse theory" of tort liability.17 1 They state:
What stands next to Contracts, Property, and Criminal Law is
the law of private wrongs. By recognizing torts as wrongs, civil-
recourse theory permits legal scholars to make sense of and develop
further a vast body of concepts and principles central to a general un-
derstanding of American law.174
Goldberg and Zipursky argue that the classification of claims based
on conduct that is "wrong," in the sense they understand the word, makes
sense of the tort taxa.175 The taxonomic division of obligations to which
the old ex contractu and ex delicto distinction belongs thus emerges as an
extremely durable version of the old Roman model that can and will re-
sist the influence of contemporary appeals for the primacy of moral prin-
ciples in the pursuit of coherence in the application of tort law. Moral
values may cohere with tort law in some instances, but it may be simply
too difficult to recast a "tort"-based doctrinal classification as a pure rep-
lication of moral obligations.176 A rights-based approach based on moral
precepts thus fails to shake the contemporary legal taxonomists' hold on
a fundamental classification of legal claims based on "tortious" conduct.
If it is difficult to cast the law of torts solely in terms of moral val-
ties, it is nearly impossible to find "enforceable moral rights" to be at the
root of cognizable claims for breach of contract, at least insofar as that
172. Id. at 930. The authors describe the "Moral-Legal Dilemma" associated with characteriz-
ing torts as "wrongs" as follows: "[The dilemma is that] one cannot characterize torts as moral
wrongs without losing the ability to account for large swaths of doctrine, yet one cannot characterize
torts as legal wrongs without rendering the concept of 'wrong' vacuous (a legal wrong being any-
thing the law defines as a legal wrong)." Id. at 947-48.
173. Id at 953, 985-86 (describing a "wrongs-and-recourse" model of tort law).
174. Id. at 985-86.
175. Id at 950-51 ("[T]here is no obstacle to seeing tort law as a domain of duty-imposing
legal directives. And then it is straightforward to understand torts-the violations of these direc-
tives-as legal wrongs.").
176. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal
Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1585-86 (2006)
("[H.L.A.] Hart analyzed obligations as a genus of social and normative forms (for lack of a better
term), and he took moral obligations and legal obligations each to be different species of that ge-
nus. . .. [O]ur own aim, within tort, has been to avail ourselves of a roughly Hartian framework for
thinking about the nature of duties in tort law. ... [Although] legal obligations are, in many respects,
the same sort of creature as moral obligations ... because law comes with consequences that morali-
ty does not (most obviously state-enforced sanctions), and because there are, at times, demands on
law that it take a certain form that renders it efficacious, capable of being internalized, and amenable
to application by judges, there will be times at which it is appropriate for legislatures and judges and
jurors to decline to elevate certain moral norms to legal norms. Similarly, there are sometimes rea-
sons that favor recognition of legal norms that do not have counterparts in morality.")
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taxa has been traditionally and is presently understood.17 7 Very recently,
however, bold legal philosophers like Professor Andrew Gold have ar-
gued that because "private law-the law of torts, contracts, and proper-
ty-is at an interpretive impasse . . . [there should be] a new way to un-
derstand private law . . . as a means for individuals to exercise their mor-
al enforcement rights."178 For Professor Gold, even a breach of contract
may create in the promissee a "moral enforcement right," to wit:
According to [some] account[s], contract law diverges from morality
in light of the contractual overlap with promising. ... A contract is
often portrayed as a promissory relationship. And contract law doc-
trines, at least purportedly, are premised on the idea that people
should feel free to breach their agreements as long as they pay dam-
ages. Promissory morality, in contrast, frowns upon a breach of
promise even if damages are paid, and even if the breach is efficient.
Consequently, contract law appears to disregard the moral duty that a
promisor owes to a promisee....
[I] offer[] ... a different way to understand contract law....
[C]ontract law, like other fields within private law, is best understood
in terms of moral enforcement rights. Contract law is not about the
contractual promisor's moral duties to the promisee, and so we
should not be looking for contract law doctrines to parallel a promi-
sor's moral duties. Once we consider moral enforcement rights, the
meaning of contractual remedies changes. . . . [I]f we focus on a
promisee's moral enforcement rights, contract law may actually rep-
resent a convergence between legal doctrine and moral principles.179
Here again, a legal philosopher may focus on the rights of the indi-
vidual based on moral values; in Professor Gold's view of contract law,
the promissee's. But again, this proposed conceptual model will run
straight into the contemporary legal taxonomists' hold on the view that
177. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462
(1897) ("Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the law of
contract. Among other things, here again the so called primary rights and duties are invested with a
mystic significance beyond what can be assigned and explained. The duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else.
If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are
liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the differ-
ence. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advanta-
geous to get as much ethics into the law as they can."). In any event, Holmes resisted the recognition
of primary rights theory in the common law. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal
Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2189 (2009) ("Holmes'
view[s] may have been the product of his jurisprudential attempts to dispense with the concept of
'primary rights."').
178. Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873,
1910 (2011) ("Instead of thinking that a wronged party possesses a right to 'act against another'
when there has been a violation of her legal rights, we may recognize that the right of redress applies
in cases where the wronged party has suffered a violation of a strong moral right. In those cases
where the victim of a wrong would normally have a moral enforcement right, the state is obligated to
provide an alternative means for the victim to bring about that enforcement.").
179. Id. at 1922-23.
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the contract taxa is at bottom based on the notion that an ordinary breach
of promise is not "wrongful." These taxonomists can dodge any claim to
an "immoral" breach of contract (or conversely, in Gold's view, a breach
that creates a reciprocal "moral enforcement right" in the promissee) by
simply conceding that sometimes a breach of contract is a tort. This bit of
legerdemain is all too facile and sweeps the question of morality back
into the hopper. By reference to a baseline analysis of a tort as a legally
cognizable private wrong, a contemporary legal taxonomist can avoid the
legal philosopher's appeal to find "moral enforcement rights" in contrac-
tual relations.
Thus, Professor E. Allen Farnsworth blithely stated in his famous
treatise on contract law that the justification for reliance-based recovery
(such as in cases involving promissory estoppel) is essentially extra con-
tractual and tort-based. As Farnsworth explained:
The possibility of an answer founded on principles of tort law is
inescapable, particularly if recovery is limited to the reliance meas-
ure. One person has caused harm to another by making a promise that
he should reasonably have expected would cause harm, and he is
therefore held liable for the harm caused.
80
Professor Barnett amplified Farnsworth's resort to a "wrong"-based
characterization of promissory estoppel theory as follows:
[A]lthough ... court[s] [speak] of promissory estoppel, [their] deci-
sion[s] may fit better into that field of liability for blameworthy con-
duct that we know as tort, instead of the field of liability based on ob-
ligations voluntarily assumed that we call contract.18 1
Contemporary legal taxonomists thusly redraw doctrinal lines to ac-
count for situations that appear to demand recognition of the "wrongs"
that may arise in the course of a contractual relationship. For the con-
temporary legal taxonomist, if recovery is based on "reliance" (i.e., the
right of the person "harmed") rather than the "consent" of the person
held liable (as in cases of promissory estoppel or fraud), then for the con-
temporary legal taxonomist the matter can be simply conceptually reclas-
sified as a tort. There is then, putatively, no threat to the overall view that
contract law both governs and defers to the private ordering of legal ob-
ligations based on volition and consent (including consent to a predicta-
ble damages remedy in the event of an "efficient breach"). In the face of
180. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 97-98 (1982), quoted in Barnett, supra note 164, at
1241.
181. Barnett, supra note 164, at 1241 (first alteration in original) (quoting E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACT SCHOLARSHIP AND THE REEMERGENCE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 192
(1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Professor Randy Barnett, reviewing Professor Farns-
worth's treatise, explains that in such cases "the tort-contract distinction is inadequate to account for,
much less resolve, the apparent tension between freedom of contract and reliance-based liability." Id.
at 1241.
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a "bad faith" breach of contract, the contemporary legal taxonomist, if so
inclined, can blithely find a tort arising out of breach of an implied prom-
ise in every contract to "fairly deal" with another. 18 2 In the case of a con-
tract that limits liability, the contemporary legal taxonomist, if so in-
clined, can unashamedly find a violation of an implied in fact right en-
forceable in tort that is therefore incapable of volitional alienation (de-
spite actual waiver) owing to "public policy" or some other ad hoc,
vaguely stated premise.183
Left to their own devices, moralists thus can and will never over-
come the fetid legacy of the Romans' ex contractu distinction so deeply
embedded in contemporary legal theory and praxis. When a moralist runs
into the resistance of contemporary legal taxonomists, the taxonomists
will win the debate by stretching and reshaping the porous boundaries
that supposedly separate the "core" contours of the contemporary legal
taxa. This reality in practical terms may be insurmountable.
Yet, there is powerful reformative strength in asking what "rights"
are legally cognizable based principally on what is "just" in a "moral"
sense. 184 Although perhaps unable to avoid the squishy and unseemly
squirming and trickstering of contemporary legal taxonomists, laudably,
moralists directly challenge the more hollow aspects of contemporary
legal taxonomy. Their appeal does not depend upon the answer to sterile
questions about into which taxa a legal claim should fall. A moralist
identifies a primary moral right that has been infringed and the theory
that justifies the state compelling some form of redress for its infringe-
ment. These are the eternal questions of law, grounded in a fierce sense
of justice. Ironically, however, these principal strengths in the proposi-
tions of legal moralists are also fatal flaws.
Aside from whether any resort to morality as the principal justifica-
tion for the enforcement of legally cognizable rights is likely to succeed
in the present American legal climate, a question remains whether such
resort should succeed. Are any but the most basic moral precepts suffi-
ciently recognizable to effectively guide this or any other complex and
functioning legal system? I think not. Discerning inalterable "primary
moral rights" or "moral enforcements rights" has inarguably eluded reso-
lution from time immemorial. Were systemic guidance ceded solely to
the legal moralists, the legal system in the United States would falter and
never achieve what the reformers during the fin de sidcle sought to cre-
182. See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967).
183. Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 79-80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
184. See, e.g., Helge Dedek, From Norms to Facts: The Realization of Rights in Common and
Civil Private Law, 56 McGILL L.L 77, 104 (2010) ("Private law rights are not ends in themselves; of
what use, after all, are rights without remedies, substantive entitlements without any means of reali-
zation, if people do not comply with them? Does it not make sense to keep an eye on the possible
enforcement of a right while discussing its substantive merits?").
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ate: a "systematic reclassification of the law, which would make it easier
to teach and learn and more accessible to the public."'1 5
Because resting legally cognizable rights on moral obligation en-
trusts the ability to obtain remedies in court to the sometimes vague and
often difficult-to-understand standards propounded by contemporary
legal moralists, the theory of primary rights advocated by scholars like
Pomeroy is a superior means to move to a rights-based legal system-at
least insofar as legally cognizable primary rights are not postulated, but
derived, through the common law experience. For Pomeroy, primary
rights are discernible in "principles [that] emerge[] gradually through a
process of judicial deliberation that combine[s] reliance on precedent
with .. . gradually perfected [expansion tested] against the developing
natural justice ideal in particular cases."1 86 This process does not involve
the keyboarded postulations of legal moralists. The primary rights so
derived have been forged in the crucible of reality and polished by the
work of legal theorists and practitioners over centuries.
Despite any of their respective shortcomings, normative legal phi-
losophers, moralists, and like-minded legal theorists who believe a
rights-based analysis of legal claims to be superior to the present system
of legal taxonomy can and should be allied. In the search for a means to
abandon contemporary legal taxonomy to focus more on legally cog-
nizable primary rights, Professor Randy Barnett perhaps pointed the way
to a workable synthesis:
What is needed-and, I suggest, possible-is a theory of justice that
explains when legal force, whether it is exercised in the realm of con-
tract or of tort, is morally justified. Such a theory must articulate the
rights people have and the ways in which these rights may be consen-
sually or nonconsensually alienated. The fact that this is precisely the
mission upon which the new moral and legal philosophers have em-
barked highlights the importance of legal philosophy and the direct
role it can play in developing legal doctrines. The treatise writer is
.... in need of the philosopher's theory of justice, without which a
completely coherent doctrinal analysis will remain elusive.1
185. See Grey, supra note 2, at 1241.
186. See Bone, supra note 124, at 41-42.
187. Barnett, supra note 164, at 1245. Professor Barnett fits a rights-based view of contract law
neatly within a normative legal philosopher's frame: "[C]ommitments should be enforceable as
contracts when the parties effectuate the unilateral or bilateral transfer of alienable rights to re-
sources in the world by manifesting their consent to a legally binding transfer." Id. at 1242.
Indeed, the moral justification for consent-based enforceability can be provided only by
underlying notions of rights. The two-step analysis under a consent theory-that is, the
bifurcated inquiry into rights and consent-shows the proper relationship between con-
tract theory and a more fundamental theory of justice based on rights. The analysis can
thus explain the source of many of the extracontractual considerations that courts current-
ly incorporate into contract law under the loose heading of "public policy" but that are
completely unaccounted for by either a bargain or a reliance theory of contractual obliga-
tion.
262 [Vol. 90:1
2012] LEAVING CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY
Professor Barnett got this just about right: the quest to develop legal
doctrine in the service of what is "just" is perpetual.'88 Fortunately, in the
roots of the contemporary legal system, there is already a venue in which
legal claims and remedies have been tested against theories of justice and
morality. That venue is not the writings and debates of contemporary
normative legal philosophers and moralists (though, these writings and
debates are of great value and influence nevertheless). It is still, as it has
been for centuries, the role of equitable jurisdiction in the common law
courts to break down the barbarism of formalism in the law and to give
true meaning to concerns about justice.189
By refashioning rules of law and thereby allowing remedies once
thought unavailable, the courts of equity have traditionally hastened the
development of a legal system unhampered by archaic doctrinal bounda-
ries, while fostering a sense of controlling moral principles and funda-
mental justice. This is, perhaps, a form of the doctrinal coherence of
which Professor Barnett speaks.190 A "unification principle" has already
been at work in the United States (and other countries as well) under the
guise of an "equitable jurisdiction" in the merged courts of law and equi-
ty. These courts can focus competently less on ancient notions about
forms of action (and the relief thereby prescribed) and more on the
recognition of certain primary rights and remedies that Pomeroy champi-
oned.' 9'
Id. at 1244-45.
188. See Calnan, supra note 141, at 559. Comparing the views of "instrumentalists," who argue
that private law is merely a means to achieving any number of political or social ends, with "deon-
tologists," who contend that the law seeks only the moral end of justice and cannot be used for
anything else, Professor Calnan offers a composite theory called "instrumental justice" that
acknowledges the inherent instrumental nature of private law but establishes justice as its central,
organizing ideal. Professor Calnan summarizes:
So framed, instrumental justice's primary function is to create rights that serve as tools
for marking and mapping important interests, and for defending and vindicating those in-
terests when they are threatened or impaired. Rights, in turn, both imbue the law with the
moral credibility necessary to perform secondary social functions, and prevent it from
pursuing these functions at the expense of its core principles.
Id.
189. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 67-
68 (1993) ("Our substantive law is derived from common law, from equity, and from statute. [Fred-
erick W.] Maitland [in I Equity I (2d ed. 1936)] correctly observed . .. that it is impossible to gen-
eralize about the things that came from equity. . . . He also noted that the most basic rights and legal
concepts came from common law. When equity imposed personal duties . .. it presupposed legal
rights of property and contract. Equity without common law, Maitland said, would have been 'a
castle in the air.' He was right. But the other half of his comparison was equally right: Common law
without equity would have been a functioning system, but in many applications it would have been
'barbarous, unjust, absurd.' It is hardly surprising that we have not abandoned equity and reverted to
barbarism. To the contrary, substantive equity is now fully integrated into our substantive law, with
or without continued consciousness of its equitable origins.").
190. Barnett, supra note 164, at 1245 (referring to "coherent doctrinal analysis").
191. POMEROY, supra note 118. Pomeroy noted that jurisdiction in equity provides "those
doctrines and rules, primary and remedial rights and remedies, which the common law, by reason of
its fixed methods and remedial system, [is] either unable or inadequate in the regular course of its
development, to establish, enforce, and confer, and which it therefore [has] either tacitly omitted or
openly rejected." Id. at 89; see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 177, at 2156 ("In the latter
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- Since the early twentieth century, the constant and inexorable ob-
scuring of the porous boundaries thought by some to keep tort and con-
tract law distinct has been advanced by the abandonment of judge-made
doctrinal restraints.19 2 Unified courts can and do blend and transform
doctrinal principles once thought inviolate, making possible the dissolu-
tion of formalistic distinctions between "tort" and "contract" law.
As stated by Kevin M. Teeven:
After the abolition of the forms of action and the complete fusion
of law and equity in American jurisdictions during the second half of
the nineteenth century, the way was open to consider the possibility
of ... a third branch of private law independent of contracts and
torts .... As it became irrelevant whether a remedy was obtainable
under a particular form, courts began to pry open the old common
counts to determine their foundation and meaning. In the process,
courts recognized the existence of a third category of the common
law grounded upon neither tortious conduct nor bargain ... .193
A proper synthesis of legal and equitable principles avoids the "bar-
barism" of formalistic adherence to doctrinal distinctions, yet tethers
courts' discretion to juridical traditions and precedent.194 Abandonment
of doctrinal distinctions in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction does not
toss away the past. Instead, liberation from the doctrinal shackles of the
past allows a court to draw from the law of contract and torts (and all the
other old taxa) to properly discern legally cognizable rights' 95 and to
half of the nineteenth century, John Norton Pomeroy, in his treatises Remedies and Remedial Rights
and Equity Jurisprudence . . . address[ed] whether equity merely provided additional remedial rights
for the same primary rights as those vindicated at common law or instead vindicated additional
primary rights.").
192. See, e.g., Vincent A. Wellman, Assessing the Economic Loss Doctrine in Michigan:
Making Sense out of the Development of Law, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 791, 861 (2008) ("[I1f one goes
back far enough, it should be clear that both tort law and contract law (and any sense of the boundary
that divides them) are the result of judicial decision-making with little or no guidance or-even
attention-given by the legislative branch. ... [T]he ongoing development of torts and contracts [is]
a development that has been judge-made since its inception.").
193. Kevin M. Teeven, The Advent of Recovery on Market Transactions in the Absence of a
Bargain, 39 Am. BUs. L.J. 289, 339 (2002).
194. The courts of equitable jurisdiction have been traditionally guided by a form of precedent
known as the "equitable maxims." See, e.g., Regions Bank v. Wingard Props., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 348,
352 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) ("Equitable maxims are not binding legal precedent but represent notions
and concepts of equity in various situations."); see also RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
REMEDIES LAW 8 (2007) ("[Equity courts] ... began to develop 'rules' or 'maxims' governing
equitable relief. Although these 'maxims' were generalizations of experience based on the results of
prior cases, they eventually developed into a loose set of 'rules' designed to bring some coherency to
the body of decided cases and some consistency to future decisions."). Maxims developed, at least in
part, to reflect the attempt by the courts of equity to create guiding principles, in the same way that
the courts of law have developed binding precedents. See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp.,
41 F.2d 929, 936 (D. Ohio 1930) ("Maxims are but attempted general statements of rules of law. The
judicial process is the continuous effort on the part of the courts to state accurately these general
rules, with their proper and necessary limitations and exceptions.").
195. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920, 34 HARV. L. REV.
388, 393-94 (1921) ("[1]t is important to ascertain the nature of [coterminous legal theory] to under-
stand the basis of equity jurisdiction, [because] courts of equity [often] are not really dealing with
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afford relief in the form of remedies unhampered by taxonomic classifi-
cation. 19 6 The true merger of law and equity makes possible a more ra-
tional system in which at long last the old maxim will hold true that "for
every right there is a remedy."' 97
Of course, not all legal scholars have applauded or will welcome
encroachments upon contemporary doctrinal distinctions.'98 For the past
any question of equity but with the law of torts, just as they determine the law of contracts, when
they ask whether a promise has consideration before they specifically enforce it.").
196. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-Merger Justification of
Unclean Hands, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 455, 509 (2007) ("Continued reliance on outmoded anachronisms
of law and equity in order to determine the availability of [a particular defense] is to chase ghosts
and leave courts in a constant state of epistemic failure. It also limits the legal reasoning process of
judges to formulations designed in the dark days of the common law. Adherence to the increasingly
irrelevant labels of law and equity additionally diverts judicial resources from the true interests at
stake and deprives the law of its ability to meet the needs of an ever-changing society. Distinctions
between legal and equitable defenses are dead. They were buried with the merger. It is time for
courts to begin writing their obituary.").
197. See, e.g., Andrew Burrows, We Do This At Common Law But That In Equity, 22 OXFORD
J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 1, 4 (2002) ("While there are areas where common law and equity can happily
sit alongside one another, there are many examples of inconsistencies between them. It is important
to remove the inconsistencies thereby producing a coherent or harmonized law. In developing the
law it is legitimate for the courts to reason from common law to equity and vice versa. A harmonized
rule or principle that has features of both common law and equity is at the very least acceptable and,
depending on the rule or principle in question, may represent the best way for the law to develop. It
is submitted that the latter view is to be strongly preferred. There are numerous instances of incon-
sistencies between common law and equity; and to support fusion seems self-evident, resting, as it
does, on not being slaves to history and on recognizing the importance of coherence in the law and
of 'like cases being treated alike."'); see also Bone, supra note 124, at 26 ("For those who sub-
scribe[] [to the view that the rights enforced by the common law should duplicate much of the rights
structure of equity], the solution [is] clear. First, the anomalous and indefensible distinction between
law and equity ha[s] to be eliminated, that is, law and equity ha[vel to be merged. Second, the anti-
quated forms of action [need] to be abolished and the natural classification of causes of action based
on the nature of abstract rights and duties substituted for the irrational categories defined by the
forms. With law and equity merged and the forms of action abolished, judges [will] be free to apply
the ideal system of substantive general principles to resolve all controversies openly and without use
of fictions. And abolition of the forms of action [will] have the additional benefit of jettisoning the
arbitrary common-law limitations on types of remedies and extending the equitable principle of
remedial flexibility to the merged system as a whole."); Laycock, supra note 189, at 71 ("Equitable
doctrine ... should continue to develop in harmony with related legal doctrines, and on the basis of
sound policy in a modern democratic society. I submit that no question concerning the scope or
content of these doctrines should any longer depend on whether they historically arose in law or
equity. The substantive rules that govern our behavior should not depend on the historical jurisdic-
tion of ancient courts that were merged fifty-five or one hundred forty-five years ago."); Anenson,
supra note 196, at 457-58 ("[Tlhe content and application of a particular law in any given contro-
versy should not depend on the historical happenstance of whether it originated in law or equity.
Because the historic boundary between law and equity was accidental and not functional, functional
choices about the role of discretion, the method of adjudication, or an award of damages or specific
performance should be considered outwardly and independently on their merits.").
198. See, e.g., Israel Gilead, Non-Consensual Liability of a Contracting Party: Contract, Neg-
ligence, Both, or In-Between?, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 511, 514 (2002) ("To achieve its goals,
the legal system functions through 'intermediaries' such as tort and contract, each of which has a
different agenda, different characteristics, and built-in limitations. Liability must, therefore, be
characterized as tortious, contractual, or both. There should not be 'liability in the air,' liability that
has no defined origins."); R.P. MEAGHER, W.M.C. GUMMow & J.R.F. LEHANE, EQUITY, DOCTRINES
AND REMEDIES (3d ed. 1992) ("[The fusion fallacy] involves the conclusion that the new system was
not devised to administer law and equity concurrently but to 'fuse' them into a new body of princi-
ples comprising rules neither of law nor of equity but of some new jurisprudence conceived by
accident, born by misadventure and nourished by sour but high-minded wet-nurses."); T. Leigh
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fifty or so years in particular, as the pace of erosion of the boundaries
between tort and contract law has accelerated, more than a few scholars
have mourned the "death of contract," albeit in various ways.1 99 Most of
this mourning is misplaced, however. A synthesis of tort and contract
theory is more historically sound than the unsound distinctions between
the two that it displaces.
To be sure, any prescriptions for progress based on the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction must necessarily be undertaken cautiously. Faults
associated with the exercise of equitable jurisdiction are inevitable. There
are particular grounds for concern insofar as trial courts in the United
States continue to indulge the untoward fiction that unfettered discretion
is inherent in the exercise of equitable powers. 2 00 Trial judges who pur-
port to "sit in equity" are inclined on occasion to act on the faulty belief
that this fictional position affords them nearly absolute discretion. And
this faulty belief is encouraged because decisions in "equity" are too
often insufficiently checked by the courts of appeal.2 0' Insufficient prec-
edential value afforded to decisions in "equity," together with ineffectual
appellate review of ad hoc adjudication, can promote outcomes just as
dysfunctional and confused as those that rely on contemporary legal tax-
onomy.
Yet, a carefully reasoned response to these concerns overcomes
them. Failings in the course of the common law are more often than not
corrected. The English courts of equity ultimately established distinct
precedents and adhered to them.202 Indeed, by the eighteenth century,
Anenson & Donald 0. Mayer, "Clean Hands" and the CEO: Equity as an Antidote for Excessive
Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 947, 982 n.134 (2010) (collecting authorities addressing the
"fusion wars" in various common law countries).
199. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 2, at 103; Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54
U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 370 (2004) ("Grant Gilmore predicted the death of contract. He saw the
expansion of legal liability for relied-upon promises as evidence that contract was being swallowed
up by tort and would soon disappear as an independent, coherent body of law... . [Notably,] for
Gilmore, the triumph of reliance over bargain was an entirely salutary development.").
200. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel
Under a Pluralistic Model of Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 633, 641-42 (2007) ("The chaotic
state of equity jurisprudence makes ... cases easy to distinguish. Moreover, a risk in equity, or in
any other area of law with abstract concepts like justice, is that the rules of decision become a free-
for-all for the courts and make the identification ofdecisional patterns difficult.").
201. There unfortunately remains today a distinct reluctance on the part of appellate courts to
disturb the judgments of a modem-day "Chancellor," even though the role of a current American
judge has little or no relation at all to the role of an eighteenth-century English "Chancellor." See,
e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) (explaining that "discretion" is
"unfettered by meaningful standards and shielded from thorough appellate review"); Cravens, supra
note 116, at 958 ("For discretion to have real meaning, lower court judges must not be subject, in
their exercise of judgment, to reversal based on mere second guessing or differences of opinion by
the appellate court. Indeed, that would change what the law is."); Denham v. Superior Court, 468
P.2d 193, 199 (Cal. 1970) ("[Ulnless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will
not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power."). But see
Barnett v. Gomance, 377 S.W.3d 317, 323 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010) ("Equity cases are reviewed de novo
on appeal.").
202. See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. EQUITY § 6 (2012) ("The doctrine of stare decisis became an estab-
lished part of equity jurisprudence. Thenceforth, equity ceased to be a mere corrective agency and
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critics complained that the English courts of equity were as hide-bound
as the courts of law.203 Thus, "equitable jurisdiction" properly understood
and viewed in actual practice for centuries has not been a pretext to justi-
fy any solution to a difficult problem that is irreconcilable with rigid ad-
herence to formalistic rules of law.
Modernly, most judges and attorneys agree that courts are obliged
to provide predictable guidance and equality before the law, and to that
end, may not change the rules at will to suit personal predilections or
2 205idiosyncratic notions of "fairness."2 04 Resorts to "divine law" are rare.
Contemporary courts are much more likely to avoid haphazard or ad hoc
adjudication. The common law possesses its own dynamic, subject to
external influences, but is nearly always typified by slow and careful
incremental adjustments.
Jurisdiction in equity is a grand fiction in a contemporary American
court. Still, it is an analytical construct that focuses more on remedies for
violation of primary rights than on restricting remedies based on unat-
tainable taxonomic purity. There is a poetic symmetry in the notion that
the legal fiction of equitable discretion unburdened by doctrinal distinc-
tions may be ultimately the analytic convention that can overcome an
became a definite system of jurisprudence occupying the field side by side with the common law,
each with a distinct jurisdiction, and, therefore, necessarily there also grew up, not only two distinct
systems of practice in these courts, but also two distinct systems of substantive jurisprudence . .. .").
203. Anenson, supra note 200, at 643-44 ("In fact, the English Court of Chancery during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries came to be called a court of 'crystallized conscience.' This
rigidity, or rigor aequitatis as it was called, emitted equitable precepts that came to suffer the same
fate as the rules of the common law. The court's inability or unwillingness to account for the sur-
rounding circumstances was denounced as defeating the ultimate purpose of the legal system to
provide just results."); Bellia, supra note 109, at 783-84 ("Though the prescribed forms of proceed-
ing in equity were more 'flexible' than those at law, they were 'prescribed' nonetheless."); id at
789-90 ("If the common law failed to fulfill the maxim ubijus, ibi remedium, did equity, with its
own maxim that it 'will not suffer a right to be without a remedy,' fulfill it? In its early days, equity
jurisprudence may well have been thought to derive from principles of conscience and natural jus-
tice. . . . By the eighteenth century, however, Blackstone would describe equity as a system ofjuris-
prudence as 'equally artificial' as the common law, different only in its usages in the forms and
modes of its proceedings.... In 1815, in the preface to his treatise on equity practice in the High
Court of Chancery, Henry Maddock mused that 'if it were true, that the Chancellor, in the exercise
of his Jurisdiction, acted only, as is vulgarly supposed, according to an unbounded discretion ... it
would be a folly to attempt to systematise the doctrines of Chancery.' The Chancellor's discretion, in
fact, was anything but unbounded.... Equity practice in America, as a general matter, was similarly
bounded [as i]n 1836, [when] Joseph Story explained the formal, remedies-based nature of equity
practice that prevailed around the time of the American Founding. . .
204. See, e.g., Burrows, supra note 197, at 2.
205. But see, e.g., State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am. v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 1027, 1031
(Okla. 1985) ("Human law is the offspring of divine law. One of the strongest principles of law is
compensation. Every man compensates his own wrong. He cannot claim the benefits of it." (quoting
Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Weightman, 160 P. 629, 631 (Okla. 1916) (holding a life insurance
beneficiary was not entitled to the benefits of a policy despite her acquittal in a murder trial after she
killed the policyholder)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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equally untoward legal fiction that elevates taxonomy to a set of govern-
ing legal principles.206
V. CONCLUSION
Inequities arise from the present system of legal taxonomy. These
inequities are not the inevitable derivative of an unavoidably imprecise
but necessary system of doctrinal classification. Rather, these inequities
are the product of the choices made during a period of great reform of the
legal system in the United States about one hundred years ago.
During this period, referred to herein as the "fin de si~cle," John
Norton Pomeroy and others proposed a rights-based organization of le-
gally cognizable claims analytically superior to the methodology of re-
stricting relief based on the fuzzy taxonomic classifications familiar to-
day. This achievable alternative would have consigned the then-nascent
precepts of contemporary taxonomy to the dustbin of legal history. In-
stead, the precepts of an ancien rigime prevailed.
The question remains how best to achieve the goal of allowing all
appropriate relief upon infringement of cognizable primary legal rights,
within the bounds of precedent and the incremental development that is
associated with the common law. At present, there is again a rising ap-
peal to move incrementally to a rights-based system of legal claims and
remedies that focuses more on upholding enduring values than on enforc-
ing formalistic taxonomic distinctions.
For those who hold that the design of any functioning judicial sys-
tem will be inevitably imperfect, no paradigm can be genuinely pro-
pounded as the perfect solution to every legal challenge. Yet, in the
foundations of the legal system in the United States, one finds an elegant
legal theory fashioned from the roots of established primary rights that
abjures the sort of senseless legal taxonomy that demands bloodletting
debates typified by a recent mil6e about whether negligent misrepresen-
tation should be classified as a breach of contract.
Primary rights theory, albeit elegant, is not without faults but in
practice obliges and relies upon the incremental improvement that is the
hallmark of the common law. It is in the inexorable currents of legal his-
tory that grounds for optimism can be found, but not in the work of legal
taxonomists who, over the past century in particular, have created so
much dysfunction to the pointless end of demonstrably unsound dogma
about contracts and torts.
206. To paraphrase former President William J. Clinton Jr., there is nothing wrong with the
American judicial system that can't be fixed with what is right with American judicial system. Larry
King Live, (CNN television broadcast June 1, 2005).
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MARTINEZ V. RYAN: A SHIFT TOWARD BROADENING
ACCESS TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
ABSTRACT
Prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief face numerous barriers im-
posed by the courts and Congress that prevent federal review of state
court convictions. In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court took a step
toward broadening access to federal habeas review. Although prisoners
generally may not assert claims in federal habeas proceedings that they
failed to raise in state proceedings, the Martinez Court ruled that prison-
ers may assert ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in federal
court when failure to raise such claims in state proceedings was caused
by ineffective assistance of counsel in those proceedings.
This Comment argues that Martinez marks a shift away from the
previous trend of limiting federal habeas review and signals a new em-
phasis on ensuring that prisoners receive at least one full and fair adjudi-
cation of claims. However, the narrow holding does not ensure that pris-
oners will receive adequate representation in collateral proceedings or
have a fair opportunity to prevail on their claims in federal court. The
Court declined to guarantee a right to counsel in collateral proceedings,
meaning that prisoners without effective counsel will still face significant
challenges in vindicating their constitutional rights in federal habeas re-
view. Additionally, some lower courts' narrow interpretations of the
Martinez holding indicate that the decision may have little impact be-
yond ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. Martinez represents a
significant step toward ensuring that prisoners receive a full and fair re-
view of constitutional claims, but the Court did not go far enough in eas-
ing the substantial barriers to accessing habeas corpus relief.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal habeas corpus allows state prisoners to seek relief in federal
court on the grounds that they were convicted or sentenced "in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."' In recent
decades, the courts and Congress have placed significant restrictions on
state prisoners' ability to access federal habeas review.2 Failure to com-
ply with state procedural rules in postconviction proceedings results in
"procedural default," which precludes prisoners from raising defaulted
claims in federal court.3 Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to
counsel in postconviction proceedings,4 and procedural default is fre-
quently the result of inadequate counsel in those proceedings.' In Mar-
tinez v. Ryan,6 the Supreme Court declined to extend the constitutional
right to counsel to prisoners in postconviction proceedings,' but ruled
that ineffective assistance of counsel in those proceedings may constitute
cause to excuse procedural default in limited circumstances.8
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
2. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255, 2261-2266
(2006)). See generally John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REV.
259, 265-66 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's "regime of systematic judicial limitations on
federal habeas corpus" from the 1970s to the 1990s).
3. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
86-87 (1977). See generally RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 2 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26.1 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing procedural default doctrine).
4. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 ("There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-
conviction proceedings." (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987))).
5. Hugh Mundy, Rid of Habeas Corpus? How Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Has Endan-
gered Access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus and What the Supreme Court Can Do in Maples and
Martinez to Restore It, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 186 (2011).
6. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
7. Id at 1315 ("[T]he Court of Appeals in this case addressed ... a question of constitutional
law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the
first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. . . . This is not the case, however, to
resolve [that question].").
8. Id ("This opinion qualifies Coleman by recognizing a narrow exception: Inadequate
assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's
procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.").
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This Comment argues that although Martinez signals a landmark
shift toward broadening access to federal habeas review based on the
idea that prisoners should receive at least one full and fair review of con-
stitutional claims, the limited holding does not ensure that prisoners will
be adequately represented by counsel or have a fair chance to prevail on
their claims in federal court. Part I of this Comment examines the rules
that limit state prisoners' ability to litigate constitutional claims in federal
habeas court and then discusses ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
and Supreme Court precedent on the right to counsel in postconviction
proceedings. Part I summarizes the factual background, procedural his-
tory, and majority and dissenting opinions in Martinez. Part III examines
the policy interests and legal reasoning behind the Martinez decision and
assesses the implications of providing a new avenue to overcome proce-
dural default.
I. BACKGROUND
The courts and Congress have erected numerous barriers to federal
review of state court convictions.9 This Part first examines the limitations
imposed by the exhaustion requirement and the doctrine of procedural
default. Second, it explores how concerns about federalism and promot-
ing the finality of state court convictions have driven these restrictions on
federal habeas review. Third, the Part examines how ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims provide a narrow avenue for prisoners to
access federal habeas review. Fourth, the Part outlines the Supreme
Court's decision in Coleman v. Thompson'o, which firmly established
that the Constitutional right to counsel does not extend to habeas pro-
ceedings.1'
A. Limiting Access to Federal Habeas Corpus
Federal habeas corpus allows state prisoners to petition for relief on
the grounds that they were convicted or sentenced "in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."l 2 The Supreme
Court's 1953 ruling in Brown v. Allen'3 established that state prisoners
with federal constitutional claims may petition for habeas relief in federal
courts, even if those claims have been heard by state courts.14 In a series
of decisions that began in the 1970s, however, the Supreme Court has
placed significant restrictions on state prisoners' ability to access federal
9. See generally Blume, supra note 2, at 265-70 (discussing the Supreme Court's "regime of
systematic judicial limitations on federal habeas corpus" from the 1970s to the 1990s).
10. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
i1. Id.at752-53.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
13. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
14. See id. at 484-86; Mundy, supra note 5, at 195-96 ("'Through its [Brown] ruling, the
Court opened the Writ to state prisoners who possessed federal constitutional claims, notwithstand-
ing state adjudication of those claims.").
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habeas review.15 Prisoners must exhaust all state-court avenues for post-
conviction relief before petitioning in federal court.'6 When a petition
includes multiple claims, the "total exhaustion" rule adopted by the
Court in 1982 requires that the entire petition be dismissed if it contains
even one unexhausted claim.' 7 Additionally, a prisoner's failure to com-
ply with state procedural rules for asserting a constitutional claim in state
postconviction proceedings results in "procedural default," meaning that
federal habeas courts are precluded from reviewing the claim.18 Congress
codified these rules and enhanced other restrictions on federal habeas
review in the centerpiece of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penal-
ty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).' 9
The doctrine of procedural default is rooted in a federal common
law rule that prohibits review of state decisions based on "adequate and
independent state grounds." 20 A state procedural rule is adequate if it is
regularly and fairly applied, 21 and it is independent if it is not so interwo-
ven with federal law that applying it requires a determination of a federal
law question.22 Federal courts must determine whether a state procedural
rule is adequate and independent before dismissing a claim as procedur-
15. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 1 (1992) (adopting a cause-and-prejudice
standard to prisoner's failure to develop facts in state court); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470
(1991) (restricting federal courts' ability to review subsequent habeas petitions); Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (prohibiting federal courts from retroactively applying new rules of crimi-
nal procedure to grant habeas relief); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520-21 (1982) (adopting a "total
exhaustion" rule requiring federal courts to dismiss petitions containing both exhausted and unex-
hausted claims); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 539 (1981) (holding that presumption of correctness
applies to state appellate courts' factual findings); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 72 (1977)
(requiring petitioners to show cause and prejudice for procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 481-82 (1976) (precluding federal review of Fourth Amendment claims when state courts
offered a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims). See generally Blume, supra note 2, at 265-
70 (discussing the Supreme Court's "regime of systematic judicial limitations on federal habeas
corpus" from the 1970s to the 1990s).
16. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1886). See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra
note 3, § 23.1 (discussing the exhaustion requirement).
17. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 522. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 23.5 (dis-
cussing petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims).
18. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991); Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 86-87.
See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3 (discussing the procedural default doctrine).
19. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of28 U.S.C. §§
2244,2253-2255, 2261-2266 (2006)).
20. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, (discussing the "adequate and independent state
procedural grounds" doctrine).
21. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, §
26.2[d][i] (discussing the "adequacy" requirement).
22. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, § 26.2[d][ii] ("[S]tate law cannot be said
entirely to underpin the state court decision .. . if the answer to the state law question depends upon
the answer to some federal law question.").
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ally defaulted,2 3 but often give substantial deference to states in this ar-
ea.24
To overcome procedural default, a petitioner must either show good
cause for failure to comply with state procedural rules and resulting prej-
udice, or show that dismissal of the claim would result in a "miscarriage
of justice."25 The standard for proving miscarriage of justice is notorious-
ly difficult to meet and limited to cases where the prisoner is "actually
* ,26innocent. Thus, most prisoners who fail to properly raise constitutional
claims in state court must show cause and prejudice to excuse the proce-
dural default in order to have their claims heard in federal court.2 7 Pursu-
ant to Murray v. Carrier,28 cause requires a showing that an "objective
factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with
the State's procedural rule." 29 Historically, the Court has found cause to
overcome a default when a constitutional claim is so new that its legal
basis was not available at the time of the state proceeding, 30 when factual
basis for the claim was not reasonably discoverable at the time of the
state proceeding, 1 when state courts or officials hindered compliance
23. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 ("This Court will not review a question of federal law
decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.").
24. Mundy, supra note 5, at 198 ("In reviewing challenges to the adequacy of state procedural
rules, the United States Supreme Court affords considerable deference to states as to both the sub-
stance and application of rules. Even a rule applied with 'seeming inconsistencies' by state court can
serve as an adequate and independent state ground. As a result of such broad judicial discretion, a
state procedural rule may be both 'firmly established' and 'regularly followed' even if its application
permits consideration of a federal claim 'in some but not other' cases. Further, the language of a
state rule need not be exacting to be deemed 'adequate."' (citations omitted)).
25. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 ("In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal
claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas
review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the
claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.").
26. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) ("The Carrier standard requires the habeas
petitioner to show that 'a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who
is actually innocent.' To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence."
(quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986))); id. at 321 ("To ensure that the fundamental
miscarriage ofjustice exception would remain 'rare' and would only be applied in the 'extraordinary
case,' while at the same time ensuring that the exception would extend relief to those who were truly
deserving, this Court explicitly tied the miscarriage of justice exception to the petitioner's inno-
cence.").
27. See Mundy, supra note 5, at 199-200.
28. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
29. Id. at 479.
30. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ("[W]e hold that where a constitutional claim is
so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his
failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures.").
31. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988) ("If the District Attorney's memorandum was
not reasonably discoverable because it was concealed by Putnam County officials, and if that con-
cealment, rather than tactical considerations, was the reason for the failure of petitioner's lawyers to
raise the jury challenge in the trial court, then petitioner established ample cause to excuse his pro-
cedural default. . . .").
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with the procedural rule,32 or when the default was caused by ineffective
assistance of counsel at a proceeding in which the prisoner had a consti-
tutional right to counsel.33 The exhaustion requirement, the doctrine of
procedural default, and the difficulty of showing cause to excuse proce-
dural default have all limited prisoners' ability to access federal habeas
review.
B. Federalism and Finality
Two related policy concerns have provided the principal justifica-
tion for limiting federal habeas review: federalism and finality.34 Habeas
corpus raises concerns about federalism because it involves a federal
court overturning state criminal convictions. 35 As a result, the Supreme
Court has demonstrated a preference for deferring to state-court judg-
ments on constitutional issues in state criminal cases.36 AEDPA codified
the idea that state courts, not federal courts, should be the primary adju-
dicators of constitutional challenges to state convictions.3 7
The Court has also emphasized the goal of promoting the finality of
state convictions.3 8 Finality is necessary, proponents argue, to conserve
judicial resources and to avoid routinely second-guessing the rulings of
state judges.39 It ensures that cases will not be reviewed long after evi-
dence is lost and memories have faded, and allows courts to deliver a
conclusive sense of justice to victims. 4 0 Concerns about federalism and
finality have driven the Court and Congress to create an increasing num-
ber of restrictions on the scope of federal review of state convictions.4 1
32. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 671 (2004) ("[A] petitioner shows cause when the reason
for the failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings was the State's suppression of the relevant
evidence.").
33. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) ("Where a petitioner defaults a
claim as a result of the denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the State, which is re-
sponsible for the denial as a constitutional matter, must bear the cost of any resulting default and the
harm to state interests that federal habeas review entails.").
34. See Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48
WM. & MARY L. REv. 2313, 2335-39 (2007) (discussing how policy concerns about federalism and
finality have influenced federal habeas law).
35. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 443-44 (1963).
36. Mundy, supra note 5, at 196 ("[S]ubsequent court rulings show increased deference to
state courts in resolving constitutional conflicts in criminal cases.").
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006) (mandating deference to state court rulings unless "contrary
to" Supreme Court precedent or "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts").
38. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 ("We now recognize the important interest in finality
served by state procedural rules, and the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of
federal courts to respect them.").
39. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 35, at 451 ("I could imagine nothing more subversive of a
judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part
of the difficult and subtle art ofjudging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all
the shots will always be called by someone else.").
40. See Pettys, supra note 34, at 2336-37 (citing Bator, supra note 35, at 452).
41. See Tom Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L. REv. 425, 428
(2011) (discussing how concerns about finality have influenced restriction on federal habeas corpus).
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C. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims and Right to Counsel in
Collateral Proceedings
The most commonly asserted claim in federal habeas petitions is in-
effective assistance of counsel.4 2 The prevalence of this claim may be a
result of the restrictions put on federal habeas petitions because ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel can provide cause to excuse procedural default
of claims.43 The Court held in Carrier that an attorney's failure to raise a
claim may only constitute cause if the error is so "egregious" as to con-
stitute ineffective assistance of counsel." Thus, to avoid procedural de-
fault, a prisoner must show that the attorney's performance fell below the
standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.45
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to effective
counsel ends at direct appeal and that prisoners do not have a constitu-
tional right to counsel in collateral challenges to their convictions. 46 Col-
lateral review encompasses both federal habeas corpus review and state
postconviction review because these proceedings are outside the trial and
47direct appeals process. The Court has reasoned that counsel is not nec-
essary in collateral proceedings because pro se petitioners have access to
the trial and direct-appeal records, and collateral review amounts to a
duplicative review of claims already raised on direct appeal with the as-
sistance of counsel.48
D. Coleman v. Thompson
In Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether procedural default in state collateral proceedings due to attorney
error precludes federal habeas review of a claim. 4 9 Petitioner Roger
Coleman was convicted of murder in Virginia and sentenced to death.so
On collateral review, a state court considered and rejected Coleman's
42. See VICTOR E. FLANGO, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 45-47 (1994), available at
http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/PublicationsfKlIS StaFedHabCorpStFedCts.pdf (showing that 41%
of state habeas petitions and 45% of federal habeas petitions raise the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel); NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS 28 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf
(showing that 81% of habeas petitions in capital cases and 50.4% of those in noncapital cases raised
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
43. Zimpleman, supra note 41, at 446-47.
44. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (establishing standard for effective assistance of counsel).
46. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) ("There is no constitutional
right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings." (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. I
(1989))); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610, 615 (1974) (holding that there is no right to postcon-
viction counsel under due process or equal protection).
47. See Zimpleman, supra note 41, at 426.
48. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 614-16.
49. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728-29.
50. Id. at 726-27.
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claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Coleman's postconvic-
tion attorneys appealed the decision but filed the notice of appeal one day
late.52 The state court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the late filing
constituted procedural default.53 Coleman then petitioned for habeas re-
lief in federal court, raising the claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.5 4
The Court ruled that procedural default of a constitutional claim in
state court bars federal habeas review of that claim unless the petitioner
can show cause to excuse the default and resulting prejudice.5 This hold-
ing overruled the previous rule from Fay v. Noia56 that failure to comply
with state procedural rules does not preclude a federal habeas court from
hearing a constitutional claim." The majority opinion emphasized "the
important interest in finality served by state procedural rules, and the
significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal
courts to respect them."58
The Coleman Court also held that attorney error in state collateral
proceedings does not constitute cause to excuse procedural default be-
cause there is no constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceed-
ings.59 Thus, Coleman's attorneys' day-late filing of the notice of appeal
in state court meant that federal courts were forced to dismiss Coleman's
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.60 With no further opportunity for
a review of his constitutional claims, Coleman was ultimately executed
in "the following year."6 1
II. MARTINEZ V. RYAN
A. Facts
Luiz Mariano Martinez was convicted in Arizona of sexual conduct
with an eleven-year-old child and sentenced to two terms of life impris-
onment.62 In Arizona, prisoners may not raise a claim of ineffective as-
51. Id at 727.
52. See id.
53. See id at 727-28.
54. See id at 728.
55. Id at 750 ("In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state
court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the
claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will
result in a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice.").
56. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
57. Id. at 426-27 ("[F]ederal court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitu-
tional restraint and is not defeated by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings. State
procedural rules plainly must yield to this overriding federal policy.").
58. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
59. Id. at 752-53.
60. Id. at 757.
61. See Pettys, supra note 34, at 2313.
62. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012).
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sistance of trial counsel on direct appeal but must instead raise the claim
in state collateral proceedings. 6 3 If the claim is not raised in the first col-
lateral proceeding, it is waived and cannot be raised in later proceed-
ings. 4 Martinez's postconviction attorney began state collateral proceed-
ings but did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.6 5 Alt-
hough the court gave Martinez forty-five days to file a pro se petition,
Martinez alleged his attorney never notified him of the collateral pro-
ceedings and did not advise him that he would forfeit the claim if he did
not file a pro se petition.66 Martinez did not respond to the deadline, and
the state trial court dismissed the collateral action.67
Represented by new counsel, Martinez began a second state collat-
eral proceeding seeking to claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel.6 8
The state court dismissed his petition because he failed to raise the claim
in the first state collateral proceeding.
B. Procedural History
With the assistance of his new attorneys, Martinez filed a habeas
petition in federal district court and again raised the claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.70 Martinez argued that he had cause to excuse
the procedural default of that claim because his attorney in the first state
collateral proceeding was also ineffective.71 The federal district court
denied Martinez's habeas petition, reasoning that Martinez had not
shown cause because, under Coleman, an attorney's errors during collat-
eral proceedings do not constitute cause to excuse procedural default.72
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, adding that there is no constitutional right to
effective counsel in collateral proceedings.73 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the issue of whether a prisoner has a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in the first collateral proceeding when that
63. State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (Ariz. 2002).
64. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.2.





70. Id at 1313.
71. Id. at 1314-15 ("He could overcome this hurdle to federal review, Martinez argued,
because he had cause for the default: His first postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise any claims in the first notice of postconviction relief and in failing to notify Martinez of her
actions.").
72. Id at 1315 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991)).
73. Id ("The Court of Appeals relied on general statements in Coleman that, absent a right to
counsel in a collateral proceeding, an attorney's errors in the proceeding do not establish cause for a
procedural default. Expanding on the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals, citing Coleman,
noted the general rule that there is no constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings."
(citing Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 2010))).
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proceeding provides the first opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.74
C. Majority Opinion
In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court
held that procedural default would not prevent a federal court from hear-
ing the merits of Martinez's habeas petition if his first collateral review
attorney was ineffective. 7 5 The Court avoided answering the constitu-
tional question of whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel on
collateral review.76 Ilstead, the Court narrowly framed the issue as
whether an attorney's errors in an "initial-review collateral proceeding"
could qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default of an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. 77 Justice Kennedy used the term "initial-
review collateral proceeding" to refer to state "collateral proceedings
which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance
at trial."78 The Court held that when a state requires ineffective-
assistance claims to be raised in collateral proceedings instead of on di-
rect appeal, "a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from
hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the ini-
tial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that
proceeding was ineffective."79
The Martinez Court framed this holding as a narrow qualification of
the general rule from Coleman that prisoners have no right to effective
counsel in collateral proceedings.80 The Court emphasized the distinct
nature of initial-review collateral proceedings.81 Unlike other collateral
proceedings in which an attorney's error merely precludes further review
of claims that a court has already addressed, an attorney's error in initial-
review collateral proceedings means "that no state court at any level will
74. Id. at 1326 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We granted certiorari on, and the parties addressed
their arguments to, the following question: 'Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is
prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has
a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with
respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim."' (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001))).
75. Id at 1320 (majority opinion) ("Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not
bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the
initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffec-
tive.").
76. Id at 1315.
77. Id. at 1313 ("While petitioner frames the question in this case as a constitutional one, a
more narrow, but still dispositive, formulation is whether a federal habeas court may excuse a proce-
dural default of an ineffective-assistance claim when the claim was not properly presented in state
court due to an attorney's errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding.").
78. Id at 1315.
79. Id. at 1320.
80. Id. at 1315 ("This opinion qualifies Coleman by recognizing a narrow exception . . .
81. Id at 1316.
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hear the prisoner's claim."82 The Court characterized initial-review col-
lateral proceedings as "the equivalent of a prisoner's direct appeal as to
the ineffective-assistance claim" and noted that an attorney's error on
direct appeal may be cause to excuse procedural default. 83
The Court used the importance of initial-review collateral proceed-
ings to distinguish Martinez from Coleman.84 In Coleman, the postcon-
viction attorney error was a failure to file a timely appeal on a claim that
had already been heard in the first collateral proceeding. In Martinez,
the alleged attorney error was a failure to raise the claim in the first col-
lateral proceeding.86 Unlike the petitioner in Coleman, Martinez's claim
was never heard at any level.
The Court also emphasized the particular significance of ineffec-
tive-assistance claims to the adversarial system, stating that "[t]he right
to effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our
justice system."" Proving an ineffective-assistance claim "often re-
quire[s] investigative work and an understanding of trial strategy," which
presents practical difficulties for prisoners who do not have an effective
postconviction attorney.89 When such claims cannot be raised on direct
appeal where prisoners have a right to effective counsel, prisoners are
significantly hindered in their ability to assert their constitutional right to
effective counsel at trial.90
The Court predicted that allowing federal courts to hear the merits
of this type of habeas claim would not place significant strain on state
resources.9t The Court noted that many states already appoint counsel for
ineffective-assistance claims, and procedural default on those claims can
still be enforced when postconviction attorneys perform adequately. 92
States that choose not to appoint counsel in initial-review collateral pro-
82. Id
83. Id. at 1317.
84. Id. at 1316 ("Coleman, however, did not present the occasion to apply this principle to
determine whether attorney errors in initial-review collateral proceedings may qualify as cause for a
procedural default. The alleged failure of counsel in Coleman was on appeal from an initial-review
collateral proceeding, and in that proceeding the prisoner's claims had been addressed by the state
habeas trial court. As Coleman recognized, this marks a key difference between initial-review collat-
eral proceedings and other kinds of collateral proceedings. When an attorney errs in initial-review
collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state court at any level will hear the prisoner's claim."
(citation omitted)).
85. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1991).
86. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
87. See id. at 1316.
88. Id. at 1317.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1318 ("By deliberately choosing to move trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the
direct-appeal process, where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State significantly diminish-
es prisoners' ability to file such claims.").
91. Id at 1319.
92. Id. ("It is likely that most of the attorneys appointed by the courts are qualified to perform,
and do perform, according to prevailing professional norms; and, where that is so, the States may
enforce a procedural default in federal habeas proceedings.").
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ceedings may defend against ineffective-assistance claims on the merits
in federal court.93
According to Justice Kennedy, the holding would have a limited
impact on habeas jurisprudence.94 It did not contradict Coleman, the
Court reasoned, because Coleman did not involve an initial-review col-
lateral proceeding and had never been applied to this type of situation.
The Coleman rule would still control in all circumstances other than ini-
tial-review collateral proceedings that provide the first opportunity to
raise an ineffective-assistance claim.9 6 The Court emphasized that the
holding did not establish a constitutional right to counsel in collateral
proceedings. 97 Rather, it was merely an equitable judgment "that the ini-
tial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with
ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper
consideration was given to a substantial claim."98 In these particular cir-
cumstances, a prisoner has cause to excuse a procedural default so that
federal courts may hear the merits of the claim.99
D. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia accused the
majority of contradicting habeas precedent and violating principles of
federalism and finality.'" Justice Scalia observed that the Court's hold-
ing ignored the "external-factor requirement" of cause for procedural
default.'01 He reasoned that habeas precedent firmly established that at-
torney error is not an external factor unless the prisoner has a constitu-
tional right to effective counsel. 10 2 Because there is no constitutional
right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings, attorney error is not
an external factor and thus cannot constitute cause to excuse procedural
93. Id. at 1320 ("[A] State [may] elect between appointing counsel in initial-review collateral
proceedings or not asserting a procedural default and raising a defense on the merits in federal habe-
as proceedings.").
94. Id. at 1319-20.
95. Id. at 1319 ("Coleman itself did not involve an occasion when an attorney erred in an
initial-review collateral proceeding with respect to a claim of ineffective trial counsel; and in the 20
years since Coleman was decided, we have not held Coleman applies in circumstances like this
one.").
96. Id. at 1320 ("The rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances recognized
here. The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings, includ-
ing appeals from initial-review collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings,
and petitions for discretionary review in a State's appellate courts. It does not extend to attorney
errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of
ineffective assistance at trial . . . ." (citations omitted)).
97. Id at 1319.
98. Id. at 1318.
99. Id. at 1320 ("Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must
be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas
court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collat-
eral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.").
100. Id at 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




default.'0 3 He also suggested that the holding was incompatible with a
number of habeas cases that rejected any right to counsel on collateral
review, including in circumstances where collateral proceedings present-
ed the first opportunity to raise certain claims.'1"
Justice Scalia suggested that the Court's holding would have "pre-
cisely the same" consequences as finding a constitutional right to effec-
tive counsel in collateral proceedings. 0 5 He predicted that the holding
would force states to appoint counsel in collateral proceedings because,
although states could still legally choose not to appoint counsel, the prac-
tical consequences of that choice would be litigating the merits of every
ineffective-assistance claim in federal court. o0 Even states that did ap-
point collateral counsel would be forced to defend the effectiveness of
that counsel in federal court.107 Because procedural default would no
longer automatically keep claims out of federal court, states would have
to defend criminal convictions through "years-long federal retrial."',
Justice Scalia also predicted that the future implications of the holding
would be broad because it would be difficult to limit the new rule to inef-
fective-assistance claims.09 He criticized the Court's holding for impos-
ing significant costs on states and preventing states from achieving finali-
ty in criminal convictions. 0
III. ANALYSIS
Martinez v. Ryan marks a landmark shift toward easing the proce-
dural barriers that prevent prisoners from accessing federal habeas re-
view. The Martinez holding represents a departure from the previous
trend in habeas decisions restricting federal review of state convictions
and signals a new emphasis on ensuring a full and fair adjudication of
constitutional claims. However, the Court's refusal to recognize a consti-
103. Id. at 1325.
104. Id. at 1326 ("In Pennsylvania v. Finley ... we stated unequivocally that prisoners do not
'have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions.' . . .
[I]n announcing a categorical rule in Finley, and then reaffirming it in Giarratano, the Court knew
full well that a collateral proceeding may present the first opportunity for a prisoner to raise a consti-
tutional claim." (citations omitted) (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); Pennsyl-
vania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987))).
105. Id. at 1321.
106. Id at 1322 ("[W]hoever advises the State would himself be guilty of ineffective assistance
if he did not counsel the appointment of state-collateral-review counsel in all cases-lest the failure
to raise that claim in the state proceedings be excused and the State be propelled into federal habeas
review of the adequacy of trial-court representation that occurred many years ago. Which is to say
that the Court's pretended avoidance of requiring States to appoint collateral-review counsel is a
sham.").
107. Id. at 1322-23.
108. Id at 1323.
109. Id. at 1321 ("[N]o one really believes that the newly announced 'equitable' rule will
remain limited to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel cases. There is not a dime's worth of differ-
ence in principle between those cases and many other cases in which initial state habeas will be the
first opportunity for a particular claim to be raised .....
110. Id. at 1327.
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tutional right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings and lower
courts' efforts to limit the application of Martinez mean that petitioners
will still face significant challenges in asserting their constitutional rights
in federal court.
A. A Shift Away from Federalism and Finality Toward a Full and Fair
Adjudication of Claims
Although the Court began its legal analysis by affirming that con-
cerns about federalism and finality guide habeas jurisprudence,"' Mar-
tinez is a significant departure from previous decisions" 2 that relied on
these policy interests to restrict federal habeas review. Federalism and
finality provided the principal justification for restrictive procedural de-
fault rules-exemplified by Coleman and AEDPA-that kept federal
courts from reaching the merits of most habeas petitions.1 3 The Martinez
decision affirms that promoting finality for state convictions is an im-
portant goal but recognizes that finality interests do not insulate unfair
state processes from federal review. As previous scholarship has recog-
nized, in the absence of a fundamentally fair state postconviction pro-
cess, federal habeas review must proceed unencumbered and de novo.114
Although never explicitly stated, the idea that prisoners should have
at least one full and fair opportunity to litigate claims is a resounding
theme throughout the majority opinion.' This theme reflects the proce-
duralist model of habeas review endorsed by commentators like Profes-
sor Justin Marceau." 6 The proceduralist model emphasizes that access to
federal habeas review should depend on whether state procedures pro-
vided a full and fair review of claims."17 The right to a full and fair op-
111. Id. at 1316 (majority opinion) ("Federal habeas courts ... are guided by rules designed to
ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the
integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.").
112. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) ("We now recognize the
important interest in finality served by state procedural rules, and the significant harm to the States
that results from the failure of federal courts to respect them."); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
88 (1977) ("A contemporaneous-objection rule may lead to the exclusion of the evidence objected
to, thereby making a major contribution to finality in criminal litigation.").
113. See Pettys, supra note 34; Zimpleman, supra note 41, at 438.
114. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in §
2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter Marceau, Don't
Forget Due Process] ("Where the aggregate of available state proceedings fail to provide a meaning-
ful corrective process such that federal constitutional issues are not 'fully and fairly' adjudicated, it
is necessary for the federal courts to review the federal claims de novo."); Justin F. Marceau, Defer-
ence and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(I), 82 TUL. L. REV. 385, 441
(2007) ("[T]he text, structure, and purpose of § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) compel the conclusion that
state findings still must comport with minimum standards of procedural regularity . . . .").
115. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318 ("Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel when an attorney's errors (or the absence of an attorney)
caused a procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable
matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with ineffective
counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given to a substantial
claim.").




portunity to litigate constitutional claims comes from the constitutional
right to due process."' In his discussion of the origins of the "full and
fair" right, Professor Marceau has noted that even Professor Paul Bator, a
leading proponent of limiting federal habeas review, "concluded that it is
not an exaggeration to say that 'the essence of . . . due process [is] to
furnish a criminal defendant with a full and fair opportunity' to litigate
constitutional claims concerning the validity of his detention or sen-
tence."119 When state procedures fail to provide a full and fair adjudica-
tion of constitutional claims, due process requires that prisoners have
access to a full and fair review of claims in federal habeas court.120
The petitioner in Martinez faced a situation analogous to other ex-
amples of state procedural unfairness that habeas scholars have argued
should permit unrestricted federal habeas review. For example, Professor
LaFave has reasoned that "federal habeas relief should be available with
respect to a [constitutional] claim if the state court by some stratagem or
procedural device unfairly prevented the petitioner from presenting ar-
gument on legal issues."'21 Similarly, proceedings are not full and fair if
prisoners are not allowed to develop facts necessary to prove their
claims.12 2 When unfair state processes prevent prisoners from litigating
constitutional claims, it seems procedurally unfair to force prisoners to
forfeit claims.123 Forcing a prisoner to forfeit a claim that was procedur-
ally defaulted because of his attorney's mistakes in an initial-review col-
lateral proceeding raises similar concerns about due process. Given the
complex nature of ineffective-assistance claims, the Court in Martinez
recognized that "[t]o present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial in
accordance with the State's procedures, . . . a prisoner likely needs an
effective attorney." 24 The Martinez Court concluded that ineffective
assistance of counsel at an initial-review collateral proceeding likely
deprives the prisoner of "fair process and the opportunity to comply with
the State's procedures and obtain an adjudication on the merits of his
claims."l 25
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . ."); see Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process, supra note 114, at 18
("[D]ue process mandates that every prisoner receive at least one full and fair review of his constitu-
tional claims, either through direct or collateral proceedings, and either in state or federal court."
(citing Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 298-99 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
119. Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process, supra note 114, at 7-8 (quoting Bator, supra note
35, at 456).
120. Id at 7.
121. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 11.7(g), at 497-98 (4th ed. 2004).
122. See Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process, supra note 114, at 34-36 (discussing deficien-
cies in fact-finding procedures as a violation of due process).
123. See id at 34 ("[W]hen the state process is guided by procedures, formal or informal, that
render the process inhospitable to basic fairness, due process requires uninhibited federal review.").
124. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
125. Id.
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In this context, the Court's decision to allow ineffective assistance
of initial-review collateral counsel to qualify as cause to overcome pro-
cedural default seems compelled by due process. The Court recognized
that ineffective counsel on collateral review will likely deprive prisoners
of a meaningful opportunity to have their claims reviewed on the mer-
its. 126 Thus, without effective postconviction counsel, state collateral
proceedings do not offer prisoners the full and fair adjudication of consti-
tutional claims required by due process. When ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel prevents a state court from reaching the merits of
a claim, federal habeas review presents the only opportunity for prisoners
to have their claims heard. The Court held that, under these circumstanc-
es, ineffective assistance of collateral counsel qualifies as cause for pro-
cedural default, allowing prisoners an opportunity to litigate claims in
federal habeas court. This avenue for overcoming procedural default is
meant to guarantee that prisoners receive at least one full and fair review
of their constitutional claims, either in state postconviction proceedings
or on federal habeas review.
The Martinez Court's focus on giving prisoners a meaningful op-
portunity to litigate constitutional claims is a landmark development in
habeas law. The habeas remedy has been so eviscerated in recent decades
that it has become extremely difficult to bring a successful petition in
federal court, even for prisoners with meritorious claims.12 7 In Martinez,
the Court finally took a step toward balancing the interest in finality with
allowing prisoners with meritorious constitutional claims to have their
day in court.
B. A Missed Opportunity to Guarantee the Right to Counsel on Collat-
eral Review
Although Martinez expanded prisoners' access to federal habeas re-
view, the Supreme Court avoided deciding the issue of whether prisoners
have a constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings.128 In do-
ing so, the Court missed an opportunity to extend the constitutional right
to counsel to all proceedings that present the first opportunity to raise
important constitutional claims.
The Court's own reasoning points to the absurdity of differentiating
between collateral review and direct appeal in circumstances where col-
lateral review presents the first opportunity to raise a claim. Martinez
rejects the flawed assumptions that the Supreme Court has previously
relied upon to deny prisoners the right to counsel in postconviction pro-
126. Id. at 1316 ("When an attorney errs in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that
no state court at any level will hear the prisoner's claim.").
127. See KING ET AL., supra note 42, at 52 (showing that only 0.35% of federal habeas peti-
tions in non-capital cases resulted in a grant of relief for any claim).
128. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1313.
284 [Vol. 90:1
MARTINEZ V. RYAN
ceedings. 129 The Martinez Court recognized that the trial and direct-
appeal records provide little assistance to pro se petitioners asserting a
claim for the first time in collateral proceedings.1 30 The Court acknowl-
edged that when collateral proceedings provide the first opportunity to
raise a claim, an initial collateral review is more like a direct appeal than
a duplicative review of claims. 131
Given the similarities between initial-review collateral proceedings
and direct appeal, it makes little sense to continue to deny prisoners the
right to counsel on collateral review. The need for postconviction coun-
sel is especially pressing when the claim at issue is ineffective assistance
of trial counsel. The Martinez Court admitted that "[t]o present a claim
of ineffective assistance at trial in accordance with the State's proce-
dures, . . . a prisoner likely needs an effective attorney." 3 2 When a pris-
oner's only chance to assert a vital constitutional claim depends on ac-
cess to an effective attorney, it is difficult not to conclude that basic no-
tions of "fairness and equality" require a right to counsel to initial-review
collateral proceedings.' 3 3
C. Anomalies Created by Avoiding the Constitutional Question
To avoid ruling on the constitutional issue, the Court opted instead
to create an avenue for prisoners to overcome procedural default. 13 4 The
Court's decision to expand cause for procedural default instead of find-
ing a constitutional right to collateral counsel raises several unresolved
questions.
First, as the dissent noted, the majority opinion does not explain
how the holding is consistent with the "external factor" requirement for
cause.13 5 Carrier and Coleman established that an attorney's error is not
a factor external to the defense and thus cannot constitute cause for pro-
cedural default unless there is a constitutional right to effective coun-
129. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 614 15 (1974) ("[R]espondent ... received the
benefit of counsel in examining the record of his trial and in preparing an appellate brief on his
behalf for the state Court of Appeals. . . . We do not believe that it can be said, therefore, that a
defendant in respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme
Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking review in that court.
At that stage he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief
on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion
by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submis-
sion respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina
with an adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review.").
130. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (citing Halbert v. Michigan, 454 U.S. 605, 617 (2005)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Ross v. Moffiti, 417 U.S. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The right to seek discre-
tionary review is a substantial one, and one where a lawyer can be of significant assistance to an
indigent defendant. It was correctly perceived below that the 'same concepts of fairness and equality,
which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary
appeals."' (quoting Moffit v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 655 (4th Cir. 1973))).
134. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
135. Id. at 1324 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sel.'36 To justify the creation of an exception to the general rule from
Coleman, the Court focused on the special importance of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims.' 37 But the significance of the claim fails to
explain how an attorney's error in collateral proceedings can constitute a
"factor external to the defense" 38 when a prisoner has no constitutional
right to an attorney. The majority opinion did not even mention the ex-
ternal factor requirement, much less attempt to resolve the questions
raised by Justice Scalia in the dissenting opinion. Martinez leaves the
future of the external factor requirement uncertain. It is unclear whether
the external factor requirement will continue to be an obstacle to over-
coming procedural default as it was Carrier and Coleman, or whether it
will be ignored in the future as it was in Martinez.
Martinez also creates a potential anomaly for prisoners whose
claims have been denied on the merits in state court. When a prisoner
fails to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim due to inef-
fective counsel at an initial-review collateral proceeding, Martinez al-
lows the prisoner to litigate the claim in federal court.139 However, it is
unclear what effect Martinez will have when a prisoner's postconviction
counsel raises the claim but litigates it poorly. In such circumstances, the
claim has technically been exhausted instead of procedurally defaulted.
Unlike the situation in Martinez where a claim was not raised at all,
when postconviction counsel raises the claim but does so in an ineffec-
tive manner, it is unclear whether the prisoner will be entitled to relief. It
fails logic to treat less favorably prisoners whose lawyers act deficiently
in litigating a claim than prisoners whose lawyers fail entirely to raise a
claim.
This problem is potentially amplified by the Court's recent decision
in Cullen v. Pinholster.14 0 Federal habeas review of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims is now limited to the record available to the
state court that ruled on the merits of the claims.141 When a postconvic-
tion attorney's incompetence causes the claim to be denied on the merits
in state court, the prisoner will be unable to develop new facts in support
of the claim in federal court because of Pinholster. Thus, Martinez may
136. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) ("There is no constitutional right to an
attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutional-
ly ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings." (citations omitted)); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 488 (1986) ("So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not
constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, we discern no
inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default. In-
stead, we think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether
the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to
comply with the State's procedural rule." (citation omitted)).
137. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
138. Cartier, 477 U.S. at 488.
139. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
140. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
141. Id. at 1398.
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provide an opportunity for relief to prisoners who never raise claims at
all but not for prisoners whose claims are denied due to ineffective post-
conviction counsel.
D. Will Martinez Force States to Appoint Collateral Counsel?
In its discussion of the advantages of expanding cause for procedur-
al default instead of recognizing a constitutional right to collateral review
counsel, the Martinez Court emphasized that its decision would not force
states to appoint collateral counsel. Instead, states could choose "between
appointing counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings or not assert-
ing a procedural default and raising a defense on the merits in federal
habeas proceedings."1 42 But the dissent predicted that the Court's holding
in Martinez would have the same practical effect on states as finding a
constitutional right to counsel on collateral review.14 3 Justice Scalia rea-
soned that, faced with the prospect of litigating ineffective-assistance
claims on the merits in federal court, states will choose to appoint coun-
sel in collateral-review proceedings.'"4
If the dissent is correct, then this is a positive step toward ensuring
broader access to counsel for prisoners with constitutional claims. How-
ever, Justice Scalia's prediction ignores the difficulty of presenting a
habeas petition and prevailing on the merits in federal court. 45 Litigating
habeas claims in federal court will certainly be more costly for states
than the pre-Martinez option of winning a quick summary victory by
asserting procedural default. But given the uphill battle that prisoners
face in prevailing on their claims, states might decide that it is more cost-
effective to win a relatively easy victory on the merits in federal court
than to appoint counsel in every state initial-review collateral proceeding.
The practical barriers to filing a successful habeas petition mean that
states will likely still be able to avoid appointing counsel for prisoners in
collateral proceedings, knowing that pro se prisoners will have little
chance of petitioning successfully in federal court.
State courts in Delaware and Kentucky interpreting Martinez have
confirmed in unpublished opinions that prisoners still do not have a right
142. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319-20.
143. Id. at 1321-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, even if today's holding could (against
all logic) be restricted to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, it would have essentially the
same practical consequences as a holding that collateral-review counsel is constitutionally re-
quired.").
144. See id. at 1322 ("[W]hoever advises the State would himself be guilty of ineffective
assistance if he did ndt counsel the appointment of state-collateral-review counsel in all cases-lest
the failure to raise that claim in the state proceedings be excused and the State be propelled into
federal habeas review of the adequacy of trial-court representation that occurred many years ago.
Which is to say that the Court's pretended avoidance of requiring States to appoint collateral-review
counsel is a sham." (footnote omitted)).
145. See KING ET AL., supra note 42, at 52 (showing that only 0.35% of federal habeas peti-
tions in non-capital cases resulted in a grant of relief for any claim).
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to counsel on collateral review in those states. 14 6 Even though there is no
constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings, it remains to be
seen whether states will decide to appoint counsel, as Justice Scalia pre-
dicted, in order to assert procedural default for federal habeas claims.
Because Martinez does not guarantee prisoners the right to counsel
in initial-review collateral proceedings, the Court's holding does not go
far enough in ensuring that prisoners with meritorious claims will prevail
on those claims. Prisoners who had no counsel in collateral proceedings
will no longer have their claims dismissed due to procedural default, but
they have little chance of succeeding on the merits without the assistance
of counsel. As the Court recognized, proving an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim presents special difficulties for pro se petitioners.14 7 It
requires "investigative work,"48 which is virtually impossible for peti-
tioners to accomplish from prison, and "an understanding of trial strate-
gy,"l49 a subject that is beyond the reach of many petitioners.150 Although
the Martinez decision may lead to fewer petitions being dismissed for
procedural default, the likelihood of ultimate success will remain small
for pro se petitioners raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.15' Because prisoners still have no right to counsel in collateral
proceedings, Martinez is inadequate to ensure that prisoners with merito-
rious ineffective-assistance claims will have a real chance to prevail on
the merits in court.
E. Applying Martinez to Other Types of Claims
Another unresolved question is whether Martinez's expansion of
cause will be applied to claims other than ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. According to the Court, the Martinez holding is limited to pris-
oners asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.15 2 But
the dissent suggested that the holding will not remain limited to ineffec-
tive-assistance claims because they are no different in principle from
146. State v. Finn, No. 0801037592, 2012 WL 2905101, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 17, 2012)
("Martinez does not change Delaware's longstanding rule that defendants are not entitled postcon-
viction relief counsel."); Denny v. Commonwealth, No. 201 1-CA-001232-MR, 2012 WL 2604599,
at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. July 6, 2012) ("Although we find the logic ... from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Martinez persuasive, the Kentucky Supreme Court has specified that there is no
right to the effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings in Kentucky, and we are
bound by that decision.").
147. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Mundy, supra note 5, at 212.
151. See KING ET AL., supra note 42, at 52 (reporting that in a random sample of 2,384 federal
habeas petitions in non-capital cases, only 7 resulted in a grant of relief, and only I of these grants
was based on an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim).
152. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
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claims based on prosecutorial misconduct, exculpatory evidence, or im-
peachment of prosecutorial witnesses.' 53
Courts accord special significance to the role of attorneys in the ad-
versarial system,154 and the Martinez majority emphasized the particular
importance of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims to justify creating
a narrow exception to Coleman.'55 However, courts also accord great
importance to the fairness of the adversarial fight.156 Brady claims, which
involve allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in withholding exculpa-
tory evidence from the defense, may be just as central to protecting the
fairness of the justice system.'15  Whether Martinez remains limited may
depend on whether courts decide that ineffective assistance of counsel
constitutes a more heinous violation of a defendant's rights than a cheat-
ing prosecutor.
On the other hand, it may not matter whether, as Justice Scalia sug-
gested, ineffective assistance of counsel is indistinguishable in principle
from other important claims. Although the Martinez rule could logically
be expanded to other claims, courts inclined to limit habeas relief will
likely take the Martinez opinion at face value in order to deny relief on
other types of claims. In Ibarra v. Thaler,'58 a recent Fifth Circuit case,
the petitioner argued that Martinez should be applied to excuse his de-
fault of two claims in addition to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim.'59 The Fifth Circuit summarily denied relief for these two claims,
stating that "Martinez, by its terms, applies only to ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims."'60 Similarly, a federal district court in
Washington decided that Martinez cannot be applied to Brady claims. 6'
153. Id at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one really believes that the newly announced
equitable' rule will remain limited to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel cases. There is not a
dime's worth of difference in principle between those cases and many other cases in which initial
state habeas will be the first opportunity for a particular claim to be raised: claims of 'newly discov-
ered' prosecutorial misconduct, . . . claims based on 'newly discovered' exculpatory evidence or
'newly discovered' impeachment of prosecutorial witnesses, and claims asserting ineffective assis-
tance of appellate counsel." (citation omitted)).
154. See Zimpleman, supra note 4 1, at 449-52 (discussing how ineffective assistance of coun-
sel functions as a "safety valve" to overcome procedural default).
155. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 ("A prisoner's inability to present a claim of trial error is
of particular concern when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel. The right to the
effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system.").
156. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("Society wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."); see also Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and
Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 643, 643 (2002).
157. See Sundby, supra note 156 ("Brady is often heralded as the Supreme Court case that
granted the criminally accused a constitutional right to discovery. Like the other members of the
[Warren Court] pantheon, the Brady Court announced its holding with a strong tone of moral author-
ity.").
158. 687 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2012).
159. Id. at 224.
160. Id.
161. Hunton v. Sinclair, No. CV-06-0054-FVS, 2012 WL 1409608, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 23,
2012).
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Several other district courts have interpreted Martinez as limited to inef-
fective-assistance-of-counsel claims.162 If Courts continue to read Mar-
tinez narrowly and follow the letter of the majority opinion, Martinez
will do nothing to lower the barriers that prevent prisoners from raising
other types of procedurally defaulted claims in federal court.
F. Lower Courts' Efforts to Distinguish Martinez
Some courts have also limited the application of Martinez by nar-
rowly interpreting the definition of "initial-review collateral proceed-
ing." 63 The Fifth Circuit in Ibarra ruled that Martinez did not apply be-
cause under Texas rules, an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim can
be raised at trial on a motion for a new trial and also on direct appeal.16
Because Texas, unlike Arizona, does not require that the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim be raised only on collateral appeal, the Ibar-
ra court ruled that the collateral proceeding did not constitute the first
opportunity to raise the claim as required by Martinez.16 5 Similarly, a
federal district court in California held that Martinez did not apply be-
cause California prisoners are required to bring ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims on collateral appeal only when matters outside the trial
record must be considered; otherwise, they may raise the claim on direct
appeal.166 Other courts have ruled that Martinez does not apply in Arkan-
sas, Alabama, and Tennessee because those states allow prisoners to
raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. 6 1
162. See Felix v. Cate, No. CV I1-7713-JHN (RNB), 2012 WL 2874398, at *10 (C.D. Cal.
May 8, 2012) ("[T]he narrow exception to Coleman recognized in Martinez applies only to defaulted
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims."); Dunn v. Norman, No. 4:11CV872 CDP, 2012 WL
1060128, at *5 n.2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2012) (finding Martinez inapplicable to procedurally default-
ed claim of insufficient evidence at trial because it is "not a claim that trial counsel was ineffective").
163. See Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2012); Ibarra, 687 F.3d at 224;
Arthur v. Thomas, No. 2:01-CV-0983-LSC, 2012 WL 2357919, at *8-9 (N.D. Ala. June 20, 2012);
Felix, 2012 WL 2874398, at *9-10; Leberry v. Howerton, No. 3:10-00624, 2012 WL 2999775, at
*1-2 (M.D. Tenn. July 23, 2012).
164. Ibarra, 687 F.3d at 227 ("Ibarra is not entitled to the benefit of Martinez for his ineffec-
tiveness claims, as Texas procedures entitled him to review through counselled motions for new trial
and direct appeal.").
165. Id.
166. Felix, 2012 WL 2874398, at *10 ("[U]nlike Arizona, California does not have a procedur-
al rule requiring that all ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims be raised by way of a collateral
attack in a writ of habeas corpus, and not on direct appeal. Rather, it is only when the determination
of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim necessitates consideration of matters outside the
record on appeal (e.g., the existence or nonexistence of a tactical basis for trial counsel's course of
conduct) that California requires the claim to be raised on habeas corpus.").
167. Dansby, 682 F.3d at 729 ("Martinez does not apply here, because Arkansas does not bar a
defendant from raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal."); Arthur,
2012 WL 2357919, at *9 ("The second major difference between Arthur's situation and that of the
petitioner in Martinez is that Arthur could have obtained a review of his ineffective-assistance-of-
trial-counsel claims with the aid of counsel different from his trial counsel in his direct appeal, as
well as in his first collateral challenge."); Leberry, 2012 WL 2999775, at *I ("Martinez is not appli-
cable to this case. . . . [I]n Tennessee, 'there is no prohibition against litigation of ineffective counsel
claims on direct appeal, as opposed to collateral proceedings."' (quoting State v. Monroe, No.
E2011-00315-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2367401, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2012))).
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These courts ruled Martinez inapplicable because state rules do not
bar prisoners from raising ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal,
but the courts did not consider the feasibility of raising those claims on
direct appeal. In Hearn v. Thaler,'68 the petitioner argued that the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Ibarra rendering Martinez inapplicable in Texas
should not apply to claims that rely on facts outside the trial record. 169
The petitioner, who was sentenced to death, noted that in capital cases "it
is not practicable for the defendant to develop the evidence to support
ineffective assistance of counsel claims through a motion for new trial,"
and without factual development these claims "will not receive meaning-
ful review in the direct appeal.",70 Under these circumstances, the peti-
tioner argued that his first collateral proceeding was an initial-review
collateral proceeding as defined by Martinez because it presented the
first practical opportunity for a capital defendant to raise an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. 7 ' The court rejected this argument and in-
terpreted Ibarra as binding precedent that Martinez does not apply in
Texas under any circumstances.172
These lower-court decisions suggest that Martinez will have limited
applicability in states that allow prisoners to raise ineffective-assistance
claims in motions for new trial or on direct appeal, despite the reality that
collateral proceedings often present the first feasible opportunity to raise
such claims. This limited application of Martinez is inconsistent with the
Martinez Court's emphasis on ensuring that every prisoner gets one full
and fair opportunity to litigate ineffective-assistance claims-a point
articulated powerfully by the dissent in Ibarra. 173 The dissent noted that
collateral proceedings are the "preferred and encouraged" venue for rais-
ing ineffective-assistance claims in Texasl74 and that "there clearly are
instances where a collateral proceeding will be the 'first occasion' to
legitimately raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in
Texas." 7 5 Although prisoners may technically be allowed to raise inef-
fective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in a motion for new trial or on
direct appeal, these methods will rarely represent a fundamentally fair
opportunity to vindicate those claims.' 76 The Martinez Court noted that
the "[a]bbreviated deadlines to expand the record on direct appeal may
not allow adequate time for an attorney to investigate the ineffective-
168. No. 3:12-CV-2140-D, 2012 WL 2715653 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2012).
169. Id. at *4.
170. Id. ("[Hearn] argued that the only opportunity to include evidence that is not already in the
trial record is by a motion for new trial that must be filed within 30 days of judgment, usually by
trial counsel and before the record is transcribed.").
171. See id
172. Id. at *3-4.
173. Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2012) (Graves, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 229.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 228-31.
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assistance claim." 7 7 The Ibarra dissent concluded that "it is not equita-
ble to find that [the prisoner] has defaulted on a claim of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel because his claimed ineffective counsel did not prem-
aturely raise said claim when clearly not practicable." 7 8
When state procedures make collateral proceedings the only feasi-
ble place to raise an ineffective-assistance claim, it seems unfair to en-
force a procedural default simply because the prisoner was technically
allowed to raise the claim on direct appeal. Due process requires at least
one full and fair opportunity to litigate constitutional claims. 7 9 If state
procedures do not offer a meaningful opportunity to do so, whether on
direct appeal or in collateral proceedings, Martinez allows federal habeas
courts to excuse a prisoner's procedural default. Ibarra and other deci-
sions are wrong to limit Martinez's applicability without considering
whether state procedures actually afford prisoners a full and fair oppor-
tunity to have their claims heard on the merits. These decisions contra-
vene the Court's purpose in Martinez of giving every prisoner a mean-
ingful opportunity to litigate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
G. The Future of Coleman
Two decades after Coleman established that an attorney's mistakes
in collateral proceedings do not qualify as cause to overcome procedural
default, the Martinez Court shifted course to carve out a "narrow excep-
tion" to this rule. 80 It remains to be seen to what extent Martinez will
limit the reach and impact of Coleman in the future.
Despite the majority's insistence that Martinez constitutes a narrow
exception instead of a reversal, the decision represents a dramatic shift in
the Court's habeas jurisprudence. To explain how Martinez was con-
sistent with Coleman, the Court found it necessary to create an entirely
new distinction that had never previously existed in habeas jurispru-
dence-the "initial-review collateral proceeding."' 8 ' This distinction
meant that attorney error in postconviction proceedings led to strikingly
different outcomes in the two cases. In Coleman, a prisoner facing exe-
cution was barred from federal habeas review because of his attorney's
error in collateral proceedings.1 8 2 In Martinez, the attorney's error on
177. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012).
178. Ibarra, 687 F.3d at 229.
179. See, e.g., Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process, supra note 114, at 18 ("[D]ue process
mandates that every prisoner have at least one full and fair review of his constitutional claims, either
through direct or collateral proceedings, and either in state or federal court." (citing Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277, 298-99 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
180. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
181. Id. ("Coleman v. Thompson left open, and the Court of Appeals in this case addressed, a
question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral pro-
ceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. These
proceedings can be called, for purposes of this opinion, 'initial-review collateral proceedings."'
(citation omitted)).
182. See supra Part I.D.
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collateral review provided an opportunity for the prisoner to raise the
claim in federal habeas court.' 83 Whereas Coleman focused on the im-
portance of finality, Martinez focused on "ensur[ing] that proper consid-
eration [be] given to a substantial claim."l 84 From the Court's emphasis
on providing a full and fair review on the merits rather than on prioritiz-
ing finality, it might seem that Martinez has ushered in a new era of
broader federal habeas review.
Nevertheless, the Coleman rule, that an attorney's mistake on ap-
peal from an initial-review collateral proceeding does not constitute
cause for procedural default, still stands. Several federal court decisions
since Martinez have made clear that Coleman, not Martinez, governs
procedurally defaulted claims caused by attorney error beyond the initial-
review collateral proceeding.' 85 The Eighth Circuit held in Arnold v.
Dormire'8 that Martinez did not apply when, like Coleman, the petition-
er's claims were litigated in the initial-review collateral proceeding but
not preserved on appeal.' 87 The Arnold court reasoned that "unlike Mar-
tinez, Arnold has already had his day in court; deprivation of a second
day does not constitute cause."' 8 8 Federal district courts in Colorado and
Arizona have made similar rulings.'89
These decisions provide support for the Court's assurance that
"[t]he rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances" rec-
ognized in Martinez.'90 The decisions demonstrate that although Mar-
tinez represents a significant shift in the Court's habeas jurisprudence, its
application is constrained to a narrow class of proceedings. Unfortunate-
ly, the Coleman rule will still prevent many prisoners with defaulted
claims from accessing federal habeas review.
CONCLUSION
After decades of tightening restrictions on federal habeas review,
the Supreme Court in Martinez v. Ryan finally took a step toward broad-
183. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
184. Id. at 1318.
185. Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 2012); Cook v. Ryan, No. CV-97-
00146-PHX-RCB, 2012 WL 2798789, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2012); Wilkinson v. Timme, No. I1-
CV-00454-REB, 2012 WL 1884518, at *3 (D. Colo. May 23, 2012).
186. . 675 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 2012).
187. Id. at 1087.
188. Id.
189. Cook, 2012 WL 2798789, at *8 ("Under the plain language of Martinez, post-conviction
counsel's failure to appeal the state court's denial of the ineffectiveness claims cannot constitute
cause for the procedural default because the Martinez exception does not extend to attorney errors
'beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at
trial."' (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320)); Wilkinson, 2012 WL 1884518, at *3 ("With respect
to all of Mr. Wilkinson's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Supreme Court held in a case
prior to Martinez that an attorney's errors on appeal from an initial-review collateral proceeding do
not qualify as cause for a procedural default." (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757
(1991))).
190. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
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ening access to federal habeas corpus. Martinez represents a shift away
from federalism and finality, the policy concerns that historically served
to close the courthouse doors to habeas petitioners. The holding provides
an avenue for habeas petitioners with inadequate counsel in a collateral
proceeding to overcome procedural default and have their claims heard
in federal court. The Court affirmed the importance of ensuring that pris-
oners receive at least one full and fair review of inadequate-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claims and proved willing to open an avenue for federal
habeas review of those claims in limited circumstances. 19 1
If the Martinez holding allows more petitioners with meritorious
constitutional claims to have their day in court, then Martinez represents
a victory for constitutional rights. But although Martinez marks a land-
mark shift toward easing procedural barriers that keep prisoners from
accessing federal habeas review, the Supreme Court missed an oppor-
tunity to guarantee that prisoners with vital constitutional claims will be
represented by counsel in collateral proceedings. Lower court decisions
narrowly interpreting Martinez have already demonstrated the limitations
of the Court's equitable ruling.19 2 Although Martinez represents a signifi-
cant step toward ensuring that prisoners receive a full and fair review of
constitutional claims, prisoners without effective counsel still face signif-
icant challenges in vindicating their constitutional rights in federal habe-
as review.
Mary Dewey
191. Id. at 1318-20.
192. See, e.g., lbarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding Martinez inapplica-
ble because Texas allows prisoners to raise ineffective assistance claims in a motion for new trial
and on direct appeal); Hunton v. Sinclair, No. CV-06-0054-FVS, 2012 WL 1409608, at *1 (E.D.
Wash. Apr. 23, 2012) (holding that Martinez applies only to ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims and not to Brady claims); State v. Finn, No. 0801037592, 2012 WL 2905101, at *2 (Del.
Super. Ct. July 17, 2012) ("Martinez does not change Delaware's longstanding rule that defendants
are not entitled postconviction relief counsel.").
* J.D. Candidate, 2014. I would like to thank Professor Justin Marceau for his valuable input
and guidance. I am also indebted to the wonderful Denver University Law Review Board and editori-
al staff who worked with me to make this Comment publishable-particularly Edward Shaoul for his
dedication to the intricacies of comma usage.
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UNITED STATES V. HoME CONCRETE & SUPPLY, LLC:
MAKING "AMBIGUOUS" AMBIGUOUS
ABSTRACT
Courts have long given some amount of deference to executive
agencies charged with administering bodies of law. When a statute is
ambiguous, the agency charged with administering the statute may be
better positioned than the courts to interpret it. But when is a statute am-
biguous? How does a modem court determine whether a prior court
thought a statute was ambiguous? Does a Supreme Court interpretation
of an ambiguous statute remove the ambiguity? These are the questions
that faced the Supreme Court in United States v. Home Concrete & Sup-
ply, LLC.
The 1984 Supreme Court decision Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, Inc. ushered in a new era of increased defer-
ence to agencies by replacing the previous circumstantial standard with a
presumption of deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous stat-
utes. Chevron's policy was obvious but its limits were vague. In United
States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court drew a procedural line beyond
which deference to agencies was inappropriate in order to ensure due
process. National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Inter-
net Services made administrative law more consistent by giving Chevron
deference to all proper agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, re-
gardless of whether courts had already interpreted those statutes. Home
Concrete is the Supreme Court's most recent effort to adjust the standard
for Chevron deference.
This Comment analyzes Home Concrete on two levels: (1) by re-
viewing the case-specific issues that primarily controlled Home Con-
crete, and (2) by considering the decision's broader effects on adminis-
trative-deference law. The Comment suggests that the Supreme Court
wrongly decided -ome Concrete on the micro-level and unwisely re-
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INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
source Defense Council, Inc.' held that courts should defer to an agen-
cy's interpretation of a law it administers when (1) Congress was silent
or ambiguous on the issue, and (2) the agency interpretation is reasona-
ble.2 This presumptively deferential approach stood in stark contrast to
the traditional circumstantial analysis of Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 3
In United States v. Mead Corp. , however, the Supreme Court nar-
rowed the Chevron analysis, limiting application only to those circum-
stances where Congress intended to allow agencies to resolve statutory
ambiguities with the force of law.s Where Congress had delegated such
authority to agencies, National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Services recognized that agencies were entitled to
Chevron deference even in the face of a conflicting appellate court deci-
sion.7 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC' is the Supreme
Court's most recent effort to revise administrative-deference law, in
which a plurality of Justices redefined what constitutes "ambiguous"
congressional intent.9
This Comment explores the flaws of Home Concrete and frames the
case as a retreat from the deferential doctrine of Chevron and Brand X.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See id. at 842-45.
3. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
4. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
5. Id at 226-27 (holding that "Chevron deference" applies only "when it appears that Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency" to interpret with the force of law and the agency interpreta-
tion was an "exercise of that authority").
6. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
7. Id. at 982 (holding that an agency interpretation "otherwise entitled to Chevron deference"
trumps a prior judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
8. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
9. See id. at 1843-44 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that congressional intent is only ambig-
uous when Congress "left a gap to fill").
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Part I of this Comment briefly describes the history of Supreme Court
administrative-deference jurisprudence. Part II summarizes the facts,
procedural history, and opinions of Home Concrete. Part III criticizes
Home Concrete for unnecessarily confusing Brand X application, desta-
bilizing the meaning of "ambiguity" in the context of Chevron, and fail-
ing to address two administrative-deference issues that have vexed lower
courts. This Comment concludes that Home Concrete was wrongly de-
cided and will negatively affect administrative-deference law going for-
ward.
I. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has long recognized the need for deference to
executive agencies on interpretations of laws administered by those same
agencies.'o Prior to the landmark Chevron ruling, courts applied a case-
by-case analysis as prescribed by Skidmore to determine proper defer-
ence," varying the range and weight of factors considered.12 Enactment
of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) reduced this vari-
ance by articulating the procedures by which agencies could make and
interpret rules, though it did not directly address the judicial framework
for deference.' 3
Chevron brought a sweeping change with its two-step framework,
creating a presumption of deference to the administering agency when a
statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation is reasonable.14 The
Court subsequently sought to clarify when Chevron applies in Mead,15
though the clarity of that holding is debated.16 Later, Brand X controver-
sially extended Chevron deference to agency interpretations that directly
contradicted prior judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes.' 7 More
recently, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United
States'8 made clear that Chevron applies to Treasury regulations.' 9
10. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to
administrative interpretations.").
11. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989) (discussing pre-Chevron statute-by-statute analysis).
12. See Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over "Fighting Regs" and Judicial Deference in Tax
Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643, 649-60 (2012) (describing variations of factors considered over the
history of tax law deference).
13. Id at 649-50, 653-56, 658 (describing the APA and its effects on tax-law deference).
14. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
15. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
16. Id. at 240-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for creating uncertainty by
abandoning Chevron's presumption of delegation for a requirement of affirmative legislative intent
to delegate).
17. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
18. 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
19. Id. at 713 (rejecting a subject-specific deference standard and adopting the more general
Chevron standard for tax law). The Court also rejected the concept that deference varied based on
whether the grant of authority to the agency was general or specific. Id. at 713-14.
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A. Skidmore and Early Approaches to Administrative Deference
In the 1944 Skidmore case, the Supreme Court recognized that
agency interpretations may be worthy of significant persuasive weight
though they "lack[] power to control." 20 In Skidmore, plaintiffs brought
suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 seeking overtime and
associated damages for nights spent on call in the company fire hall.21
The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division had previously put
forth his view that "the problems presented by inactive duty require a
22flexible solution" depending on the circumstances.22 In Skidmore, the
Administrator filed a brief amicus curiae explaining that his policies
"point[ed] to the exclusion of sleeping and eating time of these employ-
ees from the work-week and the inclusion of all other on-call time."23
However, the trial court denied the employees any recovery by ruling as
a matter of law that waiting time is not work, and the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed.24
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that
weight should be given to agency interpretations based on a non-
exclusive set of factors and that standards of agencies and courts should
differ "only where justified by very good reasons." 25 The Court reasoned
that agency interpretations deserve persuasive weight because agencies
have specialized experience and breadth of knowledge in their respective
fields and because agencies determine the policy that guides enforce-
ment.2 6 The factors affecting the weight given to an agency interpreta-
tion, the Court concluded, should include its thoroughness, reasoning,
and consistency with other pronouncements.27
For the next forty years, courts generally applied some version of
the Skidmore case-by-case approach to agency deference while also con-
sidering guidance from the APA.28 In addition to the Skidmore factors,
courts gauged their deference based on whether an interpretation was
legislative or interpretative,2 9 whether the interpretation was triggered by
litigation,3 0 whether the regulation incorporated common law concepts,
20. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
21. Id at 135.
22. Id at 138.
23. Id at 139.
24. Id at 136.
25. Id at 140.
26. Id at 139-40.
27. Id. at 140.
28. See Scalia, supra note 11.
29. See Lederman, supra note 12, at 649-54 (explaining that interpretive rules received less
deference than legislative rules both before and after the 1946 enactment of the APA).
30. See id at 675-78 (explaining that courts prior to Chevron were "concern[ed] about regula-
tions promulgated during litigation").
31. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review ofAgency Decisions,
104 Nw. U. L. REv. 799, 806-13 (2010) (explaining the problem of deferring to agency interpreta-
tions of statutes that include common law phrases, arguably well within the judiciary's proper do-
main).
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which agency made the interpretation, 32 and whether congressional dele-
gation to the agency was general or specific. 3 3
B. Modern Administrative Deference: Chevron
The Chevron Court announced a new standard for administrative
deference based on a presumption that Congress intended to delegate
interpretation to the administering agency when Congress's intent on the
specific matter was not directly expressed.34 In Chevron, the National
Resources Defense Council filed a petition in the D.C. Circuit for review
of an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation that defined
the term "stationary source" from the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977.35 At issue was whether stationary source of pollution in the Clean
Air Act permit program referred to a facility as a whole (the "plant-wide"
definition) or to each individual polluting device in a facility. The EPA
under Reagan had issued regulations establishing the plant-wide defini-
tion, reversing course from the EPA under Carter.37 Despite observing
that Congress's intent regarding the definition was ambiguous, the D.C.
Circuit set aside the regulations because it found the plant-wide defini-
tion inconsistent with the purpose of the program.38
The Chevron Court granted certiorari and reversed, deferring to the
EPA's plant-wide definition because Congress was silent on the issue
and the plant-wide definition was reasonable. 3 9 The holding established a
two-step test requiring deference to an agency's construction of a statute
the agency administers when (1) Congress has not "directly spoken to the
precise question at issue" and (2) the agency's view is reasonable. 40 Fur-
thermore, the new standard applied whether Congress left a gap unfilled
either intentionally or inadvertently.4 1 The Court stressed agencies' polit-
ical accountability and expertise as reasons for this broad deference and
rejected the notion that an agency's change in interpretation over time
precluded deference.42
32. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712-13
(2011) (noting the Treasury-specific standard of Nat '1 Muffler Dealers Ass' v. United States, 440
U.S. 472 (1978)).
33. Lederman, supra note 12, at 656 ("Prior to the APA, there was an understanding specific
to tax law that general-authority regulations were interpretive and that specific-authority regulations
were legislative.").
34. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
35. Id. at 840-41.
36. Id
37. Id. at 853, 857-58.
38. Id at 841-42.
39. Id. at 862, 866.
40. Id at 842-43, 845.
41. Id at 865-66.
42. Id. at 863-66.
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C. Mead Limits Chevron "Step Zero-'
Mead pulled back from Chevron's broad standard, limiting applica-
tion of Chevron deference to situations where Congress has shown intent
to grant agency authority to make rules with the force of law and the
interpretation in question is an exercise of that authority." In Mead, the
plaintiff challenged a Customs Headquarters ruling that reclassified its
three-ring binders as diaries, subjecting them to a tariff.4 5 The Court of
Intemational Trade granted summary judgment to the government with-
out addressing deference.4 6 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
Customs rulings should not receive Chevron deference because they are
not subject to notice-and-comment procedures under the APA and do not
apply beyond the specific case.47
Affirming this limitation, the Supreme Court held that classification
rulings were not subject to Chevron deference because they were not an
exercise of authority delegated by Congress to make rules with the force
of law. The Court reasoned that because classification rulings are case-
specific and are "being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at ... 46
scattered offices," such rulings are so informal that Congress could not
have intended for them to carry the force of law.48 Rather than presuming
delegation, the Court required indications of legislative delegation such
as express authorization of rulemaking or authority to use formal proce-
dures more worthy of the force of law.49 Additionally, when Chevron
deference is not merited, the Court noted, an agency interpretation may
still be persuasive under Skidmore.so
In lone dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's "avulsive"
change as abandoning Chevron's clear presumption of agency authori-
ty.51 Further, he emphasized that the majority ruling was unfaithful to the
policies behind Chevron and would lead to uncertainty and ossification
of previously flexible administered laws.52
43. Pojanowski, supra note 31, at 803 ("Much of the copious ink spilt over Chevron, howev-
er, runs toward Chevron's so-called 'Step Zero'-the threshold determination about which agency
interpretations should be eligible for the two-step inquiry.").
44. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
45. Id at 225.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 225-26.
48. Id. at 232-34.
49. Id at 229-30.
50. See id at 234.
51. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 241-42, 244-45, 247-49 (conceding that ossification of administered laws could be
remedied by allowing agencies to readopt their interpretation through an approved procedure follow-
ing a contrary judicial ruling, but rejecting that concept as a "landmark abdication of judicial pow-
er").
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D. Brand X Extends Chevron
Although Mead limited the applicability of Chevron deference, the
Supreme Court in Brand X broadened the reach of such deference when
it did apply.53 Where Congress left an ambiguity in a statute for determi-
nation by an agency, the agency interpretation was entitled to deference
even when conflicting with a prior judicial interpretation.54 After Brand
X, "[o]nly a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously
forecloses the agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no -gap for
the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction."
In BrandX, digital-subscriber-line (DSL) broadband providers chal-
lenged the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) classification of
cable broadband services as information services instead of telecommu-
nications services, thus allowing cable companies to avoid mandatory
common-carrier regulations that burdened DSL companies. 6 The Ninth
Circuit vacated the classification and remanded on principles of stare
decisis because it had previously held that cable broadband was a tele-
communications service.57
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that
Congress's intent for the meaning of the terms "telecommunications ser-
vice" and "information service" was ambiguous and the FCC's formal
classification of cable broadband providers as information services was
reasonable. The majority reasoned that a court's interpretation of an
ambiguous statute should not bind an agency just because the court's
ruling happened to come first, noting that to hold otherwise would lead
to ossification of administered law. 5 9 Dissenting again, Justice Scalia
warned that the holding made "judicial decisions subject to reversal by
executive officers." 6 0
II. UNITED STATES V. HOME CONCRETE & SUPPLY, LLC
A. Facts
Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a),61 the statute of limitations for the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to assess income taxes is generally three
years, but that period is extended to six years by 26 U.S.C.
§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) when the taxpayer "omits from gross income an
amount properly includible therein [which] is in excess of 25 percent of
53. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 982 83.
56. Id. at 975-80.
57. Id. at 979-80.
58. Id at 989, 1000-01, 1003.
59. Id. at 983.
60. Id at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) (2006).
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the amount of gross income stated in the return." 6 2 In its 1999 tax return,
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC listed income from the sale of certain
property but overstated the basis for that property resulting in an under-
statement of income greater than the statute's 25% threshold. 63 The IRS
assessed this deficiency after the three-year period but before the six-year
period.6
Section 6501 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in 1954.
A provision materially identical to § 6501 existed in the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939.66 However, the 1954 version contains two subsections
not present in the 1939 version, one of which defines "gross income" for
a trade or business as the total received from the sale of goods or services
prior to the diminution of the cost. 67 The 1954 Code also made an estate-
tax-omission rule, but that version used the phrase "omits . .. items" 68 as
opposed to the phrase "omi[ts] . . . amount" in the income-tax-omission
rule.69
In 1958, the Supreme Court decided Colony, Inc. v. Commission-
er,7 0 which addressed the issue at play in Home Concrete: whether an
overstatement of basis resulting in an understatement of income consti-
tuted an omission of an amount from gross income.7 1 Although the 1954
Code was already enacted at the time of Colony, the 1939 Code applied
in Colony because the income in question was from 1946 and 1947.72
The Court held that an overstatement of basis did not constitute an oms-
sion for purposes of the 1939 version,73 but it observed that the new 1954
version "resolved [this issue] for the future" 74 with "unambiguous lan-
guage."75 Though noting that the language of the 1939 provision was not
14 76"unambiguous" on the issue, the Court found in the legislative history
"persuasive indications" that Congress intended application only for
omission of entire items, rather than for all understatements of income.7 7
In making its holding, the Court inferred that Congress's purpose was to
62. Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i).
63. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1839 (2012).
64. Id
65. Id. at 1840.
66. Id. ("The Code provision applicable to this case, adopted in 1954, contains materially
indistinguishable language [to the 1939 code]." (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A))).
67. Id. at 1841 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)).
68. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(2).
69. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1851 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
70. 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
71. Id. at 29-30.
72. Id. at 30.
73. Id. at 36.
74. Id. at 32.
75. Id. at 37.
76. Id. at 33.
77. Id. at 35.
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prevent the IRS from being disadvantaged at detecting errors by the ab-
sence of an item.78
B. Procedural History
Home Concrete brought suit in the Eastern District of North Caroli-
na, seeking to recover taxes it had paid based on an adjustment that was
issued after the default three-year period expired.7 9 The district court
granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding the taxpayer's under-
statement of income resulting from its basis overstatement to be an omis-
sion of gross income that triggered the extended six-year statute of limi-
tations.so
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that, per Colony, an
understatement of income resulting from overstatement of basis is not an
omission from gross income. 8' The court was not persuaded that the ad-
ditional subsections in the 1954 Code altered the meaning of the control-
ling provision. 82 The IRS also argued that Treasury Regulation
301.6501(e)-i, finalized in 2010, overturned Colony by expressly includ-
ing understatements of income resulting from overstatements of basis as
omissions from income, and the regulation should have been applied
retroactively in Home Concrete because the case was not finally re-
solved.83 The court rejected this argument, holding that the regulation
could not be applied retroactively and, further, that Colony could not be
overturned because it resolved an unambiguous statute.8 4 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the three-year or the six-
year statute of limitations should apply.85
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia. 86 The majority
affirmed, holding that the six-year statute of limitations did not apply on
the grounds of stare decisis.87 Colony controlled because its Court deter-
mined the intent of Congress in the 1939 Code and because there was no
clear indication that Congress had changed the treatment of overstate-
ments in relation to income omissions in the 1954 Code.88 A plurality
78. Id. at 36. This stated purpose was not clear from the legislative history but rather from
what the Court thought Congress manifested. See id
79. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 252-53 (4th Cir. 2011),
aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
80. Id. at 253.
81. Id. at258.
82. Id. at 255.
83. Id. at 255-56.
84. Id. at 257-58.
85. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1839 (2012).
86. Id. at 1838.
87. Id. at 1844.
88. Id. at 1841.
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went on to clarify that the 2010 Treasury Department regulation could
not overturn Colony because Brand X only applied when Congress "left a
gap to fill."89 Justice Scalia declined to join that portion of the opinion,
suggesting instead that BrandX should be abandoned. 90
The majority began by summarizing Colony and then proceeded to
dismiss the dissent's reasons that the changes in the 1954 Code affected
the overstatement-of-basis issue.91 First, the Court reasoned that there
were potential congressional motives for adding the new subsections to
§ 6501(e)(1)(A) beyond changing the general rule on overstatements of
basis. 9 2 Second, the addition of the phrase "omits ... items" to the estate-
tax-omissions rule did not have sufficient strength to overturn Colony's
careful interpretation of the phrase "omits . . . amount" in the income-
tax-omissions rule.
In considering whether the IRS regulations overturned Colony, Jus-
tice Breyer's plurality found that the decision left no room for agency
interpretation. 9 4 Although acknowledging that ambiguous language con-
stituted "at least a presumptive indication that Congress did delegate ...
gap-filling-authority" to an agency, Justice Breyer disregarded the Colo-
ny Court's characterization of the statute as ambiguous. 95 Justice Breyer
pointed to the Colony Court's use of legislative history, characterization
of the taxpayer's argument as the "better side of the textual [analysis]," 96
and observation that ruling for the government would result in a "patent
incongruity in the tax law."97 As a result, finding "every reason to be-
lieve that the [Colony] Court thought that Congress had 'directly spoken
to the question at hand,' and thus left '[no] gap for the agency to fill,," 9 8
the Court concluded that Brand X did not apply; therefore Colony's in-
terpretation was binding.99
D. Concurring Opinion
Concurring in part and in the judgment, Justice Scalia renewed his
staunch objection to Brand X 00 In doing so, Justice Scalia underscored
the impracticality of trying to determine whether a pre-Chevron Court, to
89. Id. at 1844 (plurality opinion).
90. Id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. Id at 1839-42 (majority opinion).
92. Id
93. Id
94. Id at 1843 (plurality opinion).
95. Id Colony stated, "[LIt cannot be said that the language is unambiguous." Colony, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958).
96. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844. Colony stated, "[W]e are inclined to think that the
statute on its face lends itself more plausibly to the taxpayer's interpretation." Colony, 357 U.S. at
33.
97. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (citing Colony, 357 U.S. at 33, 35-37).
98. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1846 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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whom the label "ambiguous" had no relevance, thought a statute was
ambiguous.101 Assuming, arguendo, the validity of BrandX, he criticized
the majority's gap-to-fill requirement as unnecessarily 02 confusing ad-
ministrative-deference law "yet again."10 3 Citing the vague references to
congressional intent from Colony, Justice Scalia explained that in this
case congressional intent was still very much ambiguous and thus the
majority should have found that Brand X applied.'
E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, explained that the changes to the 1954 Code
made the already ambiguous exclusion of overstatements of basis'05 even
more ambiguous,106 thereby effectively making § 6501 a new statute
subject to Chevron and not controlled by Colony.10 7 Without the need to
deal with Colony, the analysis in BrandXhad no bearing on the decision,
so the Treasury was free to adopt its own interpretation. 08
Justice Kennedy enumerated the additions to the 1954 version that
indicated congressional intent to include basis overstatements in income-
tax omissions. First, the addition of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) expressly exclud-
ed overstatements of basis from omissions of income in special circum-
stances, implying that the general rule included overstatements.' 09 Sec-
ond, the continued use of the word "amount" for income-tax omissions
despite the deliberate use of the word "items" for estate-tax omissions
implied that income-tax omissions did not just apply to entire items." 0
Additionally, the dissent stressed that Colony "never purported to inter-
pret" the 1954 version."'
Because the IRS's interpretation of § 6501 was at least reasonable,
perhaps even the best interpretation, the dissent concluded that such in-
terpretation deserved deference. 12 The dissent declined to suggest that
101. Id. at 1846-48.
102. Id at 1847 (observing other more appropriate means of protecting taxpayers' justified
reliance).
103. Id. (referring to criticism of United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)); see also
supra Part LC (describing Justice Scalia's dissent in Mead).
104. Home Concrete, 123 S. Ct. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 1849 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting Colony's description of the 1939 language as
ambiguous).
106. Id ("Although the main text of the statute remained the same, Congress added new provi-
sions leading to the permissible conclusion that it would have a different meaning going forward.").
107. Id at 1851.
108. Id. at 1852 ("The Treasury Department's regulations were promulgated in light of [the
1954] revisions, which were not at issue in Colony.").
109. Id. at 1850-51.
110. Id. at 1851.
I11. Id at 1852-53 (quoting Intermountain Ins. Serv. v. Comm'r, 650 F.3d 691, 705-06 (D.C.
Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id
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the 2010 Treasury Department regulation overturned Colony under
BrandX, dismissing such an issue as "not implicated here.",l 3
III. ANALYSIS
The Home Concrete majority erred by holding, in the face of com-
pelling contrary evidence, that Colony's interpretation of the 1939 tax
code applied to the 1954 tax code. The plurality followed by misapplying
Brand X in several significant ways. First, the plurality chose a difficult
hypothetical-based test for Brand X applicability that will generate un-
predictable results in administrative-deference cases. Second, the plurali-
ty blurred the meaning of ambiguity in a shift away from the deferential
approach of Chevron and BrandX. Third, the Court missed an opportuni-
ty to address two unresolved issues in administrative law: (1) Brand X
applicability to prior Supreme Court interpretations, and (2) whether
agencies should be able to reverse litigation by creating new interpreta-
tions after the litigation and retroactively applying those interpretations
to individuals to whom the courts have already given relief.
A. Home Concrete Improperly Applied Colony to a New Statute
The Colony Court never intended that its interpretation of the 1939
tax code apply to the 1954 tax code. Congress's intent to include over-
statements of basis in income omissions in the 1954 version is apparent
from the statutory text, the context in which the 1954 version was writ-
ten, and the Colony Court's comments in recognition of that intent. Nev-
ertheless, the Home Concrete majority found otherwise, impractically
assigning itself a Brand X analysis and reopening a tax loophole that
Congress closed in 1954.
As the Home Concrete dissent explained, Congress made several
textual additions to the 1954 tax code indicating that overstatements of
basis should be included in omissions from income.l 14 First, Congress
added two subsections to the income-omissions provision, one expressly
announcing that overstatements of basis do not count as omissions in the
particular case of trade or business.
In the case of a trade or business, the term "gross income" means
the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or
services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) pri-
or to diminution by the cost of such sales or services ... .1
The dissent reasoned that this exception for goods sold by businesses
excluding overstatements of basis implied that the general rule included
113. Id at 1851-52.
114. Id at 1849-51.
115. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
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overstatements. 116 The majority maintained that Congress "could well
have" intended only to specify the overstatement rule for sale of goods
by businesses, leaving the general rule to be decided by the courts.117 It
also noted that the subsection had an additional reasonable purpose unre-
lated to overstatements of basis.1 8
Second, Congress used the language "omits... items" in the estate-
tax-omissions provision, but used the language "omits .. . amount" in the
income-tax-omissions provision.' These provisions serve identical pur-
poses for two different types of tax, are phrased in otherwise very similar
language, and are adjacent subsections of the same tax-code section.120
The dissent suggested that this distinction shows deliberate congressional
intent to include overstatements for income-tax omissions but not for
estate-tax omissions.121 The majority conceded that the language was
new, but belittled the change as insufficient proof of congressional in-
tent.122
The majority's reasoning manifests its error: it should have been re-
viewing the textual changes for an introduction of ambiguity, not for a
change in the best interpretation. By noting that "one plausible reason
why Congress might have added clause (i)" is that Congress "could well
have" intended something else, the majority conceded that the new text is
ambiguous.123 Such ambiguity should have triggered a new Chevron
analysis, rendering Colony irrelevant.
The context of the writing of the 1954 Code also supports a finding
of congressional intent to change the overstatement issue. Preceding the
new tax code, federal circuits were split on the overstatement issue re-
garding the 1939 version; Congress had a motive to resolve this issue in
the 1954 version. 12 4 Congress could not have intended, through silence,
"to convey an established meaning from prior judicial and regulatory
interpretations" because there was no established meaning.125
116. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1851 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The revised statute's
special treatment of these costs suggests that overstatements of basis in other cases could have the
effect of extending the limitations period.").
117. Id. at 1841 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 1841-42.
119. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(2), with § 6501(e)(1)(A).
120. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (extending the statute of limitations for assessing
income taxes when there are omissions in income), with § 6501 (e)(2) (extending the statute of limi-
tations for assessing estate taxes when there are omissions in inheritance income).
121. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1851 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1842 (majority opinion) ("But to rely in the case before us on this solitary word
change in a different subsection is like hoping that a new batboy will change the outcome of the
World Series.").
123. Id. at 1841 (emphasis added).
124. Russell R. Young, D.C. Circuit in Intermountain Sets Stage for Supreme Court Consid-
eration of Home Concrete, 116 J. TAX'N 33, 36 (2012).
125. Id.
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The Court in Colony noted the circuit split on the issue and recog-
nized that Congress had resolved the issue for the future with the 1954
Code.126 The Court believed that Congress had addressed the issue and
changed it in the text; this is evident from its contrasting descriptions of
the two versions. The Court noted that "it cannot be said that the [1939]
language is unambiguous," 27 but maintained that its ruling was "in har-
mony with the unambiguous language of [the 1954 Code]." 28
Aside from being textually and contextually unsupportable, the ma-
jority's refusal to interpret the 1954 statute under Chevron is neither jus-
tified by policy nor practical. Stare decisis is a non-issue; the new inter-
pretation would be of a different statute so it would not conflict with
Colony. Protecting taxpayer expectations here is unnecessary; expecta-
tions are sufficiently protected by the processes required by Mead,12 9 the
reasonableness standard of Chevron,' 30 and the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of the APA.131 Judicial efficiency as a basis also falls flat.
Spending time conducting a Chevron analysis of the statute is not waste-
ful because the alternative is spending time conducting a Brand X analy-
sis of the prior judicial construction.
Holding that the 1954 Code did not affect the overstatement issue
was poorly reasoned and unjustified. Taxpayers who underpay taxes by
overstating bases for sales, whether intentionally or not, will benefit at
the expense of all other taxpayers. Congress, which has already ad-
dressed the issue once, will have to spend time resolving it once again in
order to correct the Court's error.
B. The Plurality's Implementation of the Brand X Test Unnecessarily
Creates Uncertainty
The Home Concrete plurality put forth a daunting test for Brand X
applicability to pre-Chevron judicial interpretations-Would the prior
court have found that Congress's intent was unambiguous by Chevron
standards if it had considered the issue? The plurality selected this test
126. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1958) ("We granted certiorari because this
decision conflicted with rulings in other Courts of Appeals on the same issue, and because the ques-
tion as to the proper scope of [the 1939 Code], although resolved for the future by [the 1954 Code],
remains one of substantial importance in the administration of the income-tax laws for earlier taxable
years." (citations omitted)).
127. Id.at33.
128. Id. at 37.
129. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead has Muddled Judicial Review ofAgency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1478-81 (2005) (describing the protections offered to individuals by notice-
and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication).
130. Note, Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step One Holding?, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1532, 1551 (2006) ("Under the [Chevron] doctrine of hard look review, courts can block change if
the agency has not rationally considered, weighed, and addressed the reliance interests of regulated
parties.").
131. See Lederman, supra note 12, at 697 (suggesting that Treasury Department "fighting
regulations"-those created for the purpose of affecting ongoing litigation by changing the law
retroactively-should be dealt with using the arbitrary and capricious check).
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over the more practical "if necessary" test suggested by Brand X.132 This
decision will result in a standard that is difficult to follow for courts, and
it will lead to uncertainty and unpredictability for agencies that adminis-
ter laws and for individuals governed by them.133
The difficulty presented by Brand X is predominantly limited to
cases decided before Chevron. After Chevron, most courts knew to make
their decisions clear by uttering the "magic words" that their "construc-
tion follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute" and citing Brand
X.134 Pre-Chevron courts, like Colony, however, pose more of a dilemma.
These courts had no reason to determine whether congressional intent
was clear enough to merit the Chevron "unambiguous" label.'35 Instead,
pre-Chevron courts only needed to determine what was most likely Con-
gress's intent. These courts interpreted administered statutes virtually the
same as they interpreted any other statute: with a de novo review to de-
termine the best interpretation.'36
This was the question facing Home Concrete-How should a court
best determine whether a pre-Chevron court held that its interpretation is
the only one permissible, when that court had no reason to make that
holding? The plurality answered that a court should take its best guess at
what the prior court would have done, hypothetically, had it considered
the Chevron question.'37 A better answer is that a court should never try
to make such a determination. Rather, a court should find that a pre-
Chevron decision held that the statute was unambiguous only "if [it was]
necessary"' 3 8 to do so, such as when the prior court applied some "other
132. See Note, supra note 130, at 1540 ("The [if necessary] test finds a Step One holding when
the previous court, due to another interpretive doctrine (the rule of lenity, a clear statement rule, the
canon of avoidance, etc.), could have reached the result it did only by holding that its interpretation
was the only reasonable one."). The Court suggested this test in Brand X. Id. at 1540-42; Nat'l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) ("A court's prior
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron defer-
ence only if the prior decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the
statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion." (emphasis added)).
133. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1847 (2012) (Scal-
ia, J., concurring) ("[T]he plurality ... revisles] . . . the meaning of Chevron ... in a direction that
will create confusion and uncertainty.").
134. Note, supra note 130, at 1537. Courts between Chevron and BrandX would have instead
used Chevron's "magic words" and cited Chevron, except for those with no agency interpretation to
defer to. See id. at 1537-38.
135. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1846 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Indeed, the Court was
unaware of even the utility (much less the necessity) of making the ambiguous/nonambiguous de-
termination in cases decided pre-Chevron.").
136. Doug Geyser, Courts Still "Say What the Law is": Explaining the Functions of the Judi-
ciary and Agencies After Brand X, 106 CoLUM. L. REv. 2129, 2129 (2006) (noting that "precedent
had only supplied a 'best' meaning").
137. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (plurality opinion). The plurality gave this answer
by example; it considered the entire text of the Colony opinion, which did not require a holding that
the statute left no gap to fill, and found that "the opinion ... makes clear that it did not [leave a gap
to fill]." Id.
138. See Note, supra note 130, at 1540 (explaining the if necessary test).
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rule of construction (such as the rule of lenity) requiring it to conclude
that the statute was unambiguous to reach its judgment." 1
3 9
The plurality's choice of this hypothetical-Chevron test over the if
necessary test is impracticall 40 and lacks support in Brand X.14' Aside
from the plain difficulty of surmising a prior court's beliefs on an issue
from language written for a different purpose, this textual-review exer-
cise has other less obvious pitfalls. "[L]abels like 'clear' and 'ambigu-
ous' took on new meaning after Chevron," 4 2 but prior courts may have
used them more casually when they just colored dicta and lacked this
heightened significance.14 3 The presence of the labels could mean every-
thing or nothing, as could their absence. Tellingly, the Home Concrete
plurality itself had to deal with this precise issue in order to reach its
holding.'"
The text of Brand X supports a clearer, more practical test.14 5 The
Court only required a determination of whether the earlier interpretation
was the "only permissible reading of the statute." 4 6 In addition, Brand X
at least implied that dicta should not factor into the test.147 Moreover, in
applying its own principles to its case at hand, Brand X did not recite the
prior court's findings to fish for indications of the answer to a hypothet-
ical question,14 8 but rather simply noted that no rule of construction had
forced the prior court's holding.149
In applying the test, the Home Concrete plurality provided no clear
guidance. Justice Breyer purported to rely on Colony's use of the "tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction" to ascertain the intention of Con-
139. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985 (2005).
140. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1846-47 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("For many of those earlier
cases, therefore, it will be incredibly difficult to determine whether the decision purported to be
giving meaning to an ambiguous, or rather an unambiguous, statute.").
141. See Note, supra note 130, at 1540-42 (considering the support provided by Brand X for
each type of test).
142. Id. at 1537.
143. Id. at 1537-38 ("[C]ourts were probably less cautious in calling statutes 'clear' when it
did nothing other than sway readers impressed by adjectives."); see also Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct.
at 1846 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In cases decided pre-BrandX, the Court had no inkling that it must
utter the magic words 'ambiguous' or 'unambiguous' in order to (poof1) expand or abridge executive
power, and (poot.) enable or disable administrative contradiction of the Supreme Court.").
144. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (plurality opinion) ("As the Government points out,
the Court in Colony stated that the statutory language at issue is not 'unambiguous.' But the Court
decided that case nearly 30 years before it decided Chevron. There is no reason to believe the lin-
guistic ambiguity noted by Colony reflects a post-Chevron conclusion that Congress had delegated
gap-filling power to the agency." (citations omitted)).
145. Note, supra note 130, at 1540-42 (considering the support provided by Brand X for each
type of test).
146. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984 (2005).
147. See Note, supra note 130, at 1540-42 (noting that the BrandXCourt focused on "what the
precedent did and did not hold" (citing BrandX, 545 U.S. at 983-86)).
148. Id. at 1540-41 ("Brand X contains very little of the play-by-play analysis one would
expect of a court applying [the hypothetical-Chevron] standard."). The Court did, however, cite the
prior court's full analysis. See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 984.
149. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 985.
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gress in determining the meaning of the statute.' 50 As Justice Scalia not-
ed, however, "[T]hese are the sorts of arguments that courts always use
in resolving ambiguities." '5 The plurality even conceded, "It may be that
judges today would use other methods to determine whether Congress
left a gap to fill."l 52
When it chose the hypothetical-Chevron test, the plurality suggested
a standard that lower courts will be unable to follow with any consisten-
cy. The if necessary test would have been far easier to apply and is fa-
vored by BrandX. The plurality's decision will result in protracted con-
fusion and uncertainty about "what the law is" for both agencies and
governed individuals.
C. Home Concrete Abandons Chevron's Presumption ofAmbiguity
By finding unambiguous congressional intent in Colony's review of
vague bits of legislative history,15 3 the Home Concrete plurality danger-
ously damaged Chevron's clear deferential standard that ambiguity exists
where congressional intent on the issue is not clear. 5 4 To do so, the plu-
rality reversed Chevron's presumption of ambiguity, thus reducing def-
erence and departing from Chevron's wise policy.
In Home Concrete, the plurality searched the text of Colony to de-
termine whether the Colony Court would have found congressional intent
to be unambiguous if it had considered the issue. 1s The plurality ob-
served that the Colony Court (1) believed "the taxpayer had the better
side of the textual argument," (2) found "'persuasive indications' that
Congress intended overstatements of basis to fall outside the statute's
scope," and (3) thought the IRS interpretation "would 'create a patent
incongruity in the tax law."'l 56 However, the plurality inferred from these
observations that the Colony Court "thought that Congress had 'directly
spoken to the question at hand.'""5
This inference involved a logical leap that is inconsistent with
Chevron. Chevron's instruction was that ambiguity exists where Con-
150. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984)).
151. Id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 1844 (plurality opinion).
153. See id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting paucity of evidence from Colony on which
the plurality found unambiguous congressional intent to exclude overstatements of basis from the
provision).
154. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.").
155. See supra Part Il.B (referring to the hypothetical-Chevron test applied by the plurality).
156. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (plurality opinion) (citing Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r,
357 U.S. 28, 33, 35-36, 37 (1958)).
157. Id (emphasis added) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
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gress had not "directly spoken to the precise question at issue."' 58 This
instruction was written in terms of a requirement for unambiguity (i.e.,
clear congressional intent), effectively creating a presumption of ambigu-
ity. Absent an affirmative showing that Congress clearly had an intention
on the issue, ambiguity exists. So how did the plurality find unambigu-
ous intent in Colony's remarks about Congress's indirect statements? It
reversed Chevron's presumption of ambiguity.' 59
Rather than overturn revered Chevron by announcing this reversal
overtly, the plurality effectively accomplished this by subtly shifting the
language of the longstanding Chevron test from a positive to a negative.
Where Chevron found ambiguity absent an affirmative showing that
Congress "directly spoke[] to the precise question at issue,"'60 the Home
Concrete plurality found unambiguity absent an affirmative showing that
Congress "left a gap to fill."' 61 The phrase "left a gap to fill" is not a
Home Concrete creation; it was used in both Chevron'62 and Brand X, 3
where, admittedly, it described what Congress must have done before an
agency interpretation could fill that gap. However, Chevron'6 and Brand
Y 65 made plain that finding Congress left a gap to fill was a conclusion
reached by a court after failing to find that Congress had directly spoken
to the issue. The Home Concrete plurality put the cart before the horse
when it concluded that Congress had "directly spoken to the question at
issue" by failing to find that Congress "left a gap to fill."
To require an affirmative finding that Congress "left a gap to fill" is
to ignore what a functional definition of "ambiguous" must mean in the
context of Chevron.166 Ambiguity will almost never be found if it is held
158. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
159. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1847 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("But in order to evade Brand
X and yet reaffirm Colony, the plurality would add yet another lopsided story . . .: To trigger the
Brand X power of an authorized 'gap-filling' agency to give content to an ambiguous text, a pre-
Chevron determination that language is ambiguous does not alone suffice; the pre-Chevron Court
must in addition have found that Congress wanted the particular ambiguity in question to be re-
solved by the agency."). Justice Scalia referred to the text itself rather than to legislative history, but
his comments are still accurate when applied to congressional intent.
160. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
161. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1843-44 (plurality opinion) (summarizing Chevron's
"underlying interpretive problem" as deciding when a statute "delegates to an agency the power to
fill a gap").
162. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency . . . .").
163. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83
(2005) ("Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency
construction.").
164. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (noting that a gap may be inferred from an ambiguous
statute).
165. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 982-83 ("[A] judicial precedent holding that the statute unambigu-
ously forecloses the agency's interpretation ... therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill . . .
(emphasis added)).
166. See Scalia, supra note I1, at 520 (discussing the impracticality of a definition of "ambigu-
ous" that only applies to various interpretations that "are in absolute equipoise").
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to mean that alternative interpretations are equally likely, without the
slightest probability that one interpretation is more likely Congress's
intent than the other.'67 Ambiguity must therefore be "when two or more
reasonable, though not necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist." 68
Clearly, Colony found that the taxpayer's interpretation was better than
the IRS interpretation,1 69 but it is not clear at all from Colony that the
Court considered the IRS interpretation unreasonable.
Home Concrete's reversal of Chevron's presumption of ambiguity,
like Mead's reversal of Chevron's presumption of delegation, 70 will
result in less judicial deference to agencies. The Mead Court, though, had
a policy basis for limiting Chevron deference: such limiting guaranteed
that due process would not be compromised when agencies made law in
statutory gaps-that the laws were made with sufficient deliberation,
oversight, and process. '7  The Home Concrete plurality's decision to
limit deference by changing the ambiguity standard goes against Chev-
ron's deferential policies without reason.
Chevron's shift towards administrative deference was based on the
Court's understanding that courts, agencies, and society usually benefit
when agencies that are charged with administering laws are allowed to
fill gaps in those laws. The administrative state is larger than ever now,
and administrative law is frequently complex and subject-specific; 7 2
agencies have expertise in the laws they administer 73 and more resources
than the overburdened courts. 7 4 As part of the Executive Branch, agen-
cies are politically accountable and thus are more properly positioned
than courts to make decisions that involve policy. 175 Perhaps most signif-
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958) ("[W]e are inclined to think that the
statute on its face lends itself more plausibly to the taxpayer's interpretation . . . .").
170. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that Chevron defer-
ence only applies "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency" to interpret with
the force of law and the agency interpretation was an "exercise of that authority").
171. See Bressman, supra note 129, at 1479-80 (explaining that Mead delivered procedural
formalities required by the Constitution "to promote predictable and fair lawmaking").
172. Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the modem "era when federal statu-
tory law administered by federal agencies is pervasive").
173. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (noting
that deference has been given where understanding "has depended upon more than ordinary
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations"); id. at 865 ("Judges are not
experts in the field .... ).
174. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 516-17 (noting the "sheer number" of agencies and the
"sheer volume of modem dockets").
175. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices . . . ."); id. at 866 ("The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial
ones: Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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icantly, agencies require flexibility to execute efficiently the laws they
administer as society and policies change over time.176
Home Concrete will put more policy decisions in the hands of the
less knowledgeable, overburdened, and unaccountable Judiciary. If
courts hold more often to precedent rather than defer to agencies' newer
interpretations, the law will become static and agencies will be robbed of
needed flexibility. 17 7 The traditionally recognized benefit of reducing
agency deference in favor of judicial interpretations is an increase in
stability and predictability that arguably comes from courts' common,
learned methods of analysis and their reliance on precedent.'7 1 Unfortu-
nately, these benefits will not be delivered by Home Concrete's pre-
sumption of unambiguity because it is accompanied by the plurality's
new, unpredictable hypothetical-Chevron test.
When the Home Concrete plurality suggested that a court should
consider a statute unambiguous unless the court affirmatively determines
that Congress "left a gap to fill," it reversed Chevron's presumption of
ambiguity. The costs will include lay interpretations of expert matters,
inefficient allocation of government resources, unaccountable policy
making, and ossification of administered laws. The benefits will be scant.
D. Home Concrete Failed to Answer Open Deference Questions
Home Concrete presented two additional unresolved issues in ad-
ministrative-deference law: (1) whether Brand X allowed agency inter-
pretations to trump prior Supreme Court interpretations, and (2) how
courts should treat retroactive application of litigation-induced interpre-
tations. The Treasury regulation at issue in Home Concrete was induced
by litigation, retroactively applied, and used to trump a prior Supreme
Court interpretation. By conducting a Brand X analysis in Home Con-
crete, the plurality implicitly took these issues up, but it remained silent
on them, leaving lower courts with more questions than answers.
Justice Stevens concurred in Brand X to add the caveat that "[Brand
X's reasoning] would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by this
Court that would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity."179
Home Concrete presented a conflict between an agency interpretation
and a prior Supreme Court interpretation, representing the first time this
issue had come before the Supreme Court since Brand X. However, the
176. Id. at 863-64 ("[T]he agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.").
177. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)
("[P]recluding agencies from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes" "would
'lead to the ossification of large portions of our statutory law."' (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 247
(Scalia, J., dissenting))).
178. See Pojanowski, supra note 31, at 821-31.
179. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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plurality chose not to address the issue directly.' 80 Instead, the plurality
entertained the government's BrandXargument but dismissed it on other
previously mentioned grounds,'8 ' thus allowing an inference of Brand X
applicability to Supreme Court decisions but not making it clear.182 In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that Brand X would have to allow
agency interpretations to trump the Supreme Court's interpretations, by
rejecting Justice Stevens's idea that "an ambiguity resolved is an ambi-
guity that never existed in the first place." 83 The dissent mentioned this
unresolved issue just before indicating that it would not address the gov-
ernment's Brand X argument,184 perhaps revealing its motive for avoid-
ing the argument.
The Court did previously address BrandXapplicability to litigation-
induced regulations,'8 5 but questions have since arisen about the limits of
this application based on concerns for protecting governed individuals'
justified expectations. Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the
Fourth Circuit held in Home Concrete that the government's retroactive
application of the regulation to the taxpayer was an alternative ground
for ruling in favor of the taxpayer.186 However, there is no mention of the
retroactive-application issue in any of the Supreme Court Home Con-
crete opinions.
There are potential explanations for the Court's silence on these is-
sues. By holding on step-one grounds that the agency interpretation did
not trump Colony, the Court was not required to address these additional
potentially constitutional issues, so judicial restraintl87 Suggests its si-
lence was appropriate. Additionally, the Court might have considered the
180. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843-44 (2012)
(plurality opinion) (failing to mention relevance of fact that prior interpretation was made by the
Supreme Court).
181. Id. The previously mentioned grounds are that the Colony Court found congressional
intent unambiguous.
182. One could infer support for the idea that a Supreme Court interpretation resolves ambigui-
ty, thus foreclosing Brand X application, from one majority statement: "In our view, Colony has
already interpreted the statute, and there is no longer any different construction that is consistent
with Colony and available for adoption by the agency." Id. at 1843 (majority opinion). It is more
likely that the Court intended no such inference, but was attempting to phrase a general rejection of
the government's argument in a way that was consistent with both the plurality's Brand X analysis
and Justice Scalia's concurrence.
183. Id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 1851-52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("There has been no opportunity to decide
whether the analysis would be any different if an agency sought to interpret an ambiguous statute in
a way that was inconsistent with this Court's own, earlier reading of the law." (citing Brand X, 545
U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring))).
185. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712 (2011)
("[W]e have found it immaterial to our analysis that a 'regulation was prompted by litigation."'
(quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996))).
186. See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2011),
af'id, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
187. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) ("[A] 'longstanding principle of
judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the neces-
sity of deciding them."' (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445
(1988))).
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retroactivity issue sufficiently addressed by its prior instruction that
whether an agency interpretation was induced by litigation is immaterial
to the deference analysis. However, these are insufficient bases for Su-
preme Court silence when lower courts require direction.188
Like Home Concrete's confusion of ambiguity, its silence on Brand
X's applicability to the Supreme Court and to retroactive litigation-
induced regulations creates more questions than it answers. And like the
ambiguity issue, these will leave lower courts, agencies, and affected
individuals in legal limbo.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court made great leaps forward in administrative-
deference law with Chevron, wisely abandoning the unpredictable case-
by-case approach of Skidmore for a general presumption that courts
should defer to agency interpretations. While giving agencies a predicta-
ble grant of flexibility in administration of their respective bodies of law,
Chevron reserved appropriate judicial standards to prevent abuse of
agency discretion. Brand X appropriately extended Chevron deference to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes that had already been inter-
preted by courts, thus preventing an anomalous race for authority be-
tween courts and agencies.
Home Concrete errantly reached a Brand X analysis by undervalu-
ing congressional changes to the tax code. Through misapplication of
Brand X, Home Concrete's plurality damaged the test for Brand X ap-
plicability and casted doubt on Chevron's clear meaning of "ambiguous."
The Court also stirred controversy into several open issues of administra-
tive-deference law by ignoring them without explanation. Considering
the Court's flawed reasoning and missed opportunities, Home Concrete
was wrongly decided and signaled an unwise retreat from Chevron's
deferential doctrine.
W Matthew Pierce*
188. See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 985-86 (referring to need for Supreme Court to resolve "genuine
confusion in the lower courts" even when resolution is not "logically necessary").
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